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Abstract 
 
 
Germany’s support for the Eastern enlargement of the European Union was a key 
factor in the successful completion of this idea in 2004. Germany’s policy towards the 
enlargement was, however, ambivalent and for this reason perceived as controversial. 
This thesis examines and explains the reasons of this paradox. 
German policy makers endorsed the idea of the Eastern enlargement of the EU for 
the reasons deriving from the national identity, based on a history-related narrative, and 
from the fact of the successful unification of Germany. As Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
captured it — the unification of Germany and the unification of Europe were two sides of 
the same coin.  
Eastern enlargement was, however, a novel idea and was changing the existing 
European order and concepts of the European integration. It faced therefore powerful 
constraints both in the shape of still existing, though declining, Cold War structural grip, 
as well as of the conflicting with the enlargement interests of other member state of the 
EU and domestic economic preferences and interests. It caught German policy makers 
between powerful and mutually conflicting challenges and faced them with a need to 
choose strategic priorities for the foreign policy.  
The choice was continuity of multilateralism, the principle of the foreign policy of 
the West Germany. This choice turned the enlargement policy into one of the premises of 
the grand strategy of the German Europapolitik. Examining the ambivalence in the 
enlargement policy allows not only to explain its causes but also to observe a process of 
changing the concept of the European integration. 
This doctoral thesis is a result of the research conducted at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science under the supervision of Prof. William Wallace and Dr. 
Ulrich Sedelmeier.  
The author is thankful for the advice and help of both Supervisors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  
Germany’s support for the Eastern enlargement of the European Union was a key 
factor in the successful completion of this idea in 2004. Yet Germany’s policy towards 
the enlargement used to be perceived as ambivalent and for this reason controversial. 
Advocacy for widening the Union, so strongly voiced by German government politicians 
on the European stage, used to be accompanied by strong contradictions: the rhetoric of 
the commitment was in conflict with the lack of specific agenda, delays in setting it, and 
frequently uncompromising stance of German negotiators over the enlargement’s terms 
and conditions. Germany was seen as a leading force that placed the enlargement on the 
EU agenda, but at the same time its policy was perceived as half-hearted, and German 
policy makers as delaying the process by postponing the pledged actions or insisting on 
the terms of the accession, which the East Europeans found hard to accept. 
This represents a paradox that so far has not been analysed and explained in a 
satisfactory way. Germany has been recognised in the IR scholarship as the main 
supporter of the enlargement, and majority of the professional literature on this subject 
depicts driving factors of the German enlargement policy, thus the reasons behind 
Germany’s endorsement of the enlargement, while the ambivalence in this policy 
received comparatively little attention. This leaves the picture of this policy incomplete.  
Ambivalence in the foreign policy raises mistrust among state’s partners. Foreign 
policy when ambivalent translates into perception of a state as unpredictable, uncertain 
and unreliable. It is useful and important therefore to uncover reasons of such 
ambivalence in regards to any state, but it is of a very special meaning in regards to 
Germany, for three reasons. First — because Germany is recognised as a power, the most 
powerful European nation-state thus a regional power. Secondly — because Germany is 
perceived as the leading state in the European Union. Thirdly — because the main thrust 
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of Germany’s post-war foreign policy had been reliability of a predictable, responsible 
and cooperative partner, and maintaining this feature was desired by majority of German 
political elites after the unification of their country.   
Rarely in a democratic system such as in Germany, a process of policymaking, be 
it a domestic or foreign, is free of internal differences, conflicts and contradictions. 
Hammering out an ultimate outcome is the essence of the policymaking in democracy. If 
however the outcome of this process, the policy, when implemented, causes an 
impression and perception of ambivalence, it suggests this policy contains elements of 
ambivalence. Such ambivalence has been recognised and acknowledged in the German 
enlargement policy by analysts, and in the German EU policy more generally too1, yet 
there has been no sufficiently clear and comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon.  
The existing analyses of Germany’s enlargement policy that touch upon the issue 
of the ambivalence indicate that it stems from two conflicting sets of factors. The support 
was based on historical obligations German elites felt towards Eastern Europe and 
calculation of material and security gains that would result from stabilization of the 
region. As indicated it was conflicted with a set of economic interests of domestic 
provenience that were adverse to the enlargement2. First set of such interests related to 
the costs of the enlargement, which German government, due to the strained by the 
unification financial capacity, wanted to spread out on other member states. The other 
interests were those advocated by specific interest groups such as German farmers or 
workers’ unions, who were trying to preserve their economic status quo in the EU, while 
the enlargement was expected to alter the established arrangements3. One notable 
                                         
1 See for example: Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order. Enlarging NATO and the EU, Manchester University Press, 
2000; Henning Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe, Palgrave 2002 and Stephen D. Collins, German Policy-Making 
and Eastern Enlargement of the EU During the Kohl Era; Managing Agenda?, Manchester University Press, 2003; also: Timothy 
Garton Ash, “Germany”s Choice”, Foreign Affairs, NO 73, 1994; Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe”s Name: Germany and the Divided 
Continent, Vintage, 1994; Jonathan P. Bach, “Germany after Unification and Eastern Europe: New Perspectives, New Problems, a 
lecture given at the University Seminar on Post-Communist States, Societies and Economies at Columbia University, November 10, 
1998; Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery, William Paterson, Germany”s European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu, Manchester 
University Press 2000; Kenneth Dyson and Klaus Goetz (eds), Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint, Oxford University 
Press, 2003 
2 Ibid. 
3 Collins, German Policy-Making…, op.cit; there is also a vast literature on the economic conditions of the Eastern enlargement of the 
EU, e.g. Michael Dauderstädt, Can the Democracies of East-Central Europe Cope with the Double Impact of Transformation and 
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analysis explored the issue of the ambivalence in the German enlargement policy deeper, 
indicating that it resulted from the specificity of the German policymaking that relies on 
the dispersion of the process4 and opening participation to a wide range of domestic 
actors. These actors promote various preferences and interests, making it difficult for the 
government to establish and run a clearly stated and unwavering policy, which creates an 
impression of indecisiveness and ambiguity.  
As much as those lines of reasoning point to valid phenomena, neither provides a 
sufficient explanation of the ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement. 
These accounts, despite pointing to very important constraints to the enlargement, are too 
narrow to explain ambivalence in such a complex policy like on the admission of new 
members into the political-economic framework of the EU. First occurrence of the 
ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy is observable at the moment of the 
introducing this idea, during the negotiations over Germany’s unification. The unification 
was a political process, during which practically the only domestic interest of Germany 
was a goal of unifying two countries. That suggests that the constraints that created first 
manifestation of ambivalence in the German enlargement policy were not of domestic 
provenience or economic character. 
The process of the enlargement lasted for 14 years and s o did the German 
enlargement policy. This policy had its own dynamic and the ambivalence in this policy 
reflects this dynamic, raising the question of what interests at what stage influenced 
Germany’s stance on the enlargement, what factors hampered the support for the 
enlargement and how the process unfolded during these 14 years? How did it happen that 
the official stance of the German governments remained throughout the whole period 
consistently supportive for the enlargement, despite diverse and conflicting interests that 
created the ambivalence in the enlargement policy?  
                                         
Integration, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 1996; “Die Kosten der Ostweiterung der EU werden überschatz”, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung Arbeitsgruppe Europäische Integration, Arbeitspapier Nr 2, Bonn, 1996; Burkard Steppacher, Der Europäische  
Wirtshaftsraum (EWR) — Ein Modell für Mittel und Osteuropa?, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Interne Studien, 87/94 1994; Stefan 
Tangermann, “Ostweiterung der EU: Wird die Agrarpolitik zum Hindernis?”,  Wirtschaftsdienst, 9, 1995; “The Eastern Enlargement 
of the European Union: Major challenges for macro-economic policies and institutions of Central and East European countries”,  
European Economic Review, Volume 41, Issues 3-5, April 1997 
4 Collins, German Policy-Making…, op.cit. 
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These questions point to a great complexity of this policy and the strength of the 
concept, while the basic matter, the causes of the ambivalence and origins of the 
conflicting interests, remain unexplained because answered only partially. The Eastern 
enlargement policy was a fully-fledged, coherent part of Germany’s European policy, its 
grand strategy of Europapolitik. The position of Germany in the European Union and the 
process of the EU enlargement are too meaningful to leave such questions unanswered. 
They concern fundamentally important issues of the German position in the EU and 
Germany’s relations with its European partners. 
This thesis is therefore going to examine ambivalence in the German policy 
towards the EU Eastern enlargement and answer the question what caused this 
ambivalence, what were the reasons for the ambiguities. The argument follows. 
 
THE ARGUMENT 
The argument of this thesis is that the constraints to the EU enlargement that 
created ambivalence in the German policy were not confined to the domestic interests, 
and these of the domestic provenience were not only of economic character. 
Ambivalence was created by tension between supportive and opposing interests, 
embraced simultaneously. Germany’s endorsement of the enlargement is consistent with 
a number of German identities based on various narratives, e.g. of Civilian Power 
identity, or European identity of its foreign policy, and they generate various constraining 
and conflicting factors.  
Therefore the claim of this thesis is that while economic interests of domestic 
origins were certainly important and impacted Germany’s enlargement policy creating 
ambivalence, but in the late phase of the process, when the terms of the enlargement were 
already discussed — specifically during the negotiations of the Agenda 2000. But the 
ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement is observable not only during 
the final phase of the enlargement process. This policy lasted for 14 years and different 
stages of the process were shaped by different factors both supportive and conflicting 
ones, and the clash between the two created ambivalence in Germany’s policy. 
The first major constraints to the enlargement that created such ambivalence 
occurred in the external realm, were of political character, and active already at the 
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beginning of the preparation for the enlargement, in the early 1990s. They stemmed from 
the conditions of Germany’s unification and problems in bilateral relations of Germany 
and its Eastern partners, then occurred as a part of the creation of a new security system 
in Europe, or as the necessity to maintain old political loyalties or to chose between 
alternative concepts of the European Union’s development. They all are of political 
character and unfolded in the first phase of the enlargement process, when the idea of the 
enlargement was debated by the EU member states. Economic constraints to the 
enlargement emerged only in the later phase of the process and therefore they represent 
the second set of factors that created ambivalence in Germany’s policy.  
The order this thesis presents manifestations of ambivalence and their causes is 
not a comparison of their importance; it reflects chronological developments in 
Germany’s enlargement policy as the research follows the occurrences of ambivalence. 
Ambivalence in Germany’s policy manifested in different ways at different stages of the 
enlargement process, and the factors creating those occurrences in some cases overlapped 
each other. Some of them like Russian implicit opposition declined with the 
disappearance of the Cold War order, while the French explicit opposition had a much 
firmer grip over Germany’s enlargement policy. The impact of each of these constraints 
was different. Political constraints that occurred chronologically first, at the early stage of 
introducing the enlargement idea, caused ambivalence which is observable in a gap 
between supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of German actors and lack of follow-up 
with concrete political actions. Alternative concepts of the European Union development 
for example resulted in consideration a contradictory to the enlargement direction, while 
economic constraints resulted in a political bargaining of the enlargement process, both 
creating ambivalence in Germany’s stance. 
As manifestations and causes of the ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement 
policy vary, identification and systematization of conflicting factors and concepts, then 
preferences and interests, is the first step toward untangling the reasons of the 
ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy.  
Ambivalence manifested in three ways:  
1. As a gap between supportive rhetoric and lack of corresponding/following 
actions 
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2. As actions contradicting the support to the enlargement and/or hindering its 
progress 
3. As a contradictory rhetoric  
A perception of the ambivalence was caused by a gap between expectations and 
lack of delivery of expected results.  
Identifying the causes of ambivalence in Germany’s policy is possible by looking 
at the chronological development of the enlargement policy. It leads to distinguishing two 
sets of constraining factors and conflicting interests. They organise structure of the thesis. 
In the external realm the support for the enlargement was hindered by six main 
factors: 
1. Conditions of Germany’s unification  
2. Historical legacy in bilateral relations  
3. Bilateral relations with France  
4. Deepening the European integration  
5. Creation of the new European security system 
6. Economic and financial costs of enlargement  
In the domestic area the support for the enlargement was hindered by two 
factors: 
7. Exhaustion with costs of the unification 
8. Interests of domestic actors interest groups 
 
 EXTERNAL REALM DOMESTIC REALM 
POLITICAL REALM 1. Germany’s unification 
2. Historical legacy in 
bilateral relations 
3. Relations with France 
4. Deepening the European 
integration 
5. A new European security 
system 
 
ECONOMY REALM 6. Enlargement costs  
7. Exhaustion with costs of 
unification 
8. Interests of domestic 
interest groups 
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An underpinning factor of the constraints is supranational characteristic of the 
European Union. The role of the EU in enlargement policies of the member states, thus 
Germany’s policy too, is changeable. Its presence impacts these policies because it allows 
broadening or narrowing a manoeuvre margin, thus allowing a bigger flexibility in 
changing the course when needed, without the necessity of withdrawing from the prior 
declarations or pledges.  
Both ambivalence and perception of ambivalence are at the core of the paradox of 
the German enlargement policy. Some of the external factors listed above as hampering 
the support for the enlargement, generated a supportive reasoning for this project. An 
example of that is the creation of a new European security order or historical legacy in 
bilateral relations of Germany and its Eastern neighbours.  
The contradictions in these areas could be seen as pro and contra factors, which 
often occur in foreign policies. In such a case a policy is usually marked by a struggle (or 
at least a conflict) between the contradictory factors (external or domestic), and policy 
makers of both sides, pro and contra, are trying to prevail with their own goal (to succeed 
with an original goal of the policy in case of its proponents, or contrary, to bring this goal 
down and reverse the policy in case of the opposite party).  
In regards to the German enlargement policy, however, applying the pro and 
contra distinction would not be an accurate supposition. The contra factors not always 
represented or created the obstacles German policy makers were ‘dealing with’, trying to 
overcome and eliminate them in order to realise the vision of supporting the enlargement 
(or giving up and changing the goal under the pressure of the contra factors). There were 
no struggling parties either. The conflicting with the enlargement factors listed above as 
the causes of ambivalence represented alternative to the enlargement reasoning, concepts, 
and options that were adopted, and in some cases actively pursued, and presented as a 
goal by German policy makers, within the same foreign policy apparatus that 
simultaneously was lending support to the enlargement.  
This constitutes a difference between obstacles on the way to achieving a certain 
goal of a certain policy, and ambivalence in conducting such a policy. And similarly — 
between ambivalence and a changing dynamics of the policy, e.g. exhaustion of the 
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support. In other words ambivalence in this policy shadows the support for the 
enlargement, it occurs only when there is such a support. 
 
THE APPROACH 
The claim of this thesis is that ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy was 
caused by eight listed above factors. Examination of the process, how the ambivalence 
was created and manifested, represents a dependent variable in this thesis. The analysis 
will be completed with an explanation how this ambivalence impacted Germany’s ability 
to influence the EU enlargement process.  
The key notion in this research is ambivalence in a conducted policy. It suggests 
lack of clarity and coherence of such policy. It also comes from the external perception 
— it was observed that this policy was ambivalent, it was not stated by the authors of this 
policy that it would be ambivalent. The first question it implies therefore is whether this 
ambivalence was present in the rhetoric and actions that constituted this policy, thus was 
this policy conducted in an ambivalent way, or was this ambivalence only a perceived 
image?  
Looking for causes of ambivalence in the German policy leads to uncovering the 
reasons for the support, and for the simultaneous opposition to the enlargement. 
Examining the interplay between the two streaks allows first discerning actual 
ambivalence from perceived one, second — unravelling explicit as well as implicit 
factors that impacted Germany’s enlargement policy. An example of the latter is an 
impact of an emerging new European security order. It was never explicitly stated that 
European politicians should (or could) proceed with the EU enlargement when the 
concerns over international security had been settled. Yet that is what happened and 
German policy makers were at the centre of the interplay between these two powerful 
streams.  
The research is primarily empirical and for explaining the findings it employs the 
two-level game theory of Robert Putnam5 and draws on the insights from two accounts 
                                         
5 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,  International Organization, Vol.42, NO.3, 
1988 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
16 
— social constructivism mainly in the version of Alexander Wendt6 and the rationalist 
approach of liberal intergovernmentalism as designed by Andrew Moravcsik7. Both 
approaches remain in conceptual opposition as constructivism focuses on normative side 
of the creation of national interests and preferences, while liberal intergovernmentalism 
usually emphasises rational, cost-benefits calculation and bargaining of such interests. 
Both however have been used in the existing analyses of the German European policy 
and of the European integration and are highly applicable for this analysis. 
Finding the causes of ambivalence requires examining interests of Germany, how 
Germany understands its interests in relation to the enlargement. The explanatory strategy 
relies thus first and foremost on constructivism. Constructivist perspective is employed in 
majority analyses of the German European and enlargement policies. They ascribe 
Germany’s endorsement of the enlargement to normative reasoning of historically 
motivated obligations. They also explain the fact of sustaining the commitment to 
deepening the European integration as a result of the ‘European identity’ of the German 
foreign policy8. A widening-deepening of the European integration tension created in 
Germany’s enlargement policy, however, one of the manifestations of ambivalence. Both 
directions were seen as opposing each other. An explanation of this tension needs a 
further examination of preferences and interest that derive from the concept of 
Europeanization of the national identity, thus employing the constructivist perspective. 
Similarly, narratives pertaining to the historical experience that created ambivalence and 
perception of ambivalence can be analysed as a constructivist inquiry.  
Liberal intergovernmentalism in this thesis serves as a complementary 
perspective. It is successful in explaining European integration, of which enlargement is a 
part. It is useful for application in this segment of the research, which examines 
ambivalence created by material interests, motivated by benefits/costs calculation, most 
often economic and financial. Such interests were at the bottom of national and group 
                                         
6 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”,  International Organization, Spring 
1992; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999 
7 Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”,  Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 31, NO 4, December 1993 
8 See for example: Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, Germany”s European Diplomacy, …op.cit.; Dyson and Goetz (eds), Germany, 
Europe, …op.cit. 
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policies, and generated both support and opposition to the enlargement. 
Intergovernmenatlism also opens a possibility to examine a bargaining process over such 
interests, which is intrinsic to the process of European integration. Both economic and 
financial costs of enlargement, as well as economic and political costs of the German 
unification were powerful reasons constraining the support for the enlargement. How the 
tension was created and developed needs to be examined from this perspective. 
Despite the fact that ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy manifested in 
various configurations of conflicting interests that constitute the complexity of the 
process, this ambivalence represents a constant variable that highlights the change of the 
concept of the European integration. Therefore an underlying theoretical explanatory 
variable for this research is a constructivist concept of the changing normative, based on 
values and ideas, social construct of the international system in Europe.  
 
CONTRIBUTION 
The value and contribution of this research lies in empirical explanation of 
ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy, thus in answering the question that had 
received little attention in the IR scholarship so far. This thesis seeks therefore to address 
shortcomings in the German enlargement policy’s analyses. Why such an examination is 
important?  
Although the subject of this research is the policy towards the Eastern 
enlargement of the EU, the meaning of ambivalence of this policy cannot be confined to 
the relations with the Eastern countries or to the enlargement process. Ambivalence in 
Germany’s European policies has been observed also on the issue of the Eastern border at 
the Two Plus Four conference, or in its policy towards NATO expansion, or on the issue 
of deepening the European integration too9. The research offers therefore a possibility 
                                         
9 See for example: Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order. Enlarging NATO and the EU, Manchester University Press, 
2000; Henning Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe, Palgrave 2002; Alan Mayhew, Kai Oppermann, Dan Hough, 
“German foreign policy and leadership of the EU — You can”t always get what you want … but you sometimes get what you need”,  
Working Paper NO 119, Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex, May 2011; Marco Overhaus, “Deutschland und die 
Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1998-2003: Gewollte Ambivalenz oder fehlende Strategie?”, in: S. Harnisch, C. 
Katsioulis and M. Overhaus (eds.), Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder (Bade-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 
pp.37-58; Marco Overhaus, “In Search of a Post-Hegemonic Order: Germany, NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy”,  
German Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 December 2004, pp. 551-568 
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that its findings will add more generalizable insights into the way German foreign policy 
is conceptualised, constructed and conducted.  
The Eastern enlargement of the European Union was completed to a very high 
degree thanks to the support of Germany. Germany is seen in the professional studies as 
one, if not the main ‘driver’ of this policy10. There were strong reasons for Germany to 
endorse the enlargement that translated into the policy of support, but there were also 
countervailing forces. And while the main thread of this thesis is an examination of the 
causes of ambivalence in the enlargement policy, the narrative of this thesis is the 
interaction between two clusters of the driving forces and of constraints. The aim here is 
to present a difficult path of switching the idea of reunification of Europe through the EU 
enlargement into political actions and outcomes, i.e. to present it from its beginnings — 
picking up the idea, through introducing it into the political realm to designing the means 
necessary for turning it into political actions and to managing the chosen course.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
10 For example: Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of 
the European Union”,  International Organization 55, 1, Winter 2001, pp. 47-80 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
RESEARCH FOCUS  
METHODOLOGY  
THEORY 
THE ARGUMENT 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents an organization of the thesis as well as explanatory factors 
of the argument. The first section defines the focus of this research in the context of the 
existing literature. The second one presents methodology employed in this research. The 
third section outlines a theoretical framework and the fourth — the argument and its 
structure.  
The following chapters of the thesis elaborate the argument outlined in this 
chapter, and correspond overall with the chronological development of the German 
enlargement policy. 
 
I. RESEARCH FOCUS 
The focus of the research is the causes of ambivalence in Germany’s policy 
towards the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. It is thus the enlargement policy 
that will be investigated with an aim to answer the question about the reasons of 
ambivalence that occurred in this policy.  
This subject received little attention in the IR literature, which while examining 
Germany’s foreign policy since 1990 concentrated predominantly on the question of how 
the unification would and did affect the new Germany’s foreign policy — would this 
policy become more assertive than practised by the Federal Republic, reflecting the 
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increase of Germany’s power? This question was explored in relation mainly to the 
European integration and the new concept of the European security. Literature 
concerning the policy of the new Germany towards the Eastern partners is much more 
modest, with three works on Germany’s policy towards the EU and NATO enlargement 
of key importance for this thesis. These are analyses by: 
• Adrian Hyde-Price,  
• Henning Tewes and  
• Stephen D. Collins 
The first two authors place Germany’s post-unification Eastern policy within 
Germany’s grand European strategy. Adrian Hyde-Price points out that the inclusion of 
the Eastern policy into the Europapolitik was the main alteration in the quality of the 
relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. Henning Tewes analysed 
Germany’s policy towards NATO and EU expansion, testing it against the premises of 
the Civilian Power. Both authors admit the presence of challenging difficulties in the new 
Eastern policy but concentrate on its premises and driving factors. Only the third author 
Stephen D. Collins focuses explicitly on contradictions in Germany’s policy towards the 
Eastern enlargement. His examination of this policy during the Kohl’s era, through the 
prism of ‘management of the agenda’, indicated that the contradictions in this policy were 
caused by the specificity of the German policy-making, which is characterised as a 
typical bureaucratic system empowered with far reaching prerogatives.  
These accounts do not provide sufficient explanation of ambivalence in 
Germany’s enlargement policy. In order to find such an explanation analysis of the 
German enlargement policy has to be refocused from the driving forces as a dependent 
variable, to inquiry about constraints to the driving forces. For this reason the 
examination will follow a framework of five steps: 
1. Finding out what area ambivalence, or perception of ambivalence, occurred in 
2. Determining supportive factors relevant to the circumstances of a particular 
ambivalence — be it national identity, material preferences, expectations of 
other states or external partners,  
3. Identifying opposing/constraining factors causing ambivalence that occurred 
either in the international or domestic realm — what external partners or 
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domestic actors demanded of the German government, what interests, potential 
and perceived opportunities and strategies of those actors were 
4. Examining how decision-makers perceived their foreign policy agenda, 
choices, options and the room of manoeuvre   
5. Analyzing the interplay between the supportive factors and constraints and 
determining the results of the ambivalence, i.e. impact on the enlargement 
process, its agenda and decision making on the EU level 
A foundation of this inquiry is that there was no single reason of Germany’s 
support for the enlargement. There were several factors constituting this support, and 
some of them can be identified in terms of normative/ideational values that derive from 
the German national identity, while others can be approached in terms of 
rationalist/material preferences based on benefits/costs calculation. These factors were 
geopolitical, economic and ideological, and differentiation in their origins and character 
indicates that similarly the constraints hindering the support to the enlargement were also 
of various origins and character (a detailed argument is presented in the next section of 
this chapter). 
Germany’s policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the European Union 
considered mainly three countries — Poland, Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic) 
and Hungary11, which according to German politicians should be in the first round of the 
enlargement. Some of the constraints that created ambivalence in Germany’s policy 
concern complex relations with Poland and the Czech Republic (e.g. those in bilateral 
relations). Germany’s enlargement policy lasted for 14 years. It started at the time of the 
negotiations over Germany’s unification in 1990, and lasted till the successful completion 
of the enlargement in 2004. It spanned tenures of two German Chancellors — Helmut 
Kohl and Gerhard Schröder. Their terms, Helmut Kohl’s from 1989 to 1998, and Gerhard 
Schröder’s from 1998 to 2005, correspond with two main phases of the enlargement 
process — of the preparations that lasted till the agreement on the Agenda 2000 that was 
reached in 1997, and of the negotiations over the entry terms that started afterwards and 
ended in 2002.  
                                         
11 Germany was widely perceived as an advocate of inclusion into the EC/EU framework those three countries. See for example: 
Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order..., op.cit.; Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap..., op.cit. 
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It is the argument of this thesis that, unlike suggested so far, the major and most 
powerful factors that caused the ambivalence in the German enlargement policy occurred 
during the first phase of the process, during Helmut Kohl’s tenure. The focus of this 
thesis is therefore predominantly on these factors and this phase of the enlargement 
process. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY  
This section demonstrates methodology of the research. It consists of two 
subsections — the first explains how the research identifies ambivalence and specific 
factors that were causally relevant as constraints, and the second one presents criteria for 
the selection of empirical material.  
 
1. Identification of Ambivalence and its Causes 
Identification of ambivalence and its causes in the German enlargement policy is 
possible when following the five-steps framework provided in the first part of this 
chapter — Research Focus. It needs first finding out how the ambivalence manifested, 
thus identifying a tension. That leads to determining supportive for the enlargement 
factors that were relevant to the manifestation of ambivalence — be it national identity, 
material rationalist preferences, expectations of other states. Accomplishing those two 
points will allow to discern what constraints countered supportive factors, creating 
ambivalence, or perception of ambivalence, in the enlargement policy. 
Manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy is observable at 
three junctures — in a gap between supportive rhetoric and lack of following actions; in a 
gap or mismatch between political declarations and stalling tactics or actions 
contradicting the support and hindering enlargement’s progress; in a rhetoric of the actors 
conducting the enlargement policy that is internally contradictory — either contradicting 
each other’s statements, or a contradictory rhetoric of a single actor. A gap between 
rhetoric and lack of actions is apparent for example during the period of over three years 
since Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared 
the support for the enlargement in the years 1989-1990. An example of ambivalence that 
manifested as a gap between rhetoric and stalling tactics is a tension between two 
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conflicting concepts of widening and deepening of the European integration. And an 
example of contradictory rhetoric is noticeable in the rhetoric of Chancellor Schröder, 
when he declares support for the enlargement and at the same time emphasises the need 
for Germany to secure economic and financial interests, which are in conflict with the 
enlargement. These are only examples; the ambivalences in Germany’s enlargement 
policy this thesis identified and examines are listed in detail in a part presenting the 
Argument.  
 
2. Material Selection Criteria 
The research is based on an investigation of the foreign policy rhetoric and 
actions and the domestic elites discourse. The former concerns German foreign policy 
makers, the latter — both policy makers and political experts and commentators. The 
thesis does not aim at including all public statements of the key actors, but a 
representative sample. For selection of the material the research employs the following 
criteria: 
1) Who delivers a statement or conducts an action — position and competences of 
an actor and authority they are invested with, 
2) Where, when and to whom a statement is addressed and delivered, or action 
presented — a forum, time and addressee, e.g. speeches delivered at the Bundestag 
during sessions on the foreign policy premises, statements made at the EU 
intergovernmental conferences, signing agreements, treaties or passing resolutions 
relevant to the subject of the enlargement, expert opinions and views expressed in an elite 
discourse; 
3) Merits, novelty and results of a statement/speech and action, i.e. whether it is 
denoting of a direction in the foreign policy, and the novelty — whether it represents 
originality, what response and attention it received. 
The repetitive statements and speeches are mentioned, or sometimes quoted, only 
for the purpose of demonstrating they are not accidental, but signify a direction of the 
policy, or represent a voice of a wider group. This combination helps to reduce the risk of 
bias in selecting samples.  
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The basic is the first set of criteria — for selection of the actors examined in this 
research. They derive from an organization of the German foreign policymaking system. 
This system is based on dispersion of power, which results in openness the participation 
in this process to various actors. This could pose a problem for the material selection. 
Despite this openness, however, the decision-making in the German foreign policy 
apparatus belongs mainly to the government executives, i.e. ‘central decision makers’. 
These central executives, quoting Robert Putnam, whose two-level game theory is 
employed in this research, ‘have a special role in mediating domestic and international 
pressures because they are directly exposed to both spheres not because they are united 
on all issues nor because they are insulated from domestic politics’12. And the structure 
of the German system with the precise allocating powers to specific actors provides the 
necessary for the material selection rigor, and naturally eliminates a bias in selection of 
actors.  
 
(I) Government Actors 
German political system has been termed a ‘cooperative federalism’13, in which 
executive and administrative responsibilities are shared between different levels of 
government. The basic division is between the federal and Länder. In regards to the 
representation of the German state in the external realm, scholars usually list five actors:  
• Chancellor 
• Chancellor’s Office 
• Foreign Ministry 
• Federal Ministries — usually three more apart the Foreign Ministry — (i) 
the Finance, (ii) the Economics and (iii) the Food and Agriculture Ministry 
• Länder 
These actors are usually listed together, but only two of them represent the 
German state on the international stage in practice. The first is the Chancellor of 
                                         
12 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics…,op.cit. pp.427-460 
13 See for example: Fritz W. Sharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: lessons from German federalism and European integration”,  Public 
Administration, NO 66, 3, 1988; W.E. Paterson and D. Southern, Governing Germany, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991; Simon Bulmer and 
William Paterson, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community, London Allen and Uwin, 1987; Bulmer, Jeffery 
and Paterson, Germany”s European Diplomacy…, op.cit.; Collins,  German Policy-Making…, op.cit. 
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Germany as the ‘government’s chief executive’ (the Bundespräsident has only 
representative and symbolic competences). The second one is the chief-operator of the 
Foreign Ministry. Both these actors speak in the name of the German state, representing 
the Federal Government. All other listed above actors represent the German state in their 
particular domains. That makes the representation of the German state on the 
international stage differentiated; none of these actors, however, conducts an independent 
foreign policy. They all are actively involved in hammering out the foreign policy 
through coordination of procedures, based on the Rules of Procedure of the Federal 
Government and the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries14. This process 
constitutes a ‘cooperative federalism’, which works according to three rules15:  
• Policy sectorisation — with ministries preparing policies that are 
coordinated only at a late stage; 
• Incrementalism — when some ministries amend existing domestic 
policies; 
• Consensual relations within policy communities, which is built up 
between relevant officials and interest groups.  
To have a full picture of the system it is useful to quote Peter Katzenstein16 who 
observed that the system works a threefold policy network based on: 
• Party system’s preference, 
• The need for consensual relation between Bund and Länder, 
• Prevalence of quasi-public institutions through which policy-making can 
be influenced. 
The Basic Law provides a legal framework for the system. A condition of 
‘consensus building and rationality’ is a requirement for the system to work17, and this is 
the reason why German democracy is sometimes called a ‘co-ordination democracy’. 
                                         
14 Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung, GOBReg and Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der BundesMinisterien, GGO. See: 
BundesMinisterium des Innern, (ed.), loose leaf collection, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 
15 Peter Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany. The Growth of a Semisovereign State, Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1987; Simon Bulmer, The Domestic Structure of European Community Policy-Making in West Germany, New York, Garland 
1986; Kenneth Dyson, “West Germany: The search for a rationalist consensus”, in: J. Richardson, European Union, Power and 
Policy-Making,London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 216-29.; Collins, German Policy-Making…., op.cit. 
16 Kaztenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany…, op.cit. 
17 Collins, German Policy-Making…, op.cit. 
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Nonetheless it is the Chancellor of Germany as the ‘government’s chief executive’, and 
the chief-operator of the Foreign Ministry, who are the main actors representing the state 
on the international stage. They are also responsible, on the basis of the constitutional 
competences, for creation and conducting the European policy, and policies in the 
relation to the European Union. The Chancellor is responsible for the formulation of 
general guidelines on the foreign policy, and the Foreign Minister bears political 
responsibility for the European integration policy, thus for setting agenda for the 
European policy of Germany.  
Both these actors played a leading role in creation and conducting the 
enlargement policy. Other government actors, whose voice impacted this policy, are the 
heads of the Defence Ministry (in relation to the NATO enlargement), of the Finance and 
Economics Ministries and of the Bundesbank (in relation to the economic and financial 
aspects of the enlargement). These are the government executives who constitute the 
state’s foreign policy-making apparatus this research focuses on.  
The second group is of non-government actors.  
 
(ii) Non-government Actors 
There are three groups of non-government actors, whose contribution to the 
enlargement policy is examined in this research. The first group is of state non-
government actors, and the next two groups are private actors. 
Actors of the first group belong to the political system of the state, but unlike the 
government executives, they do not represent the state externally. They are: 
• Political parties,  
• Bundestag, 
• Bundesrat. 
Position and views of political parties are fundamental for the government 
executives in formulating and conducting foreign policy, including the enlargement 
policy. Bundestag and Bundesrat represent the legislative branch of the state system18 
                                         
18 The Bundestag has the right to give opinions on foreign policy towards the basis of the Law on the Ratification of the EEC Treaty 
of 1957; the Länder governments have the same right in the Bundesrat on the basis of the Art. 23 of the Basic Law which introduced a 
possibility for Länder for active participation in the formulation of the European policies. See for example: Jürgen Kühn, Die 
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and are referred to in the context of passing resolution, ratification of agreements and as 
platforms for presenting and discussing state policies. 
The second group of non-government actors, whose voice is of the key meaning 
for this research, are German political analysts and experts outside the centres of power, 
in media, at universities and think tanks. They create a domestic elite discourse on the 
German national identity, which is a milieu for political choices, actions and strategies. 
The key for the selection of the elite discourse material — analyses, opinions, comments 
— is domestic and international reputation of an author, a think-tank, academic centre or 
media outlet, and the second deciding factor is how representative and influential is a 
given hypothesis, proposal or analysis. 
The third group of non-government actors consists of organised interest groups. 
Out of numerous organizations in Germany only a few were engaged, or interested in the 
enlargement policies. Nonetheless they were powerful and their stance impacted the state 
policy, especially in the second phase, of negotiating the entry conditions of the 
enlargement. The German Farmers’ Union (Deutscher Bauerverband — DBV) is the first 
such interest group, the Federation of German Industry (BDI), German Chambers of 
Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag), German employers associations 
(BDA) and Trade Union Federation are the other ones. A separate category of interest 
groups represents organizations of the WWII expellees, such as the Sudeten Germans or 
the Expellees Federation (Bund der Vertriebenen, shorthand BdV). They are more private 
than political organization, although their origins and goals are strictly of political 
character. They had a powerful impact on the German enlargement policy. 
 
 
III. THEORY 
This section consists of two parts: the first explains the meaning and application 
of the key notion of this thesis — ‘ambivalence’, and the second presents the choice of 
theoretical approaches employed in this research and the reasoning behind this choice. 
 
                                         
Koordinierung der deutschen Europapolitik, Zentrum für Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 
Bonn, 1994 
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1. Notion of Ambivalence 
The operational term of this research is the notion of ambivalence. A concept of 
‘logic of ambivalence’ as a framework for understanding, analysis and explanation of 
choices in politics is known in the field of sociology and political behaviour19. It is not in 
common use in foreign policy analysis, and has not been conceptualised theoretically. 
The basic question is therefore how ambivalence can be approached in order to make it a 
methodologically appropriate variable? 
First — ambivalence can be detected through examination of rhetoric of a given 
foreign policy as the first step, and of a nexus between rhetoric and actions as the second 
one. Coherence, or lack thereof either in rhetoric or in a rhetoric-actions nexus, is a strong 
indicator whether a given policy contains ambivalence or not. Rhetoric is a vital part of 
the foreign policy as a form of communication and dialogue. While foreign policy 
consists of strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve 
its goals in the international relations milieu, rhetoric allows to carry out these strategies, 
and to express ideas, values, norms, ethics and intentions. It might, and sometimes is used 
instrumentally, serving as a means of disguise, to hide true intentions or interests. That 
stresses its importance even more. While the perceptions and philosophy of key policy 
makers are the most important variables in foreign policy decision-making, their rhetoric 
as a means of communication, is a tool in the foreign policy. Most often the tool policy 
makers reach for first.  
Yet rhetoric is usually only the first part of policy. The second part is action. 
Rhetoric expresses a goal, which, if supposed to be achieved, in most cases requires 
actions.  
Majority of foreign policy analyses implicitly or explicitly assume that a given 
policy has a goal and may face obstacles — both in the external and domestic realms. If 
                                         
19 In sociological and psychological studies the term “ambivalence” is a category of interpretation and represents a duality of opposed 
emotions, attitudes, thoughts or motivations which a person simultaneously holds towards a person or object or phenomenon. For 
reference to the political behaviour see for example Stanley Feldman and John Zaller, “The Political Culture of Ambivalence: 
Ideological Responses to the Welfare State”,  American Journal of Political Science 36, 1992 pp.268-307; Michael R. Alvarez and 
John Brehm, “Are Americans Ambivalent Towards Racial Policies?”,  American Journal of Political Science 41, 1997, pp.345-374; 
Michael F. Meffert, Michael Guge, and Milton Lodge, “Good, Bad, Indifferent, and Ambivalent: The Consequences of 
Multidimensional Political Attitudes;, in: The Issue of Belief: Essays in the Intersection of Non-attitudes and Attitude Change, Eds. 
W.E. Saris and Paul Sniderman, Amsterdam School of Communication Research, 2002 
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the domestic level is analyzed, then mechanisms and dynamics of hammering out such 
policy are uncovered, including the clashes between the conflicting factors and 
preferences. This is detection in the ‘pro and contra’ terms, driving forces versus 
obstacles. Obstacles in such configuration need to be overcome or ignored, or influenced 
by contra factors, and changed. These analyses correspond with a definition of the 
foreign policy given for example by Christopher Hill, that foreign policy is ‘the sum of 
official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in 
international relations’20, or the one, more discerning, provided by Michael Smith, who 
emphasised its ‘making’ part, the unfolding of the components of the foreign policy, 
stating that the foreign policy is ‘the embodiment of national aims and interests, pursued 
through the mobilization and application of national resources’21. In the sense of both 
these definitions, foreign policy is the final outcome of a clash of various domestic ideas, 
interests, preferences and ways the national identity is expressed. Foreign policy 
conducted by state agencies may or may not reflect all these elements, but it does not 
reveal them. 
What however if the sum of official external relations conducted by an 
independent actor, usually a state, the final outcome of a clash of various domestic ideas, 
is not clear-cut and suggests, or reveals internal ambivalence? It then says that the makers 
of such a policy simultaneously hold conflicting attitudes about the object of their policy 
and its goal. That may represent a concept of ambivalence in such a policy. And in the 
absence of definition, conceptualization, politico-theoretical models of ambivalence in 
the foreign policy theories, as well as of reference in commonly used in IR scholarship 
definitions of the foreign policy, a proposal of this thesis is to adopt the above description 
as a determinant in this analysis. The empirical material of this research requires an 
interpretation of the conditions, under which there are opposing factors, present 
simultaneously in the foreign policy, and which policy makers conducting this policy, 
simultaneously embrace. 
                                         
20 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003 
21 Michael Smith, “The European Union, Foreign Economic Policy and the Changing World”,  Journal of European Public Policy, 
1:2, Autumn 1994, p. 287 
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As mentioned in the introductory part of this thesis, the concept of ambivalence in 
the German enlargement policy does not represent (or reflect) a process of eliminating 
factors that are contradictory to the driving ones, i.e. obstacles. It reflects a complexity of 
the analyzed policy, which is characterised by fluctuation of preferences and 
development of new interests. The contra factors to the support for the enlargement are 
the reasoning, concepts, and/or options that are alternative to the enlargement and were 
adopted, and in some cases actively pursued as a goal, by German policy makers within 
the same foreign policy apparatus that simultaneously lent support to the enlargement.  
Ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy is accompanied by perceived 
ambivalence. In order to discern the two one has to detect whether what is observable 
reflects an adoption of the reasoning, concepts, and/or options, which oppose the 
enlargement, and has an impact on this policy, or not. The former represents 
ambivalence, but if there are no consequences in terms of political actions determined in 
statements and speeches, the ambivalence if possible to observe, is probably a perceived 
one. 
 
2. Choice of Theoretical Approaches  
The examination follows the logic and is organised according to the Robert 
Putnam’s22 two-level game theory. It divides the policymaking into two parts — (i) at the 
national level domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to 
adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among 
those groups; (ii) at the international level national governments seek to maximise their 
own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while minimising the adverse consequences of 
foreign developments23.  
This research will adopt this division though in a reverse order, identifying first 
actions in the external and following then with uncovering what led to such actions. In 
other words the first level is an analysis on the international stage: identification of 
occurrences of ambivalence, then identification of external reasons for Germany’s 
support to the enlargement and external constraints to this support. It is then followed by 
                                         
22 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics..., op.cit. 
23 Ibid., p. 434. 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
31 
an examination of such factors on the domestic level — of domestic preferences and 
interests at the basis of the choices in the external policy. 
Analysis of these factors will be possible with the tools borrowed from social 
constructivism and the rationalist framework of liberal intergovernmentalism. Empirical 
findings of this research indicate that both pro and contra enlargement factors that shaped 
Germany’s enlargement policy are rooted both in normative, ideational factors of national 
identity, as well as in strict costs-benefits calculations. For explanation of the former the 
tools are provided by constructivism, while the latter is possible to explain with the 
rationalist approach. Application of either is not, however, identical with the division 
between the external and domestic areas; the use of either rationalist or constructivist 
framework in this research is a function of the specificity of a given factor in analysis, or 
in other words it is subordinated to the characteristic of the occurrence of ambivalence 
and its causes. And while the rationalist approach explains the political preferences based 
on calculation of costs and benefits, constructivism in contrast applies sociological and 
normative explanations for the pursued interests.  
Both accounts — rationalist intergovernmentalism and constructivism — remain 
in conceptual opposition; the contemporary question is however to what extent they 
complement each other24. It is therefore necessary to follow Robert Jervis’ observation 
that ‘no one approach consistently maintains a leading position: each of them catches 
important elements of international politics’25, and the one of John G. Ruggie, who 
pointed out that ‘the ‘great debates’ that have swept through the field of international 
relations (…) typically have been posed in terms of the alleged superiority on one 
approach over another, but the fact that these debates recur so regularly offers proof that 
no approach can sustain claims to monopoly on truth — or even on useful insights’26. 
This research does not aim at synthesis of two approaches, but at grappling with the 
dynamics created by ambivalence in the German policy towards the EU enlargement.  
                                         
24 William Wallace, “Collective Governance”, in Helen and William Wallace, (eds), The Policy-making in the European Union, 
Oxford 2000, p. 525 
25 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976 
26 John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?, Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”,  
International Organization, vol. 52, NO 2, Autumn 1998 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
32 
Applying both approaches will help to determine causes of various occurrences of 
ambivalence. The ambivalence, its occurrences as a variable, demonstrates the changing 
concept of the European integration in Germany’s milieu, and reveals origins of this 
change — the interplay between changing interests and preferences of Germany. It is a 
constructivist variable, pertaining to a normative, based on values and ideas, concept of 
social organization of the international community. A transformation of social and 
ideological constructs lies at the heart of the constructivist stream offered by Alexander 
Wendt27. 
 
A. Constructivism 
Majority of the literature on Germany’s foreign policy after the unification depicts 
consistently a constructivist interpretation of this policy. Thomas Banchoff, Gunther 
Hellmann, Peter Katzenstein, Thomas Risse, Adrian Hyde-Price28 apply broadly the 
constructivist method arguing that it is crucial to examine historical, ideational and 
cultural sources of actors’ identities, in order to understand the behaviour of states, 
because states’ grand strategies are the result not only of political conditions in the 
domestic and international environments but also of a broader cultural determinants29. It 
is especially important in the case of Germany’s foreign policy. This research follows this 
direction. 
Although constructivist approach is diverse and as ontology does not offer a 
unified theory or framework, most of the premises laid out by constructivists provide 
insights that are useful for this research. Starting from the constructivist concern with the 
                                         
27 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it…, op.cit 
28 Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order..., op.cit 
29 Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security,: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York; Columbia University 
Press 1996; Thomas Banchoff, “German Policy Towards the European Union: The Effects of Historical Memory”,  German Politics, 
Vol. 6 1997; Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed, Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press 1999; Gunther Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany”,  
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol.40 1996; Gunther Hellmann, “Weltpolitik and Self-Containment? Germany”s Global 
Ambitions”, University of Birmingham Discussion Papers in German Studies No IGS99/10, 1999; Thomas Risse, “Between the Euro 
and the Deutsche Mark”, Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown, Working Papers, 1997; Thomas Risse et al, “To 
Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Indentity Politics in the European Union”,  European Journal of International Relations, Vol., 5 
1999; K. M. Fierke and Antje Wiener, “Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement.”, in: Antje Wiener, Thomas 
Christiansen, and Knud Erik Jorgensen (Eds), The social construction of Europe, London: SAGE, 2001 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
33 
human consciousness of individual actors, to the premises that the ‘building blocks’ of 
international reality are ideational as well as material, and that ideational factors have 
both normative and instrumental dimensions, to the claim that they express not only 
individual but collective intentionality as well30.  
The central assumption of this thesis is that ambivalence in Germany’s 
enlargement policy was created by simultaneous pursuit of various, conflicting interests, 
both by the German state and German domestic actors. These interests and preferences 
represent different streaks of the German national identity. They are not structurally 
determined, on the contrary. Majority of scholars within the constructivist school 
identified that the unified Germany continues cultivating the culture of reticence in its 
foreign policy, which is characterised by Europeanization and multiteralism. 
Europeanization is also a part of an ideational ‘building block’ of international reality of 
the European Union. The identity of the German nation has been called in the recent 
years as highly ‘Europeanised’ and having Europeanization in the genetic code31. Using 
the constructive perspective will allow to understand how this feature influenced the 
choices over the enlargement policy. For example at the moment of Germany’s 
unification, when Chancellor Helmut Kohl started referring to the German and European 
unification as the two sides of the same coin, or at the moment of tension between two 
concepts, of deepening and of widening the European integration, when Germany chose 
to support both. 
Philosophy, preferences and choices of individual actors such as Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl or his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher were crucial for shaping 
the German enlargement policy. Numerous analyses proved that German foreign policy 
demonstrated a constructivist assumption that interests are not objectively and 
exogenously given either by the domestic structures of states or by the nature of the 
international system, but they are defined by the actors involved, according to their 
identity, values and self-perception32. The rhetoric created by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
that was supportive of the enlargement, or a shift of accents in the enlargement rhetoric of 
                                         
30 John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, Penguin Books, London 1996 
31 Katzenstein, Tamed Power: Germany in Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997; also: Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in 
West Germany …, op.cit.; Banchoff, The German Problem…, op.cit.; Dyson, Goetz, “Germany, Europe…, op.cit. 
32 Hyde-Price, Interests, Institutions and Identity…, op.cit. 
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Kohl’s successor’s Gerhard Schröder, are the facets of the German foreign policy 
possible to explain by application of the constructivist concern with the human 
consciousness of individual actors.  
Individual preferences of both Chancellors also reflect collective intentionality33 
of their generations. A generational change of 1998 in German politics is observable in 
different attitude towards history and its role in contemporary politics. It concerns the 
fundaments of the national identity, formed on interpretations of historical experience. As 
those interpretations differ, either between generations or between interest groups, it may 
lead to clash of interests, like it did in the case of the past legacy problems in bilateral 
relations, which created one of the manifestations of ambivalence. 
Lastly, constructivism is concerned with rhetoric and the conviction that political, 
elite discourse co-shapes foreign policy. Such a discourse illuminates, as Thomas 
Banchoff stresses, the content of state identity34. Elite discourse is fundamental for 
understanding ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy created for example by 
deepening-widening tension, or choice of priority in bilateral relations, or consideration 
of various concepts of a new security system in Europe.  
Although central variable of constructivism are interests and constructivist 
perspective offers a possibility to look into the normative, ideational factors, shared ideas, 
beliefs and social facts behind the choices over the EU enlargement, it does not provide 
tools for explanation of rational pursuit of material interests, which were also at play at 
the choices over the enlargement policy. For this part normative narrative of national 
identity is not central. But as the context for the pursuit of material interests is another 
major juncture in the European integration, the Eastern enlargement, liberal 
intergovenrmenatlism will be the most useful for explaining the benefits/costs 
calculation-based choices. 
 
B. Rationalist Approach 
Rationalist perspective of intergovernmentalism draws on both realist and 
institutionalist approaches, successfully explaining European integration as the bargain 
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between states pursuing self-interested goals35. Given the time framework for this 
analysis such a bargain is apparent for example at the negotiations over Maastricht 
Treaty, or in a more direct connection with the Eastern enlargement — in negotiations 
over Amsterdam Treaty, or when German policy makers worked with their French 
counterparts on the agreement over the EU expansion.  
Intergovernmentalism, originally designed by Stanley Hoffmann as a theory of 
regional integration36 rightly stresses that member states can have shared interests and 
may pick up collective action for a better outcome, but it is still a state a primary factor 
for integration and the increase in power at the supranational level results from decisions 
of governments of single states as they have the legal sovereignty. As this research 
focuses on a specific aspect of the European integration and relies mostly on 
constructivist interpretation, the most suitable is the version of intergovernmentalism 
modified by Andrew Moravcsik37.  
First, because contrary to realism it assumes that states are configurations of 
individual and groups interests, who project their interests into the international system 
through governments. Secondly because it emphasises economic interests as necessary to 
take into account for explaining decisions of states’ governments in the negotiations over 
integration38. Thirdly it also operates on two levels of analysis — of domestic preference 
formation and the EU intergovernmental bargaining, which corresponds with the two-
level game employed in this research.  
All these facets are reflected in the late phase of the German enlargement policy 
when German policy makers take up actions aimed at the EU reforms or when they 
bargain economic interests and preferences of specific group interests of the German 
industry or farmers, what are the causes of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the 
enlargement. 
Intergovernmentalism offers also an important for this research insight into the 
power of the German state. The empirical findings of this research confirm that at the 
                                         
35 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton 1984, p. 122-123 
36 Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on Theory and Practice of International Politics, Preager 1965 
37 Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community…, op.cit. 
38 While analysing the evolution of monetary union in Europe Moravcsik observed that economic interests drove the negotiations as 
congruent with national interests of the states participating in the process and were superior sometimes to the political interests.  
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basis of the German multilateralism is the culture of political reticence, of restraining the 
power of the state. As pointed out by Adrian Hyde-Price domestic factors decide about 
the power capabilities nowadays — demographics, territorial size, resource endowment, 
wealth and economic structure, industrial financial and technological capabilities, but 
also non-material factor such as societal cohesion and the stability of the political 
system39. All these factors constitute Germany’s place of the most powerful state in 
Europe. Germany’s foreign policy however never had features of power politics. On the 
contrary, it gained an opinion of ‘ostentatiously modest’40, and provoked application of 
numerous new notions of state power — starting from the ‘soft power’, through the ‘trade 
power’, to the most developed conceptually notion of the ‘civilian power’ elaborated 
after Germany’s unification41. 
At the same time German government’s actions follow specific interests of the 
state, and policy makers in order to realise these interests use the power of their state. 
This is not the power-exercise that can be explained with the traditional realist approach, 
as the essence of the power of a state has changed in the European environment. A flag 
example is the evolution of the German power into a normative, ‘civilian power’42 and 
so-called Franco-German engine of the European integration as the soft Lockean power 
epitomise the change. Yet as Kenneth Dyson and Klaus Goetz elaborated — German 
foreign policy spans power and constraints and uses the ‘state power’ to influence the 
behaviour of others in order to obtain desired outcomes. This facet of exercising state 
power in the environment of the EU is described also as the ‘institutional power’ of the 
German state. While it is not possible to explain this sort of power with the realist 
                                         
39 Hyde-Price, Interests, Institutions and Identity… , op.cit.  
40 Carl Cavanagh Hodge, “The Federal Republic and the Future of Europe”,  German Politics, Vol. 1, 1992, 224. 
41 A summary can be found in Charlie Jeffery, William Paterson, “Germany”s Power in Europe”, ESRC- IGS Discussion Paper 
2000/10 
42 The notion of the institutional power is related to the Germany”s power in S. Bulmer, C. Jeffery and W.E. Paterson, Germany”s 
European Diplomacy: Shaping the regional milieu. Manchester, Manchester University Press 2000. Also the notion is elaborated in 
the field of sociology; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall offer a fourfold taxonomy of power in International Politics: (i) 
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approach, it eludes constructivist tools too, evoking the intergovernmentalist framework 
as more comfortable for explanation.  
Rational calculation and bargaining of material interests created other 
manifestations of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy than those possible to 
explain with constructivist tools — at the negotiations over the budgetary and 
institutional reform and over the entry terms of the enlargement. 
 
 
IV. THE ARGUMENT 
The outlined below factors that were conflicting with the enlargement created 
various manifestations of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy. They have a 
common denominator in the shape of the response of German policy makers that is 
grounded in the domestic setting of the national identity and material and normative 
interests. Uncovering the reasons why German policy makers responded to these 
constraints in the way that created ambivalence in their enlargement policy is possible 
while looking both at the external and domestic levels of determinants of the foreign 
policy.  
A foundation of the German policy makers’ response is the national political 
identity formed in the WWII aftermath and based on the premises of restraining the 
state’s power, culture of antimilitarism and commitment to multilateral international 
cooperation. The organization of the domestic policy-making system did not have a 
decisive impact on the enlargement policy and creating ambivalence in this policy. The 
decision making in the German foreign policy can be and often is very clear-cut, definite 
and unambiguous. The locus of political power in this system, the power decision-making 
in the foreign policy, remains still in the hands of the government executives. It does not 
contradict the fact that Germany is a state, in which borders between the domestic and the 
external are sometimes blurred. 
According to the definition of such a state given by Georg Sørensen43, it is a state 
with a high degree of international interdependencies, and a particular policy-making 
                                         
43 Georg Sørensen, “An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict and Cooperation”,  Review of International 
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structure, with some aspects of sovereignty delegated to the supranational level. Such a 
state includes highly organised interest groups operating on all levels of state activity, 
along with a highly developed civil society, both of which influence external relations of 
the state. Multilevel interdependencies of economy and business complete this picture. 
Germany has all these features and the multilevel policy-making system is their 
consequence.  
As some scholars observed, this system brings Germany benefits against its 
partners on the European stage44. Negotiations with German representatives are perceived 
as tough because as noticed by Collins ‘German negotiators and policy-makers are able 
to negotiate with the fellow EU member states’ representatives on the assumption — 
whether true or not — that the initial German position is more or less final, as the 
complex domestic policy-making structure makes re-negotiation among the many policy-
makers back in Bonn extremely difficult and time consuming’. Collins stresses that a 
German representative is able to utilise an apparent weakness of the need to satisfy a 
large number of heterogenic actors with a variety of interests in Germany. By referring to 
it they can hold an intransigent position, which would otherwise be untenable, or at least 
open to criticism from EU colleagues. This example reflects often, although not always, 
how the agenda of the foreign policy is ‘managed’. 
This feature of the German policymaking system however is relevant primarily to 
the policymaking within the EU, especially a day-to-day policymaking, when particular 
EU policies are discussed and designed, and particular interests of particular domestic 
actors are discussed as the subject of a particular policy. Germany’s policy towards the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU concerns particular policies of the EU only in its late 
phase, of the negotiations of entry terms and conditions. For the most of the time of the 
enlargement preparations, Germany’s enlargement policy was a ‘high politics’ deciding 
on directions of the development of the EU, and only when the budgetary negotiations 
started, it involved internal EU policies.  
 
A detailed argument of the thesis unfolds as follows: 
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I. External Challenges 
1. Conditions of Germany’s Unification 
First manifestation of ambivalence in the German policy towards the Eastern 
enlargement of the EC occurred during the process of Germany’s unification. The idea 
was proposed by the Eastern European new democratic governments, and backed by the 
U.S. administration. Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared support for this idea, developing a 
persuasive rhetoric that conveyed a normative reasoning of two sides of the same process 
— Germany’s unification as identical with the unification of the whole continent, which 
was epitomised by the idea of embracing Eastern European countries into the framework 
of the European Community.  
Declarations of support were confronted, however, with the structural constraints 
of the crumbling Cold War order. The chief goal of German policy makers at the time 
was the unification of the country; it required consent of Germany’s Western partners and 
of the Soviet Union. Western partners, France first of all, fearful of the increasing power 
of the German state, imposed on Germany a condition of engaging into the deepening the 
EC integration. It became Germany’s priority in the context of the EC politics and limited 
drastically a possibility of introducing the enlargement on the EC agenda. Winning the 
Soviet acceptance required in turn highly cautious proceeding of diplomacy. The Soviet 
Union was losing its influence in Eastern Europe. As the U.S. administration put forward 
a condition of including East Germany after unification into NATO, obtaining Russian 
consent on the unification was a challenge. Introducing the enlargement idea at the same 
time represented a hazard of jeopardising the Soviet acceptance for the unification.  
These contradictions caused ambivalence in Germany’s early policy towards the 
EC enlargement. It represents a tension between two streams. First — an emerging new 
concept of the political organization of Europe based on community of values and ideas, 
thus a case for constructivist approach. Second — the realist grip of the old Cold War 
structure that induced a bargaining of the security and material interests, which can be 
explained by rationalist perspective. 
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2. Bilateral Relations  
Unresolved legacy of the past between Germany and its Eastern neighbours 
created perception and another occurrence of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement 
policy. This policy related first of all to Germany’s Eastern neighbours. Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic, were considered as the first countries that 
would be admitted to the EU.  
The difficult history between Germany and its neighbours was the main reason for 
Germany to support their application for the EU membership. German elites felt 
obligation to help these countries in overcoming the division that resulted from WWII 
and hindered their post-war development. Enlargement also represented an opportunity to 
overcome a difficult legacy of the past, and the German support was received as a strong 
expression of the will to build new quality relations with the Eastern neighbours. The past 
legacy represented two main problems — the issue of Germany’s Eastern border in 
relations with Poland and the claims of German expellees groups against the Czech 
government over the lost after WWII territories. The former was solved relatively 
quickly. It caused though a perception of ambivalence, which manifested as a gap 
between the pledges by German policy makers to support Poland’s application for the EU 
membership and reluctance to solve the border problem. The expellees’ claims were not 
solved and affected the Czech application when German deputies launched an initiative 
to block the Czech membership in the EU creating appearance of ambivalence in 
Germany’s enlargement policy. 
The case represents a tension between two different narratives constituting 
German national identity and built upon the interpretation of the historical experience; it 
requires application of constructivist perspective.  
 
3. Relations with France 
While German policy makers declared strong support for the enlargement of the 
EC/EU, they also declared, and worked, on maintaining good relations with the main 
European partner of Germany — France. Fierce opposition of France to the enlargement 
curbed the support of German policy makers for this idea. Despite the emergence of the 
new interests of Germany in the East, that were highly congruent with the enlargement, 
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German policy makers did not take up political actions that would put the enlargement on 
the EU agenda. It represents another cause of ambivalence in Germany’s policy.  
This factor appeared first time during the negotiations over Germany’s unification 
and persisted, curbing Germany’s support for the enlargement until the agreement on 
Agenda 2000 in 1997.  
The EU enlargement was to change a political balance in Europe and in the 
European Union. The prospect of alteration was sensitive for France. French politicians 
viewed the expansion of the EU as shifting the centre of the political power in Europe to 
a new, unified Germany. It jeopardised the main provision of France’s post-WWII policy, 
which was to contain Germany’s power. It was therefore an initiative of French policy 
makers to commit Germany to a single European currency as the prerequisite for 
Germany’s unification. The means aimed at constraining economic power of the unified, 
thus stronger, Germany. The enlargement idea induced fears that it would dilute the 
efforts to bind Germany with the Maastricht Treaty and that it would deprive France of 
its position at a hub of the European Union.  
German policy makers considered France a primary partner. They felt a 
historically motivated obligation toward France that resulted from the fact that France 
offered Germany a partnership after WWII, which elevated Germany out of the post-war 
international isolation. Preserving good relations with France was assigned therefore a 
top priority. A choice made between two sets of interests in Germany’s bilateral relations, 
despite that partially those interests were economic, represents a case for constructivist 
interpretation.  
 
4. Deepening the European Integration 
Deepening the European integration was perceived and presented by majority of 
EU policy makers and commentators as alternative to the enlargement option. German 
leaders chose to endorse both directions and that created a manifestation of ambivalence 
in Germany’s enlargement policy. This is a clash of normative visions of the social 
construction of the international system and for this reason is possible to explain with the 
constructivist perspective. 
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Regaining with the unification a full sovereignty prompted among German elites 
a debate over the future foreign policy, its premises and direction. A part of German 
elites were considering a closer Western integration, thus strengthening the core of the 
EU as the main provision for the new foreign policy. This option was perceived as 
conflicting with the enlargement because it was to precede the widening of the EU and as 
expected — would absorb political energy and means at the expense of the enlargement. 
Taking into consideration this alternative hindered the consensus on the enlargement and 
deepened the ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy.  
Yet, the debate on the European integration broadened this notion. In its old pre-
1990 version the European integration epitomised Western European integration; the new 
understanding was about the integration of the whole continent. This represented another 
paradox — the old concept of the European integration was a constraint to the support for 
the enlargement, but at the same time the outcome of the debate in Germany established 
its new concept. This is a case of constructivist inquiry into the process of expanding of 
the European community of nations, based on shared sovereignty and multilateralism, 
thus of adjusting the old concept to the new challenges. 
 
5. New European Security Order 
The concept of the post-Cold War organization of Europe, as presented by 
Eastern Europeans was two-dimensional: Eastward expansion of the European Union and 
of NATO. Eastern Europeans declared their desire to join both structures simultaneously. 
The hesitation of German policy makers on the issue of NATO expansion was received 
as hesitation over the concept of the future European order. And the inclination of 
German policy makers to creating a pan-European, exclusively of the U.S., security 
system was contradicting the EU-NATO umbrella concept directly. It caused a perception 
of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement (for it did not contradict 
directly the idea of the EU enlargement). 
The imperative of building a new security system in Europe absorbed attention of 
the political leaders in the EU throughout the first half of the 1990s decade. The presence 
of the Soviet troops in the post-communist countries, extended well into the 1990s, and 
the fact that Russian leaders were positioning Russia as a counter-power to the West on 
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the one hand, the aspirations of the East European states to join NATO on the other hand, 
and the intention of the U.S. to maintain its dominant position in the European security 
system, made the task of redesigning the system challenging and sensitive. Under such 
circumstances the American administration expected German politicians, who had good 
relations with Russian leaders, to play a role of a broker and win Russian acceptance for 
the Eastern enlargement of NATO.  
This task was a constraint to the project of the Eastern enlargement of the 
European Union. Not only did it absorb political energy of German policy makers, but 
also because of the importance of the security issue, it preceded and conditioned 
implicitly the EU enlargement. The ultimate support the NATO expansion idea received 
from German policy makers fundamentally contributed to the support for the EU 
enlargement as the successful introducing this fundamental political change in Europe 
brought down psychological grip of the Cold War order. 
NATO expansion can be approached both with the realist and constructivist 
assumptions; in this case the constructivist claim about values and norms at the basis of 
creation of national interests, has a stronger explanatory power for the Germany’s policy 
towards this issue, than realist calculation. 
 
6. Costs of the Enlargement 
Although the factor was strictly economic — financial costs of the enlargement, 
the issue was political. It was a requirement of reforming the EU budget and its 
redistribution system in order to spread those costs among all the member states. It 
represents a textbook case for liberal intergovernmentalism. 
The issue reached its culminating point with the prospect of negotiations over the 
entry terms of enlargement. The preparations of the Agenda 2000, set up ultimately in 
1997, was a direct reason for calculations of the costs of the enlargement and a debate on 
this issue across the EU. 
Enlargement in terms of costs presented for German politicians two major 
problems: (i) the necessity of sharing financial benefits with the new, poor members of 
the club of which the most challenging for the old members was (ii) the defence of the 
CAP. It meant that the Union’s budget would have to be increased and the main burden 
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of new additional costs would fall on Germany, because its position in the Union was of 
the main net payer to the common budget. The unification strained however financial 
capacity of Germany and German policy makers were trying to spread out the costs of the 
enlargement on other member states. 
Kohl’s government formulated in November 1994 a call for reform of the EU 
budget and reduction of Germany's net contributions. The insistence of the German 
government on linking the enlargement to the financial reform of the EU was justified, 
but hard to achieve. It caused delays in setting up a schedule for the enlargement. Waiting 
for the compromise and cooperation of other member states on the financial burden of the 
enlargement created a manifestation of ambivalence in the German enlargement policy 
— a gap between the supportive rhetoric and delaying the process. Ultimately German 
policy makers broke the impasse and put the enlargement before the EU reform, which 
already eludes the liberal intergovernmentalism implying a constructivist approach to the 
changing concept of the European integration. 
 
II. Domestic Challenges 
7. Exhaustion with the Costs of Unification 
The unification exhausted German society both in economic and political terms. It 
created constraints to the support for the enlargement and in result — ambivalence in 
Germany’s policy. It is a factor combing political and economic aspects and represents a 
set of social facts. As such it can be approached with constructivist tools. 
Financial costs of the unification as presented by the Kohl’s government were 
supposed to be insignificant. It turned out that the net public financial transfers to Eastern 
Germany only in 1991 exceeded the original predictions 14 times. Since then, the 
transfers in fiscal resources and subsidies were increasing, and throughout the whole 
decade on average reached annually 5 per cent of the cash resources of the West 
Germany, and increasing public debt at the end of 1994 to more than 60 per cent of the 
united Germany’s GDP.  
The exhaustion of the German society with the rapid political and economic 
changes influenced the attitudes towards the ‘Europeanization’ and European integration. 
As the Maastricht Treaty resulted in what most of the German society resented — 
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abandonment of the Deutsche Mark, the endorsement of the European integration 
projects, first of all costly enlargement, significantly declined.  
While the German government was trying to secure participation of other EU 
member states in the costs of the enlargement (for the strained by the unification 
finances), it also had to take into account domestic public opinion. The supportive to the 
enlargement rhetoric of government executives started to decline, and with the new 
government formed by the left-wing coalition, this rhetoric was already changed into a 
decisively opposing paying singlehandedly for the enlargement. 
That created another occurrence of ambivalence in the German enlargement 
policy, though the perception of the ambivalence in this case exceeded the actual 
phenomenon. 
 
8. Economic Interests of Domestic Actors 
German interests groups were the main actors at the negotiations of the entry 
terms of the enlargement, extending these negotiations and delaying the final date of the 
enlargement completion. Their position created a perception of the ambivalence in 
German policy towards the enlargement. It did not create ambivalence itself. It represents 
a case for the rationalist approach of liberal intergovernmentalism, which emphasises 
economic interests bargaining at the base of furthering development of the European 
integration. 
There were two most important areas of interests associated with particular 
groups such as industry or farmers unions: labor market and agriculture. The negotiations 
over the transition periods for opening the labour market, the agricultural production 
quotas and the extension of the system of direct payments lasted for 4,5 years, postponing 
the final date of the enlargement. Much of this time was taken by a ‘ping-pong’ exchange 
of proposals between the Commission, candidate countries and the two main players — 
France and Germany. The position of the German negotiators created a perception of an 
ambivalent attitude towards the enlargement. It was the final act in the process of 
preparations for the enlargement and it was a far cry from the support declared by the 
German representatives for the enlargement initially. The Copenhagen Summit 
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eventually confirmed that the first wave of enlargement would take place in 2004, but the 
‘enlargement package’ agreed upon then, was disappointing to the Eastern countries. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Germany’s Unification As the Cause of Ambivalence 
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EC Enlargement 
 
1989—1992 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses causes of the first occurrence of ambivalence in Germany’s 
policy towards the idea of the EC Eastern enlargement. It transpired in the context and at 
the time of Germany’s unification, when leading actors on the stage at the time, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, developed a 
supportive of the enlargement rhetoric, but did not turn it into political agenda.  
The enlargement idea was put forward during the process of negotiations of 
Germany’s unification. The origins of the German policy towards the Eastern 
enlargement of the EC/EU are closely connected with the unification though not only 
because of the time concurrence, but primarily because of the political reasoning behind 
two projects that changed the geopolitics of Europe. The ambivalence in the German 
stance on the enlargement at this time was caused by the conditions of the unification — 
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the need to win support for unification from the Soviet Union and to meet expectations of 
the Western partners. 
Germany’s unification is a time of opening of a new era for Europe, and this has a 
special meaning for the relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. The 
novelty is that the East European countries are coming out of 40-year period of remaining 
‘behind the Iron Curtain’. The events in Central Europe in the years 1990-1991, 
Germany’s unification and the idea of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, 
set the direction for the political developments in this region for the next decade.  
The focus of this chapter is on Chancellor Helmut Kohl, because he made the first 
official pronouncements regarding the enlargement of the European Community, and 
because he is the main representative of Germany on the international stage during the 
unification negotiations. The statements of his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
are also considered, as he is the second most powerful actor in the German policymaking 
system. The supportive for the enlargement rhetoric reflects a normative reasoning based 
upon social constructivism. This reasoning was confronted by the conditions imposed on 
Germany and which German policy makers had to meet. These conditions were 
generated by the structural constraints of the Cold War division of the continent. 
Application of the two-level game theory indicates that the reasons for German policy 
makers not to follow their own rhetoric that was supportive of the enlargement at the time 
of the unification can be explained by the domestic factor. It was an imperative at the 
core of the national identity, of achieving the goal of the unification of the divided 
country. It was a goal of securing ‘autonomy’, which consists according to Alexander 
Wendt of ‘the ability of a state-society complex to exercise control over its allocation of 
resources and choice of government’45. 
 
I. AMBIVALENCE 
The first appearance of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the Eastern 
enlargement of the EC manifested as a gap in the rhetoric-actions nexus, specifically 
between a highly positive and supportive language for the enlargement rhetoric, and the 
lack of corresponding actions. This is the rhetoric of the two main actors representing 
                                         
45 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 234 
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Germany at the time on the international stage—Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Foreign 
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The occurrence of the first ambivalence, as the later 
developments of the German enlargement policy will demonstrate, was symptomatic for 
its future. On the one hand Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher set a direction for this policy and its tone, indicating the reasoning and building 
rhetoric for the German government’s support for the enlargement idea. On the other 
hand, the factors that turned out to be contradictory to the declared support were also 
indicative for the future impediments to this policy.  
The very first signal from the German policy makers about an idea of the Eastern 
enlargement of the European Community came from Hans-Dietrich Genscher. His 
statement came early, at the time when Poland had already a new democratic 
government, and the dismantling of the socialist order was about to start in 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Genscher pointed to a possibility of a rapid Eastward 
enlargement of the European Community as early as during the EPC meeting of 14-15 
October 1989 at Esclimont46. Although his comment did not have any tangible 
implications at the time, but many observers and European politicians already understood 
it as the direction FRG’s government would favour. The sheer perception of the political 
power of Genscher’s position, as the second representative of the German government 
after the Chancellor, made his statement authoritative. The fall of the Berlin Wall three 
weeks later switched the focus to a possibility of Germany’s unification. The idea of 
embracing East European countries into the common political and economic structure 
was already floating.  
What established the perception that Germany was supportive of the EC Eastward 
expansion, however, was a subtle shift of accents in the Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s 
unification rhetoric. The shift of two words, Western to European, appeared during the 
process of the unification and in relation to it, and ascertained that German politicians 
saw both challenges, of the German unification and unification of the continent, as bound 
to each other. This perception was established for two reasons: the position of the 
Chancellor as the main representative of Germany on the international stage and the fact 
                                         
46 Financial Times, 16 October 1989 
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that despite the dispersion of power throughout the German policymaking system, the 
unification policy was conducted almost single-handedly by the Chancellor Helmut Kohl.  
Rhetoric was the main tool of German politics at the time. Chancellor Kohl 
conducted the unification process using persuasive rhetoric appealing to the normative 
ideals of the European unity that started with the creation of the European Economic 
Community in 1957. He based the reasoning for Germany’s unification on the assertion 
that ‘Reunification and West-integration, Deutschlandpolitik and European politics, are 
the two sides of the same coin. They presuppose each other’47. The statement was made 
first during the speech on the state of the nation in a divided Germany delivered to the 
Bundestag a day before the fall of the Berlin Wall, on 8 November 1989. The phrase of 
this statement about ‘two sides of the coin’ of Germany’s and West-integration will be 
appearing later throughout the whole period of the unification and its long-term 
aftermath, though with a subtle shift of accents. This shift, however, denoted a supportive 
attitude towards the Eastern enlargement of the EC and became the basis for the 
supportive rhetoric. 
The shift was from the ‘West’ to the ‘European integration’. Helmut Kohl used 
this phrase explicitly, and supported it with reasoning, for the first time only a year after 
the unification — in the Bundestag speech of 13 December 199148. It was a direct 
reference to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who used to say that the unification of 
Germany would be identical with that of overcoming the division of the whole Europe, 
and as such the reference was understood as a declaration of the German support for 
overcoming this division. In this way Chancellor Kohl based the idea of the European 
Community embracing new Eastern democracies upon a direct connection to the German 
unification. Kohl’s speech, however, triggered neither a politically meaningful debate, 
nor political action. The idea of enlarging European Community beyond the unified 
                                         
47 “Bericht zur Lage der Nation im geteilten Deutschland”, 8 November 1989, Auswärtiges Amt 1995: 605-612;  
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address_given_by_helmut_kohl_on_the_state_of_the_nation_in_a_divided_germany_bonn_8_november_198
9-en-6b6dd36a-1510-4852-b33f-29688069e1d8.html 
48 Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Maastricht vor dem Bundestag am 13 
Dezember 1991 (statement to the Bundestag by Chancellor Kohl regarding the results of the European Council in Maastricht), Bulletin 
der Bundesregierung, Nr.142, 17 December 1991, 1153-1158. 
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Germany was not on the agenda of German politicians at the time, and they did not take 
up actions that would turn this idea into a political process.  
This rhetoric was consistently kept up during the whole unification period; 
Chancellor Kohl and Minister Genscher referred to the ‘two-sides coin’ of the 
German/European unification in numerous statements and comments. A part of the 
explanation for not following declarations with action is that the shift of accents in 
Chancellor Kohl’s rhetoric did not reflect Chancellor’s own, original vision of the 
European organization. It was only his response to the idea, which had been put on the 
table by Eastern Europeans, supported by the U.S. administration, and already expressed, 
more explicitly in the European debate by other politicians. Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s 
was the earliest response. The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher formulated 
similar calls for a quick widening the EC in August 199049; the Dutch EC Commissioner 
Frans Andriesen asked few months later, in May 1991, whether it was ‘time to design the 
structure of a Community of 24?’50.  
Those calls were specific, but German policy makers did not formulate or even 
refer to any concrete dates or details. Yet their ‘two-sides coin’ rhetoric indicated support 
for the enlargement idea. Soon they presented the need to support this idea as moral duty 
of the Germans towards the Eastern countries. Moral reasoning represented a powerful 
assurance that fuelled Eastern Europeans hopes for a quick integration with the West; 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary pinned their hopes on Germany’s leadership. The 
reassuring rhetoric soon found a direct expression in the bilateral treaties signed with 
Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1991 and 1992; they included a pledge by the German 
government to support the EC/EU’s accession of both Eastern neighbours. This was 
however only a bilateral dimension, whereas there was no concrete action at the EU level 
by German policy makers. 
The gap between declarations and lack of following actions was in a sharp 
contrast to another rhetoric-actions nexus in the German foreign policy at the time of 
unification—the nexus concerning Germany’s commitment to the deeper Western 
integration. The rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl on this issue was supported with concrete 
                                         
49 Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street Years, Smitthmark Pub, 1995 
50 “Geschlossene Gesellschaft”, Der Spiegel, 6 May 1991 
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actions, which led to ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by the Bundestag. There were 
no similarly concrete actions on the German side that would put forward the enlargement 
idea on the EC agenda. All the required elements were in place — the idea was already 
presented to the EC by the East European governments; Germany as the country at the 
forefront of overcoming the post-War division in Europe, was in a position to lead the 
effort; the ongoing unification of Germany was congruent with the idea of Europe’s 
unification and presented as such by Chancellor Kohl. The ‘European’ rhetoric of 
Chancellor not only imprinted the perception among Germany’s partners that the German 
unification was conducted in accordance with the European integration, but that Germany 
supported the EC Eastward expansion.  
The question is why German policy makers did not follow their own rhetoric? 
The first step is to uncover whether their rhetoric reflected supportive factors that were 
significant enough to turn them into a political process. 
 
II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS 
Origins of the Enlargement Project 
There were two supportive factors for German policy makers to embrace the idea 
of the Eastern enlargement of the European Community that were connected with 
Germany’s unification. They were grounded in the normative concept of Europe’s 
organization based on the values upon which the European Community was built. The 
unification of Germany was the first factor; the second was the expectations of 
Germany’s partners, the Eastern European new democracies, and the U.S. administration, 
that Germany would support this idea. The German policy makers’ response was based 
on the fundamental part of the national identity: the commitment to overcoming the 
results of World War II and to conducting foreign policy according to the principle of 
multilateral cooperation with other countries. Both these premises were also the reasons 
of starting the European integration. 
The end of the Cold War shifted geopolitical balance of power in the world and 
changed the international political makeup of Europe, adding new democracies in the 
Eastern part. Looking from the theoretical perspective it altered the macro-level variables 
of the international structure of Europe. It placed German policy makers at the centre of 
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these profound changes. The changing structure became for the German foreign policy a 
generative force, a leading factor in defining interests and determining direction and 
actions, because it opened up a possibility for unification of the divided country. German 
policy makers captured this power; the unification became a part of the structural changes 
and a dominant development in Europe throughout the years 1990 to 1992. As a part of 
the structural changes the unification was congruent with the process of reunification of 
the continent.  
The division of Europe and the German state was a result of World War II and for 
West German diplomacy it was clear that reunification of their country, which was the 
main goal of the post-war foreign policy of the FRG, was possible only with overcoming 
of the division of Europe. This assumption, formulated by Konrad Adenauer, was 
according to Helmut Kohl’s assertions at the heart of his politics. Kohl presented himself 
always as a successor of Adenauer’s political philosophy. The unification rhetoric of 
Chancellor Kohl and his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, which grew into a 
supportive for the enlargement concept, reflects the core of the German post-war 
conceptualization of the national identity. 
Germany’s unification was also seen as a natural consequence of the Eastern 
European revolution, which started at the beginning of 1989 and was nearly completed in 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, when the Berlin Wall was pulled down. The very sense of 
the Eastern revolution bringing down the Iron Curtain implied the unification of the 
continent and as the European Community embodied successful development, its 
Eastward expansion was the only alternative for filling the post-communist political 
vacuum. Last, the unification brought East German state a membership in the European 
Community. It was a rapid integration, unprecedented, justified by the unification of the 
two states and possible thanks to the power of the FRG’s economy, which was expected 
to shield the EC from the costs of embracing the GDR. For these reasons the immediate 
gaining of the EC membership by East Germany was exceptional. Nonetheless, it was a 
precedent that made it the more difficult to deny Eastern European countries a possibility 
of joining the European Community. 
The second supportive factor for embracing the enlargement idea was the fact that 
Eastern Europeans put the enlargement idea explicitly on the table. Every newly elected 
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democratic government in Eastern Europe51 between June 1989 and July 1990 was 
declaring officially, one after another, the desire and determination for joining the 
European Community and NATO. It was a coherent, two-pillar concept of their future as 
a part of the Western political, security and economic system and it was presented as such 
to the Western partners. This challenge, formulated by Eastern Europeans as the necessity 
of embracing their democracies into the EC structures, affected primarily German policy 
makers. For geographical and historical reasons German policy makers could respond to 
the East European counterparts only in a positive way, without risking the reputation of 
Germany as a reliable state, committed to multilateral international cooperation. 
Moreover Eastern Europeans, especially those in the immediate neighbourhood of 
Germany, turned to German policy makers for support for their integration with the West.  
Simultaneously Eastern Europeans’ calls had support from the U.S. 
administration. The idea of a unified Europe was connected directly with the German 
unification by the American administration, during the negotiations over unification. 
According to Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, the authors of a thorough account of 
the negotiations over Germany’s unification52, the idea of embracing new East European 
democracies into the Western European structures was advocated by the U.S. diplomacy 
not only at the time of the unification, but even before. President George H.W. Bush 
declared as early as April 1989 aid for Polish reforms, then one month later, in a major 
address during his visit to the FRG, proclaimed that the West’s goal now was to ‘let 
Europe be whole and free’. He declared it as a new mission of NATO and stressed that 
the Cold War had begun with the division of Europe and it could only end when Europe 
was whole again53. Secretary of State James Baker reiterated George Bush’s declarations 
in December 1989 during his trip to Germany. He sketched then a new architecture of a 
new Europe: it was to be based on political and economic ties that Western Europe was to 
                                         
51 Between June 1989 and June 1991 every communist country of Central Europe and in the case of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
every constituent republic held competitive parliamentary elections. The first elections were held in Poland, the last ones of this series 
in Albania. The newly elected representatives of the SU and Yugoslav republics declared then independence. 
52 Philip Zelikow, Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, Harvard University Press, 
1997  
53  Ibid., p. 31.  
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build with the East54. For this reason Germany’s unification, in the view of the American 
representatives, was always inseparable from the necessity to unify the continent. In this 
way a new direction for the development of Europe was set up55. And it was a new 
Germany that the Americans, and the Eastern Europeans for that matter too, perceived as 
a ‘natural’ leader for these changes.  
Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s comment of October 1989 was Germany’s first 
response to these calls. The change in Chancellor Kohl’s rhetoric in the end of 1991 also 
has to be seen in the context of the expectations of Germany’s partners. It was a response 
to the pressure of the external structure: the changing European relations forced German 
politicians to respond to the emerging challenges. These expectations, as presented by the 
U.S. administration, pointed to new responsibilities that were coming upon Germany with 
the unification and reflected a perception of the international position and standing of 
Germany. The unification of the continent, expanding the EC structures was a novel 
concept and would need a political power to translate it into a political agenda. The 
Federal Republic was a leader in the post-war Western Europe and its foreign policy 
earned Germany a credit of a civilian power. That implied the ability to influence and 
shape the international milieu, thus a leadership necessaryfor shaping a post-communist 
order in Europe.  
Answering this challenge however required a new rationale and a new set of 
policies on the German side. First — reorientation of its foreign policy and including 
Ostpolitik in the grand strategy of Europapolitik, then winning the EC member states’ 
support for the idea of the Eastern enlargement. Neither process was trouble-free. 
 
III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE 
The factors that stimulated supportive rhetoric of the emerging German policy 
towards the EC enlargement idea were countered with constraints. At this stage, during 
                                         
54  Ibid., p. 143 
55 As William Wallace and Anthony Forster wrote the Americans proposed to reformulate the idea of Atlantic community across the 
security, economic and environmental issues, but the European states resisted the idea of incorporating it into a formal treaty; they 
signed up Transatlantic Declaration signed in the fall 1990. Anthony Forster and William Wallace, “Common Foreign and Security 
Policy”, in: Helen Wallace and William Wallace, (eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 467. 
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the German unification process, there were two main constraints: an implicit opposition 
of the Soviet Union and explicit opposition of France. The former was a disappearing 
relic of the Cold War confrontation, in which Germany was subordinate to superpowers, 
and the latter illustrates the intergovernmental bargaining.  
 
1. Russian Factor 
The Russian factor was working implicitly as a constraint to the idea of the EC 
enlargement. Soviet leaders did not openly oppose ambitions of the Eastern European 
governments for joining the EC. But they opposed explicitly a prospect of East Germany 
slipping into the NATO structure (with Germany’s unification). The position of the 
Soviet Union as one the victorious allies that decided the post-WWII order in Europe, 
and the Soviet troops stationing in East Germany, presented a challenge for German 
policy makers during the process of Germany’s unification. It overshadowed the project 
of a rapid expansion of the European Community. 
A democratic revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe broke the Soviet grip over 
Eastern Europe. A prospect of two halves of Europe unifying under Western auspices, in 
all dimensions, political, economic and of security was depriving the Soviets their 
influence in the region further. This caught German policy makers between two 
contradictory streams of interests and ambitions, those of the Soviet Union and of the 
Eastern European democracies. Germany was expected to lend support to the idea of 
unifying Europe on the one hand, and on the other, due to its good relations with the 
Soviet leaders that were built through the Ostpolitik, to smooth the relations with the 
Soviet Union during the ongoing changes in Europe. These were the expectations mainly 
of the U.S. administration, who wanted to maintain its political influence in Europe. For 
German policy makers a priority was, however, to secure an acceptance of the Soviet 
Union for the German unification. Difficulties with this process delayed a moment of 
turning the idea of enlarging the EU into a political agenda. 
Success in obtaining Moscow’s consent for the unification was achieved only 
after ten months of hard diplomatic efforts, marked by unexpected swings and 
extraordinary measures. Despite the fact that ‘Perestroika’ used to be described as a 
policy constructed and promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader was reluctant 
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to recognise democratic changes sweeping throughout Eastern Europe in the summer 
1989. Neither did the prospect of the unification of two German states receive a warm 
welcome in Moscow.  
The key theme of the negotiations with the Russians was withdrawal of the Soviet 
troops from the former GDR, and the key for reaching consensus was money56. But a 
factor complicating the negotiations with Moscow the most was the insistence of the U.S. 
administration on incorporating the former GDR into the NATO structure. This was the 
most important condition discussed in the run-up to the Two Plus Four agreement and 
triggered an international debate over the future of the Alliance.  
According to commentators57, the Americans were concerned that Germany 
would try to maintain its ‘unity’ with Russia by withdrawing from NATO. The U.S. 
administration, however, formulated the NATO condition in a decisive way and 
Chancellor Kohl could not hesitate on this issue. He had to assure the American ally that 
the unified Germany would remain a member of NATO. This pledge was highly 
problematic, because although the original reasons for the creation of NATO ceased to 
exist with the end of the Cold War confrontation, a new purpose for the Alliance was not 
defined yet. Russian leaders therefore still considered NATO a hostile organization58, and 
strongly opposed the inclusion of East Germany in the structure. According to the 
observers of the Two Plus Four negotiations, the Russians believed they had been given 
                                         
56 The Soviet side demanded certain level of payment for the maintaining a transitional presence of the Soviet troops and then the 
withdrawal. Similarly breakdown of the GDR”s economic system endangered all long-term economic agreements with the Soviet 
Union. Kohl government was ready to fulfil both these conditions and quite early in the unification process Kohl pledged to honour 
the GDR”s long-term economic obligations toward Moscow, hoping that the costs of maintaining a transitional presence of the Soviet 
troops would be offset by deliveries of the Soviet commodities and the asymmetrical trade after a couple of years would be possible to 
base on market terms. “Only later in 1990 as it explored GDR files with the new government would Bonn be able to evaluate fully just 
what these obligations entailed” — wrote Zelikow and Rice. See: Zelikow, Rice, Germany Unified, … op.cit., p. 349;  
Consequently after unification Bonn opted for an old financial instrument to support trade between the USSR and the new Länder — 
“Hermes”, the federal export insurance programme in operation since 1949. The original purpose of this programme was to help 
German companies to gain a foothold in world markets. It operated on the principle of laissez-faire and subsidiarity, but after 
unification was subsequently modified to suit the needs of Eastern German firms and their customers in the USSR. It occurred that 
Hermes had to work for years, but eventually in the face of the deteriorating economy in Russia, Hermes was withdrawn. See also: 
W.A. Smyser, The German Economy: Colossus at the Crossroads, New York: St Marin”s Press, 1993; David Spence, “The European 
Community and German Unification”, in: Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm (eds.) Federalism, Unification and European Integration, 
London Frank Cass, 1993 
57 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified…, op.cit. 
58 For an analysis at the time see for example Peter Corterie, “Quo vadis NATO?”,   Survival, March/April 1990 
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informal assurance that including East Germany into NATO would not lead to a further 
enlargement of NATO, which would take it to the Russian border59.  
Chancellor Kohl and Minister Genscher managed to develop particularly good 
relations with Mikhail Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in the 
1980s, when mutual visits on both side were frequent. It helped in the negotiations over 
the unification, but it did not prevent German politicians from as Zelikow and Rice put 
it—a ‘hard punch’. Ultimately the German government had to pay the Russian Federation 
in 1990-1993 a colossal sum of nearly 20 billion Deutsche Mark (then USD 40.25 
billion) in return for Moscow’s endorsement of the unification60. But it was a success for 
Germany and for the projects of unification of the continent.  
Moscow’s ultimate consent to Germany’s unification and acceptance of 
demilitarization of the former GDR was a psychological breakthrough in the process of 
dismantling the Cold War order. It made Western policy makers more aware that the 
Soviet Union was deteriorating, so its implosion the following year was less surprising. It 
was important for dispelling EU member states’ fears of the Soviet negative and 
unpredictable reactions to the EC/EU enlargement idea. Only few months earlier the 
ambitions of the new Eastern democracies to join Western structures, especially NATO, 
seemed very remote; in December 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev called East Germany a 
‘strategic ally and reliable member of the Warsaw Pact’61. A year later the ambitions of 
Eastern Europeans became more probable, though Russia’s loss of its status as a great 
power made the relations with Moscow very sensitive. A project of the Eastward 
                                         
59 Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe, New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1999 p. 213; Jonathan Eyal, “NATO”s enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision”,  International Affairs, NO 73:4, 1997,  
p. 699 
60 This and other conditions seemingly already agreed, proved to be however unstable and in the very last moment days before the 
final settlement, the Russian side changed them. The difference was substantial — the Russians presented just a week before the Two 
Plus Four settlement a demand of a total of DM 36 billion. “These numbers far exceeded the West Germany”s planning assumption in 
July when experts from the Finance Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Chancellery had expected the package to cost DM 1.25 billion in 
the first year, and a total of DM 4.25 billion over the four-year withdrawal period  (…) now the Soviet demanded a sum eight times 
this size and the Moscow Two Plus Four Ministerial was only a week away” — as Zelikow and Rice commented. See:  Zelikow and 
Rice, Germany Unified, …, op.cit. p. 351; see also: Manfred Görtemaker, Unifying Germany, 1989-90, New York: St Martin”s Press, 
1994; Konrad Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994 
61 Speech to the Central Committee of the CPSU after his return from the Soviet-American Summit at Malta; Pravda, 9 December 
1989. 
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expansion of the EC and NATO added to a tension in the relations that were already 
strained by the secession of the Baltic states in January 1991. 
This was a fundamental dimension of the ‘Russian factor’, which worked against 
an idea of immediate introduction of the EC/EU enlargement concept. Western 
politicians were careful not to make gestures that would humiliate Russia, and the burden 
of soothing these relations was placed on Germany. Pinning upon a state a task of 
balancing relations with another partner, difficult for others, indicates a special position 
of this state. Such a position may result from various factors and circumstances, e.g. 
when there is a need to choose a mediating state in a conflict. The accomplishment of the 
German diplomacy in obtaining Moscow’s consent for Germany’s unification 
strengthened the perception among Germany’s Western partners that German policy 
makers were capable of maintaining good relations with their Russian counterparts. This 
created an expectation among the Western allies that German politicians would also 
secure Russia’s support for the idea of overcoming the Iron Curtain division of the 
continent.  
 
2. European Community First 
This factor was immediately explicit as a contradiction to the enlargement idea. It 
engaged German policy makers in a project of deepening Western integration, which was 
a condition of the unification imposed on Germany by Western partners. As such it 
blocked a possibility of introducing another direction of the European Community/Union 
development simultaneously, because Germany’s partners would perceive it as 
Germany’s ambivalence on deepening the integration.   
Germany’s Western European partners saw a prospect of liberation of the German 
state from the post-War restraints as endangering their interests. The way of containing 
this danger was to bind new Germany more tightly into the Western integration. It is 
often quoted that president François Mitterrand was supposed to have said to Minister 
Genscher: ‘Either German unification will follow European unification or you will find 
yourself opposing a triad [France, Great Britain and Russia] — and that will lead into a 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
60 
war. If German unification will take place after European unification we will help you’62. 
This represented a fear, shared by most of Germany’s Western partners, of the increase of 
the German power. 
According to a structuralist approach material factors decide that Germany is the 
most powerful state in the European Union and Europe. However, as Adrian Hyde-Price 
pointed out, it is domestic factors that decide about power capabilities of a state 
nowadays. They are demographics, territorial size, resource endowment, wealth and 
economic structure, industrial financial and technological capabilities, but also non-
material factors such as societal cohesion and the stability of the political system63. All 
these elements contributed to Germany’s position of the most powerful state in Europe. 
That provoked a question of how the new Germany was going to use its power. 
West Germany’s foreign policy was never conducted from a position of power. 
For this reason Germany gained a reputation of ‘ostentatiously modest power’64. This 
transformation of the German power was never possible to explain by the realist 
approach. The phenomenon provoked application of numerous new notions of a state 
power — starting from the ‘soft power’, through the ‘trade power’, to the most developed 
conceptually notion of the ‘civilian power’ elaborated after Germany’s unification65. All 
these notions reflected a place of Germany within the multilateral context of the 
international institutions like the EC or NATO. As Peter Katzenstein explained ‘the 
legitimate exercise of German power can occur only through Europe’s complex 
institutional arrangements’66. The so-called Franco-German engine of the European 
integration was seen as one of the examples of the ‘soft Lockean’ power. Kenneth Dyson 
and Klaus Goetz noted nevertheless that German foreign policy spanned between power 
and constraints, and used the ‘state power’ to influence the behaviour of others, in order 
to obtain desired outcomes. While pointing to this facet of the exercising power in the 
environment of the EU this research refers to the ‘institutional power’ of the German 
                                         
62 See for example: Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung, Siedler, 1991 
63 Hyde-Price, Interests, Institutions and Identity… , op.cit.  
64 Carl Cavanagh Hodge, “The Federal Republic and the Future of Europe”,  German Politics, Vol. 1, 1992, 224. 
65 A summary can be found in Charlie Jeffery, William Paterson, “Germany”s Power in Europe”, ESRC- IGS Discussion Paper 
2000/10 
66 Katzenstein, Tamed Power …, op.cit., p.304 
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state67. This power, in spite of the positive post-War experience of Germany’s partners 
with Germany’s power, now was perceived a threat. The fear prompted actions aimed at 
curbing Germany’s power: Western partners, France first of all demanded Germany’s 
commitment to deepening the Western integration. A basic tool was at the time a pledge 
to embrace the EMU. 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl fully complied with these demands. He based 
Germany’s unification rhetoric on the assertion that ‘Reunification and West-integration 
are the two sides of the same coin’68. He also confirmed Germany’s commitment to the 
European Community integration. In a speech delivered a few weeks after Germany’s 
Western partners initiated the preparation to the Two Plus Four Conference Chancellor 
explicitly said ‘Our political goal continues to be acceleration of European integration 
wherever possible (…) we want to advance towards a political European Union above 
and beyond the significant Single Market, which is to be completed by 31 December 1992 
and the Economic and Monetary Union’69. This was reiterated at every important event. 
 In the Bundestag on 22 November 1990, in a speech on the next meeting of the 
European Council in Rome, Kohl declared: ‘For us Germans— and I want to emphasise 
this — the parallelism of the two intergovernmental conferences is of fundamental 
importance. Our core goal is, and will remain, the political union of Europe. As 
important as the Economic and Monetary Union is to us, in my opinion it would remain a 
piecemeal solution if did not realise a Political Union at the same time: both goal are 
inseparable’70. Kohl’s party colleagues echoed his rhetoric71, but it was his voice that 
                                         
67 The notion of the institutional power is related to the Germany”s power in Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William .E. 
Paterson, Germany”s European Diplomacy: Shaping the regional milieu. Manchester, Manchester University Press 2000. Also the 
notion is elaborated in the field of sociology; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall offer a fourfold taxonomy of power in 
International Politics: (i) Compulsory Power — the direct control of one actor over another, (ii) Institutional Power — the control 
exercised indirectly over others through diffuse relations of interaction, (iii) Structural Power — the constitution of subjects” 
capacities in direct structural relation to one another, determines what kind of social beings actors are and (iiii) Productive Power — 
the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification (overlapping often with the previous one), in: 
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, International Organization 59, Winter 200 
68 “Bericht zur Lage der Nation im geteilten Deutschland”, 8 November 1989, Auswärtiges Amt 1995: 605-612 
69 Speech of Chancellor at the opening of the Conference for Economic Cooperation in Europe in Bonn 19 March 1990, in 
Auwärtiges Amt 1995, 661-666. 
70 Bulletin der Bundesregierung, Nr. 136, 23 November 1990, p.1408 (the translation of the author)  
71 The foreign policy spokesman for the CDU/CSU group in Bundestag Karl Hornhues stated “Some countries want political union 
because they fear the dominance of a unified Germany; we should exploit this fear before it diminishes”, The Economist commented 
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determined the direction of the German policy and shaped the perception among 
Germany’s partners. 
This rhetoric was backed with concrete political actions. As early as December 
1989, Helmut Kohl outlined the link between the EMU and political union in a letter to 
president François Mitterrand72. The proposal was described by observers as a package 
deal, and would be repeatedly exposed in subsequent speeches of Chancellor Kohl. 
Moreover, when German policy makers assumed a leadership in formulating the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty, it proved Germany’s commitment to deepening the European 
integration beyond doubts. While the expectations of the Western partners were that 
Germany would comply with their demands, the congruency of German and European 
interests was perceived as limited; the commitment of Germany to the integration was 
supposed to be not on Germany’s, but its partners’ terms. French politicians especially 
used to oppose ‘excessive German plans’, such as fundamental ideas for a new 
organization of the EU73. Nonetheless, Germany met the imposed conditions through 
concrete actions that corresponded with the rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl.  
The commitment of the new Germany to deepening the European integration is 
according to majority of observers a chief proof of Germany’s continuity of the pre-
unification premises of the foreign policy74. Paradoxically at the time, the calls of Eastern 
Europeans were also based on the concept of European integration on the one hand, 
although in a new, broader sense than the integration of Western Europe, and on the 
conviction that the power of the German position within the European Community would 
secure a leadership necessary for introducing the enlargement idea on the EC/EU agenda. 
Contrary to Chancellor Kohl’s rhetoric about support for both directions of the European 
                                         
on it sarcastically: “This is where Germany”s good Europeans start to sound like good blackmailers” (“A German Idea of Europe”, 
The Economist, 27 July 1991, p.28) indicating the limits of congruency between interests of Germany and other European countries. 
72 Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage… op.cit., pp.98-100 
73 The challenge of devoting Germany to the European integration pursued by President Mitterrand was at the beginning of the 1990s 
priority, the French version of the European integration differed from a German one. While German politicians opted for a federal 
European state, their French counterparts contrary — opposed any loss of national sovereignty in key areas and — as it was observed 
by some German commentators — only accepted integration if it served as a useful tool to pursue the interest of limitation of German 
economic and political power. See: Frenkel, “German at Maastricht …, op.cit. 
74 See for example Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity and European Identity”,  European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 
5 No 3, September 1998 
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integration the expectations of Germany’s partners presented German policy makers with 
the necessity to make a choice.  
 
IV. OPTIONS 
European Imprint  
The idea of the European integration in its new emerging broader sense, as 
epitomising the unification of the continent, captured by Chancellor Kohl in the ‘two-
sides coin’ phrase worked in favour of the EC/EU enlargement. It lacked, however, 
substantiation. In its older, narrower aspect of the Western Europe’s integration, which 
was summed up in the Maastricht Treaty, it worked against a tangible support for the 
enlargement by Germany’s policy makers for three reasons.  
At the beginning of the 1990s Western integration was both more important and 
more attractive to German policy makers, but even if they wanted to support more 
actively both direction, their choices at the time were limited. A projected increase of the 
German power created impossible to ignore nervousness among Germany’s partners. 
Germany’s position in the EC/EU was of a leading power. This power was, however, 
kept in check by Germany’s partners; any major decision of the German government was 
immediately confronted with the question ‘a German Europe, or a European 
Germany?’75. This limited possibilities of manoeuvre for German policy makers 
regarding the EU enlargement. If their support for this idea was too strong, the EU 
partners could perceive it that Germany was growing more assertive in pursuing its own 
interests.  
Limiting German power had at the basis economic dimension — it kept engaging 
German resources, especially financial. The insistence on Germany’s commitment to the 
Western integration conflicted with the idea of engaging German political and economic 
                                         
75 Joseph Grieco elaborating on an earlier insight by Hans Morgenthau suggests that European integration may be the result of the 
attempts of other member states to constrain Germany especially after it has emerged potentially stronger after unification. According 
to Grieco “if states share a common interest and undertake negotiations on rule constituting a collaborative arrangement, then the 
weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules so constructed will provide sufficient opportunities for them to 
voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger partners”. See: Joseph Grieco 
, “State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and 
Monetary Union”, in: Benjamin Frankel, Realism: Restatements and Renewal, London Frank Cass, 1996, p. 34; Hans Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. New York: Knopf, 1973, p. 509 
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power into the project of the EU expansion. Each direction, the deepening and widening, 
was expected to bring certain financial costs upon the member states, but the widening of 
the EU, i.e. acceptance of the poor, post-communist East European countries, was 
anticipated as more expensive.  
The supportive for both directions rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl suggested a 
possibility of endorsing both challenges simultaneously. However, both directions were 
perceived and presented by the EU member states, and in elite discourse, as 
contradictory. A discussion over the priorities for the EC was not new and generated 
ideas of various speeds of integration for various countries. It promoted two close 
advisers of Helmut Kohl, Michael Mertes and Norbert Prill, to pointing to such a 
possibility already in July 1989. They published a draft of a European architecture of 
concentric circles, in which France, Germany and other EC countries would be in the first 
circle, Britain along with other ‘reluctant’ member states would be in the second and 
Eastern Europe — in the third one. They also stressed that both directions, deepening and 
widening of integration, would cause tension for both political and economic dynamics76.  
These arguments presented a complex dilemma for German politicians of an 
either-or choice. They did not take up actions on promoting the enlargement of the EC at 
the time of the unification, responding first to a more forceful demand of commitment to 
the deeper integration of the European Community77. Yet, although it was a condition of 
the unification, Germany’s partners also formulated much broader expectations they held 
towards the new, more powerful Germany. The scope of these expectations is reflected in 
the key document of the time — the Ten-Point plan for the unification that Chancellor 
Kohl presented on 28 November 1989, and which was accepted by all three major 
political parties of Germany: the ruling at the time Kohl’s party CDU/CSU, its partner in 
the government Free Democrats (FDP) and the opposite Social Democrats (SPD)78. The 
plan specified three areas for which Chancellor felt that the new Germany would have 
responsibility: 
                                         
76 Michael Mertes, Norbert Prill, “Der verhängnisvolle Irrtum eines Entweder-Oder. Eine Vision für Europa”, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 19 July 1989 
77 See e.g. Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage…, op. cit.; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, Broadway, 1998 
78 During the session of the Bundestag on this day. See: Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographische Berichte, Sitzung 11/173, 28 
November 1989, pp. 13510—14. Also: “Zehn-Punkte-Plan zur Deutschlandpolitk”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 29 November 1989 
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1. The first was the area of the West European integration and the continuity of 
the FRG’s foreign policy based on institutionalised multilateral cooperation.  
2. Securing sensitive relations with the Soviet Union was the second area. Soviet 
support for changes in Central and Eastern Europe, including unification of Germany, 
depended to the high degree on the American policy and the way the U.S. government 
was treating the Soviet leaders79. But it was also a challenge for the German politicians. 
Helmut Kohl had to work personally on wining support of the Soviets. Western partners 
also expected German politicians to secure smooth relations with Russia vis-à-vis the 
change of international orientation of the Eastern countries’ towards the West. 
3. Successful unification expanded Germany’s European responsibilities into the 
Eastern Europe. New democracies turned to Germany for support and help with their 
application for the EC/EU and NATO membership. This role was not imposed on 
Germany like the deeper commitment to the European integration, but it was expected of 
Germany because of its powerful position both in the EC and NATO. It was not only the 
expectation of Germany’s European partners, but of the Americans as well.  
After winning the elections of December 1990 Chancellor Kohl reiterated the 
commitment to the European integration and presented Germany’s position on the EU 
deepening and widening projects in more detail in the programme of his new government 
in January 199180. It included the following objectives: 
• Completion of the Single Market,  
• Removal of border controls,  
• Subsidiarity and cultural diversity,  
• Empowering the European Parliament,  
• Creation of a common foreign and security policy, and of economic and 
monetary union,  
• Creation of the social chapter, and linking it up closely intergovernmental 
conferences on monetary and political union  
                                         
79 Zelikow, Rice, Germany Unified…, op. cit. 
80 Helmut Kohl, Bilanzen und Perspektiven, Regierungspolitik 1989-1991, Bergisch Gladbach: Gustave Lübbe, 1992, p. 687; also 
Bulletin der Bundesregierung NO 11, 31 January 1991, p. 62 
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While presenting the programme Kohl stressed that the EU should be open for 
other European countries and that the East European states should have a ‘European 
perspective’. He clarified this statement further two months later, saying ‘this does not 
mean that we can accept all European countries tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, but 
it does mean that we do not exclude anyone if the conditions for membership are 
fulfilled’81. This reflects accurately a place of the enlargement idea versus the integration 
project in the political concept of the German European policy in 1991. 
 
2. Enlargement Not Critical 
At the time of the unification negotiations while presenting the reasons for the 
integration commitment Chancellor Kohl stressed that the unified Germany needed to be 
anchored in a more integrated Europe. This would give political assurance to its 
neighbours and prevent ‘any recidivist behaviour by future German governments’82. This 
concern was the main force behind the German insistence on the Maastricht Treaty. The 
EMU, projected in the Treaty, was regarded by Kohl as essential in order to give the 
Union the capability to act as ‘Europe’s anchor of stability that was to be accompanied 
by efforts to build a political union’83.  
Despite the fact then, that structural determinants of Germany’s power after the 
unification allowed Germany to ‘go it alone’, Germany chose the consistency in its 
foreign policy. The fact that Germany, with its new sovereign status, accepted the 
commitment to the further and increased multilateral interdependence within the 
European Union, prompted commentators to declaring the continuity of the European and 
multilateral premises of the German foreign policy84. This continuity was also congruent 
                                         
81 Solidarität und Bereitschaft zur Verantwortung. Die Rolle Deutschlands in Europa, on 13 March 1991, in Kohl, Bilanzen und 
Perspektiven…, op.cit., p. 818 
82 Kenneth Dyson, “The Franco-German Relationship and Economic and Monetary Union: Using Europe to Bind Leviathan”,  West 
European Politics, Vol. 22, No 1 January 1999 
83 Kohl stressed that explicitly in the statement at the Bundestag on 30 January 1991, in Deutscher Bundestag, Stengroahic Reports, 
155: 67-90. See also Josef Janning and Franco Algieri, “The German Debate”, in: “The 1996 IGC — National Debates (2): Germany, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK”, Chatham House Discussion Paper 67, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996; See also 
Ulf Frenkel, “German at Maastricht — power politics or Civilian Power?”, in: Harnisch, Maull, Germany as a Civilian, … op.cit. 
84 Thomas Banchoff elaborating on the new identity of the new Germany asked why Germany had not embraced a more assertive and 
independent foreign policy choosing to make an active Ostpolitik a priority over deeper European integration?; in: Thomas Banchoff, 
“German Identity… op.cit. A typical is also the observation like the one Christian Deubner evolved his analysis around: “However, 
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with Germany’s interests; the commitment to the deeper integration was as much a result 
of conditioning the unification, bas the fact that Western integration was in many respects 
congruent with Germany’s interests.  
Germany’s dedication to the European integration was first a consequence of the 
choices made in the WWII aftermath. After 40 years of multilateral and increasingly 
closer cooperation within the European project, in which Germany played a fundamental 
role, at the moment of regaining the state’s unity and sovereignty, German politicians 
held that national interests lay in the further multilateral cooperation within the European 
structures. Germany neither could afford, nor wanted to change these cornerstone 
premises, risking loss of the reputation of a civilian power that was built over decades. 
These credentials represented a core value of Germany’s position in the international 
realm and within the structures of the EU. 
Germany’s European commitment coalesced with the political culture of reticence 
and presented opportunities for exercising a soft state power. German policy makers 
found their involvement in cooperation within the EC/EU structures satisfying, because it 
provided an opportunity to influence the shape of these structures and this cooperation. 
This supposition does not have a pejorative connotation. The EC/EU membership was 
conceptualised in terms of multilayered interactions of interests, institutions and ideas85. 
German politicians exercised institutional power within the European Community 
through ‘exporting’ German domestic institutional models, policy preferences, and the 
‘ways of doing things’86. It gave Germany a significant position within the EU.  
                                         
despite the epochal events of 1989–90, the Federal Republic continued to make the deepening of European integration a priority over 
its widening. When the twin goals of deepening and widening conflicted, as they did periodically in 1993–4, the Kohl government 
placed greater emphasis on the former. French concerns about a possible shift of the EU”s centre of gravity eastward were apparently 
one reason Kohl abandoned plans to make widening a central issue of Germany”s 1994 EU presidency”. In: Christian Deubner, 
Deutsche Europapolitik Von Maastricht nach Kerneuropa?, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 1995   
85 Wayne Sandholz, “Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions”,  Journal of Common Market 
Studies, NO 34, September 1996 
86 As it was put by Jeffrey Anderson “Bonn”s general goal in Europe was to erect institutional and normative frameworks at the 
supranational level that would nurture its successful domestic economic formula”, in: Jeffrey Anderson, German Unification and the 
Union of Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 13; see also Dyson and Goetz citing Jeffrey Anderson, “Hard Interests, Soft 
Power and Germany”s Changing Role in Europe”, in: Katzenstein, ed. Tamed Power…, op.cit.  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
68 
The fact, that German post-war foreign policy was based on the belief that 
integration with the Western community would strengthen Germany87, resulted in 
‘Europeanization of the German state identity’88. This notion represents a strategy for 
German national interests seeking to shape the surrounding milieu89. From the German 
leaders’ point of view a supranational identity did not rule out clashes with other EU 
members. Hans-Dietrich Genscher in his speech on the Maastricht Treaty during the 
Bundestag debate of December 199190, stressed that Germany might not always be able 
to prevail under the weighted majority voting of the Council of Ministers. He added that 
Germans should accept such outcomes ‘in a European spirit’ and work upon them.  
This represents a facet of a state power in the European context that is explainable 
with the liberal intergovernmenatlist assumptions, which emphasise the bargaining 
between member states as the driving force of the development of the European Union. 
In the rationalist spirit Gunther Hellmann also pointed to a concept of ‘self-binding’ of 
Germany’s power in order to reassure its neighbours about its reliability91. This motive, 
the assurance of the EC partners that a unified Germany would remain loyal to the 
Community was according to Joseph Grieco the reason why German leaders accepted the 
EMU in 1990-199192. German leaders accepted the EMU however before the unification, 
already in 1988. During the unification they reiterated and strengthened this commitment. 
This circumstance points to constructivist perspective as the tool for explaining the 
origins of the choice of multilateralism but as Peter Katzenstein put it, the context for 
German foreign policy is Europeanization: ‘this is not to argue that German policy 
reflected idealistic motives in the 1980s or 1990s. It did not. It reflected German 
                                         
87 Bulmer and Paterson point that “German diplomatic resources were enhanced tangibly through the integration process; e.g. foreign 
policy cooperation among the EC states served as important multilateral tool for a political dwarf”. In: Bulmer and Paterson, 
“Germany in the European Union: gentle … , op. cit. 
88 Goetz, Integration policy in a Europeanised state, … op.cit.; Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Power…, op.cit. 
89 Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, Germany”s European Diplomacy…, op.cit. 
90 Verhandlungen, 13 December 1991: 5822 
91 Gunther Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck: The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany”,  Mershom International Studies Review, 
40:1-39, 1996; Gunther Hellmann, “The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who is Listening?”,  German Politics, 6:29-57, 
1997 
92 Joseph M. Grieco, “The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union  and the Neo-Realist Research Programme”,  Review of 
International Studies, 21, 1995; Joseph M. Grieco, “State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of 
the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union”,  Security Studies, 5, 1996, p. 302-03 
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interests. But those interests, pursued through power and bargaining, were 
fundamentally shaped by the institutional context of Europe and the Europeanization of 
the identity of the German state that had taken place in the preceding decades’93.  
The chief interest of Germany at the beginning of the 1990s decade was to regain 
the full sovereignty in the world of national sovereign states. It was the driving force of 
the German foreign policy at the moment of the structural opening. And the challenges 
Germany had to meet, to overcome peacefully the Russian obstacle and to commit to the 
deeper Western integration, became the priority for the German foreign policy. The idea 
of the Eastward expansion of the European Community/Union was not critical for the 
main goal of the German foreign policy.  
 
V. RESULTS 
Not the Same Coin 
The Eastern European governments pushed the European Community for an 
explicit commitment to the goal of enlargement94. That required, however, a leadership 
on the EC side. Eastern Europeans expected Germany to assume this role, and so did the 
U.S. administration. Preoccupation of the German government with the unification 
created a vacuum. It was filled with a highly unsatisfactory for the Eastern Europeans 
solution.  
The calls for widening the European Community forced the EC members to 
responding in a more tangible way than just rhetorically. To the disappointment of the 
East Europeans, the EC members did not offer opening the door to the EC, starting 
negotiations of the terms and conditions of accession, what East European diplomacy 
                                         
93 Peter J. Katzenstein, “United Germany in an Integrating Europe”, in: Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Power…, op.cit., p.14-15 
94 For example the Polish chief negotiator in the association negotiations with the EC, Krzysztof Olechowski, stated “that “the 
technocratic approach” is not enough in these negotiations, which have a historic goal: give Europe back to Poland, and Poland back 
to Europe”. See: Europe 5456, 21 March 1991, 4. In 1990, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kodolanyi argued that the Iberian enlargement 
“had been the result of a political settlement” (pushing economic problems in the background) and “that the Community would do the 
right thing now to take a similar decision”, see: Europe 5206, 3 March 1990, 5. Not only Poles, Czechs or Hungarians were stressing 
the historical and moral side of the enlargement challenge. When Italy blocked negotiations with Slovenia because of open property 
questions, Slovenian officials also brought history and European identity into play. President Kucan argued that “Slovenia would 
again have the feeling that it is the victim of a historical error if it were refused access to the European Union” and warned that “Italy 
cannot allow itself to oppose Slovenia”s accession as it would be placing a self-centred position before European interests”. See 
Europe 6263, 30 June 1994, 6 
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strived and worked for. The EC members agreed instead to offer merely a packet of 
economic concessions, and only to three Eastern countries that were known as the 
Višegrad Group95— Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It was the European Council 
and the European Commission, supported by the French president François Mitterrand, 
who first offered an initiative to respond to the developments in Eastern Europe. In the 
summer of 1989 the Council proposed financial assistance to the new Eastern 
democracies96, and in December that year the creation of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Subsequently, in February and April 1990, the 
European Commission offered association arrangements that took the shape of the 
Europe Agreements97.  
A proposal of association arrangements presented an occasion for German policy 
makers to put forward an offer congruent with the direction set in the supportive for the 
enlargement rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl. Kohl’s government, however, did not present 
its own proposals, accepting only those of the Western partners.  
The packet, called Europe Agreements, was viewed not only by Eastern 
Europeans, but also by many Western observers as a ‘defence instrument’ of the EC 
members, designed to keep East European countries outside the EC98. The outcome of the 
negotiations of the Agreements was even more disappointing than initial design, and it 
was the German representation, which contributed to this disappointment. Although 
                                         
95 It was created in February 1991, when the leaders of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia established a Višegrad Group as a 
common front and tool to press for integration with the EC and other Western organisations; the name comes form the Hungarian 
village, in which the leaders of these countries met for the first time a year before, in April 1990 to discuss a commons strategy versus 
the Western organisations. For other details see: http://www.Višegradgroup.org/.  
96 “Conclusions of the Presidency Adopted at the End of the European Council in Madrid, 26 and 27 June 1989”,  Bulletin of the 
European Communities 6, 1989 
97 It was an initiative of the European Council to response in an organised way to the changes in the East; at the summit of G7 in 
Paris in July 1989 it was decided that the European Commission should coordinate the financial assistance for Poland and Hungary, 
what has become the PHARE fund. The proposal of founding the EBRD was presented by François Mitterrand at the European 
Council meeting in Strasbourg in December 1989. And it was the European Commission that proposed officially in April 1990 
opening the negotiations over association agreements. See “Conclusions of the Presidency Adopted at the End of the European 
Council in Strasbourg, 8 and 9 December 1989”, Bulletin of the European Communities 12, 1989 
98 Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider claim the proposal of the Europe Agreements was burdened with the “strategic 
ambivalence”: Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider, “Association and Beyond: the European Union and the Višegrad States”, in: 
Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider, (eds.), “Monitoring Association and Beyond. The European Union and the Višegrad States”,  
Europäische Schriften des Instituts für Europäische Politik, Band 74, Europa Union Verlag Bonn, 1995, p.26; Heinz Kramer, “The 
European Community”s response to the New Eastern Europe,”  Journal of Common Market Studies, NO 31/2, 1993 
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initially German policy makers voiced their support for the association agreements with 
the East and Central European states, it turned out that economic interests of the German 
agriculture and steel industry were in conflict with the idea of opening market to cheaper 
competitors from the East.  
Of the proposed packet of economic accords, only the liberalization of trade was 
successfully delivered. The removal of barriers in the areas of agriculture, coal, steel and 
textiles industries, which was vital for introducing free market economies in Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, remained in the sphere of intentions. The negotiations over 
Europe Agreements conducted in June/July 1991, six months after the unification of 
Germany, were interrupted when the Polish negotiators walked away from the table, 
protesting against changes in the EC offer. The incident had bad perception in the Eastern 
countries; it was a shock for Eastern Europeans that the EC members were so defensive 
in keeping the status quo, and that the main opposition came from France, which 
originally had proposed the negotiations, and Germany99.  
Both countries’ domestic interests were at stake, but it was France leading the 
opposition, with Germany following. As Ulrich Sedelmeier noted ‘Although Germany as 
a whole had the strongest interest among EU members in stability in Eastern Europe, 
concessions to some sectors of domestic industry led to a highly restrictive stance on 
market access in the Europe Agreements negotiations. Not only did it contradict a strictly 
economic logic, if one takes into account the considerable future export opportunities for 
German industry, but in the broader political context it undermined an otherwise 
consistent political strategy which combined substantial financial aid with support for 
eventual membership’100. The barrage of criticism was directed mainly at Germany, 
although the German position was not as rigid as the French one. German negotiators 
                                         
99 The European Agreements were eventually signed up in December that year, however in a much narrowed down version, without 
the vital for the Eastern countries part. The bitter shock was a subject of numerous articles in the press of Poland and Czechoslavakia; 
how deep was the disappointment shows the opinion of the then Polish Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, who commented in the 
interview with the author that “we should have first negotiated the concrete help from the European Community and the opening of 
their market for our products, then to run the general elections, which brought Poland democracy and independence”. The same 
comment Bielecki applied to the case of the Czech Velvet Revolution as the perception of the failure of European Agreements in 
Czechoslovakia was similar to this in Poland. 
100 Ulrich Sedelmeier, “The European Union”s association policy towards Central and Eastern Europe”, Sussex European Institute 
Discussion Paper, 2001, p. 14 
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favoured setting up long transitional periods, while the French representatives opposed 
transitional periods altogether. 
The passive stance of the German government was not an exception among the 
EC members. The Community’s response to the East European calls for enlargement was 
to stall rather than to act101. As Sedelmeier and Wallace put it, they ‘reflected a sense that 
’something had to be done’, but not a policy’102. The Commission proposed negotiation 
of the association agreements but sought to avoid any reference to the future accession103. 
In its communication to the Council, the Commission clearly stated that the associations 
would not represent a sort of membership ‘antichamber’ and the issue of the membership 
would not be excluded, but for the time being this was a ‘separate question’104. It 
presented a sharp contrast with the rapid inclusion of the former GDR into the EC; the 
EC institutions showed far-reaching flexibility in arranging coordinating mechanism, 
which was exceptional and unconventional in the EC practices105. 
The support for the enlargement idea Chancellor Kohl declared in his rhetoric, the 
unification of Germany, and the embracement of the GDR into the EC, created 
expectations that Germany would lead the enlargement process. Those factors raised 
hopes in Eastern Europe and fears in the Western part. These opposing perceptions 
marked the room of manoeuvre for German policy makers and presented the reason why 
Chancellor’s rhetoric was designed carefully, without indicating specific prospects.  
In October 1990 Helmut Kohl declared ‘our offer is aimed at the reform states of 
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, to guide them to the European Community 
as early and as closely as possible through an association geared at their needs’106. As 
the pressure during the German unification was on securing Russian support and leaving 
                                         
101 See the descriptions for example: Alan Mayhew, Recreating Europe. The European Union”s Policy towards Central and Eastern 
Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998; Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, “Policies Towards Central and Eastern 
Europe”, in: Helen Wallace and William Wallace, (Eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 353-387; José Ignacio Torreblanca Payá, “The European Community and Central Eastern Europe (1989-1993): Foreign Policy 
and Decision-Making”, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, 1997 
102 Sedelmeier and Wallace, Policies Towards…, op.cit. 
103 See for example Jose I. Torreblanca, The reuniting of Europe: promises, negotiations and compromise. Ashgate, 2001 
104 Europe 5185, 2 February 1990 
105 David Spence, “Enlargement without Accession: the EC”s response to German unification”, London: Royal Institute for 
International Affairs Discussion Paper NO 36, 1991. 
106 Kohl, Bilanzen und Perspektiven… op.cit, p. 687  
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no doubts about the Western integration commitment, German policy makers did not 
push for tighter, earlier arrangements with Eastern Europe. Chancellor Kohl, while 
presenting the goals of his new government in January 1991, assured that East European 
states should have a ‘European perspective’. He stressed at the same time, however, that 
it did not mean that ‘we can accept all European countries tomorrow or the day after 
tomorrow’, but that ‘we do not exclude anyone if the conditions for membership are 
fulfilled’107.  
 
SUMMARY 
The described inconsistency between Chancellor’s pronouncement of ‘Europe’s 
unification’ as identical with ‘Germany’s unification’, and the lack of adequate actions 
that would support this idea on the European Community level, created ambivalence in 
Germany’s initial policy towards the EC Eastern enlargement, and in Eastern Europe a 
fear that the Chancellor’s rhetoric was only a lip service. This empirical evidence points 
to a question: was it possible for the German Chancellor, at the time of Germany’s 
unification, to back up his own rhetoric with tangible actions and use more resolutely for 
example the Europe Agreements’ planning and negotiations? 
To explain Germany’s enlargement policy at the unification moment one has to 
look at the structural level of the geopolitical order. The presence of the Soviet troops in 
East Germany was the first factor. Germany’s partners’ fears of the enhanced German 
power prompted imposing on Germany a condition of committing to the deeper Western 
integration, which was the second factor. Both created a grip, which did not leave 
German policy makers much room for the normative approach during the negotiations of 
the unification. Despite thus that German policy makers stressed that the unification of 
their country fulfilled a normative goal of ending bipolar confrontation, at the unifying 
Germany remained at the time still subordinate to the Cold War order. On the other hand, 
the normative rhetoric of Helmut Kohl was countered by its Western partners with the 
rational calculation of the political and economic costs of Germany’s unification. The EC 
members used the deepening EC integration instrumentally in the context of Germany’s 
                                         
107 Solidarität und Bereitschaft zur Verantwortung. Die Rolle Deutschlands in Europa, on 13 March 1991, in: Kohl, Bilanzen und 
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unification. Although the introduction of the single currency had been planned as the next 
step of upgrading the integration before 1990s, but Germany’s unification speeded up the 
process; Germany’s partners used the EC deepening project as a tool for containing 
Germany’s prospective super-power.  
In this way international environment shaped German government’s actions: they 
were aimed at meeting Western partners’ terms and winning the Soviet acceptance. 
Rationalist politics of Germany’s partners limited the constructivist narrative, as the 
German foreign policy became a narrow channel for subordinating all efforts to the 
unification goal. A challenge of the EC Eastern enlargement prompted response and the 
response given by Chancellor Helmut Kohl was in the spirit of multilateralism of the 
German foreign policy. Given the demands of Western partners of Germany he could not 
though push for an early enlargement. The lack of actions, the absence of a more 
supportive for the Eastern Europeans stance during the Europe Agrrements negotiations, 
created ambivalence in Germany’s early policy towards the enlargement. As the 
supportive rhetoric was built by Chancellor Helmut Koh, the question about this passive 
stance concerns first his person as the main actor. 
During the unification process, Chancellor Kohl fully demonstrated the ability of 
independent setting a guideline for state policies. Famously, when the Chancellor’s 
Office drew up the Ten-Point plan for th eunification, none of the government ministries 
or any major partners abroad were consulted. Kohl did it empowered by the constitutional 
prerogatives for setting a Richtlinie, a guideline for the state policies. This evidence 
points out that the dispersion of power in the German policy-making apparatus does not 
affect the power of the Chancellor in formulating the policy either in the internal or 
external domain. ‘In principle, the fragmentation of foreign policy has not limited the 
scope or influence of the chancellor as the most important foreign policy actor’ — writes 
Judith Siwert-Probst108.  
Chancellor Kohl used to sometimes reserve the right to have the ‘last word’ on 
some issues, declaring them to be ‘Chefsache’. Chefsache is rather an exception than the 
rule. The circumstances of the unification were unique by all means and called for 
                                         
108 Judith Siwert-Probst, Traditional Institutions of Foreign Policy”, in: Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (eds.), Germany”s 
New Foreign Policy. Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, Palgrave 2001  
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exceptional measures. The idea of embracing Eastern Europe was novel and 
unprecedented too, yet it did not become a Chefsache. Nor did Chancellor present it to 
his European partners as a matter for consideration. Apart from the rhetoric the idea did 
not receive any support from the German Chancellor at the time. The main explanation is 
that Chancellor’s top priority was the unification, and that the conditions presented by 
Western partners required his utmost attention. But it also points to probability that 
Chancellor Kohl was undecided about the enlargement idea yet.  
Henning Tewes who looked into the nexus Germany’s unification-EC 
enlargement, indicates that the fact that Chancellor Kohl did not present a guideline on 
the issue of Europe Agreements created chaos in the negotiations109. Details of 
agreements like the Europe Agreements are rarely elaborated on the level of the chief of 
government; the Chancellor usually sets Richtlinie (guideline), and the others negotiate 
details. Europe Agreements dealt with a change in two sectors, of agriculture and steel 
industry. Representatives of both sectors had at the time extensive experience in 
defending their interests in the EC, especially on the Common Agriculture Policy. 
Chancellor Kohl left the room for them to negotiate. That was a reflection of the 
dispersion of power in the German policymaking system, which is most apparent in 
negotiations of economic/financial arrangement on the EC/EU level. 
In sum — the opinion that Chancellor Kohl was an architect of the enlargement 
could suggest that the enlargement was an initiative launched by German politicians. It 
was not. German politicians were preoccupied with the unification of their country and 
were far from embracing the enlargement idea on the policymaking level in the years 
1990-1992. But paradoxically with the Helmut Kohl’s persuasive, ideational argument 
about the unification of Germany as identical with the unification of the whole continent, 
the Eastern enlargement idea gained crucially important spur of support from one of the 
main actors on the European stage. The Kohl’s unification rhetoric represents the first 
dimension of the normative reasoning that will be from this moment onwards behind the 
German support for the enlargement. It also represents the beginning of the change of the 
concept of the European integration. German elite discourse and German policy will 
contribute immensely to this change. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Past Legacy in Bilateral Relations 
As the Cause of Ambivalence 
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EC/EU Enlargement 
1990 — 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This chapter examines perception and manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s 
enlargement policy that were caused by the problems stemming from the past legacy in 
bilateral relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. The perception of 
ambivalence was created by reluctance of the German government executives to solve 
these problems, because it contradicted the reasoning behind their supportive for the 
enlargement rhetoric. The manifestation of ambivalence was caused by the actions of 
non-government actors, who attempted to block the Czech application for the EU 
membership on the grounds of unresolved claims pertaining to the past legacy, which 
contradicted the support of the German government for the enlargement.  
Historical legacy played double role in the German policy towards the EU 
enlargement. It provided the main normative reasoning for the support of the 
enlargement, but it also caused problems that interfered with this support. The year 1989 
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presented a ‘zero-hour’ in bilateral relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours 
and it faced German policy makers with a two-fold challenge. First was the necessity to 
achieve a post-WWII rapprochement with the neighbours, second — to avoid economic 
and political domination of the region. The EU enlargement idea was perceived as an 
excellent opportunity for achieving both goals. This reasoning presented the grounds for 
the German support of the enlargement. Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
whose formative experience was shaped by the WWII aftermath, supported ambitions of 
the Eastern European countries, particularly of Poland, for joining the EU and NATO 
structures, because they both considered such a support as a historical imperative for the 
German nation.  
The relations between two sides were burdened with a difficult, unresolved WWII 
legacy. The issue of the Eastern border of Germany, and the claims of the German 
expellees against the Czech government, overshadowed both the rapprochement process 
and the German enlargement policy. While during Helmut Kohl’s tenure these problems 
did not jeopardise the enlargement, they did after a generational change at the German 
government in 1998. Different rhetoric, and a costs-calculation oriented approach to the 
foreign policy of the new politicians at power, encouraged domestic expellees groups to 
using the EU enlargement instrumentally in attempt to win the claims. 
The ‘past legacy’ factor reflects interplay between political calculations on the 
domestic level and actions on the international board. Expellees groups presented a 
significant part of the CDU/CSU constituency. Securing their support in elections 
required accommodating their demands. Government executives, both Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl and Gerhard Schröder kept distance to the problem, neither supporting the demands 
of expellees, nor denying them, which created a perception of ambivalence in Germany’s 
enlargement policy. The demands of the expellees were used, however, as leverage in 
elections campaigns, and actions of other politicians aimed at helping the expellees’ 
cause, created a manifestation of ambivalence. 
While both the perception and the manifestation of ambivalence in this case were 
caused by interplay between two levels of the game, external and internal, at the basis of 
this interplay was a clash of two different historical narratives that refer to the experience 
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of World War II and constitute a significant part of the German national identity; it is a 
constructivist perspective that can explain these narratives.  
 
I. AMBIVALENCE 
The support for the enlargement voiced by German policy makers was perceived 
as contradicted by conflicts in bilateral relations between Germany and Poland, and was 
contradicted in relations with the Czech Republic. The conflict was caused by unresolved 
legacy of the past. A problem of this legacy overshadowed mutual relations for the most 
part of the enlargement process, from the moment of Germany’s unification into the early 
2000s. At the initial stage of introducing the enlargement idea, this factor caused a 
perception of ambivalence; in the later phase of negotiations over the terms of 
enlargement it caused a manifestation of ambivalence.  
A perception of ambivalence occurred as a gap between supportive for the 
enlargement rhetoric of German policy makers and their reluctance with solving 
problems of the past legacy. Ambivalence manifested as a contradiction between 
supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of government actors and actions of non-
government ones, who held the power to influence the course of the enlargement. The 
perception of ambivalence was caused by the dispute over the Oder-Neisse border 
between Germany and Poland, which occurred during the negotiations of Germany’s 
unification. The manifestation of ambivalence was a result of actions of the German 
deputies to the European Parliament, who put forth a demand of the German expellees’ 
organizations for annulment of the so-called Beneš Decrees, making it a precondition of 
the Czech membership in the EU. The call jeopardised directly the Czech accession 
application. 
Neither issue was directly related to the EU enlargement process. The question 
thus is how did it create a perception and manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s 
enlargement policy?  
The past legacy problems belong to the bilateral relations between Germany and 
its Eastern neighbours — Poland, and Czechoslovakia, after 1993 — the Czech Republic. 
Germany’s policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the EU was a dominant part of 
these relations, and German officials considered both countries, plus Hungary, as 
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frontrunners of the enlargement. This was an indicator of the meaning German politicians 
attached to the relations with these countries. At the basis of this attitude was the sense of 
particular historical connection. German elites felt a strong moral obligation towards the 
Poles and the Czechs in the context of WWII. They also shared awareness of the role 
both nations played in the 1989 revolution, which opened up for Germany a path to 
unification.  
The narrative referring to the experience of WWII has a special meaning because 
it is a foundation of the post-war national identity of the German nation. It is built around 
the imperative of breaking with the negative past experience of the war, and underlies 
Germany’s European identity and the premises of multilateral cooperation in the post-war 
German foreign policy. Continuity of this imperative into the post-unification time 
substantiated support for the EU enlargement, which was expressed in the supportive for 
enlargement rhetoric of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. He built this rhetoric during the 
unification time, relating Germany’s unification to the unification of the whole continent. 
This support was received by Germany’s neighbours as a very strong 
confirmation of the will to overcome and solve problems of the past legacy. It was seen 
as a cornerstone of a new era in the mutual relations. This represents a normative, moral 
dimension of the German enlargement policy, which distinguishes it from enlargement 
policies of other EC/EU member states. Reluctance against solving problems of the past 
legacy undermined thus the image of the German government as willing to build new 
quality relations with the Eastern partners, and for this reason created a perception of 
ambivalence in the declared supportive stance on the enlargement. Both images and 
perceptions play an important role in politics and international relations and in relations 
between Germany and the Eastern neighbours constitute a significant part of their 
national identity narratives. 
Out of the three countries only relation with Hungary was trouble-free. The 
relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic were heavily burdened. The 
most important issue between Germany and Poland was the status of the border. 
Although determined by the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, the border between two 
countries was provisional in legal terms and that served the revisionists claims. The 
German-Czech relations were troubled by the compensation claims for the lost territories 
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and properties, brought up by the German expellees, the so-called Sudeten Germans. 
Before 1989, their claims were solved only partially. The issue returned in the midst of 
Germany’s unification, casting shadow on the initial enthusiasm over the 1989 
revolution, which was seen as a chance for break in the difficult history between 
Germany and the Eastern countries.  
At the early stage, during the Germany’s unification process, both issues caused a 
perception of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement. The reluctance 
of Chancellor Helmut Kohl to confirm the Eastern border presented a strong contrast to 
his ‘two-sides coin’ rhetoric about the unification of Germany and of Europe. It caused a 
perception of ambivalence in the German stance on the enlargement in relation to Poland. 
A similar perception in relation to the Czech application for the EU membership was 
caused by a similarly reluctant attitude of Chancellor Kohl in regards to the issue of the 
Sudeten Germans’ claims, raised by the German expellees organizations against 
Czechoslovak authorities during the German unification. 
The border issue was solved relatively quickly, although causing political tension 
and freezing for almost a year the German-Polish rapprochement. The Sudeten Germans’ 
claims against the Czech Republic were solved neither during the German unification nor 
in bilateral treaties. The reluctant stance of Helmut Kohl’s government, who did not 
interfere in the argument between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech authorities, caused 
the perception of ambivalence in the German policy towards the Czech Republic and its 
application for the EU membership. Despite later efforts to put bilateral relations on a 
reconciliation track, the problem of the Sudeten Germans kept returning and 
overshadowed the enlargement policy of the government of Gerhard Schröder.  
Gerhard Schröder’s team brought different attitude towards the enlargement. A 
formative experience of Gerhard Schröder’s generation was not shaped by the WWII 
aftermath, but by the leftist student movement of 1968, which burst out in opposition to 
the Bonn Republic and its politics. This formed different attitudes in the area of national 
identity related to Germany’s past. A distinction brought into the foreign policy was not 
about its re-orientation, or breaking from its premises; the new Social Democrat–Green 
coalition government announced that it would pursue a much bolder advocacy of national 
interests. That encouraged expellees group to taking up more decisive actions: in order to 
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force the Czech government to meet their demands they attempted to block the Czech 
application to the EU. The action was carried out by the leading politicians of the CDU 
party and German deputies to the European Parliament, who both are a part of the 
German policymaking system. German government did not support these attempts, but 
the move caused a manifestation of ambivalence in the German policy towards the 
enlargement and the silence of the German executives over the issue exacerbated the 
perception of this ambivalence. 
 
II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS 
Enlargement — Leverage in Bilateral Relations 
The end of the bipolar world created a possibility to break a power politics pattern 
in the mutual relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. Elites on both sides 
understood that the post-war reconciliation between two sides was a precondition for a 
genuine reunification of Europe. They realised it would require overcoming two deeply 
rooted sets of resentments connected with WWII: Eastern Europeans’ distrust of 
Germans, rooted in the grave experience of the war, and German resentments over the 
post-war lost territories and expulsions.  
This represents a background for what most observers and scholars indicate as the 
main reason of Germany’s support for the Eastern enlargement110 — the sense of 
historical responsibility and obligation towards Eastern Europe shared by majority of the 
German elites. According to the constructivist perspective, historical narratives can 
establish a link between identity and interests on the level of elite discours. Such a 
discourse builds a narrative that interprets the past in the light of the present challenges. 
German historical narrative built the national identity presenting the narrative of 
departing from the atrocious experience of WWII. It also suggests a responsibility for the 
WWII consequences and points to the interest of overcoming the past. 
In respect to Eastern Europe German elites felt responsibility that stemmed from 
the WWII atrocities inflicted by Nazis on the region and the 4-decades Soviet rule 
brought upon Eastern Europe as the result of the war. It is the very same foundation as 
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Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
82 
the basis of the national identity narrative of discontinuity with the negative experience of 
the past. But the moral call for supporting the enlargement had also another dimension. 
As early as 1989 a respected German historian and political scientist Peter Bender 
reminded, that forty years earlier the USA and the Western European states helped 
Germany financially to lay down the foundation for the future wealth of the FRG. Now 
Germany had a moral duty to help those in need. The call that ‘Germany cannot afford 
the EC ended on the Oder-Neisse border’111 exemplified the attitude of the majority of 
the German elites at the time. From the constructivist point of view this was a narrative of 
an extension of the key positive juncture in Germany’s history.   
Historical circumstances made the post WWII rapprochement between two sides 
much more challenging, however, than it was for Germany and the Western countries112. 
The latter were neither burdened with comparably heavy experience of war atrocities, nor 
were they alien to West Germany after WWII, like Eastern Europeans locked out behind 
the Iron Curtain. Propaganda employed during the Cold War on both sides of the Curtain, 
deepened the mutual hostility between Germany and Eastern countries, as both sides 
were indoctrinated with a simplified and confrontational version of history113.  
Solving the past legacy problems within a common institutional framework of the 
EC/EU presented thus the best prospect for developing relations of new quality. As noted 
by Adrian Hyde-Price the belief commonly shared by the German elites, that the 
enlargement would provide a multilateral context for German relations with the Eastern 
neighbours, coalesced with the strong sense of historical debt and moral responsibility 
                                         
111 Peter Bender, “Die Grosse Chance für den alten Kontinent”, Die Zeit, 1 July 1989 
112 On post-WWII reconciliation of Germany with France, Israel, Poland, the Czech Republic see: Lily Gardner-Feldman, “The 
principle and Practice of Reconciliation in German Foreign Policy. Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic”, 
International Affairs 75, no 2, 1999; Ann Philipps, “The Politics of Reconciliation”, German Politics, no 2, 1998; Michael Zielinski, 
Friedensursachen. Genese Und Konstituierende Bedingungen Von Friedensgemeinschaften Am Beispiel Der Bundesrepubli 
Deutschland Und Der Entwicklung Ihrer Beziehungen Ze Den USA, Frankreich Und Den Niederlanded, Baden-Baden: Nomos-
Verlagsgessellschaft, 1995 
113 For attempts of the Polish dissident writers to discuss the official communist propaganda and remembering true facts from the 
Polish-German history see for example: Stanislaw Stomma, Czy Fatalizm Wrogości, Refleksje o Stosunkach Polsko- Niemieckich 
1871-1933, Znak: Kraków 1980; Jan Józef Lipski, “Dwie Ojczyzny- Dwa Patriotyzmy. Uwagi o Megalomanii Narodowej i 
Ksenofobii Polakow”, in: Powiedzieć sobie wszystko, Eseje o Sąsiedztwie Polsko-Niemieckim, Wydawnictwo Polsko-Niemieckie, 
Warszawa 1996 
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toward the Eastern countries114. Membership in the common political structure of the EU, 
with certain state powers delegated to the common supranational body, would create a 
platform for creation of common interests, thus a much better environment for solving 
problems of the past. 
There were three problematic areas that needed a change. 
The first was the old Ostpolitik. It was originally addressed first and foremost to 
the Soviet Union. After 1989, the East Europeans’ goal was to break down their status of 
‘buffer states’ between the West and Russia. The membership in the EU and NATO was 
seen as a possibility for obtaining this objective and Eastern Europeans sought German 
support for their ambitions. It required Germany to put the relations with the Eastern 
neighbours on equal terms with the relations with Russia, thus to depart from the 
‘Moscow first’ premises. 
The second challenge was of economic character and concerned the whole region. 
German policy makers felt obligated to prove that the unified Germany did not intend to 
assume a hegemonic position in the region and revive the notion of Mitteleuropa, which 
was historically loaded as a synonym for German tendencies to exercise a dominant 
power over the other states in the region115. Again the EU framework would provide a 
more levelled ground for economic and political cooperation. 
And the third issue was the WWII legacy. The Oder-Neisse border between 
Germany and Poland, claims of the expellees on the German side needed a reconciliation 
and political solution.  
 
1. Challenge of Ostpolitik 
This was a challenge to upgrade a conditional peace to a normal peace in mutual 
relations. These relations at the end of communism were, as Adrian Hyde-Price called it, 
                                         
114 Hyde-Price, Germany and European… op.cit., p.183 
115 Werner Weidenfeld, a historian and political scientist close to Chancellor Kohl and his informal aide on the European issues, 
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locale rationalised on historically motivated grounds see: Bruno Schoch, “Renaissance der Mitte — Ein Fragwürdiger Bestandteil 
deutscher Ideologie kehrt wieder”, in the same editor, Deutschlands Einheit und Europa Zukunft, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1992, pp.120-14 
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in a state of ‘conditional peace’116. It was preceded by a ‘precarious peace’, based on a 
military balance of power and nuclear deterrence, which directly reflected the Cold War 
conditions. ‘Precarious peace’ evolved into a ‘conditional peace’ under German 
Ostpolitk117. This policy was launched by the SPD/FDP coalition in the years 1969-1972, 
under the intellectual leadership of Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) and was continued 
throughout the 1980s by the CDU-FDP coalition of Helmut Kohl.  
Its aim was rapprochement with the communist countries that would bring both 
German states closer together, according to the formula ‘change through rapprochement’ 
coined by Egon Bahr, Chancellor Brandt’s advisor. Therefore the main addressee of 
Ostpolitik was the Soviet Union. As the dominant power it determined the fate of the 
German-German relations; the recognition of the political dependence of the GDR on the 
Soviet Union was thus a precondition for rapprochement with the GDR118. Ostpolitik was 
conceptualised in the early 1960s, and launched in the wake of the tragic Soviet 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This intervention strengthened the conviction 
among West German politicians that acceptance of the status quo was the only possible 
way for a long-term change. In this sense Ostpolitik was subordinated to the relations 
with the Soviet Union. For this reason dissidents in Eastern Europe perceived Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik as the policy of appeasement.  
A democratic (but illegal then) opposition to communism in Poland in the 1970s, 
which generated in 1980 an independent free trade union Solidarity, clashed with the 
premises of Ostpolitik. While German concept was based on the recognition of the 
existing political order, the Polish socio-political movement of Solidarity was based on 
contesting, and challenging this order. German politicians, especially of the SDP, the 
sponsor of Ostpolitik, openly distanced themselves from the Solidarity movement, even 
when the Polish military-led government dissolved Solidarity in December 1981, what 
                                         
116 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Building a Stable Peace in Mitteleuropa: The German-Polish Hinge”, ESRC-IGS Discussion Paper,  
2000/18. 
117 On Germany”s Ostpolitik see: Timothy Garton Ash, “Mitteleuropa?” Daedalus, Vol. 119 NO 1, Winter 1990; Timothy Garton 
Ash, “Germany”s Choice”,  Foreign Affairs, NO 73, 1994; Jörg Brechtefeld, Mitteleuropa and German Politics: 1848 to the Present, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996; Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security Beyond The Cold War, Four Scenarios for the year 2010, 
Royal Institute for International Affairs 1991; Jadwiga Kiwerska, “W Atmosferze Wrogości” in: Anna Wolff-Powęska, eds. Polacy 
Wobec Niemców. Z Dziejów Kultury politycznej Polski 1945-1989, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań 1993 
118 See for example Ash, In Europe”s Name…, op. cit. 
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was disapproved by most Western governments119. The premises of the Ostpolitik were in 
sharp contrast with the hopes of intellectual leaders of the Solidarity movement and 
Czech dissidents too. Both were supporters of genuine reconciliation between the Poles 
and the Germans and took over the power in 1989 revolution120.  
For these reasons the assessment of Ostpolitik is two-fold. Ostpolitik is often 
given credit for making the 1975 Helsinki Security Conference possible, which was a 
focal point of the relations between the Soviet Union and the West at the time.  
On the level of bilateral relations between Germany and the Eastern neighbours 
achievements were not that impressive. In case of Poland Ostpolitik resulted in a 
conditional peace between two states and opened path for reconciliation121. The famous 
Kneefall of Chancellor Willi Brandt during his visit to the Warsaw Ghetto in December 
1970122 started the rapprochement process and the transition from a precarious to a 
conditional peace. It also added a rare in diplomacy element of authenticity and emotions. 
It helped two nations after 1989 to reach relatively quickly a new level of cooperation.  
In relations with the Czechs Ostpolitik did not have a chance to make a difference. 
The rigid communist regime reinstated by the Soviets in Czechoslovakia after the 1968 
Prague Spring rejected relations with the Federal Republic, leaving them in limbo for the 
next two decades. The support for the Czech application for the EU membership was 
seen therefore as a unique opportunity for the change in relations with this country. 
                                         
119 The preservation of good relations with the Soviet Union was for German policy makers the priority. Another result of the 
Ostpolitik doctrine was the attitude toward the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the invasion was strongly disapproved by the 
U.S., a strategic ally of the FRG, German Chancellor Schmidt only reluctantly joined the U.S. sanctions campaign to boycott the 1980 
Moscow Summer Olympics. He was also the first Western leader to visit Moscow after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Chancellor 
Schmidt joined the boycott under strong pressure from the US: Zbigniew Brzeziński, the then security adviser of president Carter 
referred to Germany”s “self-finlandization” in the early 1980; see for example Zbigniew Brzeziński , “A Divided Europe: The Future 
of Yalta“,  Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/85 
120 “Orędzie biskupów polskich do biskupów niemieckich” (Udzielamy przebaczenia i prosimy o nie), Materiały i Dokumenty, 
Warszawa 1966; “Niemcy i Polska”,  Kultura, Lipiec/Sierpień 1978, pp. 123-129, published in German “Polen und Deutschland”, 
Osteuropa, Ferbuar 1979 pp 101-105; Jan Józef Lipski, “Niemcy a Polska”, Kultura, No 370/371; “Polen und Deutschland”,  
Osteeuropa, No 2 February1979; Krystyna Kersten, (as Jan Bujnowski) “Przesiedlenie Niemców”,  Veto, nr 16/1988. K. Wolicki (as 
Timur), “Niemcy”,  Krytyka, 1989, z.5.  Jan Józef Lipski, „Dwie Ojczyzny — Dwa patriotyzmy. Uwagi o Megalomanii Narodowej i 
Ksenofobii Polaków”, in: Jan J. Lipski, Powiedzieć sobie wszystko. Eseje o sąsiedztwie Polsko-Niemieckim, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Polsko-Niemieckie, 1996 
121 Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order…, op. cit. 
122 Brandt acknowledged in this symbolic gesture Germany”s responsibility for the systematic extermination of the Polish Jews and 
won enthusiastic comments from Western and Polish observers.  
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2. Overcoming Mitteleuropa Syndrome 
Enlargement was perceived in Germany also as an opportunity for avoiding a trap 
of ‘Mitteleuropa’ or ‘Zwischeneuropa’ syndrome123. Both notions returned in the elite 
discourse in the context of the post-unification increase of German power. As it was put 
by Jonathan P.G. Bach, ‘Germany’s relationship with the East is especially complex, not 
only because of historical atrocities but because Germany and Eastern Europe constitute 
each others national imaginaries. They both existed historically on the borders of 
modernity. Eastern Europe bears the brunt of the mark of being ‘the lands between’ — 
between Germany and Russia, between East and West, but also between Enlightenment 
and Absolutism, agriculture and industrialization, ethnos and demos, between planned 
economies and free markets—Zwischeneuropa’124.  
These observations pointed to a danger of potential political implications, if 
Germany was to dominate the region125. It was also a part of an elite discourse on this 
subject. An exchange between highly respected philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and 
political scientist Wolf Jobst Siedler is indicative here. Siedler expressed the view that in 
five to ten years’ time, when all difficulties connected with the unification would be 
overcome, Germany would achieve what ‘Hitler was incapable of achieving with his 
army — the domination over the territories between Vistula, Dniepr and Donn, and the 
territories of Pommerania, Silesia, Czech and Moravs would join Germany’126. In 
response to that Jürgen Habermas warned in the interview for Le Monde of September 
1993: ‘some are starting to dream about Germany as a super-power in centre of Europe. 
                                         
123 Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power…, op.cit., p.51; And as it has been observed by Adrian Hyde-Price, the “geostrategic 
vulnerability of Zwischeneuropa” — as the “lands between” Germany and Russia — has been one of the four main sources of conflict 
in modern Europe. See: Hyde-Price, Building a Stable Peace…, op.cit. p.2 
124 Jonathan P.G. Bach, “Germany after Unification and Eastern Europe: New Perspectives, New Problems”, originally given as a 
talk at the University Seminar on Post-Communist States, Societies and Economies at Columbia University, November 10, 1998, 
available online. 
125 Arnulf Baring, Deutschland, was nun? Ein Gespräch mit Dirk Rumberg und Wolf Jobst Siedler, Berlin 1991; also in some 
analysis of the external observers, e.g. W. Russell Mead, The Once and Future Reich,  World Policy Journal nr VII, 1990; S. Kinzer, 
“Germany is a Challenge for Post-Soviet Europe”, The New York Times, 27 December 1991, L.G.Geipel (ed.), Future of Germany, 
Hudson Institute, Indiana 1991. 
126 Arnulf Baring, Deutschland, was nun?... op.cit. pp. 15-16 
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Therefore one has to watch carefully the political mentality of the Germans facing the 
East. Many Germans have the feeling that in the East they meet their own history’127. 
Zwischeneuropa is connected also with the historical ‘Moscow first’ tradition. 
After 1989 German elites started formulating opinions that ‘from a historical, moral and 
political perspective Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary matter for Germany more 
than Russia’128 and that Moscow now, as Josef Joffe put it, ‘had very little to blackmail 
or to bribe Germany with’129. In the past, West Germany’s exposure to Soviet military 
might and the Soviet veto over the internal German relations ‘made for a separate détente 
[Soviet Union] and a good deal of propitiatory behaviour’. But after the unification and 
the retraction of the Soviet power, which was accompanied by tens of billions in 
‘ransom’ money, the ‘Moscow Connection has dwindled into a latent option’. 
These were prevailing opinions in the German elite discourse in the beginning of 
the 1990s, and congruent with political actions of the German representatives. It was 
Chancellor Kohl who set the direction of the future policy towards East European 
countries. In his speech at the Aspen Institute on 13 March 1991, Kohl declared that ‘our 
history and our geographical position in the centre of Europe put on our shoulders huge 
responsibility’130. His statement was preceded a day before by a statement of one of the 
CDU leaders Alfred Dregger, who explained in an interview for Die Welt, that ‘our role 
is as follows: we are a reliable ally of the West and a sought after partner for the 
East’131.  
 
 
                                         
127 Le Monde, 19 September 1993; Jürgen Habermas expanded his thoughts on the issue of Germany as an ordinary state and 
suspicions about return of nationalism in an essays published in 1995: Jürgen Habermas, Die Normalität der Berliner Republik, 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1995  
128 Thies, Germany and Eastern Europe…, op.cit., p.73-74. He was also one of not many German commentators who admitted that 
“the irony of history meant that German unification became reality because Poland was the first country fighting the Soviet status quo. 
The big earthquake was started by Solidarnosc and the people around Lech Walesa could stand the pressure because they had the 
Polish pope in Rome who was there like a lighthouse for a new political orientation. Next it was the Hungarians who speeded up 
developments in 1989”. 
129 Joffe, German Grand Strategy …, op.cit., p. 87 
130 Die Rolle Deutschlands in Europa. Rede des Bundeskanzlers auf der Tagung Forum für Deutschland in Berlin am 13. März 1991, 
Bulletin der Bundesregierung, NO 33, 22 March 1991 
131 Die Welt, 12 March 1991 
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3. War Legacy 
Both Germany and its Eastern neighbours shared understanding that the main 
challenge was to revive the process of historical reconciliation132. A model was the 
Franco-German post-war reconciliation. There were however differences: the position of 
France vis-à-vis Germany was not comparable to that of Eastern countries vis-à-vis 
Germany133, because of the asymmetry of the latter, both in political and economic terms. 
The way to reduce this asymmetry relatively fast, without waiting for levelling it in 
economic terms, was membership in a common political structure of the European Union.  
Post war rapprochement concerned however the WWII legacy and that proved to 
be the most difficult and problematic. It caused a perception and manifestation of 
ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy.  
 
III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE 
Bilateral Gridlocks 
Two past-legacy issues caused a perception and manifestation of ambivalence in 
Germany’s enlargement policy: a problem with recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as 
inviolable border between Germany and Poland caused perception of ambivalence and 
compensation claims of the German expellees organizations against the Czech Republic 
caused a manifestation of ambivalence. The border issue reflects the two-level game of 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl; the expellees’ claims issue stemmed from conflicting two 
narratives pertaining to the past — a narrative of overcoming the war legacy and a 
revisionist narrative. 
Initial reactions in Eastern Europe to the German unification were similar to those 
in Western countries — anxiety over the return of the ‘German question’. There were 
however differences between Poland and Czechoslovakia in approaching the problem. 
Poland managed to deliver quickly a concept of new relations with Germany. It was 
                                         
132 Friedbert Pflüger, “Polen-Unser Frankreich im Osten”, in: W. Schäuble, R.Seiters (Hrsg.) Außenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Die 
Thesen der Jungen Außenpolitiker, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1996 
133 Ash, In Europe”s Name…, op.cit., pp. 310, 369-370 
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presented in autumn 1989, three months after the first free parliamentary elections in 
Poland, it was future oriented with indication of areas of cooperation. The first goal of the 
Poles was to put mutual relations on the path of reconciliation. Therefore, though not free 
from concerns, Polish elites were undivided in support for Germany’s unification. It was 
seen in Poland as a natural and necessary consequence of the Eastern European 
revolution, and highly congruent with the Polish interests134. Polish side pointed to new 
responsibilities of the unified Germany as of ‘exporter of security and stability’135. The 
Czech elites shared support for Germany’s unification, yet their discourse was dominated 
by the problems of the past, the Munich 1938 agreement and Sudeten Germans issues. 
Only gradually did Czech publications begin to depict a unified Germany as a key partner 
for the Czechs136.  
The moment of Germany’s unification however revealed how much Germany and 
its Eastern neighbours had to overcome in bilateral relations. Problems of the past legacy 
created gridlocks in relations between Germany and Poland and Germany and 
Czechoslovakia. Germany’s partners expected the new Germany to pass a test as a 
partner committed to the ‘post-modern’ multilateral cooperation and principles of 
Civilian Power. While the government of Helmut Kohl complied with the Western 
partners’ conditions, it nearly failed this test in relation with the Eastern partners. 
Chancellor Kohl’s hesitation over a clear and firm recognition of Germany’s Eastern 
border received a very bad reception in Poland and Czechoslovakia. It created a 
perception of ambivalence in Germany’s support for the EC/EU enlargement. 
  
A. Poland: Border Issue 
                                         
134 The Polish side offered a far-reaching idea of building a “community of interests”. The concept was originally articulated and 
presented by the first non-communist Foreign Minister of Poland, Krzysztof Skubiszewski in a speech at the German Society for 
Foreign Policy  (DGAP) in Bonn on 7 February 1990. in: Krzysztof Malinowski, “Asymetria Partnerstwa. Polityka Zjednoczonych 
Niemiec wobec Polski”, in: Zbigniew Mazur, ed. Rola Nowych Niemiec na Arenie Międzynarodowej, Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 
1996, pp.270-302 
135 Anna Wolf-Powęska, “Dylematy Nowej Kultury Politycznej”, in: Raport o Zjednoczeniu Niemiec. Problemy, Wyzwania, 
Strategie, Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1992 
136 Vladimir Handl and Marcin Zaborowski, “Comparative Czech and Polish Perspectives and Policies on the Eastern Enlargement of 
the EU and the Prominence of the “German Factor”, ESRC-IGS Discussion Paper 2000/13 
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While Western partners expected to receive reassurance from Germany about its 
commitment to the West European integration, the expectations of the Eastern partners 
were that Germany would recognise and confirm the post-war territorial division, drawn 
up by the victorious allies at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences137. For both Poland and 
Czechoslovakia such a warrant was of fundamental importance. The post-war territorial 
division drawn up at Potsdam resulted in losses both for Poland and for Germany in their 
former territories and in expulsions of millions of people from their homelands, including 
Sudeten Germans. In the democratic environment of the FRG German expellees formed a 
political movement, which became a constituency of the CSU branch of the CDU party, 
which was in power at the time of unification. It was a narrative of continuity of the past, 
a reverse side of the interpretation that was embraced by the majority of German elites as 
a foundation on the post-war national identity. 
The expellees’ organizations never relinquished their claims to the lost territories 
in the East and the Federal Republic supported these claims by contesting the Oder-
Neisse border, until the launch of Ostpolitik. Signing the Warsaw Treaty in 1970 was the 
first confirmation that the Federal Republic would not violate the border. The treaty, 
however, was far from a legally binding pledge. According to the agreement among the 
victorious allies the war was supposed to have been ended officially with a final 
conference resulting in a peace treaty. That, however, never happened and lawmakers in 
the FRG maintained that only a united German state was entitled to sign such a pledge, 
leaving the issue open until unification138. 
Polish authorities expected during Germany’s unification a confirmation from the 
German government of the Oder-Neisse border between two countries139. Chancellor 
                                         
137 Decisions made at the Potsdam conference in 1945, especially as relating to the Oder-Neisse line, rolled back the practical results 
of the German “Drang nach Osten” lasting for centuries and redesigned German territories within the approximate Germanic borders 
of the year 1000. Germany has lost its eastern territories: Eastern Preussen, Silesia, Eastern Pomeranian to  Poland and Sudeten to 
Czechoslovakia.  
138 The Federal Republic questioned the eastern border on the basis of the article 7.1 of “German Agreement” of 23 October 1954, 
which stated that “the Signatory States are agreed that an essential aim of their common policy is a peace settlement for the whole of 
Germany (…) They further agree that the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such settlement”, in: United 
States Department of State, Documents on Germany 1944-1985, Department of State Publication 9446, p. 427 
139 The FRG”s Bundestag ratified the Treaty but the proportion of votes shows how unpopular this document was: 248 votes were in 
favour, 17 against with 231 abstentions — mainly among the members of CDU and CSU. However more important was that the 
accompanying debate over the continuing existence of the German Reich and the quality of the Oder-Neisse border, which — in the 
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Kohl did not include the issue of the border into his Ten-Point plan for unification of 
Germany. This was alarming for the Polish side as the legal interpretations of the 
Germany’s post-war status were vague140. Polish diplomacy insisted on inclusion of the 
border issue into the Two Plus Four conference. Britain, France, Soviet Union and first of 
all the U.S. administration made it clear to the German representatives that Germany’s 
Eastern border would have to be accepted and would not be a matter for any negotiations.  
It took Helmut Kohl several weeks to finally accept these demands141. He 
admitted later in his memoirs, that the decisive factor in his decision was the pressure 
from the U.S. Finally in June 1990 all the chambers of the German parliaments 
(Bundestag and still existing East Germany’s parliament) accepted the border142. Poland 
insisted, however, for inclusion of a confirmation in a bilateral treaty with Germany143, 
and the U.S. and the European partners supported this demand. 
                                         
context of the obligation to achieve unity imposed by the Basics Law — put the legality of the treaty signed with Poland in question. 
The basis for this contestation was the judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Basic Treaty of 7 July 1975 and its 
resolution regarding the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw of 7 July 1975 stated that the German Reich continued to exist and that it 
continued to enjoy its legal authority although it could not act as a state since it lacked any state organization, in particular functioning 
constitutional organs; the ruling stressed the responsibility of the Four Powers for Germany as a whole and stated that the Federal 
Republic of Germany had acted only for itself and moreover, that it could only have acted for itself. “From this judgement of the 
highest court, the expellee organizations derived that the obligation to achieve German unity had territorial implications, and it 
included all areas that were a part of Germany on 31 December 1937”. Quoted after: Frank Elbe, Richard Kiessler, A Round Table 
With Sharp Corners. The Diplomatic Path to German Unity, Nomos Verlagsgesellshaft Baden-Baden, 1996, p. 109—110; 
140 As it was put by Elbe and Kiessler it “triggered fears in Poland about how binding the settlement of borders in the Warsaw Treaty 
was for the government in Bonn”,, in: Frank Elbe, Richard Kiessler, A Round Table …, op. cit., p.111 
141 Horst Telstschik, Kohl’s advisor at the time, in the Memoirs published a year later writes how bitter for Helmut Kohl was 
unwavering Franco-British stance on Poland’s participation in the Two Plus Four conference and the fact president Mitterrand 
eventually invited Polish Prime Minister in November 1990;  Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage, op.cit., p. 150, 151, 164—167, 171. 
142 The CDU/CSU and the FDP with their parliamentary majority passed a resolution on 8 March 1990 “reaffirming that the 
inviolability of borders with Poland in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act and with a view to German unity forms 
the essential basis for peaceful coexistence in Europe. In this sense, the border issue shall be settled in a treaty between a government 
representing the whole of Germany and the Polish government, which shall seal the reconciliation between both nations. Poland”s 
renunciation of reparation claims on Germany of 23 August 1953 and the joint declaration of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and 
Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl of 10 November 1989 shall remain valid for united Germany”. : Bulletin der Bundesregierung, No 
13, 31 January 1991. And in a joint declaration of 13 April 1990, the Volkskammer of the GDR reaffirmed that the “inviolability of 
the Oder-Neisse line to the Republic of Poland form the basis for the peaceful co-existence of our nations in a common European 
house”.  
143 Both German parliaments — Bundesrepublik and of GDR — accepted the declaration, but from the Polish point of view it was 
only a declaration without any binding power apart from the moral dimension. Only afterwards when the Polish government expressed 
its dissatisfaction, Kohl, under the pressure of the US president George Bush and a vigorous action of the French president Francois 
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B. Czechoslovakia: Sudeten Germans 
The Czechs experienced a similarly bumpy start in relations with the unified 
Germany. Chancellor Kohl did not play a primary role in the conflict with the Czechs, 
but his stance on the Sudeten Germans demands towards Prague was similarly reluctant 
like on the border issue. 
WWII resulted with the shift of territorial order in Central Europe and expulsion 
of thousands of civilians — Poles from the territories incorporated by the Soviet Union 
and Germans from the territories lost to Poland and Czechoslovakia. There was a 
difference between the Germans’ expulsion from Poland and from Czechoslovakia. The 
former was decided by the victorious allies at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the 
Sudeten Germans were expelled on the basis of the decrees issued by the then 
Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš. According to the Sudeten Germans’ 
interpretation, Czechoslovakia, and only Czechoslovakia was therefore fully responsible 
for the expulsions. 
Czech President Vaclav Havel made the first reconciliatory move towards 
Germany in December 1989, shortly after being elected he announced that the Czechs 
should apologise to the Sudeten Germans for what they suffered while being expelled. 
Czech public and elites opinion was deeply divided over the Havel’s gesture. Soon 
afterwards, the then president of Bavaria Max Streibl sent a letter to the Czech 
government with a demand of apology to the Association of the Sudeten Germans, 
situated in Bavaria. Havel repeated his commitment to expiation in his letter to the 
German President Richard von Weizsäcker, before a visit to Germany. Weizsäcker did 
not respond to Havel until two months after Havel’s visit and the Association of Sudeten 
Germans did not want to take up a dialog. In April 1990 the Association presented a list 
of demands144 to the Czech government to meet their ‘right to the fatherland’ and to 
                                         
Mitterrand supporting Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, eventually agreed the issue would be clarified in a bilateral treaty. 
The pledge was fulfilled and the treaty including clarification of the border issue was signed on 14 November 1990. 
144 The letter was officially signed by the federal assembly of the Associations of Compatriots, which claimed to represent the 
Sudeten Germans. See: Vladimir Handl, “Czech-German declaration on reconciliation”, German Politics, Vol. 6, NO 2, 1997. 
Hartmut Koschyk, the leader of the Expellees Federation (BdV) sought also at the time to have the region along the Oder-Neisse 
formally incorporated into the EU. 
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compensate for the lost properties. The demands were supported with a request to stop 
the process of privatization of the Czech economy, in order to keep open the possibility 
of restoring the pre-war ownership.  
Czech authorities rejected these demands and excluded Sudeten Germans’ 
Association from negotiations, stressing that the only partner for the Czech side would be 
the German government145. President Havel presented though a conciliatory attitude: 
speaking during the ceremony when receiving the Charlemagne Award in Aachen in May 
1991, he offered the Sudeten Germans the right to return to their ‘fatherland’ and 
participation in the process of privatization, if they resign their claims. On the other hand 
he made it clear that the Sudeten Germans issue was strictly connected with the Munich 
agreements of 1938, which was the basis for Hitler’ annexation of Czechoslovakia. His 
outspoken Foreign Minister Jiří Dienstbier strongly supported this stance146. The Czechs 
wanted the German government to acknowledge that the Munich agreement was invalid. 
That would bring a conclusion that the Czech state existed continuously, making the 
appropriation of the Sudeten territory by the German Reich illegal.  
Meeting this demand was difficult not only because the Munich Agreement was 
guaranteed by four countries—Britain, France, Italy and Germany, but also because that 
would bring legal problems for the Sudeten Germans. If the Agreement were deemed 
illegal, they would have lost their German citisenship. This could further be used by the 
Czechoslovak authorities, which could bring treason charges against the Sudeten 
Germans for having served the occupying German army during the war. 
 
IV. OPTIONS 
Managing the Past — Endangering the Future 
The question pertaining to this part is what possibilities were available to German 
government executives for solving the problems of the past legacy and why they acted 
with apparent reluctance and did not take up more decisive actions? 
                                         
145 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 October 1990 
146 Dienstbier stated publicly in March 1990 that though the expulsion of 3 millions Germans was an act of revenge, Bonn should not 
put any demands nor application for compensates; he expressed also willing to pay compensations to the families of murdered Sudeten 
Germans, but only if the German government accepts claims of the families of the Czechs and Slovaks, who died in concentration or 
labour camps in the Third Reich. 
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The stance of German government executives in both disputes reflected two 
aspects — dispersion of power in the German policymaking system that allows various 
interest groups to argue their interests, and a political calculation aimed at securing 
support of the domestic constituency, of which the expellees groups was a significant 
part.  
Kohl’s reluctance to confirm the Eastern border during the unification was a 
subject of numerous analyses. They point mainly to difficulties on the domestic stage. 
Chancellor had to cope with the demands of the CSU, which represented the expellees, 
who refused to recognise the Oder-Neisse line as the border147. He could not ignore this 
pressure because he was facing soon the first parliamentary elections in the unified 
Germany that was set for 12 December 1990. Securing support of his own political base 
for the elections was of primary importance for Kohl; the expellee constituency was 
estimated then to be about 1 million votes. 
On the other hand however, Kohl could not jeopardise the unification by potential 
conflict with Poland. He was forced to play it on two boards and to employ a tactic that 
would enable to achieve two things: to maintain good relation with Poland, and to 
maintain his own expellee constituency. According to Henning Tewes he pulled off a 
bravura performance, a masterstroke: ‘By hesitating for so long and by increasing the 
stakes, Kohl virtually forced the expellees’ organizations to consent to his policy. In this 
respect, his line was a political masterstroke that weakened irredentism vis-à-vis Poland 
on the German political scene.148‘ 
In this way Helmut Kohl managed a two-level game safeguarding the foreign 
policy priority, the unification, without opposing domestic interests of a specific group, 
the expellees. It is worth stressing however that at the time Kohl’s tactics was not that 
clear even for his closest co-workers, including Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. For 
Genscher, as well as for his party the FDP, the option of reconsidering the border was 
                                         
147 As noted by observers — “the combined Franco-Polish pressure (from the French President and the Polish Prime Minister) hit the 
Christian-Liberal coalition in Bonn at time when it threatened to split over the Oder-Neisse issue”. In: Elbe and Kiessler, A Round 
Table With Sharp Corners…, op.cit., p. 112 
148 Tewes, op.cit., p. 64. Clay Clemens in the introduction to the study on Kohl”s Chancellorship explains that “delaying a decision 
on the final settlement of a border with Poland (Kohl) gave narrow domestic political interests precedence over the sensitivieties of a 
key partner”. In: Clay Clemens and William E. Paterson, The Kohl Chancellorship, Frank Cass London, 1998, p. 9. 
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closed149. He stated it clearly to the irritation of Kohl in the speech at the UN on 27 
September 1990 and in the address to the Bundestag on 8 November 1990. The liberal 
conservatives led by Rita Süssmuth, Heiner Geißler and President Richard von 
Weizsäcker, also continually rejected the word ‘reunification’, as in their view, there 
never should be a re-unification of Germany because the boundaries of the Third Reich of 
1937 could never be re-established150.  
German government’s reaction to the Sudeten Germans’ problem was initially 
mixed and unclear. The official stance was that both countries should build positive 
relations. Kohl’s government, however, did not intervene to solve the conflict between 
the Czech government and the Sudeten Germans. Chancellor made a decisive move only 
at the beginning of 1993 and declared the Czech-German reconciliation his Chefsache, 
reserving the power to make strategic decisions on this matter for himself. It did not, 
however, result in anything more than reassurance from Kohl that his decisions would be 
compatible’ with the domestic interests of the CSU, which sounded dangerous to the 
Czechs151.  
The next move was even more worrying for the Czech side. The disputed issues 
between the two countries, the Sudeten Germans’ claims and the Munich Agreement 
annulment were excluded from the negotiations of a bilateral treaty.  
Germany signed bilateral treaties with Poland in June 1991 and with 
Czechoslovakia in February 1992. Both treaties contributed to the EU enlargement 
project in an important way. They included a pledge of the German government to 
support the EC/EU’s accession of Poland and of Czechoslovakia. Although the pledge 
did not formally imply any consequences and the treaties were a standard basis for 
bilateral relations, but the German pledge had an important meaning for the Eastern 
countries. In this way they obtained the first official promise of support, and what was 
especially precious, from the one of the most important players in the EU, German 
Chancellor. But the treaty with Czechoslovakia received mixed perception in Prague. 
While Germany and Poland regulated sensitive issues of the Oder-Neisse border and the 
                                         
149 FDP maintained that post-war borders in Europe were to remain not only intact but unquestioned. See for example Heiner 
Geißler, Zugluft. Politik in stürmischer Zeit, Güterloch,1990  p. 246-8 
150 Ibid. 
151 Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power…, op.cit. p. 74; Handl, Czech-German Declaration …, op.cit. 
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rights of the German minority in a smooth and satisfactory for both sides way, the treaty 
with Czechoslovakia failed to address the most difficult concern for the Czechs, the 
claims of the Sudeten Germans. It left this issue outside the treaty, thus open. After the 
split up of Czechoslovakia in January 1993 the Czech Republic inherited the problem, 
and it overshadowed the relations with Germany for many years.  
A Joint Declaration of 1997 between Germany and the Czech Republic was to put 
the bilateral relations on a reconciliation track, but the process was soon halted again. The 
claims and demands of the Sudeten Germans for compensations from Prague grew bolder 
than before. In the run-up to the German 1998 general election, Bavarian CSU and a part 
of the CDU supported these demands.  
 
V. RESULTS 
Czech Accession Contested 
While the Sudeten Germans’ claims and the border issues caused a perception of 
ambivalence in the German stance on the enlargement because they undermined an image 
of Germany supporting the enlargement, the issue between Germany and the Czech 
Republic escalated into a conflict that caused manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s 
policy towards the enlargement regarding the Czech application.  
The expellees’ claims were revived and given again a political prominence during 
the election campaign of 1998. The Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber explored 
the issue in order to maintain the advocacy of the expellees and expellees’ associates in 
Bavaria152. The events unfolded as follows: 
On 28 May 1998 German Bundestag passed a resolution that stated a hope that 
EU enlargement would facilitate a ‘solution to open, bilateral questions in the context of 
the forthcoming Polish and Czech membership in the EU’. In the bilateral relations 
between Germany and its Eastern partners the only ‘open’ questions were those the 
German side was trying to keep open — concerning the legacy of the past. In the Polish 
case the resolution was understood as concerning the territories lost by Germany after 
                                         
152 For a scepticism in the EU Enlargement area of the CSU and some parts of the CDU see: “CSU warnt erneut vor überstürzten 
Beitritten”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 May 1998. “Für den EU-Beitritt Tschechiens”, Focus, 1 June 1998; “Do UE Po Uznaniu 
Roszczen”, Rzeczpospolita , 1 June 1998. “Wahlkampf im Parliament”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 June 1998. “100 Dni Przed 
Wyborami” Rzeczpospolita, 19 June 1998; “Vertriebene “nicht auf dem Sprung. Steinbach: Polen ist nicht EU-reif”, TAZ, 8 July 1998 
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WWII to Poland, thus as a demand to return the properties of the German expellees or to 
offer adequate compensations. In the case of the Czech Republic it was a problem of 
Sudeten Germans. The Polish sequence developed immediately, the Czech sequence two 
years later.  
The response of the Polish side to the Bundestag’s resolution was sharp, 
according to some comments even disproportionate153. The Bundestag’s counterpart 
Polish parliament Sejm passed a resolution stating that the ‘territorial order in Central-
Eastern Europe must not be questioned’. This answer caused consternation on the 
German side; the Bundestag did not mention collective territorial claims. Yet the German 
resolution hit the most sensitive for the Polish national identity cord — the Oder-Neisse 
border issue.  
The German-Czech dispute was elevated on a state-to-state level too. During the 
Bundestag debate accompanying the resolution of May 1998, the CSU leader Edmund 
Stoiber demanded that the federal government continue to veto the accession of the 
Czech Republic to the EU, until the Czech government renounces the Decrees of 
President Beneš, and returns properties to the former German owners154. Although the 
federal government did not answer this demand, it did not solve the problem. In the wake 
of the increasing pressure from the expellees, in January 2002 the then Czech Prime 
Minister Miloš Zeman155 and other leading Czech politicians reminded publicly that the 
Sudeten Germans had been Hitler’s ‘fifth column’ in the break-up of Czechoslovakia, 
and that their subsequent expulsion after WWII therefore was meant to be a ‘source of 
peace’156. It caused a sharp reaction among German politicians locked at the time in the 
early stages of an election campaign of 2002. Chancellor Schröder cancelled a visit to 
                                         
153 “Polens Parlament Kritiesiert Entschließung des Bundestages”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 July, 1998. 
154 In the Bundestag debate as covered in: “Streit um Dekrete. Stoiber: EU-Beitritt Prags nur bei Einlenken in 
Vertriebenenfragemöglich”, Tageszeitung, 30 May, 1998; The appeal was reiterated by Erika Steinbach, the President of the Bund der 
Vertriebenen, in favour of the””veto-policy”, “Die Präsidentin des Bundes der Vertriebenen beruft  sich auf den Kosovo”, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 August, 1999 
155 Zeman used this notion commenting for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz; see: Tageszeitung, 16 January 2002 
156 In an interview for the Austrian news-magazine “Profil” (January 20, 2002), Zeman claimed that the Sudeten Germans were 
“Hitler”s fith column” in the break-up of Czechoslovakia and “traitors” which at that time even deserved capital punishment; see also 
Anne Bazin, Germany and the Enlargement of the European Union to the Czech Republic, EUI Working Papers RSC NO 99/21, San 
Domenico di Fiesole (FI), European University Institute, 1999 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
98 
Prague, planed for April that year, which was received as a harsh and ultimate means in 
the diplomatic relations.  
A year after the Bundestag resolution, in 1999, representatives of the German 
expellees managed also to put their demands on the European Union’s agenda: the 
European Parliament called on the Czech government to annul the Beneš Decrees. The 
Czech government ignored the call, but the call raised a question whether the Beneš 
Decrees would be compatible with the acquis communautaire of the EU. It also 
demonstrated that there were two main streams in the bilateral relations between the 
Czech Republic and Germany.  
The first was grounded in the Joint Declaration that was negotiated between 1995-
1996 and signed in January 1997. It was not a binding treaty, but was widely perceived as 
a fairly well balanced expression of political will and an important step on the way to 
mutual understanding and political settlement. The text of the Declaration was formulated 
cautiously and it was not a breakthrough in the conflict: the Czech side declared the 
Beneš Decrees extinct and the German government withdrew its support for any property 
claims against the Czech Republic.  
The second stream was developed by the expellees’ organizations and politicians 
who were using the Sudeten Germans’ claims to capitalise politically especially 
throughout the election campaign of 2002. Traditionally the Bavarian CSU backed the 
Sudeten Germans. Edmund Stoiber, the CSU-chairman in the late 1990 — early 2000s, 
used to support position of the Sudeten Germans, but moderately. In the 2002 during the 
elections campaign, however, Stoiber demonstrated a much harder line than before. He 
indicated a more decisive approach in the speech delivered at the gathering of the 
expellees on 1 September 2001157. Stoiber contrasted a positive, ‘constructive and 
peaceful’ factor represented by the expellees engaged in the process of building the 
European house with a ‘highly unsatisfactory’ issue of the legal acquis in Eastern Europe. 
He placed this comparison in the context of the EU enlargement saying that ‘the 
enlargement of the EU is doubtlessly a significant historic event (…) we all, including the 
                                         
157 Ansprache des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Dr. Edmund Stoiber anlässlich der zentralen Auftaktveranstaltung des Tages der 
Heimat am Samstag, 1. September 2001, in Berlin – „Leitwort: Im Zentrum – Vertreibung ächten”, www.bayern.de/Presse-
Info/Reden/2001/09- 01.html 
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expellees want it to happen (…) we however want shape it on the basis of the 
Copenhagen criteria (…) and to heal the wounds of the past. The expulsion decrees as 
they concern deprivation of the rights and collective expulsion of Germans are such a 
wound and a burden. There is no place in the European Union for such decrees, no 
matter which country they concern’. Stoiber stressed that the Eastern European countries 
faced the challenge of ‘categorical and binding decision to cut off the decrees’. In his 
view the challenge did not concern any material values, but was about the moral and 
spiritual values of the Europeans.  
An important circumstance of this speech was that Stoiber clearly differentiated 
between the Czech decrees and Polish case of the expellees’ claims. He pointed to a 
processes unfolding in Poland, regarding the issue of expellees — the trial of the 
commanding officers of the Łambinowice camp where the expelled Germans suffered 
from inhuman treatment, the public debate and the broad joint Polish-German academic 
research conducted on the issue of expulsions. To Stoiber this process had a positive 
effect of expiation. He stressed the lack of a similar approach on the Czech side. In this 
way the issue of the Beneš Decrees emerged as a possible obstacle for the Czech 
Republic association with the EU.  
In February 2002 Erika Steinbach, the CDU member of Bundestag and the leader 
of the Expellees Association together with Berndt Posselt, the chairman of the Sudeten 
Germans Association and the deputy of the CSU to the European Parliament, put forth a 
demand for annulment of the Beneš Decrees before the EU enlargement. Markus Feber, 
the chairman of the CSU group in the EP, reiterated this statement, pointing out that 
without annulment of the Beneš Decrees, the whole schedule of the enlargement should 
be understood as impossible to proceed with158. This fueled the criticism of the Czech 
government in the German press but also among the European Parliamentarians.  
The issue of expulsions involved initially the Czech Republic and Germany, but 
later also Hungary, Slovakia and Austria, all of which were also affected by post the 
WWII policies of expulsions. It paved the way to a coalition of Germany, Austria and 
Hungary against the Czech Republic. Edmund Stoiber capitalised on these developments, 
declaring in his election campaign that his government would deal with this problem in a 
                                         
158 Europagruppe zweifelt am Zeitplan für Osterweiterung, 25.03.2002, www.csu.de/Aktuelles/Argumente/subpage47590 5.htm 
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much more decisive way than the government of Gerhard Schröder159. Schröder’s 
government was in fact almost absent from this debate160, till the Czech announcement 
about the ‘fifth column’ in April.  
The conflict found a finale at the European Parliament. The pressure of the 
German representatives aimed at tying the issue of the compatibility of the Beneš 
Decrees with the Czech’s EU membership and putting it on the EU agenda 161. Hartmut 
Koschyk, political speaker for the expellees of the CDU/CSU coalition and a deputy to 
the Bundestag conveyed to the European Union Commissioner Günter Verheugen a 
demand to inspect the legal structure of the Czech Republic and its compatibility with the 
acquis communautaire of the European Union. The European Parliament asked for an 
opinion of experts on the international law. The conclusions concerning the Beneš 
Decrees of professors Ulf Bernitz, Johen A. Frowein and Lord Kingsland162 were 
presented to the European Parliament in October 2002. They confirmed that the Beneš 
Decrees had no relation to the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. 
 
SUMMARY 
The impact the past legacy issue had on the enlargement policy of Germany 
throughout nearly the whole process from 1990 to 2002 indicates that at the basis of the 
German government’s support for the enlargement was a strong normative reasoning 
based on the imperative to overcome the results of WWII. It was the premise of the 
enlargement policy set by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and respected by Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder. 
                                         
159 “Beneš̌-Dekrete beseitigen”. Kritik Stoibers an tschechischen Politikern. Regierungserklärung,  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
20 April 2002, s. 4. also Regierungserklärung des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Dr. Edmund Stoiber zur Zwischenbilanz für die 
Legislaturperiode 1998 bis 2003 am 19. April 2002: Bayerninnovativ, sozial, erfolgreich:  
www.bayern.de/Presse-Info/Reden/2002/regierung_020419.html 
160 Stoiber and expellees did not receive much support from other German actors, like for example Länder; only the parliament of 
Saxony presented the extreme position, demanding abolishment of all legal acts, which went with the transfer of German population 
from East European countries countries, it demanded the legal acts to be declared as illegal as a precondition for German consent to 
accession of the individual countries to the EU; and the interior Minister Otto Schily stressed the necessity of the abolishment of the 
Beneš” Decrees. 
161 For example Europa kann mit den Beneš-Dekreten leben, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12/13 October 2002. 
162 http://www.mitteleuropa.de/frowein-e0.htm 
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Opening a new chapter in history between two sides was inseparable from solving 
the problems of the past legacy. Lack of action on Chancellor Kohl’s side to solve these 
problems during the unification negotiations, created a perception of disparity between 
his supportive for the enlargement rhetoric and his absence in the conflict that had a 
fundamental meaning for both sides. First question therefore is why did Chancellor Kohl 
abstain from using his power to solve the problematic issues with the Eastern neighbours 
that occurred during the unification process? Henning Tewes indicated that Chancellor 
Kohl’s hesitancy over the border issue and stepping aside on the Sudeten Germans’ 
problem was caused by the need to safeguard the foreign policy priority, the unification, 
without opposing domestic interests of a specific group, the expellees. For the very same 
reason Kohl did not present the guideline on the issue of Europe Agreements, leaving the 
room for negotiations for the representatives of the relevant ministries.  
The escalation of the expellees’ claims after 1998 was caused by a different 
climate around the enlargement, which was brought with a new zeitgeist of the new 
government of Gerhard Schröder. The expellees’ representatives’ calculation was that the 
best course was to bind their cause to the enlargement negotiations. Bavarian Minister-
President Edmund Stoiber of CSU employed this tactics in his agenda. Bavarian CSU 
used to be after WWII a stronghold of old resentments, which fostered the refusal to 
accept the results of WWII. Sheltered in Stoiber’s agenda the expellees were able to 
unfold their actions against the Czechs on the European level. Their cause, however, was 
not the main goal for Stoiber; he aimed at strengthening the position of Länder in the 
European Union. This agenda was congruent with the politics of other Länder, which 
wanted to protect their interests from Europeanization. As Jeffrey and Paterson explained 
— it reflected a change from the old elite consensus on Europe, to one, focusing on ‘cost-
benefit calculations and unapologetically prioritizes national and/or regional 
interests’163.  
The subordination of the political agenda to the general elections made it possible 
for the expellees’ organization to involve the Bundestag in their cause with the 1998 
                                         
163 Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson, “Germany”s Power in Europe”, in: One Europe or Several. Birmingham Discussion 
Papers, No. ESRC-IG2000/10, 2000, p. 68-70 
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resolution on the Beneš Decrees. The resolution was accepted in order to win the support 
of expellees’ organizations as constituency.  
The next success of the expellees, of engaging the EU institutions, the European 
Parliament and the Commission into the Beneš Decrees issue, connected the issue to the 
enlargement. It provoked the rise of resentments on the Eastern side; 85% of Polish 
farmers were convinced at the time that the EU membership would open a possibility for 
foreigners to purchase properties and land in Poland, which would lead Germans to 
‘buying up land’ in Poland164.  
The change from the old elite consensus on Europe to one, focusing on ‘cost-
benefit calculations’ was at the basis of the Schröder’s government’s attitude towards the 
enlargement. The approach of the SPD/Green coalition to the foreign policy was focused 
on the economic issues and protection of the national interests. This coincided with the 
last phase of the enlargement process — the negotiations of entry terms, which had been 
never easy, in any of the previous EC enlargements. The nature of such negotiations is 
that old member states agree on the concessions to the new members — the process of 
the European integration is at the moment of calibrating details through 
intergovernmental bargaining process, in which one wins and one loses.  
These factors contributed to the changed atmosphere around the enlargement in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. A fundamental factor, which encouraged the expellees’ 
demands, was lack of the pro-enlargement rhetoric during the Schröder’s time. Before 
1998, Helmut Kohl with his political weight of Germany’s Chancellor, and the 
‘Chancellor of Unity’, every now and then used to remind his European colleagues the 
core values at the basis of the enlargement. His mentoring was an enforcing factor for 
proceeding with the enlargement. Chancellor Schröder’s rhetoric regarding the 
enlargement did not operate with normative notions but with the pragmatic language of 
business. The grounds for this difference lay in the generational difference between two 
Chancellors. Gerhard Schröder lacked the ‘memory of the war’, which to a high degree 
motivated the interest of Helmut Kohl in building the broad, beyond the Western, 
European integration. 
 
                                         
164 According to a poll commissioned by the Institute of Public Affairs, national random sample, June 1999 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
French Opposition to the Enlargement 
As the Cause of Ambivalence  
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EU Enlargement 
1990 — 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy caused by 
the French opposition to the project of the EU expansion. French factor was an 
impediment to Germany’s support because it faced German policy makers with a 
dilemma how to reconcile two diverse, opposite sets of interests — the long-standing 
partnership with France and the new, emerging interests in the East.  
France since the aftermath of WWII had been the key European partner of 
Germany. It helped to elevate Bundesrepublik out of the post-war isolation. French policy 
towards Germany was based on the imperative of containing German power and the main 
tools for this containment were the institutions and regimes of the European Community. 
In 1990 Germany’s unification in the view of French policy makers through increasing 
German power brought a danger of Germany’s dominance in Europe. France insistence 
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on Germany’s commitment to the deeper West European integration and embracement of 
the single currency was aimed at containing a new increased German power. 
The project of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union exacerbated fears 
of French policy makers. It had potential to make Germany a regional power in 
Central/Eastern Europe but also to weaken the Franco-German decision-making hub in 
the European Union. French politicians opposed therefore the idea of the enlargement. 
Enlargement, however, was slowly embraced into the rationale of the German foreign 
policy and its grand strategy of Europapolitik. Apart from the normative reasoning based 
on the imperative to overcome the WWII legacy, Germany was gaining a new 
perspective on its interests towards the Eastern countries.  
In this way German policy makers found themselves between two contradictory 
challenges — of maintaining good relation with France and endorsing Eastern European 
countries as a part of the grand European strategy. The answer was to balance both 
directions. This, however, interfered with the support of German policy makers for the 
enlargement creating ambivalence in their policy. 
The French factor is connected closely with the issue of deepening the European 
integration, which constitutes another cause of ambivalence in the German enlargement 
policy. French opposition to the enlargement is nonetheless an independent constraint and 
cause of ambivalence. It was explicit, strong and persistent, and given the position of 
France in the EU critical. It created explicit and clear ambivalence in Germany’s policy 
towards the enlargement.  
At the same time interplay between two opposite sets of Germany’s interests in its 
bilateral relations, represents first a process of reshaping of Germany’s preferences, but 
also the way German policy makers balanced opposite directions in the foreign policy. 
Insights into this facet of Germany’s European policy are informative for further 
exploration of causes of ambivalence in this policy, because here German policy makers 
employ the ‘as-well-as’ strategy. For explanation of constitution of interests and 
preferences and particularly of interplay between the opposites, it is constructivism that 
offers more accurate perspective because of its focus on elite discourse that is at the basis 
of formulation national interests. Out of multiple facets of German identity that overlap 
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each other, in this case it is Germany’s identity based on the principle of multilateralism 
in the foreign policy. 
The ambivalence caused by the tension in the relations with France is also a part 
of the changing concept of the European integration; German policy makers in order to 
balance both challenges of the enlargement and the relations with France attempted to 
bring their French counterparts ‘on board’ of the enlargement. In this way they were 
introducing to their French partners a concept of embracing Eastern European countries 
as a part of European milieu.  
 
I. AMBIVALENCE 
Ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy caused by the French opposition 
to the Eastern enlargement of the EU manifested both in rhetoric and actions of German 
policy makers. German government executives declared the relations with France a 
priority in their foreign policy. Chancellor Kohl repeatedly called partnership with France 
‘decisive’ and invoked a shared Franco-German vision of a Europe ‘growing together not 
only economically but also politically’. The rhetoric was followed by actions; German 
policy makers repeatedly offered concessions to France, often on issues crucial for 
Germany’s interests. Given French explicit and strong opposition to the enlargement 
assigning priority to the relations with France by German policy makers, created 
ambivalence in their enlargement policy.  
This is a factor that occurred at early stage, when the idea of the Eastern 
enlargement was only presented by Eastern Europeans, and persisted until the 
negotiations over the EU reform in late 1990s/2000s. After the Madrid European Council 
in December 1995, which moved the enlargement process towards setting a timetable for 
accession negotiations with the associated countries, the French explicit and direct 
opposition to the enlargement declined. But it was still strong against the EU reform, on 
which the German government insisted perceiving it as indispensible in order to proceed 
with the enlargement. French defensive stance affected German policy causing its 
ambivalence from the early stage of the enlargement process till the Berlin Summit in 
1999 because the project was fundamentally in conflict with the French interests. 
Together with a closely connected factor of deepening the European integration, French 
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opposition represents the most powerful reason for Germany’s ‘yes, but’ attitude towards 
the widening of the European Union. 
French politicians declared their opposition to the EC/EU enlargement idea as 
early as January 1990; French president François Mitterrand put forward then a 
counterproposal of creating a European Confederation165. His comments that the new 
Eastern European democracies should feel comfortable remaining in ‘ante-room’ of the 
Community for ‘tens and tens of years’ reflected a deep-seated reasoning behind the 
opposition to enlargement. 
It stemmed from fears of the post unification growth of German power, which, in 
the view of French politicians, was to be enhanced further by the EC enlargement. 
German policy makers did not want to risk their most important external partnership and 
subordinated the foreign policy to the goal of preserving good relations with France. It 
was an imperative of maintaining loyalty in partnership, but German policy makers also 
perceived close cooperation with France as highly congruent with Germany’s interest. 
This partnership allowed Germany, as a part of the tandem, setting direction and 
managing the European Union’s development, to play a role of an agenda-setter in the 
EU, exercising its institutional power. Therefore if a demonstration of the European 
integration commitment was a priority for Helmut Kohl, then maintaining good relations 
with France was even more important.  
During the process that led to the Maastricht Treaty Chancellor Kohl assigned 
priority to special relations with France166 and in order to overcome France’s concerns 
over Germany’s unification, he was ready to make far-reaching concessions. When 
France opposed Germany’s central demand to strengthen a democratic legitimacy of the 
EU by increasing the power of the European Parliament and to adjust the number of 
members of the European Parliament to the changing demographics of Europe167, 
Germany withdrew these proposals at the expense of its own interests. 
                                         
165 The interview of President Mitterrand by the French radio, reported in all mainstream German and Polish press at the time. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 January 1990 
166 Mathias Jopp, “The Strategic Implications of European Integration”, Adelphi Papers, 290, 1994, London IISS 
167 Ulf Frenkel points that Germany was rather disappointed in its hope that its forthcoming position regarding the Monetary Union 
would in turn result in deepened integration of European foreign and security policies, and in expansion of the powers of the European 
Parliament. 
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At the same time Germany’s commitment to support the enlargement was gaining 
a new dimension — the emerging new interests in the East. While the primary reasons of 
the German support for the EU enlargement stemmed from the sense of historical 
obligations, there was also an emerging reasoning based in material costs and benefits 
calculation. Eastern Europe was going under political and economic changes of 
unprecedented scale and scope. That created a volatile environment at the doorstep of 
Germany. A need for stabilising the region looked more and more urgent and became the 
core of the new interests of Germany in Eastern Europe. The EU enlargement was 
perceived as providing the best, because the most complex solution for this need. From 
the German point of view it was beneficial because, as indicated in the previous chapter, 
it would allow Germany to avoid the Mitteleuropa trap, becoming a dominant political 
and economic power in the region. 
German policy makers were caught between two conflicting sets of interests — of 
maintaining good relations with France and building new relations with Eastern 
Europeans. It resulted in ambivalence in the enlargement policy; German policy makers 
could not push for enlargement because that would aggravate the relations with France. 
At the same time French opposition to the enlargement made this project vulnerable — 
the leading position of France in the EU was powerful enough to block the enlargement. 
It resulted in delaying the enlargement process. One can detect such delays by taking into 
account two elements: the calls of the applicant countries and the logic of the process. 
The application was on the table and needed a response, and if the response was positive 
— to establish criteria for admission and to set a timetable of the process. Eastern 
Europeans were pushing for such developments, but the next step considered by the EU 
members was far from the postulates of the East Europeans. 
It was not setting criteria or timetable; it was about organization of an institutional 
platform for the political dialogue with East European countries on the multilateral level 
of the EU. And even though it did not present obligations, like setting criteria and 
timetable would, it was still difficult to organise. It was achieved, nonetheless, in the 
form of the Structured Dialogue introduced at the Essen Summit of December 1994, at 
the end of the German presidency in the EU. German diplomacy played a significant role 
in this achievement, but did not push for anything beyond a platform for dialogue. This 
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indicates that the German policy was cautious and, like during the unification 
negotiations, still in disparity with the enlargement rhetoric of the top German leaders. 
Achieving acceptance of the EU members for the EU expansion needed a political 
momentum — a possible one was presented with the unification of Germany, when the 
former Eastern Germany was absorbed quickly into the EC structure. This possibility was 
missed and after the experience with absorption of the GDR economy, incorporation of 
other post-socialist economies was perceived as an insurmountable task for the EC. Only 
the Structured Dialogue in the end of 1994 created as such a political momentum. It was 
the first actions of German policy makers on the EU level, in accordance to the 
supportive for the enlargement rhetoric. But the path to the Structured Dialogue for 
German policy makers was marked by a challenge to manage a growing tension in 
relations with France, which peaked in spring 1994. 
 
II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS 
New Interests of New Germany 
German supporters of the enlargement used to list four reasons in the aftermath of 
the unification as to why the European Union should embrace Eastern Europe168: 
1) Embedding Eastern states into multilateral cooperation of the EU would bring 
stability of democracy in the nearest neighbourhood of Germany169, 
2) It would facilitate trade and investments what could bring economic benefits to 
Germany,  
3) It would create a multilateral context for cooperation with the Eastern 
countries, 
4) And the fourth reason, more of moral and normative nature, was the conviction 
that enlargement would be the consequence of the Berlin Wall fall and the end of the 
Cold War170.  
                                         
168 Hyde-Price, Germany and European order…, op.cit. p. 182-183 
169 This argument explicitly was formulated much later, in 1999 by Günther Verheugen, Germany”s Commissioner Enlargement; he 
indicated that the primary argument for the enlargement the need to “create a peace order for the whole of Europe based on 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights”; Die Zeit 9 December 1999 
170 Hyde-Price, Germany and European …, op.cit., p. 183 
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These views were presented according to Hyde-Price, at the beginning of the 
1990s by German political scientists and supported by the wide part of German society, 
though with differentiation of perceived significance171. While two last points were 
unquestionable but intangible, the views on the economic benefits were polarized, 
leaving the first reason, of stabilization of the region, as the strongest argument for the 
enlargement. It was grounded in ‘certain security needs’, which points to the 
constructivist interpretation of creation of interests, as offered by Alexander Wendt172. 
German scholar, Josef Joffe, called for stabilisation of Germany’s immediate 
hinterland (backyard) by extending Eastward the shelter of Western institutions, at least 
to Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, which would ‘make sense economically and 
geographically’173. Joffe noted that ‘economically’ Czechoslovakia was ‘Germany’s 
Mexico, next door and with work forces that offered high productivity rated at about one-
tenth of German wage levels’174. That made Eastern neighbourhood attractive for 
investments. But due to the lack of concrete stabilising institutional arrangements with 
the Eastern countries, the volume of the investments there was still low. According to the 
data published by the Bundesbank, German investors put DM 1.2 billion in Eastern 
Europe in 1991, which represented merely 4.3 per cent of the whole sum of DM 27.5 
billion Germany made available in 1990 and 1991 for all foreign investments. This 
amount increased over the years 1992/1993 and by the end of 1993 the investments in the 
Czech Republic only were worth DM 800 million175.  
Tyll Necker, the then president of the German Industry Confederation 
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), held that Central and Eastern Europe with its 
400 million market presented an excellent opportunity for the economic expansion and 
that it depended only on the Germans whether they would take advantage of this 
opportunity176. These assessments were countered by many economists, for example from 
a prestigious foundation Wissenschaft und Politik (funded by the federal government, 
                                         
171 Ibid. 
172 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 234 
173 Josef Joffe, German Grand Strategy after the Cold War, in Arnulf Baring (ed.), Germany”s New Position in Europe…, op.cit. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 November 1993 
176 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 September 1990 
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headquartered in Bavarian Ebenhausen), who indicated that much more attractive 
opportunities for German investments laid in the Far East177.  
The most concrete benefits of the enlargement, however, were seen in 
stabilization of the region. With this reasoning the support for the enlargement gained a 
second pillar. 
 
1. Stabilising Region 
Two major factors induced a debate on the necessity to stabilise Eastern Europe at 
the beginning of the 1990s: 
• Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the implosion of the Soviet Union, which 
left a security vacuum and changed the geopolitical position of Germany and 
• Outbreak of the conflicts in the Balkans, which started with the war between 
Serbia and Croatia in 1991, and in Bosnia a year later, and shocked the liberal-democratic 
Europeans, who had been celebrating victory over communism.  
These developments prompted many commentators to raising warnings about a 
possible prospect of instability in Central and Eastern Europe. Western observers 
perceived Eastern democracies as nascent and vulnerable because the economies of these 
countries were going under a ‘shock’ therapy. The concerns were voiced often in quite an 
alarming tone. A typical phrase is the one used by a German scholar Jochen Thies, who 
wrote that a ‘large zone of possible turmoil stretches from Germany’s Eastern border 
right up to Vladivostock’178. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Marion von 
Dönhoff, the then publishers of Die Zeit magazine, used a similar tone in a joint article of 
May 1990. They emphasised that ‘it is in our own interest to feel responsibility for the 
fate of our neighbours (…) if your neighbour’s house is on fire, your house is in danger. 
Therefore we help to fight the fire’179. Not only German observers were worrying; 
Timothy Garton Ash, Dominique Moïsi and Michael Mertes spelled out identical 
                                         
177 See for example A Heynitz, Hanns W. Maull, “Im Osten lockt kein Eldorado”, Die Zeit 1 July 1990, K. Seitz, Die japanisch-
amerikanische Herausforderung. Deutschlands Hochtechnologie-Industrien kämpfen ums Überleben, München 1991 
178 Jochen Thies, “Germany and Eastern Europe between Past and Future”, in Arnulf Baring (ed.), Germany”s New Position in 
Europe. Problems and Perspectives, Berg Oxford/Providence USA, 1994 
179 Marion Dönhoff, Helmut Schmidt, “Der Osten braucht unsere Solidarität”, Die Zeit, 25 May 1990; 
http://www.zeit.de/1990/22/der-osten-braucht-unsere-solidaritaet 
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concerns in a widely quoted article180, when they asked whether the dominos that ‘had 
fallen into the direction of democracy, could not fall again the other way?’ And a 
warning by a prominent American expert, Zbigniew Brzeziński, the former U.S. National 
Security Advisor who in 1989 pointed to the risk of ‘Balkanization of Eastern Europe 
and Lebanonization of the Soviet Union’181, found many believers.  
These alarming arguments that democratic reforms may be reversible, intended to 
strengthen the call for revision of the Western attitudes towards the East. The quoted 
observers, with exception of Jochen Thies, were strong supporters of binding Eastern 
democracies with the Western institutions. Their voice contributed significantly to the 
debate that eventually brought positive conclusions for the Easter EUropean pleas. Again 
it was encapsulated in a catchy phrase — ‘enhancing their security will also enhance 
ours’. It became the argument the most often referred to in the calls for opening of the 
West towards the East. 
The underlying reason for the calls to stabilise the region was a quickly increasing 
flow of immigration from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In 1990 only it reached 
1.3 million people, then the next year — 1.2 million, with the further 2 millions coming 
from the Balkans in the wake of the war182 (these figures did not include the so-called 
economic immigration). Germany was attractive for immigration from the Eastern 
neighbourhood throughout the Cold War period — the decisive factors were its 
proximity, its relatively liberal asylum policy and the excellence of the German welfare 
state. Now, with the imploding Soviet Union and an unfolding Balkan war, the influx 
represented a political hazard; given the projected costs of absorption of the bankrupt 
GDR economy, Germany did not have surpluses that could support refugees and 
immigrants in the numbers they were flowing in.  
These were immediate reasons for endorsing a project of stabilising the region 
and they were recognised by majority of the German observers and commentators; the 
idea of introducing stability through the EU enlargement was seen as the most rational 
                                         
180 Timothy Garton Ash, Dominique Moïsi and Michael Mertes, “Let the East Europeans In”, New York Review of Books, 38/17, 
1991, p.19 
181 Zbigniew Brzeziński, “Post-communist Nationalism”,  Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, No 5, 1989 
182 From the former Soviet Bloc it was in 1988 approximately 100 .000 applications for asylum, in 1992 the number was 440 
thousands. Data from: Penny Henson, Nisha Malhan, “Endeavours to Export a Migration Crisis”,  German Politics, NO 4/3 1995 
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response to the challenge. At this early stage German commentators were calling also for 
recognition of Germany’s responsibility in aiding Eastern countries. Two standpoints of 
prominent German scholars are illustrative here.  
Karl Kaiser emphasised that the German aid should not be considered a charity 
because it is entirely congruent with the German interests. Germany therefore should 
accept the fact that its part of the cost would be much bigger than that of other Western 
countries and that any possible crisis in the region would affect Germany first and 
foremost183. This rationale found a realist version in Christian Deubner’s elaboration. 
According to his views, there were two German interests ‘in its direct confrontation with 
the liberated East’184. The first was a possibility of easing the tense relations with Russia 
and the sensitive ones with the West. The Central and East European governments added 
impetus to this possibility by voicing confidence in Germany and declaring friendship 
with the powerful western neighbour. The second was the wish of all Eastern countries 
that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Central Europe. That was identical 
with Germany’s desire regarding the presence of the Russian troops in the former GDR. 
‘Doubtlessly nothing could awaken and stabilise such sentiments as much, nothing 
seemed a better precondition for preventing German hegemonic urges, and nothing 
finally promised quicker and more maintained financial aid for transformation, as giving 
them the perspective of entering the European Community, where other smaller countries 
already enjoyed fruitful equal coexistence and cooperation with the bigger ones’ — 
wrote Deubner.  
These motives for including Eastern new democracies into the EU framework 
were also in line with the liberal approach formulated by two leading liberal German 
scholars, Dieter Senghaas and Hanns Maull. Senghaas pointed that a stable peace 
involves a political order characterised by ‘permanent peaceful coexistence and reliable 
civilised conflict—resolution’185, and Maull that the ‘civilisationization’ of international 
relations is achieved through strengthening normative prohibitions against violent forms 
                                         
183 Karl Kaiser, “Unsere Rolle in Europa”, in: Christian Hein, Karl von Beyme, Karl Meyer, Deutsche Ansichten. Die Bundesrepublik 
in Übergang, Bonn 1992, p. 254 
184 Christian Deubner, “Germany as Architect of European Integration and Eastern Europe”, Working Paper 7.11 of Center for 
German and European Studies, University of California, Berkley, April 1996 
185 Dieter Senghaas, (ed.), Den Frieden Denken, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1995, p.15 
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of conflict resolution186. This corresponds with another aspect of the international 
security: after the EU enlargement Germany would be in the middle of a stable zone. It 
was Wolfgang Schäuble, the then leader of the parliamentary faction CDU/CSU faction, 
who raised this important argument in the debate on the enlargement in the Bundestag187. 
The need to establish political and economic security in the immediate 
neighbourhood of Germany started playing in this way a major role in shaping 
Germany’s support for the enlargement. But there was also another factor constituting the 
new interests of the new Germany in relation to the Eastern countries. It was the 
multilateralism of the German foreign policy, Germany’s commitment to the European 
integration.  
 
2. Multilateralism Principle  
The basis for formulation new interests in the East was the multilateral identity of 
Germany. The unification presented Germany with a question about its future place on 
the international stage. A key notion in the debate was ‘normalisation’188; it reflected the 
fact that the unified Germany were becoming a ‘normal’, i.e. fully sovereign country. 
Multilateralism of the German foreign policy chosen by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as 
the means for overcoming Germany’s post-WWII international isolation, and continued 
by all post-WWII Chancellors, allowed Germany to build a reputation of a reliable 
partner, but it resulted also in the fact that the BRD ‘had never conducted a sovereign 
foreign policy, never a truly national, never even a largely autonomous foreign policy’189. 
Now the question was what would it mean for Germany to run an autonomous and 
‘normal’ foreign policy.  
                                         
186 Hanns W. Maull, “Civilian Power: The Concept and its Relevance for Security Issues”, in Lidija Babic and Bo Huldt (eds), 
Mapping the Unknown: Towards a New World Order, The Yearbook of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1992-93, 
Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1993, pp.115-31 
187 The argument was an old predilection of the German policy, although the association is rather unfortunate, as the middle location 
was advocated by Bismarck. For the Schäuble”s quotation see Wolfgang Schäuble, Grundfragen der europäischen Integration aus der 
Sicht der CDU/CSU — Fraktion, in: R. Hellwig (Hrgs), Der Deutsche Bundestag und Europa, München 1993, p. 155 
188 Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson, Germany”s Power in Europe, One Europe or Several, Birmingham Discussion Papers, 
No. ESRC—IGS Discussion 2000/10, pp.23-46 and Ash, Germany”s Choice…, op.cit., p. 79 
189 Lothar Rühl, “Einige Kriterien nationaler Interessenbestimmung”, in: W. Heydrich, J. Krause, U. Nerlich, J. Nötzold, and R. 
Rummel, (eds), Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands: Neue Konstellation, Risiken, Instrumente, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992, pp.741-59 
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The notion of ‘normalisation’ initially was seen as eagerness to shed old limits of 
the semi-sovereign status and to assume a more assertive policy. With the passage of time 
it became evident that in the context of the European policy, as Adrian Hyde-Price and 
Charlie Jeffery put it a decade later, ‘normalisation’ did not mean Germany ‘casting off 
these normative constraints in order that it can become a rational power-maximising 
actor, but rather a process of rethinking the normative foundations of German European 
integration policy, of reformulating norms in a way that has opened up the field for a 
more nuanced and at times more instrumental — engagement of Germany with the 
EU’190.  
Formulation of the new set of Germany’s interests in the East provides an answer 
to the question of how Germany initially utilised an opportunity for normalisation: the 
formulation of these interests was based on the principle of multilateralism. In this way 
German policy makers entered the process of creation new premises for a new Ostpolitik 
and for a new grand European strategy. The principle of multilateralism allowed turning 
the new Ostpolitik into a part of Germany’s Europapolitik. That reflects a Peter 
Katzenstein’s observation that ‘state interests do not exist to be ‘discovered’ by self-
interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social 
interaction’191. The new interests were however in conflict with the old commitments, 
especially to the relation with France. 
 
 
III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE 
French Disconnection 
French politicians offered a response to the changes in Eastern Europe as early as 
autumn 1989, by putting forward an initiative of organising financial aid for the new 
Eastern democracies (supported by the President of the European Commission Jacques 
Delors, responding to the American suggestions192). Soon afterwards, however, when the 
                                         
190 Adrian Hyde-Price and Charlie Jeffery, “Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality”,  Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 39 NO 4, November 2001 
191 Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security, New Your: Columbia University Press, 1996., p.2.   
192 Sedelmeier, Wallace, Eastern Enlargement… op.cit., p. 433. 
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idea of Eastern enlargement started gaining political strength, French politicians became 
its fiercest adversaries.  
The relationship with France presented for German political elites the highest 
stake as the cooperation between Bonn and Paris was a structural landmark in the post-
war European politics. The French attitude and its policy towards Germany, both in the 
bilateral relation and in the multilateral context of the European Community, was 
motivated by mistrust; from the French perspective Germany always presented a mixture 
of rivalry and sources of insecurity and the primary goal of the French was to prevent 
Germany’s dominance in Europe. It was the motive behind Charles de Gaulle’s decision 
on the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 and of François Mitterrand’s decision in 1990 to 
move the European Community to the level of the European Union.  
A growing power of Germany was a concern not only for France — in 1986 one 
of the then European senior statesmen Giulio Andreotti of Italy said in public that it 
would be better for peace in Europe to have two German states rather than only one, and 
the reservations of Margaret Thatcher about Germany’s unification were too well 
known193. But for France the ‘German question’ after the unification was hyper 
sensitive194. François Mitterrand, the then French president, called for the December 1989 
EC summit meeting in Strasbourg, to address concerns over prospect of Germany’s 
unification. He presented a demand for a deeper integration of Germany into the EC. The 
response of Chancellor Kohl was decisive — he co-signed with Mitterrand a joint letter 
of April 1990 calling for a conference that would link both economic and political union. 
Understanding of closer political and economic union was however different on both 
sides. While the Germans wanted to ‘balance’ the creation of the EMU with wider 
prerogatives for the Commission and the European Parliament, the French opposed the 
                                         
193 As Margaret Thatcher put in her memoirs Mitterrand shared with her during a meeting on 29 January 1990 fears that the German 
leaders might succumb to a renewed Drang Nach Osten and seek a sphere of influence over the central and east Europe. In: Margaret 
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London HarperCollins 1993, p. 798 
194 For the realist perspective on the Franco-German relations, see: Thomas Pedersen, Germany, France and the Integration of 
Europe. Realist Interpretation, London: Pinter 1998; on the Farnce”s pocition on the enlargement seen from the German perspective 
see: Christian Deubner, Frankreich in der Ostweiterung der EU, 1989 bis1997, Politische Studien, Vol. 50, NO 1, 1999 
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strengthening of the EU institutions because that would limit the national influence of 
France within the EU195.  
The prospect of the Eastern European countries joining the EC in the French 
views would place Germany in a dominant position, both in politics and economy in 
Europe196. The previous, southern round of the EC enlargement in the 1980s resulted in 
diluting the parity of votes within the EC/EU, through the increased number of the 
member states. French policy makers stressed this aspect as presenting a serious threat to 
France (though in fact it was a symbolic more than a real issue). These were not ‘ad hoc’ 
fears; they were deeply embedded in the awareness of the French nation. As Dominique 
Moïsi put it the ‘fragile balance of imbalances between West German economic power 
and France’s relative political and military strength was bound to corrode’.197 These 
fears were still present three years later when around 50 per cent of the French admitted 
to it in a survey run by the Prognos-Institute for the German Handelsblatt and American 
Wall Street Journal198. 
The difficulty inherent in the complex relations between Germany and France at 
the time was characterised adequately by Stanley Hoffmann: ‘For many years the French 
who dominate the Brussels bureaucracy saw in the EC a vehicle for French influence and 
for imposing restraints on the power of West Germany. Today and for good reasons the 
fear of Germany dominating the Community has replaced (as also in Denmark) the old 
fear of an unshackled Germany outside the Community. For France it is worth staying in 
the EC as long as Germany is in it, but the French have increasing doubts who is the 
guard and who is the captive’199. In the French concept of the European integration 
France provided political leadership while West Germany provided economic resources. 
From the French perspective the idea of the Eastern enlargement of the EU jeopardised 
this model; French leaders feared, that after the EU enlargement to the East, Germany 
would displace France as the dominant agenda-setter.  
                                         
195 Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Die Kontroverse zwischen Bundeskanzler Kohl und Präsident Mitterrand um die institutionelle Reform 
der EG 1989-90”, in Marie-Therese Bitsch (ed.), Le Couple Franco-Allemand et les Institutions Europeennes, 2005 
196 Dominique Moïsi , “Insecurities, Old and New, Plague the Paris-Bonn Axis”, The Wall Street Journal, Europe, 7 February 1995 
197 Ibid. 
198 Handelsblatt, 3 November 1993 
199 Stanley Hoffmann, “Goodbye to a United Europe?”,  New York Review of Books, 27 May 1993, pp. 27-31 
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French policy makers were resistant to changes of the status quo within the 
European Community. Their stance during the negotiations over the Europe Agreements, 
opposing in fact any agreement was the expression of this deep self-preservation. 
‘Mitterrand’s overall attitude towards Central and Eastern Europe revealed a defensive 
attachment to the strategic status quo ante’ — commented Robert Niblett200. In this light, 
a quick response of the French politicians in the autumn of 1989 organising aid for 
Eastern Europe seems to be less an expression of support for Eastern Europe, and more of 
a political calculation. And viewing the East through the prism of the policy towards 
Germany was not new in the French foreign policy; Horst Teltschik in his memoirs 
recalls that Kohl had made attempts to create a common Franco-German Ostpolitik as 
early as 1988, but it was unsuccessful and led to a competition rather than cooperation201. 
The conviction on the French side that Germany could win a leading position in Europe 
by supporting Eastern Europe was now even stronger. With such an attitude, French 
politicians presented the most difficult obstacle to the launching the idea of the EC/EU 
enlargement.  
The majority of the German political elites did not want to risk the relation with 
France. The commitment to deepening of the European integration and embracing the 
single currency was not popular in Germany but understood as necessary to dissolve the 
fears of a potential ‘mightier’ Germany202. As an immediate concession Chancellor Kohl 
also supported the French position in the negotiations of the 1993 GATT Uruguay 
Round, which countered the U.S. expectations that Germany would persuade the French 
to limit their protectionist tendencies203. That did not however avert the deterioration of 
the Franco-German friendship: the French leading daily newspaper Le Monde observed 
‘frictions and fissures’ in the bilateral relations204. Foreign Minister Alain Juppé stressed 
                                         
200 Niblett, France and Europe… op.cit., p. 94 
201 Teltschik, 329 Tage…, op.cit., p. 369 
202 French policy makers initially hoped that the monetary union would de-base the DM as a leading currency in the EC, when it 
however came close to realization they feared it would be Germany benefiting from the economic union the most; See: Ingo Kolboom, 
“Die Vertreibung der Dämonen: Frankreich und das vereinte Deutschalnd”, Europa-Archiv 15-16, 1991 
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in the summer 1993 there were objective difficulties in the Franco-German relationship205 
and former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt wrote in the Parisian weekly Globe-Hebedo that 
Franco-German cooperation had been dissolving since 1989 with Helmut Kohl having 
done nothing to prevent this process206. And one of the leading German intellectuals 
Christoph Bertram observed in Le Monde that ‘those in France who are thinking in 
purely national categories must feel that Germany won first prise in the breakdown of the 
order of Yalta while France had lost’207.  
German policy makers were aware that any elaboration of the enlargement project 
needed French support. And until this support was secured, supportive actions of German 
policy makers promoting the enlargement were limited. It created ambivalence in 
Germany’s policy towards the enlargement, because the French opposition was not an 
obstacle to ignore or overcome. German policy makers were determined to preserve good 
relations with France and that made their commitment to the EU enlargement restricted. 
 
IV. OPTIONS 
Weimar Triangle 
An idea to bring France on ‘board of the enlargement’ prompted an initiative of 
creating a Weimar Triangle, a platform for cooperation of three countries — France, 
Germany and Poland. It was an initiative of Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher208. The 
Triangle concerned the relations with Poland, but was supposed to elevate all new 
Eastern democracies and bring them closer to the French policy makers. In this way 
Genscher hoped to win understanding and support of the French for the anticipated 
widening of the EU to the East. The Triangle exemplified ‘as-well-as’ strategy that 
reflected Germany’s exercising of the principle of mulatilateralism in the foreign policy. 
Genscher understood the necessity of bringing the relations with the Eastern 
neighbours out of the shadows of the Cold War. As the Soviet Union used to be a priority 
in Germany’s Ostpolitik, not many German politicians recognised at first the post-Cold 
War aspirations of the Eastern European democracies. Genscher was among those who 
                                         
205 Die EG lebt gefährlich, Der Spiegel 24 August 1993, also Objektive Schwierigkeiten mit Bonn, Die Welt 25 August 1993 
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did. To a high degree one can attribute this to his East German origins. He understood 
that Russia could not be the main addressee of the new Eastern policy of Germany. A 
title of the chapter on the relations with the East in Genscher’s memoirs is ‘The East is 
More Than Moscow’209. He also understood that a road to elevating the relations with 
Eastern countries was not only through bilateral treaties, but through bringing Eastern 
partners into the Western European circle of politics. A political expression of this 
reasoning was a proposal of the Weimar Triangle.  
Reaching out to France was the first goal. On the other hand as the relations with 
France used to be the bedrock of post-war relations of the Bundesrepublik with Western 
partners, bringing Poland to the table emphasised the commitment of German politicians 
to the goal of elevating the relations with the Eastern countries. That was rooted in the 
deep conviction about a special position of Poland.  
From the German point of view, Poland fell into a special category; paradoxically 
the point of reference for this reasoning was the relation with France. Many German 
commentators envisaged that in the context of the European integration, German-Polish 
relationship should perform a role comparable with that of the Franco-German axis in the 
Western integration210. Poland’s large territory, the size of its population (nearly 40 mln), 
its economic potential and its geographical position bordering Ukraine and Belarus, made 
Poland a natural leader among the Eastern countries. Stable and prosperous Poland, 
therefore, presented for Germany a desirable development. Genscher’s logic was 
therefore that the Franco-German-Polish cooperation could bring to a new Europe an 
added value. ‘Germany’s relations with France and Poland are a decisive determinant of 
the future of the whole continent — argued Genscher — When Germans, French and 
Poles work together as Europeans and stop any manifestation of nationalism, then the 
                                         
209 Genscher, “Memoirs…, op.cit. 
210 See: Friedbert Pflüger, Polen-Unser Frankreich im Osten, in: W. Schäuble/ R.Seiters (Hgg.) Außenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Die 
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prospects for building trust and peaceful co-operation in Europe as a whole will be 
greatly improved’, choosing a symbolic name of the Weimar Triangle for his vision211.  
Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher depicted Eastern enlargement  project 
as a ‘great historical chance in overcoming the old divisions and Germany’s role as 
bridging West and East’. François Mitterrand in an attempt to recapture the initiative in 
furthering developments in Europe proposed in January 1990 the idea of a European 
Confederation212. It was not supported by other EC members, and cost him the trust of 
the East Europeans, who saw his pan-European, ‘unrealistic’ vision as an attempt to 
counter the idea of the EC enlargement213. This perception was fortified soon by 
Mitterrand’s comments that the new democracies should feel comfortable remaining in 
this ‘ante-room’ of the Community for ‘tens and tens of years’.  
In the Genscher’s vision, the Weimar Triangle could help facilitating the relations 
of the Eastern countries with France, but it also could help in Kohl’s strategy aimed at 
diluting the burden of the enlargement by making it an obligation of the whole 
Community/Union. There was, however, a sensitive impediment to the Weimar Triangle 
— Russia. Elevating relations with Poland contradicted a Kohl government’s stance, 
which emphasised importance of partnership with the Soviet Union. This disparity was 
underlined by an outbreak of a ‘Gorbimania’ in Germany at the time; the common belief 
among the German elites, press commentators and politicians was that the unification of 
their country was possible thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev’s personal involvement. The 
gratitude of the Germans made Gorbachev a media-star. Helmut Kohl contributed to this 
picture, demonstrating cordial relations with Gorbachev. From Kohl’s point of view this 
served a purpose of securing Russia’s friendship in the long term.  
The Weimar Triangle initiative can be seen in this context as a special tactics of 
the German diplomacy. The fact that it was Kohl’s Minister, not the Chancellor himself, 
who proposed the Triangle, was very comfortable for Helmut Kohl; he could uphold an 
                                         
211 Ibid. 
212 The interview of President Mitterrand by the French radio, reported in all mainstream German and Polish press at the time. See 
for example Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 January 1990 
213 An assumption of the “European confederation” was that it would encompass all the nations of Europe. It relied upon the Gaullist 
concept of European order, anticipating Europe from Atlantic to the Ural, which would free itself from its dependence on the two 
super powers.  
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unchanged position vis-a-vis Russian leaders, starting at the same time the process of 
building up new quality relations with the Eastern neighbours. 
The first meeting within the Weimar Triangle, between Foreign Ministers Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, Roland Dumas and Krzysztof Skubiszewski, took place in August 
1991. It did not bring any particular results. Two years later in November 1993, however, 
the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and his French counterpart Alain Juppé 
declared together that they would support Poland in the process of accession to the 
European Union214. This pledge was strengthened by their appeal to other members of the 
WEU to confer the status of ‘associated’ to Poland and other Eastern countries applying 
for it. The meetings of the ‘Triangle’ did not change fundamentally France’s adverse 
stance on the enlargement, but the appeal of Kinkel and Juppé proved that the aim of 
bringing France closer was achieved. It was, however, limited to the relation with Poland. 
The French still remained opposed to wider and deeper cooperation with the East, for 
example to Germany’s push for association agreements with the Baltic states (from the 
early 1992)215.  
 
V. RESULTS 
French opposition to the enlargement idea limited Germany’s potential for taking 
up supportive for the enlargement actions. This potential was constrained already by the 
demand of committing to the deepening of he European integration. It resulted with the 
lack of a strong leadership on the enlargement issue in the EU level, which could have 
been filled by Germany. Ambivalence created in this way in Germany’s policy is 
deductible by contrasting it with an acceleration of the German actions in 1994. Until 
then, however, although the new emerging interests in the East brought about by the need 
to stabilise the region pressed for introducing the enlargement idea, German policy 
makers faced with France’s opposition in the years 1990—1993 remained passive and 
their stance on the enlargement ambivalent. Acceleration was prompted when German 
policy makers found partners for leading the process — the Dutch and British 
                                         
214 Gemeinsame Erklärung der AußenMinister von Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen, Bulletin der Bundesregierung, NO 100, 18 
November 1993, pp. 1122-3 
215 Reinhard Stuth, “Deutschlands neue Rolle im sich wandelnden Europa”,  Außenpolitik NO 1, 1992; P. Schmidt, “German Security 
Policy in the Framework of EU, WEU and NATO”,  Außenpolitik, Vol. 47, NO 3, 1996, pp.211-22 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
122 
Commissioners in the EU. That provided a multilateral platform for action, fulfilling the 
premises of the German foreign policy. 
 
1. Slowing Down the EU Dynamics  
Winning acceptance of the EU members for the EU expansion needed a political 
momentum. It took next two years, since signing up the Europe Agreements and 
Maastricht Treaty, to create it. The Europe Agreements that were described as a ‘defence 
instrument’ to keep East European countries outside the EC216, and Eastern Europeans 
pushed for setting a timetable for the enlargement.  
The first step was reached with a declaration of the European Council at the 
Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, when the EU for the first time agreed on the 
membership perspective for the associated countries. Then, after next 18 months, the 
member states signed up the Structured Dialogue at the Essen Summit in November 
1994, which institutionalised a framework for political dialogue between the EU and 
Eastern partners. It was the British and the Dutch in the Commission who, with the 
support of German diplomats, were pushing for institutionalisation of the ‘dialogue’ with 
the Eastern countries.  
Provisions for such a multilateral political dialogue were included already in the 
Europe Agreements. The Agreements did not acknowledge that enlargement was a 
Community’s objective, but included recognition of the necessity to create a closer 
partnership and multilateral dialogue with the Eastern countries. The question left open 
was — what sort of partnership beyond Europe Agreements should be developed?  
The European Council agreed at Maastricht just days after the European 
Agreements were signed, to examine at Lisbon in June 1992 general implications of the 
EU enlargement217. The Commission proposed a new formula of ‘reinforced association’ 
                                         
216 Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider claim the proposal of the Europe Agreements was burdened with the “strategic 
ambivalence”: Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider, Association and Beyond: the European Union and the Višegrad States, in: 
Barbara Lippert and Heinrich Schneider, (eds.), “Monitoring Association and Beyond. The European Union and the Višegrad States”, 
Europäische Schriften des Instituts für Europäische Politik, Band 74, Europa Union Verlag Bonn, 1995, p.26; Heinz Kramer, “The 
European Community”s response to the New Eastern Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies, NO 31/2, 1993 
217 The Lisbon report distinguished between the countries of the EFTA as immediately eligible for membership and both the southern 
applicants (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) and Central East European Countries; see: Anna Michalski, Helen Wallace, The Challenge of 
Enlargement, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992 
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in communication. The subsequent debate within the EU centred upon a dichotomy 
between deepening and widening the Union. The British advocated the widening and less 
cohesive community, the French were pushing for deepening among the twelve members, 
while the German government remained reserved trying to avoid making a choice218. 
German stance lacked clarity; it was ambivalent.  
Helmut Kohl introduced the concept of developing both directions simultaneously 
— widening and deepening. It conveyed a message that Germany would support the 
enlargement. But that it supported deepening too. Chancellor Kohl declared it in a 
government declaration of 1993 stating that ‘it would be unthinkable for us Germans if 
the Western border of the Czech Republic and Poland should remain the Eastern border 
of the political union indefinitely’219. The declaration about embracing both directions 
was reiterated few months later by the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel220 and strengthened 
by his predecessor, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who commented that the ‘vitality of Europe 
depends on two sources: deepening and widening’221. The issue of Eastern Europe in the 
quoted above government declaration, however, took only two short paragraphs in a six-
page text. This, along with the lack of concrete proposals how to reconcile both 
challenges, contributed to the prevailing among other member states at the time 
reluctance towards the idea of developing both directions. All the member states were 
rather interested first and foremost in maintaining the status quo of the EU benefits 
system.  
William Wallace and Anthony Forster noted that for most of other than Germany 
member states, France, Italy or Spain, the problem with the stability of the Eastern 
Europe was quite remote222. Eastern revolution did not affect these countries as it did 
Germany, because it happened at its doorstep. Domestic concerns, established priorities 
                                         
218 See for example Reinhard Meier-Walser, Deutschland, Frankreich und Grossbritannien and der Schwelle zu einem neuen Europa, 
Außenpolitik NO 4, 1992; Gregory F. Treverton, The New Europe,  Foreign Affairs, Vol 71 No 1, 1991-1992 
219 Erklärung der Bundesregierung über die Erweiterungsverhandlungen der Europäischen Union, Bulletin des Press- und 
Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 11 March 1994, 217-218 
220 Kinkel stated this in a speech before the German Society for Foreign Affairs saying that keeping Europe on integration in both 
directions would be a priority. See: “Rede des AußenMinisters Klaus Kinkel vor der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik”, 
Europa-Archiv 41, 2 1994 D541-542 
221 Bedenkliche Thesen, Der Spiegel 12 September 1994, p. 29-32 
222 William Wallace, Anthony Forster, “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, in: Helen Wallace and William Wallace, (Eds.): 
Policy-Making in the European Union …, op.cit. 
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and the challenge to adjust to Maastricht provisions, overshadowed the problems of the 
Eastern Europe transformation. Apart from the attempted Moscow putsch there were no 
other dramatic events that would enforce a decisive and quick political response to the 
East. The process of preparation of a multilateral dialogue was in fact stalled.  
Only arrival in 1993 of two new External Relations Commissioners, Sir Leon 
Brittan from the UK and Hans van den Broek from the Netherlands, reinvigorated the 
process and prompted German policy makers to action. Both Commissioners represented 
more liberal approach than their predecessors and started pressing for liberation of trade 
and widening the access to the EU market for the Eastern countries223. The views of 
Brittan and van den Broek found support from the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.  
 
2. Chancellor’s Chefsache 
At the arrival of the new Commissioners the negotiations over the idea of 
institutionalisation of a dialogue with the Eastern countries were stalled, and the 
emphasis in the debate over the future development of the EU was shifting towards the 
deepening the Western integration. There was no political impetus for the progress with 
the enlargement. Chancellor Kohl’s decision to make the enlargement his Chefsache can 
be seen as an expression of his commitment, and a move aimed at saving and furthering 
the enlargement. It was the next moment after the declaration of ‘two sides of the same 
coin’, which made German Chancellor the advocate of the enlargement.  
It is impossible to unravel all the details of the cooperation between the 
Commission and the German representatives, and identify which side triggered which 
decision. Important feature is that the cooperation created a common front on the issue of 
the enlargement. German representation in Brussels is formed by officials mainly from 
the Foreign and Economic Ministries, and it is the Foreign Ministry, which controls the 
policy-making by the representation224. The representatives follow a guideline, Richtlinie 
formulated in the Chancellor’s Office.  
                                         
223 Their entrance coincided with the split of responsibilities within the Commission for East and Central Europe, between DGI for 
external commercial affairs and the new DGIA for external political affairs. A newly designed DGIA provided Commission with a 
wider possibility of manoeuvre and of conducting more freely certain political enterprises See: Ulrich Sedelmeier, The European 
Union Association Policy, towards Central and Eastern Europe”, Sussex European Institute Discussion Paper, pp. 24-25 
224 Collins, German Policy-Making…, op.cit.; Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power …, op.cit. 
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Evidence that the Richtlinie the German representatives were given by their 
government, was to support the enlargement, can be found in numerous official stances 
and speeches at the time, mainly by Chancellor Kohl himself and his Foreign Ministers 
— Hans-Dietrich Genscher and subsequently Klaus Kinkel225. Their supportive rhetoric 
using appealing notions like ‘bridges’ and ‘doors’ was based on clear arguments. Volker 
Rühe, a new Defence Minister summed them up in 1992 emphasising the security 
dimension saying that ‘without stability in the East of our continent there will be no 
stability for the continent as the whole, and especially no stability for Germany’. He 
argued that Germany ‘cut many other countries in the EC and in Western Europe off from 
the problems like asylum seekers or the like and (…) it could not be in the German 
interest to remain permanently in this position’, thus Germans should commit themselves 
to eliminating the rift in the prosperity between the West and East226.  
All those arguments and statements were crowned by Helmut Kohl, who in 1993 
took active interest in the enlargement policy declaring it his Chefsache alongside the 
EMU and the EU affairs227. From this moment onwards German Chancellor pressed other 
EU states and the Commission, especially at the Essen and Madrid summits in 1994 and 
1995, to agreeing on a concrete timetable for accession. He reiterated in the spring of 
1994 that relations with the associated countries would be one of the priorities of the 
German presidency in the EU228. Eastern countries were also receiving reassurances from 
German politicians in bilateral relations. At every meeting between Polish and German 
high-rank officials the German side used to assert that Poland Hungary and 
                                         
225 For example speeches of Helmut Kohl in the Fall 1991 — Helmut Kohl: “Our future in Europe”, speech made at the European 
Institute, Edinburgh 1991;”United Germany in a United Europe”, speech made at Oxford 11 November 1991; in 1992 —Helmut Kohl, 
speech of 3 April 1992 to the Bertelsmann-Forum, Königswinter, Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr.38, 8 April 1992 
226 Protokoll des 3. Parteitages der CDU Deutschlands, 26-28 October 1992, Düsseldorf 
227 Erklärung der Bundesregierung über die Erweiterungsverhandlungen der Europäischen Union, Bulletin des Press- und 
Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 11 March 1994, 217-218; “Kohl macht den EU-Beitritt Polens zu seiner Sasche”, Kölner-
Stadt-Anzeiger 15 April 1994 
228 Klaus Kinkel summarised the German goals for the presidency as follows: a contribution to the creation of a lasting order of peace 
in Europe, a decisive process for bringing the Central and East European states closer to the EU and t he securing of an economically 
healthy EU that was able to act politically, he mentioned deepening as the last point; See: Klaus Kinkel, “Deutschland in Europa: Zu 
den Zielen der deutschen Präsidentschaft in der Europäische Union”, Europa-Archiv 41, 1, 1994. pp. 335-342 
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Czechoslovakia should be the EU members by the end of the century229. Chancellor Kohl 
for example, while visited by the Polish Prime Minister in April 1994, promised to apply 
necessary measures to help Poland in achieving a full membership. The rhetoric was thus 
very supportive, to the point that it prompted the opposite to the government SPD party to 
criticism; SPD representatives warned the government not to make ‘irresponsible 
promises’ of the fast EC membership230. 
The European Council agreed at Maastricht to examine general implications of a 
further enlargement at Lisbon in June 1992231. The Commission in a report to the Lisbon 
European Council stated general rules for applicants; according to these applicant 
countries first would have to implement ‘acquis communautaire’. The Commission also 
set out clearly that ‘widening must not be at the expense of deepening’, and that the 
enlargement must not be a dilution of the Community's achievements232. Such limited 
response of the Commission was due to the reluctance of the member states to carry the 
issue further; Italy, Spain, France and Portugal held still the Agreements as the 
framework for preparing the accession.  
Chancellor Kohl did not push for setting criteria. He called in spring 1993 for 
invitation of the heads of Višegrad states’ governments to the next European Council233. 
The invitation did not have any practical meaning as the East Europeans were not 
empowered with the right to participate in decisions making, but bringing East Europeans 
to the same table as the EU decision makers aimed as breaking a psychological barrier. It 
                                         
229 The source is the numerous interviews with Polish officials conducted by the author of the thesis while reporting on these 
developments in the years 1992-1994 for Rzeczpospolita, Polish Daily Newspaper (for example Minister Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 
Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Bronislaw Geremek, see Rzeczpospolita years 1992-1993; www.rp.pl) 
230 Parliamentary speech of Björn Engholm in the Bundestag 12/108 25 September 1992, 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/12/12108.pdf   
231 The report to the June 1992 Lisbon European Council distinguished between the countries of the EFTA as immediately eligible 
for membership and both the southern applicants (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) and Central East European Countries. In a report, the 
Commission re-stated also that there were three basic conditions for membership: European identity, democratic status and respect of 
human rights and suggested several additional criteria. Applicants had to accept the entire Community system, the “acquis 
communautaire”, and be able to implement it. This included the single European market and the Maastricht provisions on Economic 
and Monetary Union. An applicant state had to have a functioning and competitive market economy; if not, membership would disrupt 
the working of the Community. See: European Commission, “Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement”, EC Bulletin Supplement 
3/92, p. 11 
232 Ibid., p. 10; Enlargement could not be permitted to damage the progress made in implementing a single European market, a single 
currency, or a common foreign and security policy.  
233 “Kohl will Osteuropäer als Gäste beim nächsten EG-Gipfel”, General-Anzeiger, 28 May 1993 
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was a small step, but proposed by Germany.  
An ultimate success of this approach came in the shape of the Copenhagen 
Declaration of June 1993. It agreed on a membership perspective for the associated East 
European countries and lay down the background conditionality for the future 
enlargement, a supra-national legal framework of the acquis communautaire234. The next 
step was achieved due to support of the German government during the German 
presidency in the Union in the second half of 1994.  
 
3. Structured Dialogue  
Chancellor Kohl’s setting the enlargement as a Chefsache translated into more 
concrete actions. It allowed supporting an idea of creation an institutional platform for a 
‘dialogue’ with Eastern European countries. It was a first full-scale action of German 
policy makers on the EU level, conducted in accordance with the supportive for the 
enlargement rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl. They approached the challenge in a systematic 
way allocating resources and setting an agenda. This was the action awaited for nearly 
four years by Eastern Europeans. 
After the Copenhagen Declaration critics indicated that the main obstacle against 
embracing East European countries was their lack of legislation compatible with the one 
of the EU. Again it was a joint initiative of Commissioners Brittan and van den Broek 
along with German representatives working in the Commission’s DGI and DGIA, to turn 
the Copenhagen achievement into a concrete working political action. The idea was to 
help the Eastern countries to align with the EU legislation — ‘acquis communautaire’. 
The Council accepted in March 1994 a proposal for reinforcing a political dialogue with 
                                         
234 The Copenhagen European Council declared that the CEECs that had concluded a Europe agreement were eligible for EU 
membership, if they could meet three conditions: they must have a functioning market economy with the capability to cope with 
competitive pressures and market forces within the EU; they must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; and they must be able to take on the obligations of EU 
membership including adherence to the aims of economic and political union. An additional condition specifies that the EU must be 
able to absorb new members and maintain the momentum of integration. See: European Council, Copenhagen, 21-23 June 1993, 
Conclusions of the Presidency, SN/180/93. Also: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement  
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the six associated countries that were to participate in CFSP meetings235. The proposal 
was never implemented, and the scope of the dialogue was limited to meetings with the 
‘troika’. Such cooperation did not allow to address sufficiently increasingly worrying 
problems of immigration and the EU borders security. The need to mitigate these 
problems and stabilise the region was the reason for the German government to press for 
a more specific action by the EU.  
German policy makers approached the issue in a systematic way. First they 
created a special unit, an Arbeitsstab (working team) at the Europaabteilung (desk) at the 
Foreign Ministry. It was designated to deal specifically with the enlargement policies. 
Secondly, they designed an agenda, which was to further the momentum reached at 
Copenhagen. The strategy was based on understanding the need of organising more often 
joint meetings between the EU Ministers and their counterparts from six associate 
countries.  
A following ‘informal’ cooperation between the Commission and the German 
government, which while holding the presidency had an upper hand in choosing 
proposals for elaborating, resulted with the call for the Commission, presented at the 
Corfu European Council of June 1994236, to prepare a strategy that could be followed 
with a view for accession. Such a strategy was to be an introduction to a more detailed 
schedule of meetings with policy makers from Eastern Europe. The strategy was called 
later the Structured Dialogue.  
An idea of the Dialogue was presented in a joint article published in Le Monde by 
Chancellor Kohl and the French Prime Minister Eduard Balladur in May 1994237, 
prepared on the German initiative. Both politicians laid out a suggestion for a regular 
inter-Ministerial dialogue with the associated states. The proposal was since then pushed 
by German policy makers during the German presidency in the second half of 1994. In 
July 1994, at the beginning of this presidency, the Council endorsed the proposal. The 
informal meeting between the German and French policy makers in Paris on 20 
                                         
235 The proposal assumed participation of the heads of state or governments of the associated countries, in annual summits of the 
European Council president and the Commission president; special joint councils on CSFP matters with the associates” Foreign 
Ministers, along with the meetings of political directors, experts. 
236 Sedelmeier, Wallace, Eastern enlargement…, op. cit.p. 443, quoted from Bulletin of the EU, June 1994 
237 Le Monde, 26 May 1994; in translation  by DPA, 26 May 1994 
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September facilitated the further way, and one month later the Council agreed to press 
ahead with the White Paper on the Structured Dialogue.  
The Dialogue was accepted at the Essen Summit in December 1994 as ‘Practical 
Guidelines for Implementing Copenhagen European Council Decisions’238. It spelled out 
the idea of political consultations of the Eastern candidate states with the EU institutions 
and their progressive integration into the single European market through regulatory 
alignment239. The initial proposal included a wider spectrum of institutionalised 
cooperation, but due to the reluctance of France, Spain and Belgium, who opposed 
institutionalization of regular meetings, the scope was restricted240. For an ultimate 
acceptance of this limited version of the Dialogue German policy makers were forced to 
employ an incentive: German government pledged to support development of a more 
active Mediterranean policy (Barcelona Process), bringing on board also the French and 
Spanish governments.  
The declarations accepted at two subsequent EU summits, in Corfu and Essen, 
made the EU member states accept the Eastern enlargement as a prospective goal (and 
the EFTA enlargement as an immediate objective). 
 
SUMMARY 
German policy makers were faced after the unification with a challenge of 
maintaining old loyalties that served Germany’s interests and building new relations with 
Eastern Europeans that would serve Germany’s new, emerging interests in the region. As 
the French opposition to the enlargement made both directions conflicting, German 
policy makers chose to balance both, employing the ‘as-well’as’ strategy. They did not 
ignore the stance of France, pushing for the enlargement, which was congruent with a 
more pressing issue of stabilization of Germany’s Eastern neighbourhood. Instead, 
                                         
238 See: European Council, Meeting on 9 and 10 December 1994 in Essen, Presidency Conclusions  
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00300-1.EN4.htm 
239 Rejected proposals to work on were on commercial defence, agricultural subsidies, rules of origins and financial transfer. 
240 The main amendment was that a schedule of meetings would be decided by each presidency, not designed in advance. And as 
pointed out by Karen Smith the objecting countries stressed they did not want proliferation of meetings and that the EU”s 
independence of decision would have to be respected, in: Karen Smith, “Enlargement and European Order”, in: Christopher Hill and 
Michael Smith, (eds.) International relations and the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York, 2005; Karen 
Smith, The making of EU foreign policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, Palgrave Macmillain, Basingston, Hamphire, New York, 
2004. 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
130 
German leaders, Chancellor Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher applied a politics of small 
and indirect steps, creating first the Weimar Triangle, and then inviting Višegrad states’ 
governments to the European Council of 1993.  
German policy makers took up a more concrete action on the EU level only when 
a possibility of doing it in cooperation with others presented itself.  The views of two 
External Relations Commissioners, congruent with the German interests in Eastern 
Europe, allowed German policy makers to promote and achieve the Structured Dialogue. 
This approach can be seen an expression of Germany’s identity of multilateralism. Both 
maintaining good relations with France, not acting on the pressing need for securing new 
interests in the East, and, although for nearly four years only in a rhetorical sphere, but 
consistently supporting ambitions of the Eastern European partners was congruent with 
the principle of multilateral cooperation with all partners. 
Practically this was a tactics that was not spelled out as such. But consistency of 
this approach, which spanned nearly three years, from the moment of the Weimar 
Triangle proposition to the acceptance of the Structured Dialogue, indicates that it was a 
tactics. It is also indicated in the fact that it followed the Richtlinie established by the 
main actor, Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Promoting the enlargement through the Weimar 
Triangle, and on the European level through preparing the ground for the Structured 
Dialogue — German policy makers successfully uploaded the enlargement on the 
European agenda. The Weimar Triangle did not help to change France’s stance on the 
enlargement, but it helped Germany to save the relation with its primary partner and to 
further the enlargement project. 
There was however a price for this policy. It made Germany’s enlargement policy 
ambivalent. Small steps are expression of cautiousness and hesitancy; Weimar Triangle 
was a platform for only three states, France, Germany and Poland; and the Structured 
Dialogue was only a platform for communication of the EU members with Eastern 
Europeans.  
The Dialogue was agreed nearly five years after the idea of the enlargement was 
presented to the European Community. These years are marked with the calls of Eastern 
European countries for actions of the EU that would directly respond to their pleas for a 
formal recognition of their future membership in the EU as an official objective, and then 
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for setting admission criteria and a timetable. During those five years, the applicants 
received only indication at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993 of a membership 
perspective under very general conditions. But Germany’s stance on the enlargement was 
consistently supportive. French opposition was a powerful hindrance to Germany’s 
policy not only because the position of France in the EU created a potential that with a 
coalition of several other EU member states, France could have derailed the idea 
altogether. The impediment for German policy makers was that they did not have a 
partner to working with on the enlargement, in the EU environment.  
The enlargement needed an advocate and a leader at the EU forum. Both Eastern 
countries and Western partners expected and wanted Germany to be this leader. 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl decided to make the enlargement along with deepening the 
European integration his Chefsache. He set in this way the direction of the post-
unification German foreign policy. It was his political vision of Germany’s 
multilateralism aimed at the long-term gains that was surpassing the current debates in 
the EU and in Germany. It provides a proof for two assumptions:  
1) The lasting commitment to multilateralism of the German foreign policy  
2) A constructivist claim formulated by Peter Katzenstein that ‘state interests do 
not exist to be ‘discovered’ by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are 
constructed through a process of social interaction’241 
Choosing balancing both directions demonstrates that interests of the state are 
defined by the actors involved according to their own identity, values and self-perception. 
In this sense interests and identities are mutually constitutive, like Peter Katzenstein 
indicated — neither can be defined in the absence of the other242. This determines the use 
of the constructivist perspective for this part of the German foreign policy analysis, both 
for the choice of preserving old commitments to the relation with France and for the 
choice of building new quality relations with Eastern partners. According to the 
constructivist understanding the identity is generally seen as being neither objectively 
                                         
241 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security…, op. cit, p.2; see also: Helen Milner, “Rationalising Politics: The Emerging 
Synthesis of International, American and Comparative Politics”,  International Organizations Vol.152, NO  4, 1998, p.772. 
242 Katzenstein, Tamed Power, op.cit, p. 117 
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determined by material structures, nor the product of a free-floating discourse; interests 
and identities are therefore mutually related and constitutive.  
And the comment by John G. Ruggie written after the collapse of communism 
referring to new American foreign policy is applicable to the emergence of the new 
interests of Germany after its unification. Ruggie wrote that ‘‘making history’ in the new 
era is a matter not merely of defending the national interest but of defining it, not merely 
enacting stable preferences but constructing them. These processes are constrained by 
forces in the object world, and instrumental rationality is ever present. But they also 
deeply implicated such ideational factors as identities and aspirations as well as leaders 
seeking to persuade their publics and one another through reasoned discourse while 
learning, or not, by trial and error. As a result, nothing makes it clearer than the question 
of agency at times such as ours why the constructivist approach needs to be part of the 
theoretical tools of the international relations field’243. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
243 John G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 
1998, p. 202 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
Deepening versus Widening the European Integration  
As the Cause of Ambivalence  
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EU Enlargement 
1993 — 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This chapter examines ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy that was 
created by the tension between two ideas of the future development of the EU — the 
deepening and widening of the European integration. Both directions were seen as 
opposite and conflicting with each other. European policy makers were considering 
therefore options which direction should be given priority. It was a part of a debate on an 
emerging new concept for the European political and security ‘order’ and it was a core 
part of a domestic elite debate in Germany. 
A new concept of the European political and security order was based on three 
pillars: a political and economic organization in the institutional shape of the European 
Union, a new European security system as the expanded NATO, and the Eastern 
enlargement of the EU. The project of dual development of the EU, deepening and 
widening the integration, presented a problem for majority of EU policy makers. Fear of 
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an unprecedented task, which the Eastern enlargement presented, generated an inclination 
to preserve the status quo within the EU, or at least within the core of the EU. It resulted 
in an intense debate over ideas how to proceed with the European integration, varying 
from creation of a core of the EU, to developing a multi-speed, or variable-geometry 
integration, with the most popular view that the deepening should precede widening. 
In a German debate on the new, post-unification foreign policy a prevailing view 
was that both directions were necessary to embrace, but the question was whether 
deepening of the European integration should precede its widening. Despite those 
opinions, Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared embracing both directions simultaneously. It 
caused confusion, perception of ambivalence and ambivalence in Germany’ enlargement 
policy. The perception of ambivalence intensified when two leading German politicians 
of the governing CDU party, Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble published a paper 
advocating the deepening of the integration as a priority for German foreign policy. 
The chapter focuses on the elite discourse and that opens the analysis to 
examining other actors in the German enlargement policy-making along the government 
executives — representatives of political parties. The issue of the European integration 
was the core and crux of the German debate over the future foreign policy and national 
interests of the new Germany. The debate reflects the changing concept of the European 
integration, which is highlighted by the tension that caused ambivalence in Germany’s 
policy towards the enlargement. This is a part of a ‘building block’ of the European 
identity and the debate, and the changing concept of the European integration 
demonstrate a constructivist assumption that the premises of the ‘building blocks’ of 
international reality are ideational as well as material, and that ideational factors have 
both normative and instrumental dimensions244.  
Application of the two-level game theory indicates that the ongoing on the 
domestic level debate on a preferable direction of the European integration had its 
reflection in the shape of the pronounced by Chancellor Helmut Kohl a new, changing 
concept of the European integration, that embraced both directions simultaneously.  
 
 
                                         
244 John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, Penguin Books, London 1996 
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I. AMBIVALENCE 
Ambivalence caused by the tension between two directions of the European 
integration manifested as the contradictory rhetoric of the leading German actors on the 
future developments of the European integration. It reflected ambivalence of political 
elites over the choice of the priority in the foreign policy, making the German stance on 
the enlargement ambiguous. 
First Chancellor Helmut Kohl introduced ambiguity declaring that Germany 
would embrace and support both directions simultaneously — of deepening and widening 
the European integration. His declaration caused ambivalence because both directions 
were seen as opposite, thus as a choice either-or. Moreover Chancellor Kohl did not 
support his declaration with further elaboration as how to reconcile endorsement of both 
directions, which made his stance highly unclear, and given the conflict between two 
options, ambivalent. 
Secondly — two leading politicians of the governing at the time CDU party, Karl 
Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble, presented in September 1994 a paper with a proposal of 
strengthening the core of the EU. Authors held prominent positions within the German 
policymaking apparatus, their opinion was perceived therefore as an expression of the 
German stance and was a reflection of the process of policy-making, the options German 
policy makers considered. Assigning priority to the deepening of the EU integration 
weakened the support for the enlargement; if endorsed by the government it would put 
the enlargement on the second plan in the EU development, postponing its completion 
because it would lose the support of Germany, the main player in the European Union.  
The government of Helmut Kohl did not endorse the paper, yet the paper was 
never dismissed either. It created a perception that the government executives were 
testing the waters, what added to the negative perception of the ambivalence caused by 
the Chancellor’s stance supporting both directions. The more that the domestic elite 
debate in Germany indicated that the deepening of the integration had a stronger support 
as the primary interest of the unified Germany than the enlargement. 
The debate on the future foreign policy of the new Germany and a place of the 
new Germany on the international stage, had been unfolding since the unification. It 
intensified after 1992 when the U.S. administration put forward an idea of expanding 
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NATO and embracing Eastern European countries into the structure of the alliance. The 
idea presented a security pillar of an emerging concept of the future European order, but 
German policy makers were considering more inclusively European options for the 
security organization. It reinforced a view that the deepening of the European integration 
should be the priority.  
The ‘deepening first ‘option had a strong reasoning based on three elements. First 
was the commitment to deeper integration, which the government of Helmut Kohl made 
in order to fulfil the ‘unification condition’ that Western partners imposed on Germany. 
Second was the goal of maintaining good relations with France; the deepening of the 
integration was for France an instrument of containing Germany’s power, hence the 
insistence of French politicians on closer involvement of Germany in the supranational 
structures of the EU. German policy makers understood the fears of their partners and 
were committed to dissolving apprehension. And the third component was a growing 
awareness of the complex difficulties and prospective costs of the enlargement while the 
deepening presented a more attractive direction. 
This three-fold reasoning constituted the concept of deepening of the European 
integration as an independent factor, which transcended a function of serving as a tool in 
relations with France, or as a condition of the unification. German policy makers 
considered the deepening also as a possibility to further Germany’s future interests in 
Europe. Deepening of the integration presented for Germany opportunities to shape a 
growth of the EU.  
The German domestic elite debate on the EU developments corresponded with the 
one run across the EU and considered many concepts of the future integration — creating 
a core of the EU, developing it at a multi-speed or through a variable-geometry. 
Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers publishing their paper took the discussion in 
Germany from the academic level to the heart of the political debate over the choices in 
the foreign policy. The paradox is that the domestic elite debate in Germany on the 
European identity and European integration facilitated the enlargement. The paper of 
Schäuble and Lamers in fact created a road map for both directions. Authors not only did 
endorse the enlargement project in their paper, presenting it as the other side of the same 
coin with deepening of the integration, but they also set a possible date for the admission 
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of the candidate countries — the year 2000, which was reiterated soon by Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl. In this way the direction indicated in the paper, and the Chancellor Kohl’s 
follow-up with pointing to a concrete date, created paradoxically ambivalence in the 
German stance on the enlargement, but it also sanctioned the enlargement as the endorsed 
political goal.  
This paradox epitomises the change of the concept of the European integration in 
the German European policy. Endorsement of both directions, deepening and widening 
the EU, by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, exhibits the core of the European and multilaterialist 
identity, which is at the basis of the German foreign policy. The very implication of the 
notion ‘European’, about integration of the continent, now with the enlargement idea 
started to gain its fuller shape. However, both concepts of deepening and widening of the 
EU were perceived by the majority of the German and European political elites still as 
conflicting with each other. This conflict was seen both in economic and political 
dimensions — the Eastern European countries were not expected to reach quickly the 
economic development of those countries that were to adopt the single currency.  
Nonetheless Chancellor Helmut Kohl approached the challenge not as the 
necessity of choosing one direction over another but as the necessity to employ the ‘as-
well-as’ strategy, because of the principle of multilateralism embedded in the national 
identity. Chancellor Kohl’s declaration of support for both directions, and a lack of 
concept how to reconcile contradictions, created ambivalence Germany’s enlargement 
policy and the dilemma how to balance both challenges the elite debate considered, 
caused a perception of ambivalence in Germany’s stance on the EU enlargement. 
 
II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS 
Changing Notion of the European Integration  
While the first most apparent reason of the support that German elites lent to the 
enlargement idea was grounded in the historical sense of responsibility towards Eastern 
countries, and the new interests to introduce political and economic stability in the 
Eastern neighbourhood presented the second streak of the supportive reasoning, an 
overarching rationale of this support was the European identity of the German foreign 
policy, with its focus on building the European integration. During and after the 
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unification German leaders responded to the concerns of the Western partners 
unequivocally that a premise of the new foreign policy would be the European 
integration. It was the main setting of the BRD multilateralism and would remain at the 
heart of the German post-unification identity. This commitment was the main motive of 
the post-unification rhetoric by government executives; it was expressed by all political 
parties in the Bundestag debates and by the majority of German elite in a domestic 
debate. It was a powerful factor working on behalf of the enlargement.  
Chancellor Helmut Kohl encapsulated the future direction of Germany’s foreign 
policy in his Paris speech of January 1990 stating that for the ‘German question’ there is 
a ‘European answer’245. While presenting his new government programme for the years 
1991-1994 Kohl stressed that ‘Germany is our fatherland, Europe is our future’246. Hans-
Dietrich Genscher supported these statements recalling in his speech to the UN General 
Assembly on 26 September 1990 the phrase of Thomas Mann: ‘our aim is not a German 
Europe, but a European Germany’247. His successor, Klaus Kinkel reiterated idea 
declaring in May 1992 that there was ‘no alternative to the European path’248. These 
declarations reflected a prevailing view on the European integration among all political 
parties on the German domestic stage, which led to enshrining the goal of the European 
integration in the German constitution. 
 
1. European Integration in the Constitution 
During the first half of the 1990s German politicians discussed the commitment to 
the European integration in four parliamentary debates: after the Maastricht Summit in 
December 1991, two subsequent ratification debates in October and December 1992, and 
the May 1994 debate, which preceded the 1994 EU elections and the German assumption 
of the EU presidency. All these debates indicated that German political elites embraced a 
supranational European identity.  
                                         
245 Die Deutsche Frage und die Europäische Verantwortung, Rede in Paris am 17.01.1990, Bulletin des Bundesregierung, 19 January 
1990, p. 61 
246 Kohl indicated also that “on the path to a united Europe, France and Germany have to remain driving forces”. In: Kohl 
“Deutschlands Einheit vollenden”…, op.cit. 
247 Ulrich Wickert (ed), Angst vor Deutschland, Hamburg 1990 
248 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 May 1992 
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The CDU/CSU made the European integration its flag policy. The party was 
carrying out the political testimony of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the founder of the 
CDU. The integration had among the CDU/CSU ranks understanding of a much deeper 
project than it was desirable by other European member states, for example Britain, for 
which the EC was an economic enterprise. For the German CDU it was a political 
enterprise with far-reaching goal of creating the ‘United States of Europe’249. The 
rhetoric of the party representatives was calling for ‘cutting back of sovereignty’, for the 
reasons rooted in the ‘geopolitical realpolitik’250. Chancellor Kohl used to stress that the 
European integration was based on and stemmed from what he called the ‘power of 
facts’251 suggesting that the political decisions on the European integration were often 
only adjustments following the ongoing virtual integration. Only after the Maastricht 
Summit German conservatives became visibly less federalist than in their previous 
rhetoric, when the project of a deeper political union was presented in a much narrower 
than expected and debated before form252.  
The position of the liberal FDP, which since the beginning of the 1980s was 
forming the governing coalition with the conservatives, was similar to the one of its 
coalition partner. German liberals wanted a United States of Europe too253. They also saw 
the Franco-German collaboration as a driving force of Western European integration254. It 
was one of the precepts of the policy of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a prominent 
representative of the FDP and a Foreign Minister in Helmut Kohl’s governments. The 
FDP presented a European federation as a political goal in a party resolution of May 
1991; Hans-Dietrich Genscher was proposing a confederation only four months later255. 
                                         
249 “CDU, Unsere verantwortung in der Welt, Christlich-demokratische Perspektiven zur Außen-, Sicherheits-, Europa- und 
Deutschlandpolitik, Beschuß des 36. Bundesparteitages der CDU”, in: CDU-Dokumentation 19/1988 
250 Hans Stercken, “Stenographischer Bericht des Deutschen Bundestag”, 21 November 1990, pp.3 and 23 
251 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 December 1991 
252 Erich Hauser, “Das Monster von Maastricht”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 18 February 1992 
253 FDP Bundeshauptausschuß, Liberale Außenpolitik für das vereinte Deutschland, Beschluß des Bundeshauptausschusses, 
Hamburg, 25 May, 1991, p.5 
254 Welt am Sonntag, 2 February 1992 (Also available at the FPD”s Press office) 
255 “Rede von der 46. Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen,  25 September 1991”, Auswärtiges Amt, Mittelung für die 
Presse, Nr. 1205/91, p.4 
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The FDP differed from the conservatives only by exposing more strongly that a federal 
European state would need a strong democratic structure as well as a social dimension256. 
The main left-wing party, the SPD, before 1980 critical of the European project, 
changed its outlook in the 1980s into a more aligned with the position of the CDU/CSU 
and FDP. The SPD too declared then the United States of Europe as its goal, though the 
emphasis in the reasoning was different than of the CDU/CSU and FDP257; while the 
latter were concerned with Germany’s competitiveness on world markets, the SPD’s 
primary focus was on integration, which would guarantee peace in Europe258. In the 
1990s the SPD’s view on the European integration was the most radical among German 
political parties. Oskar Lafontaine, the then premier of Saarland and the SPD’s and a 
candidate for the post of the Chancellor, during the Bundestag debate of 4 October 1990 
described the ‘new state’ (a new, unified Germany) as merely a ‘transitional stage since 
we intend for it to be absorbed in a United States of Europe’. While the United States of 
Europe was the long-term goal, in a shorter perspective the EC was to transform into a 
political union accompanied by a monetary and economic community259. Social 
Democrats, however, criticised Helmut Kohl fervently for what they saw as tactical errors 
in his negotiations at Maastricht260. As expressed by the then party leader Björn 
Engholm, Maastricht would have been a full success if it had included the SPD’s 
postulates of strengthening democracy and democratic procedures261. As for the Eastern 
countries — the SPD thought the status of association was to be an interim position 
‘appropriate for the countries concerned’262.  
The Greens in the 1980s were especially vocal about their scepticism on the 
European integration, fuelled by their anti-centralist, anti-bureaucratic and anti-statist 
position. After the unification they opposed the creations of a European super-power and 
                                         
256 “Das liberale Deutschlandprogramm der FDP zu den Bundestagswahlen am 2. Dezember 1990”, FPD’s Press Office, p. 22   
257 At the 1991 party convention in Bremen the SPD voted for a United States of Europe consisting of all willing European states. 
See: “Außen-, Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik, Beschlüsse des Parteitages in Bremen, 28-31 May, 1991”, SPD’s Press Office 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid.: Von der Konfrontation der Blöcke zu einem Europäischen Sicherheits-system. Positioinpaper zu den sicherheitspolitischen 
Aspekten der Einigung Deutschlands im Rahmem der Europäischn Integration, Bonn, 25 April 1990 
260 Hauser, Das Monster… op.cit. 
261 Stuttgarter Zeitung, 16 March 1992 
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demanded that the deepening of existing structures must not hinder the opening to and 
widening of the EU to the East263. As they prepared for taking power in the mid 1990s 
most of these concerns ceased to exist. A party programmewritten then by its leader 
Joschka Fischer, first published in 1994, outlined a full support for integrating Germany 
into the EU and NATO as a matter of national interests264.  
These views of the European integration as the primary Germany’s interests, 
found an expression in the amendments of the constitution of the new German state. The 
article 23 of the Basic Law of a unified Germany was amended in December 1992 so that 
the Federal Republic instead of ‘being open for other parts of Germany to join’, was now 
committed to the ‘realisation of a united Europe’ through the European Union (as 
envisaged in Maastricht Treaty of December 1991).  
 
2. Expanding Integration Concept  
The reasoning behind this commitment presented in the debate was based on the 
history-related narrative of the German identity. One of the most often repeated 
arguments by Helmut Kohl was the claim that the European integration remained the best 
solution to the nationalist rivalry that plagued Europe before 1945. The drive for political 
union, he reminded on many occasions, was a ‘question of war and peace’ and the 
multilateral institutions of the EU, NATO and WEU that provided a normative 
framework for the FRG’s European policy, beneficiary for Germany in successful 
overcoming post-war legacy in the western realm. Helmut Kohl pointing to this 
achievement evoked the legacy of the founders of European integration, Robert Schuman 
and Konrad Adenauer and other ‘men and women who drew the consequences’ from 
Europe’s history of suffering265. The integration, Kohl pointed, helped to overcome 
centuries-old rivalries and conflicts among the participating nations. Klaus Kinkel, who 
assumed the position of the Foreign Minister in May 1992, depicted the origins of the 
integration process as a ‘reaction to centuries-long fratricidal wars’; Rudolf Scharping 
                                         
263 Bundesgeschäftsstelle Bündniss 90/Die Grünen, ed. Nur mit uns, Bornheim: Bundesgeschäftsstelle Bündnis 90/Die Grünen  1994 
264 Fischer”s plea for foreign policy realism however strictly advocates a future for Germany as a civilian power abstaining from any 
from of hard power projection. See: Joschka Fischer, Risiko Deutschland, Krise und Zukunft der deutschen Politik, Cologne: 
Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1994 
265 Kohl expressed this on numerous occasions, including the Bundestag debates. 
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the chairman of the SPD from 1993 to 1995, pointed that the EU grew out of ‘devastating 
experience of two terrible fratricidal wars’266.  
These declarations along with the amendments of the Basic Law, gave the reason 
for a conclusion that multilateralism and Europeanization became a nature of the German 
foreign policy, an intrinsic part of the German political culture. As Klaus Goetz described 
it — Europeanization became imprinted into the ‘political DNA of the German foreign 
policy’267. The mantra of the ‘European interests of Germany’ brought German policy 
makers to the point, at which it was impossible to turn away from this normative 
narrative in the face of the 1989 change in the geopolitics in Europe and ignore the calls 
of the East Europeans to overcome the post-war division of the continent.  
A positive course of the postwar integration bound German leaders to support 
further integration steps amid post-Cold War circumstances. For Kohl it compelled 
Germans to ‘empathise with the ideas of our partners’ and ‘to reflect on what one can 
demand of a neighbour’268. Together with Kinkel and others, Kohl argued that this shift 
toward a more European way of thinking had generated the trust and goodwill, which 
made rapid reunification possible in 1989–90. It represented a core orientation to be 
maintained ‘under all circumstances’269. As Wieczorek-Zeul put it, ‘Europe said yes to 
German unity; we say yes to European unity’. 
The reasons of the support for the enlargement were summed up in the early 1993 
by an influential intellectual Günther Nonnenmacher, the then co-editor-in-chief of 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, one of the leading broadsheet daily newspapers in 
Germany. He pointed that ‘Germany owes its prosperity to the integration with the other 
West European democracies. For the maintenance of security and prosperity this alliance 
has to be deepened, stretched incrementally towards the new democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and kept open for free global trade. These aims do not always compete. 
It is in German interest to mediate and, as much as possible, to work towards balancing 
                                         
266 Verhandlungen, 2 December 1992: 10824; 2 December 1992: 10837; 27 May 1994: 20126 
267 Klaus Goetz, “National Governance and Euroepan Integration: Intergovernmental relations in Germany”,  Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol 33 No 1, 1995; Klaus Goetz, “Integration Policy in a Europeanised State: Germany and the Intergovernmental 
Conference”,  Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 3 No 1, 1996 
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it’270. A former chancellor Willy Brandt noticed in 1992 that ‘many people became aware 
for the first time that Europe didn’t end at the demarcation lines in the East and that we 
have neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe which are close to us’. He proposed a 
kind of Marshall Plan and pronounced that Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia would 
be members of the EC by the turn of the century271. His call was one of the strongest at 
the time, but politicians across the political spectrum presented similar views on the need 
to open to the East in speeches at the Bundestag.  
German elites held that the reunification bound Germans to continue making 
European unity a priority. The Maastricht Treaty itself was a strong argument for the 
support of the East Europeans’ application: the integration marked a break with the ‘time 
of national policy’ as Klaus Kinkel put it, and constituted a necessary ‘self-binding’ of 
German power within durable European institutions, as noted by Wieczorek-Zeul of the 
SPD 272. Comments concerning the Maastricht Treaty indicated also an expanding 
meaning of the European integration. Helmut Kohl emphasised that support for 
Maastricht was necessary to prove that Germans remained ‘committed to what we have 
always said, namely that German unity and European unification are two sides of the 
same coin’273. 
The presented in the Bundestag debates views on the European integration reflect 
the main constructivists point that the international system arises from two fundamental 
streams — the structures of human associations that are determined by shared ideas 
rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests are constructed by these 
shared ideas274. The unambiguous commitment to the European integration declared by 
all German political parties was a strong signal about a prospective progress of the 
integration. The question was about a direction of this progress. 
 
 
                                         
270 Günther Nonnenmacher, “Deutsche Interesen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 March 1993 
271 Willi Brandt, “Eine EG von Paris bis Wladiwostok?”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 May 1992 
272 Verhandlungen, 2 December 1992: 10837; 2 December 1992: 10814. 
273 Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Halmut Kohl zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Maastricht vor dem Bundestag am 13 
Dezember 1991 (statement to the Bundestag by Chancellor Kohl regarding the results of the European Council in Maastricht), Bulletin 
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III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE 
1. Problematic Enlargement  
While the commitment to the European integration represents an ideational side 
of the European integration ‘building block’, its material dimension was much more 
problematic.  
Until the preparations of the Structured Dialogue in 1994, the enlargement idea 
remained abstractive. German politicians of all parties, and their counterparts in other EU 
member states, considered Western Europe as a model of the standards, that would be 
necessary for the new Eastern European democracies to reach, if they wanted to gain the 
EU membership. The necessary standards and conditions of admission, however, were 
still vague; it was clear that the Easter European countries would not reach quickly 
standards of the EU members, and if left outside the EU, the catching-up process would 
take much longer.  
Member states were not interested in defining accession standards. Once, 
however, a debate on the enlargement agenda started, all the difficulties and problems of 
disparity between the West and East came to the surface. It was triggered by preparations 
for the Structured Dialogue, which was accepted at the Essen Summit in November 1994. 
New setting for the political dialogue which the Eastern partners shifted the debate from 
the level of ideas, down to the real issues; economic concerns were quickly revealed as 
the main reason of scepticism and reluctance over the enlargement idea.  
While the political implications of the prospective enlargement were still 
challenging, such as the need to cushion the declining Russian influence in the region the 
most, the economic disparity between the EU and the Eastern countries rose as the most 
problematic for the EU member states. A phrase in common use at the time in the 
German debate was Wohlstandsgefälle — ‘difference in prosperity’ and East European 
new democracies were called ‘transition states’ (to differentiate them from ‘developing 
states’). Embracing them into the same redistribution system of the EU threatened the 
economic status quo of the EU the member states.  
A sharp contrast to the extrapolations about the Eastern enlargement was the 
admission of the EFTA countries, that was carried out at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Strong economically EFTA countries joining the EU were expected to improve the 
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Union’s budgetary performance. The Eastern European countries would not contribute to 
the development of the EU, as needing economic assistance. On the other hand the EFTA 
enlargement also improved the Union’s capability to counteract unwelcome effects, like 
those unavoidably connected with the Eastern enlargement. Financial issues were 
touching the very core of the European integration. As it was put by Smith and Wallace 
— ‘At the economic core of the integration model is a balance between attaining 
economic efficiency through competition and free trade on the one hand and mitigating 
the effects of rapid adjustment to economic change on the other’275. 
As indicated in the previous part, the issue of stability of Eastern Europe became 
the core of the new Germany’s interests in the East. Helmut Kohl pointed in the midst of 
the negotiations on Germany’s unification that ‘with the opening of the Iron Curtain new 
opportunities would arise, the emerging tensions would also be gaining equal 
attention’276. Two years later, in 1992, German Chancellor was stressing that the security 
problems of Eastern Europe were not any longer of a military nature and argued: ‘A 
European answer to these problems can only mean leading the states of Central, Eastern 
and South-eastern Europe into the European Community’277.  
The SPD, in opposition to the government, was more cautious at the time: the 
chairman of the SPD Group in Bundestag, Hans-Ulrich Klose called Kinkel’s demands 
for a rapid widening ‘populist and unrealistic’278 and warned about the ‘dangerous 
illusions of the markets opened to the East’ indicating that the German population would 
not be able to compete with the low-wage countries, which would result in further loss of 
jobs in Germany279 (on top of the enormous losses as a result of the unification). 
Similarly the SPD chairman Rudolf Sharping during his speech in Prague expressed his 
understanding of the Czech desire to join to the EU, but also pointed that it would be a 
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long process with considerable difficulties280. Politicians of the SPD also avoided 
indicating any dates, addressing the issue of the EU widening in vague terms and 
claiming that candidate states ‘must have an all-European perspective’281.  
Among the financial and economic factors working against the support for the 
enlargement, the most powerful was the fear of alteration of the EU status quo. The 
conviction about the need to maintain progress that was increasing the prosperity of the 
EU members was shared by most of the EU political elites, including the German elites. 
An idea of NATO expansion, that arose simultaneously to the deepening-widening 
debate, exposed the scale of the challenge the Eastern European countries faced in order 
to fulfil the conditions of the NATO membership. Meeting the EU membership 
conditions was much more complex. EU policy makers, concerned first of all with the 
Maastricht provisions, saw now the enlargement in a more incremental mode, instead of a 
big bang, one-act admission of the Eastern applicants.  
The strong normative reasoning of the support for the enlargement presented 
therefore a problem how to sustain heterogeneity within the EU, with a view to the 
widening the Union. The post Maastricht debate across the EU indicated that new 
arrangements the Maastricht Treaty brought upon the EU would require, and generate 
more of differentiation in the integration process. The Maastricht Treaty introduced a 
multi-speed mode for the implementation of the EMU, which was based on capability of 
a member-state, measured against common and unanimously agreed convergence criteria, 
its willingness to embrace the currency and a precise timetable set for each state 
accordingly. It opened a multi-speed mode for the integration and the debate on possible 
variants. 
 
2. Various Models of the EU Integration 
There were several such variants, of a multi-speed, two-tier, multi- track, 
variable-geometry or á la carte mode, with the three latter as referred to the most often. 
Each was seen as built around a hard core of the most advanced in the integration 
members or to take a form of concentric circles. In a multi-speed mode common 
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objectives were pursued by a group of member states, both willing and able to deepen 
their integration in some policy areas, with the underlying assumption that the others 
would follow later. The concept of variable geometry was about integration differentiated 
in space; it allowed a lasting separation between the core of countries and less developed 
ones. A Europe á la carte was the most flexible variant — it would allow each member 
state to pick and choose the policy area, like from a menu, in which it would like to 
participate, be it social policy, monetary policy, or defence policy, and opt out from the 
others, with a minimum number of common objectives.  
All these modes were suggested interchangeably at this stage of the discussion, 
but with the main message that the European integration, including embracing new 
entrants, could and rather should progress in one of these modes. The British Prime 
Minister John Major for example was talking about the multi-speed of the European 
development at the lecture at Leiden on 7 September 1994. The French Prime Minister 
Édouard Balladur in turn referred to ‘concentric circles’ — in an interview for Le Figaro 
of the 30th of August 1994. He indicated then in his own article in Le Monde of 30 
November 1994 that a core for integration should be a pillar for economic policy and 
political cooperation along with common borders, while solidarités renforcées in other 
areas such as UME and defence would create a second circle, with a third circle for 
applicants and future members.  
In Germany Josef Janning, one of the leading German political scientists called 
for different speeds for the EU indicating that as the only reasonable direction for the EU 
if it was to develop282. Together with Werner Weidenfeld of the prestigious Zentrum für 
angewandte Politikforschung proposed a ‘differentiated integration’, a deeper integration 
in different policy areas283. The idea was later promoted by the CDU foreign policy 
expert Rudolf Seiters284 with the emphasis on the economic reasoning: a limitation of the 
economic and currency union to the stable core of Europe would fit the preferences of 
many German policy makers, who feared that the D-Mark would be weakened by the 
acceptance of economically weak states Bundesbank adhered to the so-called ‘crowning 
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theory’ according to which economic conditions had to be similar before a common 
currency could be introduced not the other way round285. Hans Tietmeyer president of 
Bundesbank presented a model of ‘concentric circles’ picturing the future development of 
the EU in the context of embracing the single currency286. Klaus Kinkel explicitly asked 
whether the ‘convoy should be determined by the slowest also ship, or whether those who 
wanted to proceed faster, were free to do so’. He added that the German preference was 
to have all members on the board but that Germany wanted a strong European core287.  
 
3. Deepening-Widening Discourse 
The question about the future development of Europe and the European Union 
was the main line of the division among four schools of political thought that emerged 
after the unification as identified by Gunter Hellmann288. The most numerous and 
influential school was of Europeanists, who while not excluding the EU enlargement, 
favoured the deepening of the EU integration. Europeanists’ views were congruent with 
those of pragmatic multilateralists, though the latter did not give preference to the 
deepening of the European integration.  
According to the Hellmann’s taxonomy Europeanists presented two basic 
arguments why the acceleration of European integration should be at the centre of 
German foreign policy concerns. It was important (1) for ‘internal’ reasons — to prevent 
the re-emergence of counterbalancing coalitions vis-à-vis Germany and (2) for ‘external’ 
reasons — to render the EU a more competitive actor in international affairs more 
broadly. Europeanists pointed first to the constitutional obligation of German policy 
makers — to foster European integration. Europeanists viewed acceleration of the 
European integration was as the only sensible choice for geopolitical reasons, in the 
context of the changes in Eastern Europe. They indicated that the challenges in this part 
of Europe were facing Germany with a special burden, as it was the most powerful 
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economically and most exposed geopolitically state in the heart of Europe. However, if 
Germany was to respond to these challenges by unilaterally expanding its influence, such 
an action would provoke balancing behaviour on the part of its western European 
allies289. 
For this reason deepening of the European integration should have priority. As put 
it by Werner Link ‘the active participation of German in the development of federal 
structures in Europe is in its very own interest: indeed, European federalism can be 
regarded as the foreign policy ‘raison d’etat’ of Germany because in deepening 
European integration and in creating a European Union Germany can make best use of 
its power and increase its security without appearing threatening and without provoking 
counter-balancing coalitions. As a result, the foreign policy imperative is to do 
everything possible to foster the development of federal structures [in Europe]’290.  
Europeanists supported deepening of the European integration also as a means for 
improving Europe’s role in competing with other centres of power in North America and 
Asia. None of the key members of the EU, including Germany, was viewed as able to 
compete effectively on its own with the U.S., Japan or China, and the western European 
allies were seen as lagging behind the other centres of economic power, in all of the key 
‘information age’ industries291. From this assessment Europeanists concluded that 
Germany’s position as a leading economic power could only be regained and preserved 
in concert with its most important European allies and with help of an institutional 
apparatus such as the European Commission.  
Eurosceptics, on the opposite side, held that German policy makers should accept 
Germany as a normal nation-state and stop aiming at federal Europe292. Their primary 
and ultimate objective was an integration of Germany’s eastern neighbours into western 
institutions because they saw it as a matter of Germany’s security, depending on stability 
of its eastern borders. In this respect similar views to those of Eurosceptics were held by 
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normalization-nationalists who were explicitly opposed to the downgrading of the EU to 
a free trade area arguing that it has always been a classical task of geopolitics to integrate 
different zones with diverging interests293. 
The most important circumstance is that while Europeanists considered a federal 
Europe a number one long-term objective, they did not believe that accomplishing it 
would be easy294. In fact, they doubted whether it would stand a chance of being realised 
in the foreseeable future. Therefore, they realised that because the necessary enlargement 
of the EU would take time, it was ‘paramount to create the hard core of the EU 
immediately: the Carolingian Europe of the six founding members’ of the European 
Economic Community295. In the short and medium term the most practical way to 
proceed thus was to acknowledge explicitly the notion of ‘variable speeds’ in achieving 
objectives and to create a ‘hard core’ of the European Union member states, willing and 
able to move ahead faster than the rest296. For any of these scenarios essential would be 
Franco-German cooperation; therefore it ranked first for Europeanists, before for 
example the German-American relations.  
 
4. French Catalyst 
The debate over the directions of he European integration was conducted with a 
view on the bilateral relations with France. A tension in this relation, present since the 
unification, reached the boiling point in spring 1994. The French ambassador to Germany 
François Sheer criticised German foreign policy at the press conference, pointing to its 
‘power play’ that was demonstrated according to the French ambassador in the support 
for the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Klaus Kinkel in reaction warned that he would 
summon ambassador Scheer to report, an action without precedence in the Franco-
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German relations297. That prompted politicians on the highest level on both sides to a 
series of mutual reassurances about the special aspect of the relations between two 
countries. Roman Herzog, the newly elected president of Germany emphasised that in 
one of his first speeches298, and François Mitterrand invited the German counterparts in 
the Eurocorps to participate in a parade on the French national holiday of 14 July299. 
Despite those declarations, the balance between two countries in the view of the French 
politicians was changed, and as it was put by Juppé at the time, ’France needed Germany 
more than Germany needed France’300.  
The sense of lack of cooperation was exacerbated by growing problems with 
supranational integration. A conflict over a Franco-German initiative to make the Belgian 
prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene a new president of the EU that was stopped by the 
British veto, and a supranational integration on police matters that was stalled at the time, 
were the most paramount, though not the only examples of these problems. An initiative 
of the police integration was particularly important to Germany, which together with 
Britain was trying to pass a convention on a European police organization EUROPOL; it 
was however opposed by the French who did not agree on transferring sovereign rights to 
this organization301. Impatience with these issues among German policy makers increased 
their interest in the idea of ‘Europe of different speeds’.  
 
 IV. OPTIONS 
Schäuble-Lamers Paper 
The debate reached the peak in Germany when two top-members of the governing 
CDU party Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers issued a proposal for a deeper 
integration of the ‘core Europe’302. They presented their paper ‘Reflections on European 
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Policy’ on 1 September 1994. It had a very attentive reception across Europe. First, 
because it was presented under the auspices of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag, 
being thus an officially endorsed by the governing party voice in the discussion. Secondly 
— the authors were highly ranked politicians within the German policy-making 
apparatus: Karl Lamers was the CDU Group spokesman on international policy, and 
Wolfgang Schäuble, was the chairman of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag, seen in 
political circles as a possible successor of Chancellor Kohl. Their paper was therefore 
regarded as a highly significant politically statement not only for the position of the 
authors in German establishment but also because it was presented at the time when 
Germany held the Council presidency.  
It gave the European debate a special spur. By opting for deepening the Western 
integration it put in question the commitment Chancellor Kohl made to the both 
directions of the European integration. It broke the perception of Germany championing 
the Eastern enlargement of the EU.  
The paper was prescriptive, designed to reconcile a growing disparity between the 
deepening and widening, and to establish parameters of the integration debate at the 
approaching Essen Summit at the end of the year. As explained by the authors it provided 
a blueprint for the road to the enlargement. In the commonly shared perception their call, 
however, opposed the idea of the enlargement303. The overview of their proposal used to 
be summarised as a suggestion that in the absence of a broad consensus for further 
deepening among the existing members, integration should proceed among a smaller, 
core group of member states, who were willing to pool sovereignty in a number of crucial 
areas. In fact Schäuble—Lamers proposal epitomised the inclination of German elites to 
preserve the existing balance of ‘power’ and of economic redistribution system in the 
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EU304. German policy makers were not alone in promoting the idea of strengthening the 
core of the EU; they voiced the concerns shared across all political spectrum of the EU305. 
The authors pointed first of all to the need of strengthening the Union, which was 
an adjustment of the old concept to new circumstances306. In this aspect the paper was 
first a response to the concerns of German policy makers how to carry out the 
Chancellor’s commitment to both directions. Second reason for calling for creation of a 
core Europe and placing the enlargement on the second plan was a growing tension in the 
relations with France. The proposal of Schäuble and Lamers was an effort to reconcile 
both desirable directions of the European integration, but it was also an attempt to 
balance the challenge of maintaining good relations with France and opening to the East. 
The key, as the authors presented it, was to design an acceptable for both sides concept of 
the future political organization of Europe, and, what they did not admit publically, to 
dissolve the French fears about reliability of Germany.  
A response from France was immediate and unfavorable: the government 
representatives with the prime Minister Édouard Balladur (at power since March 1993) 
responded with a series of statements and speeches in which they underlined the 
importance of the state, its individuality, capabilities and their resolve to act’307 and 
started to promote the idea of the concentric development on Europe308. 
The Schäuble and Lamers’ proposal while in congruency with these calls 
elaborated in the most comprehensive way the concerns about reconciling the deepening 
and widening the EU. It offered a departure from a ‘Europe a la carte’, through 
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introduction of ‘variable geometry’ or ‘multi-speed Europe’ concepts309. A concept was 
to counteract centrifugal tendencies that arose from successive enlargements and 
prevention of a North-South alignment. A chosen mode was to be defined and enshrined 
in a quasi-constitutional document. The proposal of Schäuble and Lamers drew also 
attention to a crucial question on the EU’s essential reforms that would have to take place 
prior to the enlargement, a necessary rebuilding and redesigning of the rules of 
governance within the Union to adapt the EU to the enlargement, which were addressed 
neither at Maastricht, nor in subsequent treaties. Aalthough the paper presented rather a 
list of conditions to fulfil, than a concrete plan how to achieve them, nevertheless it was 
the first so thoroughly formulated programme on the issue of the EU reform and the 
question of efficiency and legitimacy in the future, expanded Union. 
Regarding the enlargement, the authors indicated five countries as able to join the 
European Union around the year 2000: Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary and Slovenia. The paper extrapolated that the accession would impose serious 
economic strains on both old and new members. A successful economic adjustment 
would be possible through application of a ‘variable geometry’ concept. It would result 
with accession at a later date. The authors stressed the necessity to act swiftly: ‘It must be 
borne in mind that the later the accession takes place, the higher the costs are likely to 
be’ — wrote Schäuble and Lamers.  
 
V. RESULTS  
Deepening-Widening Politics 
The paper of Schäuble and Lamers had mixed perception both inside and outside 
Germany. Not only French leaders criticised it. The proposal resulted in a discomfort and 
irritation among the EU member countries. Italy’s furious reaction because it was not 
included into the core-group was the strongest but not a single outcry; the criticism 
pointed to the division made between the deepening and widening of the EU. It was also 
the highest concern of Eastern European elites. In their view assigning priority to the 
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strengthening the core, was identical with postponing the enlargement for a long time. 
East European politicians and elites viewed the paper as putting both ideas of the 
deepening and widening of the Union in conflict, and favouring a creation of a two-tier 
(or two-speed) Europe. This variant of the European integration ran strongly against 
ambitions and desires of Eastern Europeans, whose main concern was to end as quickly 
as possible the period in their history when they remained outside a developing Europe.  
The fact that German policy makers considered creation of different speed 
integration created a perception of ambivalence in Germany’s stance on the enlargement 
of the EU. For this reason the paper was also criticised by the SPD as an attempt to create 
‘an upper and lower class Europe’ that would destroy the EU, undermine the credibility 
and reliability of German European policy’. SPD demanded Kohl to distance himself 
from a’ tactless paper’ (the criticism served also an ongoing at the time election 
campaign)310. Hans-Dietrich Genscher characterised the paper as ‘attempt by CDU/CSU 
to gain profile in foreign policy a traditional domain of the FDP’ and warned that 
distinction between core and periphery would not lead to progress, but to nuclear 
fissions’311.  
This perception was strong because the paper was embraced by the governing 
party CDU/CSU; only in June next year the CDU/CSU group of members of Parliament 
issued two official papers much more moderate and without any reference to the ‘core 
Europe’312. It is significant also that the Schäuble—Lamers paper was also perceived as 
allowing Chancellor Kohl to check the idea of a core Europe. Such scholars as Simon 
Bulmer and William Paterson wrote explicitly that ‘Kohl floated his idea of a core 
Europe via a CDU/CSU Foreign Affairs Committee’s discussion paper’313. The German 
government never endorsed the paper. Neither the German representation at the EU 
supported any of the proposals about the ‘concentric circle’ development of the Union. 
Helmut Kohl used to stress the Maastricht Treaty commitment, but pointing at the same 
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time that ‘with the aim of Maastricht Treaty the Union takes responsibility for the whole 
of the European continent’314. The official stance was that both directions were 
complementary, not conflicting. 
However, in the light of this research, the paper rather presented the reasons why 
the government of Helmut Kohl chose the implementation of the Maastricht provisions as 
the priority. This choice was confirmed by the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who 
summarised it in a key speech given in Sigmaringen on 29 April 1994315 and was 
consistent with all previous government declarations about the foreign policy goals. The 
first such a declaration, presenting provisions of the foreign policy of the new, unified 
Germany were announced by the new government of Chancellor Kohl after the 
December 1991 elections. These provisions were threefold316: 
• European integration and opening to the East 
• global and regional policy 
• policy towards the developing countries 
Klaus Kinkel, Foreign Minister and since 1993 Vice-Chancellor of Germany, 
summarising the overseen policy in a key speech in August 1994, defined four goals317:  
1) principal focus on Europe with completing the Maastricht Agenda 
2) seeking stability in central and Eastern Europe  
3) support to and stabilization of the reform process in Russia 
4) redefinition of transatlantic relations 
It is clear that despite the supporting rhetoric of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the EU 
enlargement was not listed explicitly as a goal of the foreign policy, even when Germany 
held the presidency of the EU in the second half of1994. The primary concern and 
interest of the German foreign policy was the European integration, and the Maastricht 
Treaty agenda.  
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It was the interest of Germany to deepen the integration for its own merits; the 
German political elites, like their French counterparts, preferred a ‘strong union with the 
Franco-German couple at the political steering wheel’318. The French fears were to be 
dispelled by the proposal to ‘take the Union together with the German counterparts 
further’. The relationship — as explained by Bulmer and Paterson — had served both as 
enabling and constraining role, depending on the circumstances. As much thus as the 
German dominance was restrained, the relation with France served as a ‘useful umbrella 
for idea of German origins, for example the EMS (…) and helped empower the 
government European diplomacy by making German leadership more palatable’319. The 
indication of favouring a deeper integration, like in the government’s provisions for the 
foreign policy, was dictated thus mainly by the intention to calm down French fears and 
improve the relation with France, which sharply deteriorated half a year earlier, in spring 
1994.  
Nonetheless listing the ‘opening to the East’ and ‘seeking stability in central and 
Eastern Europe’ on the second place among the goals of the government foreign policy 
was an expression of assigning a very high significance.  
Chancellor Kohl presented the two directions as closely connected. He indicated 
the need to embrace both directions simultaneously as early as in October 1992. While 
recommending the Maastricht Treaty provisions to his party as ‘unquestionable 
achievement’ Kohl pointed out that the Treaty was in fact an opening to the enlargement: 
‘The whole of Europe needs a strong European Community. This brings me to one, if not 
the essential aim of the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty is not just a European answer to 
the collapse of the dictatorships in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe. With it 
we take up our responsibility for the whole of the European continent’320. Chancellor 
consistently declared later both directions as necessary to support.  
The view of Chancellor Kohl was a political vision. As such it went beyond a 
perception of the enlargement the majority of EU policy makers had at the time. For the 
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majority the Maastricht Treaty contained provisions of the future EU organization that 
were highly problematic. They were far-reaching; the pledge to introduce single currency 
and common foreign and security policy was to alter substantially political character of 
the EU organization. It would drastically deepen the EU political integration with the 
unknown outcome, how it would work, and for this reason raising scepticism. The 
preparations for fulfilling these arrangements were seen as a long-term and exhausting 
task. Together with the German unification the Maastricht reforms caused political 
fatigue with changes and modifications that was felt across the EU. The Danish 
referendum rejecting the Maastricht Treaty was an evidence of this perception.  
Those circumstances discouraged politicians and public opinion from further 
revisions of the EU premises. They did not create a favourable context for pushing for the 
EU enlargement either — on the contrary, the enlargement was a challenge with many 
more unpredictable variables. Even such a drastic matter like introduction of the single 
currency was much more familiar to the Western European politicians and public 
opinion, because it had been discussed for years, whereas consideration of an eastward 
expansion of the European Communities was beyond political imagination and public 
debate before 1990. In this respect it was similar to the NATO expansion project, 
which took the political thinking beyond the Cold War limits. But while the NATO 
expansion had a powerful leader, the project of embracing Eastern Europe into the EU 
structures lacked a similar driving force; the Chancellor Kohl’s vision did not have a 
compelling charisma. 
 
SUMMARY 
The EU enlargement and the deepening of the European integration were seen as 
‘either or’ option and the domestic debate in Germany evolved around the question which 
option should Germany choose. The most numerous school in Germany, of Europeanists, 
was giving the preference to the deepening of the Western integration. Chancellor Kohl 
decided to support both directions simultaneously. It was a confusing decision as both 
directions were seen and presented as contradictory. It made the Chancellor’s stance 
ambiguous and his support for the enlargement ambivalent as Chancellor’s stance did not 
receive elaboration how to reconcile both directions. The perception of ambivalence in 
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German stance on the enlargement was deepened when Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl 
Lamers published their paper on strengthening the core of the EU. The primary source of 
ambivalence was though Chancellor’s decision to embrace both directions 
simultaneously and employtment of the ‘as-well-as’ strategy. 
The reason for the Chancellor’s decision was twofold — the primary one was a 
deeply normative reasoning rooted in the post-war moral philosophy of the German 
foreign policy and reflecting the national identity of Germany shaped in the post-war 
decades. The secondary motive was that both directions served interests of Germany if to 
see them through the benefits-calculation prism. 
First the choice of Helmut Kohl was primarily motivated by a strong conviction 
that Germany had to continue the post-WWII successful foreign policy based on the 
European integration and cooperation with the Western partners and the need to answer 
positively the calls of Eastern Europeans. This was the cornerstone of Helmut Kohl’s 
post-unification foreign policy. Embracing both directions simultaneously was the 
political vision of Helmut Kohl, who felt obligated to carry on the political vision of 
Konrad Adenauer. 
The principal idea of Adenauer’s grand vision for Germany was that the Germans 
needed to overcome the indignity and humiliation of the WWII legacy. German 
Europeanization did not come from the penchant and predilection to building a 
community of European nations. It was adopted out of weakness as a strategy for survival 
in the WWII aftermath by chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whose strategy was to abandon a 
unilateral sovereignty of Germany and to engage it into multilateral frameworks of 
international institutions and regimes321. It was a pragmatic strategy of a defeated state 
that was looking for redemption and re-entry into a realm of international cooperation. 
Western partners, France particularly, helped to achieve this aspiration by fostering 
reconciliation with Germany. The year 1990, nonetheless, again brought forth the legacy 
of the past. The Westbindung, the close cooperation with Western partners was the 
                                         
321 William Paterson describes this time as the “pre-sovereign” stage in post-war development of Germany. According to Paterson 
this stage lasted until 1955. William E. Paterson, “European Policy-making: Between Associated Sovereignty and Semi-sovereignty”, 
in: Simon Green, William E. Paterson(eds.), Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited, Cambridge, 
2005, pp. 261-282 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
160 
antidote to the fear of the everlasting ‘return of the shame’322, now the united Germany 
had an opportunity to achieve a similar outcome in relations with the East.  
Helmut Kohl understood and embraced the Konrad Adenauer’s heritage. He 
realised how heavily the legacy of World War II burdened the fate of Europe, and 
particularly the relations of Germany with Eastern Europe. He used to compare the 
European challenge to the task of overcoming the old alternative ‘peace or war’. This 
conviction was rooted in Kohl’s personal experience; he was the last Chancellor of 
Germany who remembered the war. His sense of Germany’s responsibility towards the 
East was unquestionable. Kohl also liked posing as a moral leader of the nation. In this 
context, he used to stress that he was fulfilling the mission laid down by Konrad 
Adenauer; in 1990 Kohl successfully accomplished Adenauer’s long-term goal, the 
unification of Germany. Sustaining the commitment to deepening the European 
integration was a continuity of the premises of the post-war foreign policy laid by Konrad 
Adenauer. And by increasingly frequent advocating the idea of taking the Eastern 
countries on the EU board Kohl was opening a new course for his nation.  
The reasoning based on benefits calculation had two dimensions. Western 
partners found the commitment of the German government to the enlargement 
controversial. They saw it as an attempt on the German side to gain a dominant position 
in the region, but at the same time as an opportunity to engage German resources into the 
European projects (such as of the EMU and deepening the European integration projects). 
So while German politicians were seeking to involve other EU member states in the 
enlargement project to share the financial burden, the other member states saw the 
enlargement as a possibility to contain Germany (apart from France). They did not, 
however, want German policy makers to lead the EU to the enlargement. German 
politicians were aware of these attitudes and applied the principle of multilateralism for 
engaging in both directions. It helped Germany to diffuse their partner’s fears and at the 
same time to co-shape developments of the EU, both in the deepening and widening 
aspects. 
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This double-track approach was illustrated by perturbations with the invitation of 
the heads of associated states to the Essen Summit. This idea of Chancellor Kohl met 
resistance from other EU member states, because other EU member states feared that the 
German government was trying to let the East Europeans into the EU through the 
backdoor. The German government repeatedly cancelled the invitation, what also led 
Chancellor to stating officially (while addressing the East Europeans in Essen) that ‘today 
you are still guests, but within a reasonable time you will be the members’, without 
suggesting any date for the membership323. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
NATO Enlargement versus EU Enlargement Tension  
As the Cause of Ambivalence  
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EU Enlargement 
1993 — 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This chapter focuses on perception of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement 
policy that was caused by the NATO enlargement project. The project interfered with the 
support of German policy makers for the EU enlargement, deepening the perception of 
already existing ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy.  
NATO expansion was a second of the two-pillar concept of new political, security 
and economic organization of Eastern Europe. German policy makers did not favour 
NATO Eastward expansion and considered alternative options of a new international 
security organization of Europe. These alternative options were contradictory to the 
premises of the idea of the EU and NATO Eastward expansion. As such the consideration 
of these alternative options created a perception that the foundation of the support for the 
EU enlargement is not as firm as declared.  
In this respect NATO expansion presents the third major, along the deepening of 
the EU integration and relations with France, external constraint to the EU enlargement in 
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the years 1992—1995. Yet, paradoxically, both these constraints ultimately facilitated the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU. And it was German policy makers who played an 
important role in this process. First German Chancellor Helmut Kohl set a new direction 
for Germany’s European foreign policy endorsing both the EU widening and deepening 
projects simultaneously. Then, German policy makers while dealing with both challenges 
— of balancing deepening the integration with the enlargement and NATO expansion 
projects — were able to hammer out a solid permissive consensus at the domestic stage 
on both issues. That allowed eventually the incorporation of both projects into a grand 
concept of Germany’s European interests. In this way Germany became a leader of the 
post-Cold War strategic changes in Europe.  
The NATO project brought to the scene new actors — the representatives of the 
Defence Ministry and of political parties. These actors were a part of an epistemic 
community that advocated NATO expansion. Their actions in the external (the first 
board) reflect domestically debated interests (the second board). NATO expansion 
presents however a puzzle — it can be interpreted both in realist terms for its sheer 
character of expanding a military organization created as defence alliance against the 
Soviet Union as well as by applying a liberal perspective that would present the 
expansion as embracing new democracies in Eastern Europe on the basis of common 
values with the aim to stabilise the region.  
The perception of ambivalence in this case was caused by a clash of alternative 
concepts of a new European security and political order. The events that ultimately led 
German policy makers to supporting NATO expansion, which was congruent with the 
support for he EU enlargement, represent a case for the constructivist ontology: an impact 
of epistemic communities on creation of the state interests.  
 
I. AMBIVALENCE 
The perception of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the EU enlargement 
caused by the NATO expansion project had two dimensions.  
First, German policy makers favoured initially other concepts of a new 
international security organization in Europe. The hesitation of German executives when 
faced with the idea of the expanded NATO was in conflict with the premises of the EU 
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enlargement idea. NATO eastward expansion was the second of the two-pillar concept of 
a new organization of Eastern Europe, with the Eastern enlargement of the European 
Union as the other pillar. Hesitation over the concept based on NATO undermined the 
overall perception of Germany as supportive to this two-pillar concept of the new 
organization of the European continent. Like other Western Europeans, German policy 
makers too were divided over the future shape of the European security system, and 
ambivalent about the NATO expansion. As it became number one political issue debated 
in Europe in the years 1992—1995, together with the discussed idea of prioritising the 
deepening of the EU integration, it put the EU enlargement project on the backburner. 
The second factor was that the project that German government eventually backed 
absorbed political energy of German policy makers. They played a key role in the process 
of preparation the NATO enlargement. The project presented also an explicit constraint 
to the progress of the EU enlargement, restraining a potentially more active and tangible 
support of German policy makers. NATO expansion was a pillar of the international 
security system. This area was of primary concern for European policy makers. Only 
when the project was put on track, it allowed a more pro-active thinking about the EU 
enlargement. 
The constraints to the NATO project also overlapped those that hindered the EU 
expansion: the Soviet opposition being the main factor and France’s different views of 
the European organization as the second one. Both these factors were of critical 
importance for German European policy; German government executives trod cautiously, 
especially towards Russia, whose troops were still on the German territory. While NATO 
expansion did not affect a relation with France, once the NATO expansion was on track 
the Russian factor declined, both in the area of the European security and the EU 
expansion. 
The concept of the post-1989 new political, security and economic organization of 
Eastern Europe was based on premises of eliminating Soviet dominance in the region, 
through including Eastern European countries into the Western structures, first and 
foremost of the European Community/Union of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It 
was a concept Eastern Europeans and the U.S. administration presented in the wake of 
the 1989 revolution. Both pillars were necessary for achieving a goal of a complete 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
165 
liberation of Eastern Europe: the Soviet Union was able to hold political influence over 
the region after WWII, because it had a military grip over the region and Soviet troops 
were stationed in Eastern European countries, including East Germany. The premises of a 
new order were the values of democracy and free-market economy that Eastern 
Europeans declared to adopt.  
NATO expansion and the EU enlargement would allow spreading the Western 
multilateral system of governance on the most of the continent. That would meet both the 
Eastern Europeans’ and Americans’ goal. The support of the German government and 
political elites was decisive for completion of both projects, but initially German policy 
makers were ambivalent about the NATO expansion; government executives did not 
back the initiative and the domestic debate revealed support for an exclusively European 
option of the security system. The hesitation over the American presence in European 
security was perceived as similar to the ambivalence over the EU enlargement, and 
overall as uncertainty about acceptance of the Eastern European countries into the 
Western structures. In this way the reluctance of German policy makers over the NATO 
expansion deepened the ambivalence that was created by the debate over the directions of 
the EU development and choosing the deepening as the priority.  
NATO expansion project deepened the perception of ambivalence in Germany’s 
policy towards the EU enlargement also because of two other reasons: it absorbed 
political energy of German politicians leaving the enlargement on the back plane and 
worked as an explicit constraint for the German support for the EU enlargement because 
it was of much more fundamental character than the EU expansion; it was an 
international security pillar, parallel to the EU enlargement in an emerging new European 
order and as it belonged to a different field, of the security not political organization, it 
was not in a direct conflict to the EU enlargement. But the international security was 
primary among the goals for a new European international order and the developments of 
the early 1990s made the issue urgent. 
An unexpected military conflict in Yugoslavia, and unstable situation in Russia 
and the departing former Soviet republics made the issue of the European security in 
1993 pressing. The American stance on this issue was unequivocal; the Bush 
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administration wanted to maintain its military presence on the continent and the project 
of the NATO Eastern expansion was a means to realise this goal.  
The idea was problematic for Europeans, who after the collapse of the Cold War 
and bipolar system Western Europeans were discussing other preferences of an 
international security organization than depending on the U.S. Secondly, the American 
idea conflicted strongly with the interests of the Soviet Union, which still had its troops in 
the Eastern European countries, including former East Germany. The negotiations with 
Mikhail Gorbachev over the German unification in June 1990 allowed President George 
H.W. Bush publicly assert that both sides agreed it would be the German, unified nation 
choosing its alliances324. It implied that other Eastern European countries should follow 
the rule. But the domestic position of Gorbachev, given the struggle for reforming the 
Soviet Union, was delicate and a prevailing view among the Soviet leadership was that 
NATO Eastern expansion was not only an attempt to limit the Soviet influence in Eastern 
Europe, but it presented a direct threat to the Soviet Union’s own security.  
The U.S. administration turned their expectations for working through the tension 
with the Soviet leaders to German policy makers, the closest partners of the Russian 
leaders in Europe. German politicians were to play a broker’s role in the NATO 
expansion project. This task absorbed political energy of the German policy makers, who 
while expected to lead a diplomatic effort, fundamental for a peaceful transition, could 
not appear as leading the project; it was a requirement of the restrained civilian power. It 
curbed potentially more active policy towards the EU enlargement amplifying the 
perception of ambivalence in the German enlargement policy. 
 
II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS   
NATO Expansion Discourse 
NATO expansion was the second pillar of a new organization of Europe that 
concerned Eastern European countries, and as such is inseparable from the EU 
enlargement project. Given, however, that the NATO represented a military organization 
with a mission in the international security area, its expansion represented more 
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fundamental therefore higher political stakes for the European members than the project 
of the EU enlargement.  
The Bush administration declared openly the will to maintain the American 
primacy in the area of the European security already in 1989 and early 1990325. That met 
the insistence of the East Europeans on expanding NATO’s umbrella over their region. 
Both calls decided eventually about the NATO expansion. The new European security 
system, as eventually emerged, looks as a coherent with concept. In the early 1990s it 
was seen as such almost only from the East European and American perspective, with 
exception of some Western experts. Eastern European chose the Western model of 
democracy. Joining the Western political institutions therefore seemed logical and the 
dismantling of the Iron Curtain was to lead to the unity of the continent under the security 
protection provided by the U.S.-led NATO.  
Among those who supported this vision were American scholars like Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, who called subsequently for expanding NATO 
eastward. They indicated that such a development would be a historical coherency and a 
political necessity, both for the Alliance itself, if it wanted to survive into the post-Cold 
War era, and for the American position on the international stage as well326. Their voices 
were however at the time countered with the opinions that NATO should be dissolved as 
its purpose ceased to exist327. The ‘historical consistency’ was not that obvious and had in 
some case diametrically different interpretations.   
An international debate over the NATO expansion evolved around two different 
understandings and interpretations of the idea. From a realist perspective NATO 
expansion was an effort of extending Western influence beyond the sphere established 
during the Cold War, and as such it was expected to provoke Russian opposition. From a 
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liberal perspective this expansion was to support the nascent democracies in Eastern 
Europe, which declared common values with those at the basis of NATO foundation, and 
the umbrella of the NATO’s conflict management mechanisms would introduce a greater 
stability in the region. Both these sets of arguments divided the supporters and opponents. 
While the project looked different from different theoretical points of view, it was less 
differentiated in the German debate. 
 
1. German Power in the International 
The subject of NATO expansion was one of the three main topics of the great 
domestic debate in Germany over its future interests in the international realm. Like the 
concepts of the EU integration and enlargement, NATO expansion was a defining issue 
for various schools of thought328. It was apparent that the supporters of deepening the EU 
integration, Europeanists did not favour NATO expansion. The arguments in the debate 
about the international security related directly to the issue of the German new power, 
increased with the unification and its role in a new foreign policy of Germany.  
As Gunther Hellmann describes it,  all three main schools — pragmatic 
multilateralists, Europeanists and Eurosceptics — subscribed to the ideas of Realpolitik, 
of which he lists three assumptions329: 
1) that order in the international system, in the sense of predictable, stable and 
peaceful relations among major powers, is valuable 
2) that the threat and use of force is both necessary and legitimate as an ultima 
ratio to reestablish order, given the conflict-ridden nature of international 
politics and the repeated occurrence of war and 
3) that the major powers have both a special interest and a special obligation to 
keep that order or reestablish it 
According to Hellmann the pragmatic multilateralists held that the unified 
Germany should be regarded as one of the major powers in the world, and for this reason 
should participate in the task of providing for the international order. A representative of 
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this school, Helga Haftendorn indicated that it was normal for a great power to be 
responsible for creating and keeping international order, even if only in a co-leadership 
role330. Yet as another pragmatic multilateralist Josef Joffe suggested — force may be 
the ultima ratio, but ‘soft power’ instruments are more important in managing the 
increasing international interdependence because ‘welfare rather than warfare’ defines 
the new paradigm of international relations331. Nonetheless according to Michael 
Stürmer, also a pragmatic multilateralist, Germany cannot be successful unless it atcs in 
conjunction with other Western powers332. And it is in Germany’s interest to have its 
foreign policy activities legitimised by appropriate international institutions — preferably 
collective security institutions such as the United Nations and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) but, if necessary, also by collective defence 
institutions made up of the Western democracies, that is, the European Union and NATO. 
While these argument were pointing to the necessity of maintaining the premise 
of Germany’s foreign policy the multilateral cooperation with international partners, 
there were also voices indicating the awareness how the principle of multilateral 
cooperation is used by some of Germany’s partners.  
Uwe Nerlich333 for example indicated a structural tension between Germany’s 
continuing interest in operating within multilateral contexts and the interests of some of 
its major Western allies, particularly those of France and Britain. In Nerlich’s view both 
countries were interested in developing such institutional functions of NATO and the 
European Union that were useful for constraining Germany, like stationing allied forces 
on German soil, constituting multinational corps primarily of German forces, and the 
European Monetary Union. Neither of these partners of Germany was interested in 
pushing ahead with European political integration or by creating supranational military 
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structures at the European level. Pragmatic multilateralists differed about the nature of 
German interests. Michael Stürmer and Karl Kaiser334 in turn, argued that although it 
could appear contradictory ‘to pursue genuine German interests at the same time as one is 
demonstrating solidarity with the allies’, this contradiction is easily resolved by pointing 
out that ‘as before, all of the essential German interests can only be realised if, and 
insofar as, they correspond to the essential interests of its allies’. 
 
2. Epistemic Community 
The outlined above arguments for cooperation with the partners represented the 
core of the argument in favour of enlarging NATO; it was pragmatic multilateralists who 
built the rhetoric for the NATO expansion. Hellmann pointed that many of the pragmatic 
multilateralists were security specialists by training and ‘highly Americanised’ ones335. 
That resulted in choosing the U.S. as a preferable ally for Germany. While the pragmatic 
multilateralists in Germany were the main supporters of this concept, the idea in fact was 
shared across the elites, what created an epistemic community, centring on the project of 
enlarging NATO.  
Two other main schools of thought in German foreign policy, of Europeanists and 
Eurosceptics shared many assumptions and preferences with the pragmatic 
multilateralists: the main was the conviction that Germany, as a matter of principle, 
should pursue a multilateral diplomatic strategy. In this sense Europeanists as well as 
Eurosceptics represented variations of pragmatic multilateralism, with Europeanists 
leaning towards European solutions and Euroscpetics more inclined towards the idea of 
continuing membership in NATO.  Out of the two, it was Eurosceptics who advocated 
Germany’s strong commitment to NATO. 
NATO stood at the top of the Eurosceptics’ list of priorities — as Hellmann put it 
— in spite of internal difference within the alliance that appeared during the Balkan crisis 
NATO was still seen as the only functioning link between Europe and the U.S.336. 
Eurosceptics emphasised that Germany could not count on its major European allies, 
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France and Britain, to the same extent it could count on the United States, what was 
revealed during the negotiations of Germany’s unification337. It should therefore clearly 
side with the Americans if there should ever arise a conflict between Germany’s 
European and Atlanticist interests338. American presence in Europe was seen as crucial 
also for balancing the European relations and as reassurance against the prevailing risks 
in Eastern Europe, especially in Russia339. Eurosceptics pointed also moral arguments for 
which NATO should remain Germany’s first foreign policy priority for — the alliance 
was the ‘legitimate heir and extension of the Four Freedoms of President Roosevelt that 
Atlantic Charter and the UN indeed of the anti-Hitler coalition of the core states of world 
civilization’340. But Eurosceptics also linked NATO to a new role they envisioned for 
Germany — that of a great power. 
Like pragmatic multilateralists, Eurosceptics too shared a strong conviction that 
Germany was not a normal nation-state, but a great power341. And given its central 
position, German’s ‘fate’ was to ‘intelligently balance a complicated system of 
(interlocking) balances of power’ made up mainly of the European Union, NATO, and a 
regional balance of power system stretching from ‘the European zone of stability to the 
earthquake zone in the Balkans and eastern Europe’342. Hellmann observes that the 
Eurosceptics’ assumption of Germany as a great power emphasised traditional 
instruments of great power politics such as alliances, diplomacy, great power concerts in 
contrast to the formal institutionalization of international cooperation in supranational 
structures343. ‘In the realist tradition Eurosceptics have long castigated as politically 
dangerous what they perceive to be a tendency on the part of German decision makers to 
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negotiations on Germany unification. 
338 Karl Feldmeyer, “Deutschland sucht seine Rolle”,  Die politische Meinung 38, October 1993. 
339 Hans-Peter Schwarz, “Außenpolitische Agenda für das Fin de siecle”,  Merkur 48 (September/October), 1994. 
340 Jürgen von Alten, Die ganz normale Anarchie: Jetzt beginnt die Nachkriegszeit, Berlin: Siedler, 1994. Also as Christian Hacke 
put it “Germany”s anchor is in the West, in general and “in the middle of the Atlantic in particular because being a member of the 
Atlantic community may be the best thing that is worth preserving from the Cold War, what is more — it may even be the best thing 
that has ever happened to Germany”, See Christian Hacke, Welmacht wider Willen. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, revisited edition, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein,1993.  
341 Christian Hacke, Welmacht wider… op. cit. 
342 Schwarz, Außenpolitische Agenda… op.cit. 
343 Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? … op.cit., p. 12 
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conduct foreign policy without any regard to traditional considerations of power politics’ 
— observes Hellmann344. He stresses however that Eurosceptics did not advocate 
unilateralism. But in contrast to pragmatic multilateralists and Europeanists, they 
advocated a more assertive, with ‘greater toughness and vigilance in negotiations’, 
approach vis-à-vis its western European partners in order to make them more responsive 
to Germany’s own interests345. 
Europeanists were not excessively vocal about NATO. Their basic assumption 
was similar to that of pragmatic multilateralists that Germany should pursue a 
multilateral diplomatic strategy. The focus of Europeanists was however on a closer 
integration within the European Union, in as many areas as possible, what they saw as a 
key to achieving a position of a more competitive actor in the international area. The 
clash between the two views — of pragmatic multilateralists favouring NATO 
commitment of Germany on the one side and of Europeanists inclined to a European 
system, that would be independent from, or less dependent on the U.S., on the other side 
— impacted German policy towards the NATO expansion.  
 
III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE  
NATO Expansion Politics 
As the domestic debate among experts demonstrates the project of NATO 
expansion was seen as congruent with Germany’s interests and Germany’s 
multilateralism346. But NATO expansion was Germany’s second choice. It was not a goal 
German policy makers proposed, and the government policy was therefore responsive. A 
distance towards this issue of the main actor, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, is indicative here. 
The success of this project was ultimately a result of mutually reinforcing factors: 
common interest of the Americans and East Europeans; advocacy by an epistemic 
community, with the prominent German policy makers as the leaders of this community; 
and adjustment of priorities in the foreign policy of Germany that allowed German policy 
makers contribute substantially to the NATO enlargement with its skilful diplomacy that 
                                         
344 Hacke, Welmacht wider… op.cit. 
345 Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? … op.cit., p.12 
346 See for example Hyde-Price, German and  European order…, op. cit. 
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allowed to overcome contradictory interests of Russia. First, however, the idea of 
expanding the NATO clashed with Western European concepts, including the German 
ones, how to fill in the post Cold War security void in Europe.  
Disappearance of the direct threat of nuclear confrontation between West and East 
opened in the view of some West European politicians a possibility to conceptualise more 
independent from the U.S. ‘protectorate’ arrangements. As Anthony Forster and Robert 
Niblett pointed out  — the old lines of the division between supporters and opponents of 
the American military presence in Europe that were muted during the Cold War, now 
reappeared: ‘the long-running dispute between France and its neighbours over the 
structure of the transatlantic relationship continued, (…) with successive U.S. 
administrations determined to ensure both that the economic and financial burdens of 
assisting political and economic transition were shouldered by Western Europe and that 
strategic and security leadership was retained by Washington’347.  
This reasoning was strengthened in the face of the Soviet reaction to the 
application of the new East European democracies for the membership in NATO; the 
nervousness and hostility to this quest on the Soviet side was the second factor 
influencing thinking of West Europeans about the new security system at the time. Given 
that President George H.W. Bush promised Mikhail Gorbachev during their meeting in 
Malta in December 1989 that the U.S. would not use the weakness of the Soviet Union 
for achieving its own goals348, the idea of NATO eastward expansion was see as 
contradictory to the Soviet interests not only by the Soviets, but also by many Western 
politicians. The Soviet sensitivity was well understood by German policy makers and the 
Bush’s pledge was reiterated in London at the NATO summit on the 6th of July next year 
by American and German politicians349.  
 
1. Russian Factor 
The Russian factor was the most powerful hindrance to the support for the 
Eastward expansion of NATO. It appears to be the first reason why German politicians, 
                                         
347 Forster and Niblett, Concepts of European Order…, op.cit., p.28 
348 Zelikow, Rice, Germany Unified…, op. cit., 
349 Erklärung der NATO-Gipfelkonferenz in London vom 6. Juli 1990, Bulletin der Bundesregierung NO 90, 10 December 1990, p. 
777-779 
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both inside and outside government, initially either directly opposed, or were sceptical 
about the NATO enlargement, and favoured ideas of developing a system that would 
either include Russia, or at least was neutral towards Russia, thus excluding the U.S. 
participation. This was a spirit of the pledge made by German policy makers to the Soviet 
leaders, during the negotiation of the German unification. The unification itself presented 
a problem in the international security aspect of the relation with the Soviet Union; the 
inclusion of Eastern Germany into the Alliance was hedged by the Genscher’s proposal 
to keep NATO troops temporarily out of the former GDR350.  
The key was the alleged obligations of Chancellor Kohl to Gorbachev, which 
Chancellor allegedly pledged during his visit in Caucasus in July 1990 while soliciting 
the consent of the Soviet Union to Germany’s unification. The controversies surrounding 
this issue have been reconciled in the most convincing way by Jonathan Eyal, whose 
claim is that Kohl had to hint that the West would not seek immediate gains out of the 
Soviet Union’s losses351. Hans-Dietrich Genscher also took a special care during the Two 
Plus Four negotiations to avoid sending disturbing signals to Moscow and for this reason 
opposed an idea of sending German troops to the Gulf, because that would be in conflict 
with the provisions of the Treaty, accepted by the Soviet Union352. 
The Russian opposition to the presence of American troops in Russia’s proximity 
although for different reasons, but was congruent with the ambitions of Western 
politicians to strengthen the European role in a new security system. There were two 
main concepts of such a system competing with the idea of enlarging NATO. Both were 
based on the European institutions, but they differed fundamentally. German politicians 
presented the first one and their French counterparts — the second one.  
The German concept was in fact the concept of Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. 
He proposed first at the Paris summit of 1990, a broad pan-European, thus including 
Russia, cooperation built around the CSCE (evolved later into OSCE). He argued that the 
                                         
350 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Perspektiven Gemeinsamer Politik und kooperative Sicherheit in Europa”, Bulletin der 
Bundesregierung, NO 31, 27 March 1990, p. 311  
351 Jonathan Eyal, “NATO”s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision”,  International Affairs, 1997 nr 4, s. 699. 
352  Genscher, Memoirs…, op.cit., p. 902; Also Rudolf Seiters , one of Kohl”s closest advisers the Minister in the Chancellor”s Office 
gave at the time an interview in which he emphasised that the deployment of Bundeswehr troops to the Persian Gulf should not 
become a subject of partisan controversy, see: Mil J. Kirchner, “Genscher and What Lies Behind Genscherism”,  West European 
Politics, 13, pp. 159 
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post-Cold War system should include the Soviet Union as an equal partner and all NATO 
and Warsaw Pact members (CSCE was seen at the time as the future form of European 
Security Council). Genscher’s concept was also advocated by Gerhard Stoltenberg the 
then German defence Minister353, but not by Chancellor Kohl. 
The logic of this concept was grounded in the premises of the old German 
Ostpolitik. The Helsinki process, the crown achievement of the Ostpolitik, was now to be 
used for creation of collective security in Europe354. The reasoning indicating that it 
would not be a ‘European security system’ if it left Russia outside was strengthened with 
the arguments that exclusion of Russia would block the reform of CSCE and of the UN, 
the disarmament process and could even provoke Russia to increasing its spending on 
arms355. The idea was criticised as impossible to be efficient with so many members (all 
European states)356 and was in conflict with the premises of the new concept based on 
NATO-EU eastward expansion. German enthusiasm for this pan-European idea, 
however, as noted by Forster and Niblett faded soon after securing the support of the 
Soviet leaders for the unification and acceptance for incorporation of Eastern Germany 
into NATO357; with the departure of Hans Dietrich Genscher in 1992 from the post of the 
German Foreign Minister the concept practically died away. 
The debate evolved further around the concept favoured by French politicians — 
of the strengthened WEU, which would cooperate closely with NATO as the main 
security guarantor. The argument of the proponents was that with the end of bipolar 
confrontation, i.e. nuclear threat, Western Europeans could take on more responsibility 
for the European security. Contrary to the Genscher’s pan-European plan, in the French 
proposal the stress was on ‘westernization’ of the new security system. There were 
                                         
353 At the Munich annual conference on the Security, February 1992; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12-13 February 1992. For a 
wider elaboration of this concept see for example Dieter Senghaas, Friedensprojekt Europa, Frankfurt am Main 1992: Dieter 
Senghaas, Was sind der Deutschen Interessen?, in: Siegfried Unseld (eds.), Politik ohne Projekt? Nachdenken über Deutschland, 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1993, pp. 463-491 
354 Every European state was to become a member of the OSCE and the OSCE itself  was to become a “regionalised UN”. 
355 The negotiations of the late 1980. on the developments of the CSCE, in which the Soviet Union was a participant, were at the 
beginning of the 1990s still vivid and as such they were incomparably more digestive for Russia than the idea of installing NATO in 
Central Europe. 
356 Michael Staack, Oliver Meier, “Die KSZE und die europäische Sicherheit. Kooperative Konfliktverhütung für Gesamteuropa”,  
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 13/1992, p.17-26 
357 Niblett, Wallace, Rethinking… op.cit., p. 29 
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however two fundamental uncertainties about this proposal. The first one was about 
subordination of the WEU — should it be directly under the authority of the European 
Council, integrated in this way with the EC/EU, or should it remain institutionally 
autonomous? The second one was about its competences — should the WEU acquire an 
operational capability and the right to operate within as well as outside the NATO area, 
or should it remain only an institutional forum for making decisions by European defence 
and Foreign Ministers358? The questions reflected differences in the views of European 
policy makers on the relation with the U.S. and NATO359.  
 
2. American Factor 
The official German stance was that the American guarantees for the European 
security were indispensable for Europe. Chancellor Kohl stressed it in spring 1991 stating 
that a ‘substantial presence’ of American troops was still favoured360. And as the 
domestic elite debate demonstrates — American guarantees were favoured by majority of 
the experts as congruent with the multilateralism of the German foreign policy. But at the 
same time the American presence was a sensitive issue for German policy makers. It was 
an attitude of a general public that made it questionable for politicians. 
The unification increased the desire in Germany to break away from the semi-
sovereign status and to use a new status of the full sovereignty more explicitly. One of 
the most thorny dimensions of the Germany’s semi-sovereignty during the Cold War was 
the presence of nearly 400 hundred thousands American troops on the West German soil. 
While remaining loyal to the U.S., German politicians and most of the society regarded 
the military presence of the Americans ambivalently. They understood the need of 
protection against the Soviet threat, but the U.S. decision to install in West Germany 
                                         
358 At a conference on the Petersberg near Bonn on 19 June 1992 the WEU Ministerial Council resolved to use the WEU as the 
European Union”s defence arm. In the future the WEU should not only carry out peacekeeping missions on behalf of the UN or the 
CSCE but also peace-enforcement missions. See: “Petersberg Declaration Adopted by the Western European Union Council of 
Ministers, in Bonn on 19 June 1992”, Brussels, European Press and Information Service, 1992 
359 As presented in a simplified form by the German daily newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung — the difference was that the 
British closely allied with the U.S. and promoting close cooperation with NATO saw WEU as a sort of a European pillar within 
NATO; for the Germans and the French it was supposed to be a mediating tool between Atlantic and European organizations. See: 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 1991. For the French policy makers the British approach was impossible to accept 
since France withdrew from NATO structure; for this reason German policy makers were ambivalent about the proposal too.  
360 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  17 April 1991 
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Pershing II and Cruise missiles in the 1980s, caused a huge opposition among the West 
Germans and a problem for the governing CDU/CSU/FDP coalition. The installation was 
perceived as too dangerous and was protested in the streets across Germany361.  
The end of the Cold War opened a question of the further American military 
presence in Europe. That was of a special meaning for the emerging new identity of the 
unified German nation, because touching upon a sensitive aspect of the German 
democracy. The American presence in Europe was initially destined to guarantee the 
peaceful development of the Federal Republic. After 40 years of practising and 
promoting multilateral foreign policy by the West German politicians there was a strong 
conviction in Germany that the lesson had been learned and the exam passed, thus the 
further American supervision was not needed anymore362.  
For these reasons some German politicians and intellectuals opted for 
development of a European-grounded security system, linked up to an American 
‘warrant’, but with the decisions on the parity with the U.S.363 This was the stance 
preferred by Helmut Kohl and coalition parties CSU/CDU and FDP. The opposition, 
mainly the SPD representatives did not see the U.S. as acting in the Federal Republic’s 
best interests; they perceived their country as being drawn into a vortex of armed 
conflicts around the globe. Their position was not anti-American, but they contested the 
U.S. hegemony in European affairs. They wanted equal partnership with the U.S.364 Egon 
Bahr, one of the leading figures of the SPD gave a clear expression of these views in a 
pragmatic version: ‘European interests are not identical with the global ones of the 
U.S.’365  
The split over ‘how much of the involvement’ for the Americans in Europe ran 
across the parties. In the CDU the Atlanticist stream was represented first of all by Volker 
                                         
361 There is a bulk of German literature on this subject. For the insight on the opinion of the German society it was useful to reach 
Thomas Enders, “Die deutsche Angst vor der Sonderbedrohung, Zur Rolle der nuklearen Kurzstreckenwaffen in Europa”, Die Sonde, 
Nr 1/2 1988 and Karl Feldmeyer, “Sorgen um das Bündnis”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 December 1986 
362 Henning Tewes writes about the wider across political parties consensus on it. See: Tewes, Germany, Civilian…, op.cit. 
363 Also in the US, among those politicians who wanted to reduce American engagement in Europe. See for example Uwe Nerlich, 
“Sicherheitsfunktionen der NATO”,  Europe Archiv NO 48 (23), 1993 
364 “Stellungnahme der Kommission Sicherheitspolitik beim SPD-Parteivorstand zur sicherheitspolitischen Verantwortung des 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Mitteilung für die Presse, 17 May 1991 
365 Egon Bahr, “Verantwortung heißt, notfalls auch nein zu sagen, Rede in der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing”, Frankfurter 
Rundschau,  2 July 1991 
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Rühe. He voiced such views as early as in 1990 saying that ‘NATO alone can guarantee 
German and European stability’366 and reiterating it two years later announcing ‘no 
changing of the guards in Europe’367. In the opposing SPD the prominent politician 
Karsten Voigt was similarly staunch supporter of the American presence in Europe.  
 
IV. OPTIONS 
1. East European Perspective 
Neither of the two concepts, of exclusively Western European security or a wider 
pan-European idea, satisfied Eastern Europeans, as both were contradictory to their 
interests. The basis of this divergence was the orientation against two poles — the United 
States and Russia.  
The pan-European project was in conflict with the interests of the East European 
countries. Their goal was to join the NATO and they viewed it as an absolute priority and 
historical imperative. The end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to liberate the 
region not only from the Soviet rule and influence. Despite the internal implosion, the 
Soviet Union still presented a potential threat, and Russian troops were still allocated in 
these countries and on the German territory. And at the February 1991 Warsaw Pact 
conference the Soviet leaders insisted on other members to pledge they would not join 
alliances that the Soviet Union held for hostile to its interests. This initiative failed, but it 
was a signal of an attempt by the Russians to keep its influence in the region368.  
The other reason why Eastern Europeans persisted on firm institutional binding 
with the Western structures, was the historical memory that lack of such bonds left East 
Europeans alone twice: at the policy of appeasement to Nazi Germany before WWII, and 
at giving away the Eastern half of the continent to the Soviet rule afterwards369. Therefore 
the only plausible mechanism capable to bring guarantees to the region of staying free 
from the Russian influence was that of a close political and military alliance with the 
                                         
366 Volker Rühe, “The New Germany in Europe”, CPC Party Conference Lecture, Conservative Political Centre, November 1990 
367 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 July 1992 
368 Michael Broer, Ole Diehl, “Die Sicherheit der neuen Demokratien in Europa und die NATO”,  Europa-Archiv, NO 12/1990, p. 
367-376 
369 During Havel”s visit at the NATO headquarter in March 1991; in “Präsident Havel in einer Rede vor der NATO am 21. März 
1991”,  Europa-Archiv, No 10/1991, p. D243; Polish politicians were less explicit at the time, however declarations of the ambition to 
join Western security structures were clear. 
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United States. NATO enlargement was the second to the EU enlargement pillar of the 
East European concept of their new political, security and economic international 
arrangements. For this reason out of two concepts favoured then by the Western 
politicians, the strengthening the WEU aligned closer with the interests of the Eastern 
European states. Genscher’s proposals in their view was to preserve the existing balance 
of power in Europe, with the position of Russia reduced, but without an actual counter-
power against it.  
Eastern European diplomacy kept therefore pressing the Western counterparts for 
the NATO expansion. They pinned their hopes upon the conference on the European 
security in Prague in April 1991. It did not however bring the expected results. The then 
NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner advocated only an idea of linking NATO with 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on the basis of various agreements and treaties370. 
At the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers of NATO member states, in Copenhagen in 
June 1991, Wörner talked only about ‘intense cooperation’371. NATO member 
governments were also preoccupied with the new Alliance’s strategy that was discussed 
in 1990-1991, along with negotiations within the European Union’s intergovernmental 
conference on a definition of a ‘common foreign and security policy’.  
Ambitions of West European policy makers were however soon confronted with 
the hard reality of the security requirements. The Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990, Yugoslavia’s disintegration next year and disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
exposed weakness of European military capabilities (on the technological level in case of 
the Gulf War) and limits of the political coherence within the WEU. Both practically 
blocked the WEU from participation in operations outside the NATO area without the 
U.S. (e.g. Yugoslavia’s war). The Europe-centred concepts were practically buried was a 
proposal by Jacques Delors, of March 1991, of strengthening the common foreign and 
security policy through the incorporation of the WEU by the EU372. Forster and Niblett 
                                         
370 Archiv den Gegenwart (further AdG) , 1991, p. 35612; Also G. Pollach, “Zwischen NATO, WEU und KSZE. Die Neugestaltung 
gesameuropäischer Sicherheit”,  Außenpolitik, NO I/1993, p. 45-54 
371 Manfred Wörner, Die Atlantische Allianz in den neuziger Jahren,  Außenpolitik, No III/1991, p. 61-62 
372 Jacques Delors, “European Integration and Security”,  Survival, March-April, vol. 32, NO 2, 1991,  p. 99-109 
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called Delors’ proposal ‘a wake-up call for the Americans and provoked them eventually 
to ‘intervene’ actively in the negotiations among IGC of the ‘twelve’373. 
 
2. Support of the Epistemic Community  
It was rhetoric of German politicians advocating NATO enlargement that 
connected it directly with the EU enlargement in the European debate. While arguing 
NATO expansion German representatives emphasised the need to stabilise the Eastern 
European region, referring to the political and economic stability too. In this way they 
broke barriers in conceptualising political landscape of Europe: what seemed at the 
beginning of the 1990s unthinkable now was on a political agenda. The main factor here 
was that the Russian threat proved to be possible to ‘disarm’. It created a new normative 
environment and resulted in the change in attitudes towards the EU enlargement. 
The main advocate of the NATO expansion was the German Defence Minister 
Volker Rühe. In Seville on 30 September 1994 Rühe began a debate over the eastward 
opening of NATO374, stressing that creation of a stronger CSCE would weaken NATO. 
Two years later, in the speech at the American Institute for Contemporary German 
Studies in November 1996, while explaining the congruency of the German interests with 
the NATO expansion he emphasised that one does not have to be a ‘strategic genius’ and 
it is ‘enough to look at the map’ to see that in the long term it is impossible to maintain 
the Eastern border of Germany as a border between stability and destabilised zone. 
‘Either we export stability or we will have to import destabilisation’ — he pointed375. He 
also argued at the meeting of the German-Polish society in Bonn in 1995, that close links 
between Germany and Poland and the admission of Poland to NATO are for him a 
Herzsache (matter of heart), as ‘it was this country, Poland, where the changes that led to 
the unification of Germany, had begun’376.  His arguments reflected the evolution of the 
                                         
373 Forster and Niblett quote the British daily newspaper The Independent of 6 and 9 March 1991. Forster and Niblett, Concepts of 
European Order…, op.cit, p. 29 
374 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1-2 October 1994; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1-2 October 1994 
375 Die neue NATO. Vertrag von BundesMinister Rühe in Washington, Bulletin der Bundesregierung NO 34, 2 Mai, 1996, p. 341 
376 Volker Rühe, Wann kommt Polen in die NATO? Vortrag des BundesMinisters für Verteidigung bei der Deutsch-Polnischen 
Gesellschaft am 7 März in Bonn, BundesMinisterium der Verteidigung. Material für die Presse. No 32/3, 1995 
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reasoning behind the NATO enlargement that embraced the idea firmly into the national 
interests and recognised other nations’ interests too. 
The change of the attitude of the governing coalition parties, the CDU/CSU and 
FDP towards the NATO enlargement was visible during the federal election campaign of 
1994. The federal election programme of the CDU and CSU of 16 October 1994 
contained a declaration of the support for the Eastern neighbours (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) in their pursuit of NATO membership. It also stressed 
that the Partnership for Peace initiative was desirable and Germany would do its best, 
using its influence, to establish a long-term partnership with Russia, both on the level of 
the relations NATO-Russia and of the EU-Russia377. A similar stance was presented by 
the FDP378. The SPD remained consistent in opposing NATO enlargement, with the 
significant exception of Karsten Voigt, who was one of the strongest supporters of the 
project. SPD however maintained its opposition till December 1997. A declaration 
against the expansion of NATO was included in a resolution taken up during the federal 
gathering in Wiesbaden in November 1993 and reiterated, and elaborated in more details 
during a similar gathering in Mannheim two years later379.  
The main concern of SPD was that the embracing Višegrad states into NATO 
would cause the isolation of Russia and would weaken the process of democratic changes 
in this country. The change in the SPD stance occurred just few days before Poland, 
Czech Republic and Hungary signed up the accession protocols with NATO on 16 
December 1997. Two weeks earlier, on 3 December during a federal gathering in 
Hannover the SPD accepted a resolution supporting NATO expansion380. Similarly the 
Greens 90 and ultra socialist PDS opposed NATO enlargement381 but eventually, in the 
run-up to the general elections the Greens avoided any categorical resolutions, and the 
                                         
377 Regierungsprogramm von CDU und CSU, August 1994, p. 53 
378 FDP-Tagesdienst. FDP-Bundestagfraktion, Nr. 768, 28. November 1996, p. 1-2 
379 Beschluss zur Außen, Friedens- und Sicherheitpolitik der SPD, in Protokoll des SPD-Bundesparteitages in Mannheim, 14-17 
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Bundestagswahl 1990, Entwurf der Programmkomission, Bonn, January 1990 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
182 
leader of the party Joschka Fischer suggested a possibility of changing his stance on the 
issue of NATO expansion382. 
The actions of the German pro-NATO expansion lobby led by Volker Rühe and 
Karsten Voigt made it possible that the Alliance reached consensus on the relation with 
the Eastern countries in the second half of 1993. Eastern countries were offered a 
‘Partnership for Peace’. It was a half way only solution, aiming at creating a forum for 
cooperation between Eastern countries and NATO, and without promises for the 
membership383. In Eastern European countries it was immediately labelled as the 
‘Partnership for Postponement’, but ultimately it smoothed effectively the way for the 
NATO enlargement. Karsten Voigt and Volker Rühe presented a proposal for 
cooperation between NATO and Russia. Their efforts in this respect were vigorous, but at 
the same time cautious. German politicians for example were using at the time specific 
language in respect to the NATO expansion. They tended to avoid the word 
‘Erweiterung’ — ‘enlargement’, speaking rather about ‘Öffnung’ — ‘opening’384. It was 
necessary from their point of view to further the enlargement idea but in a non-
inflammatory (against Russia) way385.  
Karsten Voigt proposed a ‘soft enlargement of NATO’, without deployment of 
nuclear weapons or NATO troops on the territories of the new members. He also 
suggested that the negotiations could start in 1998. Volker Rühe supported Voight’s 
proposal, stressing the argument about the necessity of ‘exporting the stability 
                                         
382 Karl Sager, Grüne Friedens- und Sicherheitspoliitik, Internationale Politik Vol. 51, NO 8, pp. 43-8 
383 That served Western politicians as an argument to soothe relations with Russia. All other NATO defence Ministers apart from 
Volker Rühe used to point that Partnership did not anticipate enlargement of the Alliance. See for example W.Schütze, Sackgasse oder 
Königsweg? Die Ostweierung des NATO,  Blätter für Deutsche und International Politik, No 8, 1995, p. 924-935 
384 F.M. Alamir, August F.M. Alamir, A. Pradetto,  Pradetto, “Osteuropa und die Erweiterung der NATO: Identitätssuche als Motiv 
für Sicherheitspolitik”,  Studien zur Internazionalen Politik, H.1 Hamburg, 1997, p. 11. 
385 It was reflected for example in a four-point plan of Zbigniew Brzeziński presented in the beginning of 1995 and which assumed 1) 
setting by NATO political standards to abide by new members, 2) indication the states that already obey these standards and starting 
negotiations with them, 3) acceptance of new members without the necessity of deployment of NATO troops at their territories and 4) 
offering Russia a transcontinental collective security system, which would consist of two pillars — the agreement on cooperation 
between Russia and NATO  and a new mechanism within CSCE for consultancy between two entities. This proposal found a 
reflection in a discussion among the NATO and NACC Foreign Ministers, whose first meeting was held in Budapest in May 1995 
(few days before signing with Russia the individual “Partnership for Peace” agreement). See: Zbigniew Brzeziński, “A Plan for 
Europe,”  Foreign Affairs, January-February 1995.  
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eastward’386. The U.S. administration was however at the time still uncertain about 
setting dates and road maps. The main problem for the U.S. was connected with the 
challenge of containing Russia’s he nuclear threat, and securing non-proliferation and 
arms control. All other issues were of second importance to the U.S.’387 These tactics 
paid off when Boris Yeltsin signed the agreement about the individual partnership with 
NATO388.  
 
V. RESULTS 
1. American-German U-Turn 
NATO expansion was decided in a double u-turn. First, the idea received finally 
unequivocal backing of the main player, the U.S. administration. Second, the American 
stance turned around the position of German policy makers. The project was conducted 
cautiously because it still faced obstacles from the Russian side but a steady political 
effort grounded firmly the rationale of this idea.  
These efforts and concerns took the political energy away from the EU 
enlargement, but in overall had strengthening effect for grounding the idea of the EU 
Eastern enlargement. 
American diplomats resumed the initiative and came with three fundamental 
requirements: 
• No European caucus inside NATO 
• No marginalization of non-EC members of NATO 
• No alternative European military organization 
                                         
386 AdG, 1995, p. 40039 A. 
387 Zbigniew Słomkowski, Realia i mity, Trybuna, Polish Daily Newspaper, 2-3 March 1996. 
388 Yeltsin sent out on 30 September 1993 letters to the governments of the US, France, Germany and the UK, expressing a list of 
objections against the expansion of NATO and Russian diplomats still attempted to strengthen the CSCE succeeding partially as the 
CSCE was agreed in December 1994 to be turned into the OSCE, while Kremlin was in 1992 enthusiastic about the cooperation with 
NATO recommending its foreign ministry development of close links, shortly afterwards Russian press revealed leaked reports of the 
foreign ministry for the Kremlin with warnings that in case NATO”s expansion to the East Russia would find itself isolated. In April 
1995 Russia also broke in fact the Vienna treaty of 1990 on the conventional arms reduction and started to fortify its 58 Caucasus 
Army. It was accompanied by the suggestion of creation with the former SU states (CIS now) of a counterbalance for NATO. 
Eventually Boris Yeltsin agreed in May 1995 on Višegrad states to be accepted in NATO under three conditions: (i) signing up on a 
strategic partnership with Russia, (ii) promise of not expanding NATO further East and not admitting for example the Ukraine and 
Baltic states, (iii) financial, economic and technical aid for “rebuilding and modernization of the Russian economy”. See: Ludger 
Kühnhardt, “Die NATO im Prozeß der inneren und äußeren Veränderung”,  Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 5/1996 
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Additionally, in order to water down European ambitions for shedding the 
American dominance, a European Security and Defence Identity was to ‘Europeanise’ 
NATO389. These proposals were accompanied by a new NATO strategy, which was 
announced in May 1991 at the Rome Summit of the Alliance.  
NATO Ministers declared a support for developing European multinational forces 
but with the primacy of NATO as the Europe’s defence organization and with ‘defence 
cooperation’ as an added dimension to the previous ‘collective defence and dialogue’. 
The alliance was also to create a new multinational Alliance Rapid Reaction Corps that 
would be capable of deployment outside the NATO area and commanded by the British, 
with the Germans in command of the air component390. 
Second, NATO decided at the Rome summit in November 1991, to create the 
NACC, North Atlantic Cooperation Council391. In the words of the then Secretary 
General Manfred Wörner it was a ‘wide response to the security needs of the East 
European region’392. For the East European states this answer was only half satisfactory 
because it still avoided binding declarations in respect to a desired membership. In 
January 1992 Manfred Wörner explained to the German press that ‘widening will not be 
considered in the near future’393. Nevertheless it opened for the first time NATO’s doors 
to the East European states, it became a foundation for redesigning the purpose of NATO 
and was an indication of emerging, new concept of the European organization. 
It was Hans-Dietrich Genscher who in cooperation with James Baker prepared the 
premises of the NACC. Genscher’s stance evolved over one year from the staunch 
opposition, to a strategy aimed at closer involvement of the U.S. in the issues of 
European security, increasingly jeopardised by arising conflicts394. The Yugoslav crisis 
                                         
389 Forster and Niblett, Concepts of European Order…, op. cit., p. 30 
390 NATO Office of Information and Press, November 1991, also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 May, 1991 
391 NACC embraced initially 9 central European states. In spring 1992 after the emergence of independent states in the wake of the 
disintegration of the SU, NACC consisted already of 36 states. NACC participation of the Germans in it — Ash, In Europe”s Name 
392 Wörner, Die Atlantische Allianz… op.cit., p. 4 
393 Die Welt, 31 January 1992 
394 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Perspektiven Gemeinsamer Politik und kooperative Sicherheit in Europa”, Bulletin der 
Bundesregierung, NO 81, 12 July 1991; Zelikow, Rice, Germany Unified…, op. cit., p. 175, 204; also Reinhard Wolf, “The doubtful 
mover: German and NATO expansion”, in David J. Haglund, (ed.) Will NATO go East?, Belfast, Queens University Centre for 
International Relations, 1996; Adrian Hyde-Price, “Uncertainties of security policy”, in: Gordon Smith et al (eds), Developments in 
German Politics, London Macmillan, 1992 
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was the main reason behind this change, but only developments in Russia of 1993, which 
undermined Russia’s democratic course (constitutional crisis between Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin and Russian parliament resolved by using military force, September-
October 1993), generated thinking of ‘NATO response’ in geopolitical terms to the 
danger of instability.  
The way for considering NATO as the pillar for the future European security 
system was wide opened after the change of the Alliance’s strategy, when the emphasis 
was shifted from a military and confrontational dimension to a political and preventive 
one. That also served indirectly but strongly as a support for the EU Eastern enlargement, 
which now had as a security background a process of peaceful transition. 
German politicians played a key role in acceleration of the NATO enlargement, 
though the beginnings did not indicate this. Volker Rühe, Germany’s Defence Minister, 
in his London speech of March 1993, called for not keeping NATO as a ‘closed shop’ 395. 
It met an icy reaction from the Chancellor Kohl and highly reluctant perception among 
the senior Bundeswehr officers. German press pronounced that Volker Rühe had lost 
credibility as a politician396. But in fact he put German European security policy a new 
track. Only four years later NATO-enlargement, in the shape proposed by and large by 
Minister Rühe, was completed.  
The reason why Volker Rühe suddenly made his London announcement is usually 
associated with an annual conference on international security held in Munich in 
February 1993. Les Aspin, the then newly appointed Secretary of Defence of President 
Clinton, discussed with European politicians during this conference the situation in the 
post-soviet territories. An underlying question was what whether nationalism in the post-
soviet states would escalate similarly to the escalation in the ex-Yugoslavia? Russia’s 
engagement in the Yugoslav conflicts was also indicated as an activity against the 
interests of the West. Another factor working along this line was that the UN Security 
Council was discouraged to take up any decisions about intervention in Yugoslavia 
(through NATO) fearing the Russian veto.  
                                         
395 In a key-note speech delivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, on 12 March 1993 
396 Editorial, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 March 1993 
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Only a month later Volker Rühe, calling for the enlargement of NATO, argued 
that accepting Eastern European countries to NATO would dismantle the buffer zone in 
this part of Europe397. Kohl’s silence for the first three months after Rühe’s call indicates 
Chancellor’s uncertainty about how strong the U.S. supported the Rühe’s proposal and 
what how Moscow would react. Moscow’s reaction was worrying — a series of 
contradictory, back and forth declarations that began with Boris Yeltsin’s pledging, while 
visiting Warsaw in April 1993, and reiterating it in August during his visit to Prague, that 
the decision about joining NATO would be a sovereign decision of the East European 
countries398. That was fiercely criticised by other Russian leaders and led soon Yeltsin to 
changing his mind.  
A wavering stance of Russian representatives was a reason for not pushing the 
idea, especially for German policy makers. The idea, nevertheless, was firmly driven by a 
small number of officials. Adrian Hyde-Price writes that ‘the decision to enlarge NATO 
represented a success for a transnational coalition between Defence Minister Rühe and 
his US-counterparts’399.  
The key elements were a good relation of Volker Rühe with Manfred Wörner, the 
former German Defence Minister and then NATO Secretary General and a nomination of 
Klaus Naumann, the general inspector of the Bundeswehr for the post of the NATO 
Military Committee’s Chairman. Their positions in the NATO structure, the common 
country of their origins, and the significance of Germany’s official, cautious, but 
supportive, stance on the NATO enlargement — all three elements formed a powerful 
pro-factor. The American lobby was formed by Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s 
national security adviser, Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for 
European Affairs and Les Aspin, Secretary of Defence. The next ally in this international 
                                         
397 He proposed also establishing a direct military cooperation between NATO and Poland on the basis of just created multinational 
German-Dutch-Polish brigade. 
398 The Russian prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin stressed soon afterwards it would be much better not to extend/modify the old 
military blocks, but to create “an integral European space”, by which Russians understood the strengthening of the CSCE. And 
according to Nowaya Yezednievaya Gazieta, 20 October 1993, that covered the discussion of academics on this issue: Oleg 
Bogolomov from the International Institute for the Political Studies claimed that the Eastern Europe sooner or later would be a matter 
of controversy between Russia and the West; the aide of Yeltsin Andranik Migranian and political scientist Nikolai Kolikov called 
Warsaw agreement of Yeltsin unfortunate; reported by Polish press at the time 
399 Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order…, op.cit., p.137 
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epistemic community was the Californian think-tank RAND Corporation, which was 
asked to prepare an expert analysis on the possibilities of the NATO enlargement400. On 
the German side among the key actors were a social democrat Karsten Voigt, the then 
President of the North Atlantic Assembly, and Günther Verheugen then the expert on 
international affairs at the SPD along with Rudolf Scharping of SPD401, but the key role 
among the German representatives belonged to Volker Rühe.  
This coalition was also projected on the state level, between the U.S. and 
Germany. When the U.S. administration decided that NATO enlargement would further 
American interests, Germany was indispensable for three reasons: as the main regional 
power, as the precursor of the expansion of NATO (into the territory of the former East 
Germany) and as a broker in the relations with Russia. This was recognised perfectly well 
by Eastern European who addressed their campaign for NATO expansion mainly at the 
German government and officials. Nevertheless winning wider support for the project on 
the domestic stage, and securing the necessary ratification by the Bundestag, needed 
time. The position of the government started changing into more supportive only after the 
June 1994 meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers in Istanbul, when the Americans 
demonstrated their support for the expansion of the Alliance. 
The speech of President Clinton of October 1996 was critical for furthering the 
idea; he indicated that the new members of NATO should be admitted on the 50th 
anniversary of the Alliance402. After the December 1996 NATO Summit in Brussels it 
was decided that the invitation of the first East European states to join NATO should be 
presented at NATO Summit at Madrid in the mid-1997. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
and American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright were appointed as NATO envoys 
for finalising the negotiations with Russia. It was achieved by the end of 1997 mainly due 
                                         
400 RAND Corporation prepared six-steps plan; the basic assumption was that NATO was to be transformed from the military 
alliance into a Pact securing political stability in an expanded outside its borders territory. It prescribed maintaining the sense of 
security for Russia, but at the same time developing close cooperation with Ukraine, perceived by the think-tank as a strategic buffer 
state between Europe and Russia. See Ronald D. Asmus, Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Relations 
(Rand Notes N-3522-AF), Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation 1992; Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stepehen 
Larrabee, “NATO expansion: the next steps” , Survival 37/1 1995 
401 Tewes, Germany, Civilian…, op.cit. p. 184 
402 See both the English as German or Polish press at the time. For example Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 October 1996  
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to diplomatic skills of Chancellor Kohl who managed to maintain good relations with 
President Yeltsin403. His role was crucial for the success.  
In February 1997 the Kremlin still insisted that enlarging NATO would be the 
biggest mistake of Western leaders in fifty years404. The Helsinki summit between 
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on 21 March ended without an agreement on this matter 
but with the promise of Russia it would not block it in return for invitation to join the G7 
and a $1 billion aid package. Russia eventually agreed that Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary could be invited to join NATO, signing on 27 May 1997 in Paris the 
‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security’405. An agreement 
established that Russia should be granted an ambassador to NATO and have twice a year 
meetings with NATO’s foreign and defence Ministers. Yeltsin promised to remove all 
warheads from Russian nuclear weapons that were pointed at NATO states. In July that 
year, at the NATO summit in Madrid, NATO officials decided to offer invitation to 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join the Alliance.  
The accession protocol with three states — Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary — was signed up in December 1997 in Brussels. The German Bundestag 
ratified the protocols for accepting Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary as the NATO 
new members on 26 March 1998 with a majority of 554 votes with 37 against and 30 
abstentions406. All three countries became full members of the Alliance on 12 March 
1999, what completed the process of building the first, international security pillar of a 
new European order. 
 
SUMMARY 
German policy makers were initially divided and ambivalent about the NATO 
expansion project and the support for this initiative was their second choice. That made 
the German policy towards this project ambivalent what deepened the perception of 
ambivalence towards the EU enlargement. The hesitancy also bears a resemblance to this 
                                         
403 NATO-Gipfel in Madrid. Treffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs des Nordatlantischen Bündnisses, Bulletin NO 64, 31 
December 1997, p. 774; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 December 1997 
404 Various press at the time, e.g. see Times, 12 March 1997 
405 Ibid., e.g. see: Times, 28 May 1997 
406 See: http://www.bundestag.de/bic/a_prot/1998/index.html  
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towards the EU enlargement. The reasons for the ambivalence in the NATO expansion 
policy are also similar to those of ambivalence in the EU enlargement policy — the 
consideration of alternative, competitive directions for the foreign policy, and acting 
within limits set by the interests of other partners. It demonstrates a pattern in the German 
foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the unification. First it reflects the 
commitment to the multilateralism. On the other hand it also demonstrates the structural 
limits of the German foreign policy and of the German state’s power. 
Bundesrepublik was embedded in a network of multilateral institutions from its 
earliest days, and these were the roots of the German multilateralism. It meant choosing 
multilateral solutions over preferable national ones. Support the German government lent 
ultimately to the NATO enlargement project was a positive response to the expectations 
of the U.S. at the expense of a preferable model. It demonstrates that the multiltarealism 
practised by the semi-sovereign Federal Republic meant determining and defining 
national interests through the multilateral lens, from the multilateral perspective and in 
congruency with interests of other states. But it also reminds about the structural limits of 
manoeuvre in choices for the German foreign policy — despite regaining the full 
sovereignty Germany was still embedded in the interdependencies of supranational (e.g. 
EU) and international (e.g. NATO) institutions. Thus, even though the ideas about an 
independent from the U.S. security system were discussed, and might have been 
favoured, German policy makers did not define them as a national interest and did not 
turn any of these into a political initiative.  
Both the actions of the German policy makers and the after unification debate on 
the future foreign policy demonstrate that multilateralism based on the community of 
values and ideas was considered and decided as the best direction of the foreign policy, 
securing German interests most efficiently. In this respect the NATO expansion matched 
the inclination of the German foreign policy to value-driven multilateral solutions. This 
inclination was a decisive factor for building the permissive consensus for supporting the 
American initiative.  
As such the support German government lent this project is a crown proof for 
many scholars, that Germany chose multilateralism contrary to neorealists assumptions. 
And the assumption most often referred to in this case is the one of Kenneth Waltz, who 
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predicted that Germany’s improved security environment and its enhanced relative power 
since unification would lead it to pursuing a policy of ‘autonomy maximization’407. The 
expansion of NATO can be seen in the context of German policy as a projection of the 
intended institutions, norms, and rules that can be continued, developed, reproduced or 
transformed by states. It then represents an element that does not exist in the neorealist 
concept of structure. As such German policy towards the NATO expansion can be 
explained through the constructivist perspective.  
This points to the congruency with the EU enlargement. An argument for this 
choice is that at the international level, institutions like EEC, the Council of Europe and 
NATO used to play a key role in shaping Germany’s interests, identity and foreign 
policy, and after the unification continued doing so. This pattern of continuity according 
to the majority of scholars reflects ideational factors such as ideas, beliefs, historical 
memory, and social discourse. This claim usually is supported with an argument that 
Germany’s specific foreign policy behaviour cannot be explained with the international 
relation theories based on rational choice assumptions such as neorealism or 
neoliberalism because the cost-benefit calculation cannot be applied to the German 
choices.  
In the light of this anlaysis German choice in the case of NATO expansion was as 
much ideational as it was a political costs calculation. A notion most suitable for 
interpreting the reasons of Germany’s choice would be a Gunther Hellmann’s phrase of 
pragmatic multilateralism. Germany’s strong anti-militarism was one of the facets of the 
civilian power, the notion applied to Germany as reflecting the best the feature of its 
foreign policy. Germany could exercise this sort of power remaining in the military 
alliance led by the U.S. In the shape of the American military umbrella Germany was 
substituting what it lacked, according to the observation by Hedley Bull of the English 
School made about a lacking aspect of the European Union’s civilian power408 — self-
sufficiency in military power. In this way the civilian power of Germany was conditional 
upon the military power of the Alliance. In this context remaining in the NATO and 
working on its transformation was a choice based on pragmatic multilateralism. 
                                         
407 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”,  International Security, Vol. 18, NO 2, Fall 1993 
408 Hedley Bull, “Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?,  Journal of Common Market Studies, 21, 2, 1982, pp. 149-164 
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A positive impact of the NATO expansion and Germany’s support for this project 
was that it knocked down old, rigid barriers blocking the thinking about a new, truly post-
Cold War Europe. As the project proved to be successful despite the biggest and 
potentially most dangerous challenge, the hostility of Russia, spreading the political reach 
up to the Russia’s borders, represented already an easier task. Acceptance of the NATO 
expansion sanctioned the new concept of the European security and political order. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
Economic and Political Costs of Germany’s Unification 
As the Cause of Ambivalence  
In Germany’s Policy Towards the EU Enlargement 
1995—1998 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This chapter examines ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement 
that was caused by constraints, which occurred in the domestic area. The powerful 
external political factors that curbed Germany’s support for the enlargement during the 
first phase of the process, the French opposition to the enlargement, the Russian threat, 
the challenge of deepening the European integration, in the mid-1990s were losing their 
impetus. The enlargement idea was placed in the rationale of the German Europapolitik, 
and the process on the EU level entered the phase of preparations of terms and 
conditions. 
German policy makers, however, now faced a growing domestic discontent with 
the European integration projects. That jeopardised the needed domestic consensus on the 
enlargement. Domestic constraints were a reflection of an internal situation of the post-
unification Germany. There were two types of such constraints — economic and social. 
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Economic constraints restrained the financial capacity of the German state to participate 
and finance projects of the European integration, including the enlargement. The social 
factor — the increasing exhaustion of German society with the costs of the unification 
and resistance to the European integration — played a similarly limiting role for the 
support the idea of the EU enlargement.  
The Structured Dialogue agreed at the Essen Summit in December 1994 was 
designed as a platform for working out a timetable for the enlargement. The subsequent 
process of creating a timetable specified concrete conditions necessary to fulfil by the 
applicant countries and concessions necessary to be made by the EU member states. The 
latter, however, presented a problem of adjusting the EU redistributive policies. For 
German policy makers this challenge was tough because German society was 
increasingly exhausted with the costs of the unification. German enlargement supporters 
had to win now permissive consensus of a wider than elites public in order to lend the 
support that would allow the progress of the enlargement. A growing disparity between 
supportive stance of the German political elites and scepticism and opposition among the 
wider public contributed first to the perception of ambivalence in German stance on the 
enlargement409. Next it changed the enlargement rhetoric of the German policy makers 
from the supportive to pragmatic. 
The economic constraints are the first type of constraints that occurred on the 
domestic stage. They are explicit. The second set of constraints is connected with the 
public perception of Europeanization; these constraints are more often implicit. The 
ambivalence variable at this stage of the German enlargement policy shifted from the 
normative, ideational milieu into a material one of economic costs and benefits 
calculations that shaped interests of Germany. While the previous manifestations of 
ambivalence demonstrate the process of changing of the European integration notion and 
concept, the manifestation of the ambivalence at this stage shows how the changing 
concept shapes domestic attitudes and domestic setting for the enlargement policy. The 
changes of the domestic setting represent a set of social facts in the constructivist 
ontology. 
                                         
409 “Größer und billiger: Das geht nicht. Zur zukünftigen Finanzierung der Eruopäischen Union”, Frakfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 
April 1995 
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I. AMBIVALENCE 
The main expression of the German support for the EU enlargement project was 
since the beginnings the rhetoric of the government executives, Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
and his Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Klaus Kinkel. This supportive 
rhetoric was also reflected in the domestic elite discourse. It started declining in the mid-
1990s. While German policy makers during the first years after the unification were 
conducting their policy towards the EU enlargement responding to the external political 
challenges, in the mid-1990s they had to face domestic ones. The exhaustion of the 
German society with economic and political costs of the unification translated into a 
declining support for the EU enlargement.  
It changed gradually the rhetoric of the German enlargement policy, shifting the 
accents from the supportive reasoning to calculations of the costs of the enlargement. The 
ambivalence in the German enlargement policy manifested during the first years after the 
unification as cautiousness of the German policy makers with pressing for a faster pace of 
the enlargement process. In the mid-1990s ambivalence appeared, and started growing, in 
the rhetoric too. The costs of the German unification that turned to be much higher than 
anticipated made German policy makers aware that it would be difficult for the German 
state to finance the enlargement project and that found its reflection in the changing 
rhetoric. 
The exhaustion with the unification costs made it also difficult for the German 
society to embrace the enlargement and politicians were adjusting their rhetoric to the 
perception of the constituencies. It revealed a weakness of the German enlargement 
policy: the lack of strategy on the enlargement in relation to public opinion. German 
leaders failed to present the enlargement case in a way that would make this policy better 
understood and accepted by the German society.  
An example of ambivalence in the attitude and stance on the enlargement was an 
action of Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself. He declared during his visit to Poland in July 
1995 the year 2000 as a date of the completion of the enlargement for three countries — 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. He backtracked on his statement just days later 
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saying it was an indication that the three countries would receive by this date assurance 
of the membership, though not the full membership.  
Chancellor’s contradictory rhetoric reflected a growing at the time across the EU 
concerns with the economic and financial side of the enlargement. The European Council 
in Essen in December 1994 approved a ‘pre-accession’ strategy for Eastern Europe. The 
next step was setting a timetable. The prospect of a free access of the Eastern European 
countries to the agriculture and structural funds of the EU, that are aimed at promoting a 
development in poor regions within the EU, raised fears that the costs of opening these 
funds to Eastern European countries would exceed the EU financial capacity.  
It posed a difficulty for German policy makers to explain to the German society 
the need for the enlargement in the context of financial costs, when German society was 
burdened with the costs of the unification that exceeded financial calculations and 
impacted not only economy, but social sphere too. As Germany was traditionally 
perceived as ‘der Zahlmeister Europas’ (Europe’s paymaster), the prospective payments 
for the enlargement were expected to fall upon Germany. Apart from the financial costs, 
the enlargement was also seen as bringing to the EU a flow of cheap labour. That directly 
threatened the most troubled area in the post-unification Germany — the labour market. 
The support for the enlargement in the rhetoric of German politicians was fading. 
Simultaneously to the developments around the enlargement German society was 
increasingly tired with the European integration project. Acceptance of the Maastricht 
Treaty provisions resulted in raising the barriers for a full membership of Eastern 
European countries in the EU. A growing conviction among the EU member states 
therefore was that the full accession would be only possible after substantial institutional 
reforms of CAP and CCP. German leaders started voicing such a need more often both in 
the external and in the domestic debate. The Maastricht Treaty was also to bring a very 
unpopular in Germany European Monetary Union, with the effect of its completion 
starting on 1 January 1999. German society perceived the EMU as forced upon Germany 
as a condition of the unification. The sentiment towards losing the Deutsche Mark, a 
symbol of the power of the West Germany’s economy was strong and translated into a 
declining support for the European integration project.  
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Chancellor Helmut Kohl was consistent with his overall support for the 
enlargement; he called for starting entry negotiations with the Eastern countries, as soon 
as six months after the conclusion of the IGC. He favoured early admission of Poland the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. His encouraging statements were however completed with 
the indication that early admission should be accompanied with long transition periods 
for the full access to certain EU freedoms (like of the labour market). It was an indication 
of growing significance of the prospective economic and financial problems with the 
enlargement. At the same time the issue of the EU reform voiced by German policy 
makers attracted opposition from other member states. It caused a disparity between the 
insistence of the German government on the EU reform and Chancellor’s support for 
speeding up the pace of the enlargement; the desire for a fast completion of the 
enlargement was contradictory to the calls for the reform of the EU that did not look as 
possible to conduct fast. The German stance on the EU enlargement was in this way 
ambivalent.  
At the basis of the push for the EU reforms was the fact that German policy 
makers started losing the support of constituencies for the enlargement. The exhaustion 
of the German society was caused by the exhaustion of the German economy. Together 
with the heavily strained financial capability of the German state it created unfavourable 
atmosphere for the enlargement. Having support of constituencies neither for financing 
the Eastern enlargement nor for the changes that would disrupt the benefits of the EU 
funds, German politicians stopped advocating the enlargement. It created another 
manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement and 
subsequently changed the characteristic of this policy deepening the ambivalence.  
 
II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS 
Promised Completion Date 
The most supportive factor for the enlargement at this stage was the support of 
Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Chancellor Kohl demonstrated his commitment to 
supporting and furthering the enlargement in July 1995. During a visit to Poland he 
declared before the Polish parliament Sejm a concrete date when the three countries — 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary would receive the EU membership — the year 
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2000. The statement received attention across Europe, as no official document of the EU 
indicated any concrete date and Chancellor was the first EU leader indicating it. Although 
Germany’s Chancellor backpedalled on his promise, explaining a few days later that he 
meant only that these countries would be formally assured of the EU entry by 2000, not 
that they would become full members on this date410, but the moment Chancellor Kohl 
chose for making his statement was ripe for setting a concrete date of the enlargement. 
The promise by Chancellor Kohl of the year 2000 was consistent with the success 
of the Structured Dialogue accomplished only six months earlier. The Dialogue was an 
important step in the progress with the enlargement idea; it broke the initial impasse over 
more tangible actions. The European Council in Essen in 1994 with the Structured 
Dialogue approved a ‘pre-accession’ strategy for Eastern Europe. The strategy included 
the promise to provide prospective members by spring 1995 with a set of guidelines for 
aligning their economies and legal systems with the EU’s internal market and the promise 
of financial aid to assist Eastern European countries in making these adjustments411. It 
declined however setting a timetable for the enlargement. The promised financial aid for 
Eastern Europe and a white paper with details on the administrative and legal reforms 
necessary for the EU membership was approved by the Cannes Summit in June 1995.  
An ongoing debate over other directions of the EU development indicated, 
however, that other member states and their leaders were considering options that would 
dilute the costs of the enlargement. The Essen ‘push’ of the German government also 
provoked a reaction of France and Mediterranean member states — the French 
presidency in the first half of 1995 (following the German one) sought to ‘rebalance’ the 
EU by promoting a new aid-programmefor Northern Africa (approved as a 
Mediterranean aid package at the Cannes European Council in June 1995412).  
Therefore one can see the statement by Chancellor Kohl in July 1995 as an 
expression of his personal views on the enlargement process. One can also read this 
statement as a political move — a declaration that the German government was ready to 
                                         
410 Deutschland Nachrichten, 14 of July, 1995; The Economist, 15 of July 1995, pp. 35-36 
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support setting a timetable for the enlargement that would allow a successful completion 
of the process in 2000, thus a move aimed at encouraging the progress of the 
enlargement. One can also see his statement as a reiteration of the support in the context 
of a growing domestic discontent with the European integration. 
In 1995 German representatives started sending contradictory signals about the 
enlargement. On the one hand there was the comment made by Chancellor Kohl about 
the date of enlargement. On the other hand other German representatives were voicing a 
growing concern with the decision-making process in the EU, which was conducted 
according to the rules designed for the Community of six. The rules were in the view of 
German policy makers inadequate for the Community of 15, let’s alone for the expanded 
to twenty-something after the Eastern enlargement. At the same time a factor supportive 
for the enlargement was, however, that German representatives took up actions aimed at 
preparing the EU for the enlargement. The German government started pressing for an 
institutional reform and adjusting a qualified majority voting as a precondition for the 
enlargement413.  
An occasion for introducing these postulates was the Intergovernmental 
Conference, which was set for March 1996. The issue of budgetary reform was linked to 
the reform of existing and expensive EU policies, CAP and regional policy which both 
were consuming about 80 percent of the EU budget. None of these issues were formally a 
part of IGC while the German government saw them as closely connected. German 
policy makers proposed thus in September 1995 a 4-year reform, separate to the 
negotiations but which would address these issues. According to the proposed project, the 
reform was to be simultaneous with the upcoming IGC and would be concluded in time 
for the 1999 launching of the EMU — it would include budgetary reform and the 
restructuring of CAP and regional policy and the main goal of these reforms was to 
prepare the EU for the EMU and enlargement414. 
Before the Madrid Summit a controversy occurred about the strategy for entry 
negotiations; Chancellor Kohl announced that negotiations with Eastern countries should 
begin six months after the conclusion of the IGC to coincide with the beginning of 
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negotiations with Malta and Cyprus. Kohl also indicated that Germany favoured early 
admission of Poland the Czech Republic and Hungary with long transition periods. He 
pointed that clear signals for these countries were needed for the EU that would support 
economic reforms and preventing a political vacuum in Central Europe415. The concept of 
a limited enlargement was dictated by concerns over the financial consequences and over 
the fact the EU was not prepared institutionally for a bigger expansion.  
The December 1995 Madrid European Council marked a key step in the 
enlargement process; it offered a prospect of beginning entry negotiations with Eastern 
European countries in early 1998. It was a compromise achieved between the German 
preference for admitting only a limited group of countries in the first wave and the 
French and Scandinavian demand that all applicant countries be treated equally. The 
Council announced that the EU would establish objective criteria for membership and 
that the Commission would give its opinion on individual candidates after the conclusion 
of IGC in 1997. This opinion would be the basis for the EU member states to determine 
which countries the EU should start negotiations with. In this way the Summit that was 
attended by Eastern European leaders, was a big step towards the completion of the 
enlargement. Chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed his satisfaction declaring that the EU 
had ‘set the switches for enlargement’ (die Weichen gestellt) 416.  
But the enthusiasm of German policy makers for the enlargement was fading 
away. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel while trying to assure Eastern European 
governments in November 1996 that enlargement remained the priority for the EU 
admitted that even the earliest new entrants would not be able to join until after 2000417. 
As he put it the enlargement proved to be ‘for obvious reasons more complicated than 
previous enlargement rounds418. German representatives also started moving towards the 
French position on the entry negotiations — also in November 1996 Kinkel announced 
that he favoured the French idea of the European Conference that would be simultaneous 
to the beginning of real negotiations419.  
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German policy makers were emphasising that negotiations were only one part of 
the enlargement challenges the EU must accomplish before the admission of Eastern 
countries. First was introducing the EMU, which was the key European policy priority 
for the Kohl government. As the date of final completion of the EMU was 2002, the 
enlargement did not seem to take place before420. And the second German precondition 
was the EU institutional and policy reforms. This included a successful conclusion of the 
IGC and introduction of new majority voting and greater flexibility421 — the concept that 
would allow states to forge ahead with more integration over the objections of others, 
proposed by the French and German governments in October 1996 with the reasoning 
that it was necessary for effective decision-making in a larger EU422. 
The support for the enlargement of German leaders had also economic dimension. 
Germany was the biggest provider of the financial and economic aid for Eastern Europe. 
Overall German governments were sending to the region more bilateral financial 
resources than any other nation in absolute terms: about two-thirds of all Western aid423. 
During the first two years after the 1989 the assistance was channelled through various 
ministries and governmental institutions, developing their own policies and programmes. 
Due to increasing criticism over insufficient control over the budget from the federal 
Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof) — as presented mainly during the Bundestag debates 
— the Federal Cabinet decided in 1992 to create a system that would coordinate activities 
of the federal ministries by implementing a concept named Transform Programme (full 
name ‘Transform: advise Central and Eastern Europe for the building of democracy and 
social market economy — concept and advising programme of the federal 
government’)424. The assistance under this programme was the biggest and the longest 
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lasting aid offered to the Eastern countries by Western partners425. Between 1993 and 
2000, within the Transform Program, more than 1500 projects were implemented in 
sectors of economics, politics, agriculture, law, environment, and social policies. The 
main idea of the programmewas the same as in assistance for third-world countries: ‘help 
the countries to help themselves’ (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe) in their transformation426.  
The financial aid aimed also at helping Eastern countries to prepare for the EU 
membership. The costs of this aid, once the enlargement was completed, could also be 
reduced, as the new EU members would become beneficiaries of the EU redistribution 
system. 
 
III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE 
Assessments of the upcoming costs of the enlargement exposed that the biggest 
part would be consumed by adjusting of the Common Agriculture Policy and of subsidies 
to certain industries. Studies in the beginning of the 1990s indicated that the so-called 
then Višegrad enlargement would raise the cost of the CAP by $47 billion annually427 and 
the extension of the Structural Funds to Višegraders under the then rules would cost ECU 
26 billion428. A rough estimation was that admitting the Višegraders in 2000 would 
increase annual EU spending by 58 billion ECU i.e. by 60 % of the EU’s budget 
projected for 2000. Financing this extra cost would require a drastic cut in EU spending 
and/or an increase in incumbent contributions. Raising taxes or deficits to cover this cost, 
however, would be unpopular with the EU voters. 
                                         
425 The French programme of Francois Mitterrand MICECO created in 1991 ended in 1993 because of rivalries between national 
ministries and organizations; Britain developed a more structured programmecoordinated and implemented by the different sections of 
its Know-How Fund. The Nordic countries, especially Sweden, were also very active with the assistance to Eastern Europe. 
426 “Help for selfhelp” was the leading concept of the American Marshall plan in Europe. The idea has been included in the German 
development policy, as most of the institutions and organisations created for the implementation of the Marshall plan in Germany then 
became the leading actors of Germany”s aid for third world or development countries. Since 2000 ten East European countries which 
were to join the EU were already included in the EU financial assistance; measures for the years 2000-2006 was signed at the EU 
Berlin summit in April 1999, opening ways to a stronger integration process, especially on the agricultural (SAPARD programme) and 
environmental/structural questions (ISPA programme), but also on institution-building projects (Twinning programme). 
427 Kim Anderson and Rodney Tyers, Implications of EC expansion for European agricultural policies, trade and welfare, Discussion 
paper / Centre for Economic Policy research No. 829, 1993; Baldwin, R. (1994). Towards an Integrated Europe. London: Centre for 
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Since EU farmers and poor regions were receiving then 80% of all EU spending, 
most of the spending cuts would inevitably fall on these two groups, including German 
farmers and German new Länder. The estimation was also that if the EU average yearly 
income grows at 2% and Višegraders’ three times this pace, it would take two decades 
before they would reach the 75% of the EU average (and if twice as fast as the EU 
average — three decades). It was clear that any substantial Eastern enlargement was 
likely to bankrupt the CAP.  
For Germany, the biggest net contributor to the EU budget, the predicted costs of 
the enlargement must be seen in the context of the costs of the German unification; 
German politicians while considering the prospect of the enlargement had to take into 
account apart from the prospective financial costs, also social ones, of which the most 
dangerous would be a possible increase of unemployment at the domestic market, as a 
result of accepting cheap labour from Eastern Europe. The prospect of the free movement 
of the people within the EU guaranteed by the Schengen Agreement, in the context of the 
economic fears looked problematic.  
 
1. Financial Costs  
A political unification of Germany accepted in the Two Plus Four Treaty and 
formally introduced on 3 October 1990, was to be fully implemented with the first all-
German election, set for the early December that year. The state treaty on economic, 
monetary and social union, which entered into force on 1 July 1990, incorporated a 
largely closed, centrally planned and highly monopolised economy into an advanced and 
free-trading market economy. It happened practically overnight429. The evidence how 
inefficient and obsolete the East Germany’s economy was, came to the West as a 
shock430. The collapse of the economic system of all former socialist states only 
                                         
429 The treaty specified the adoption of West Germany”s economic constitution (the economic, social and labour legislation and 
competition laws), the adoption of a monetary system regulated by the Bundesbank and the substitution of the Deutsche Mark for the 
Ostmark. It specified also the organised break-up of state monopolies by the Treuhandanstalt (state holding trust institution established 
in March 1990) with a mandate, which gave first priority to privatisation. 
430 See for example Rudiger Dornbusch and Wolf Holger, “East German Economic Reconstruction”, in: Olivier Blanchard, Kenneth 
Froot, Jeffrey Sachs (eds), The Transition in Eastern Europe, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994; A.Ghanie Ghaussy and Wolf 
Schäfer (eds.), The Economics of German Unification, New York: Routledge, 1993 
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aggravated problems — in 1991 economic output per head in the five Eastern Länder was 
35 per cent or less of the European average431.  
Despite emerging signs of a scale of difficulties, Helmut Kohl was spreading 
optimism, assuring the West Germans that they would not feel the costs of the 
unification. He refused in 1990 to finance unification through a large redistribution on 
national income by increasing taxes; the upcoming first all-German elections planned for 
December were at stake. Helmut Kohl made the unification a vehicle for his campaign432 
painting it as not costly. In response to Oskar Lafontaine, the then Saar prime Minister in 
competition for the chancellorship, who challenged optimism of Helmut Kohl, Kohl 
claimed that after a period of adjustments, the unification would finance itself by 
generating additional tax receipts. It was partly election rhetoric, partly however a 
reflection of the optimism about the unification that was at the time still high. Helmut 
Kohl was not the only politician mistaken about estimations of the costs of the enterprise. 
Opposition politicians were predicting only slightly higher costs, like Karl Schiller of 
SPD, the former Social Democrat economics Minister, who calculated a cost of 
unification between DM80 and DM100 billion a year 433. 
The costs, however, were gradually mounting to unanticipated and enormous 
proportions. Initially reconstruction costs were predicted as insignificant: estimated for 
DM 9 billion in 1991, DM 7.9 billion in 1992, DM 10 billion in 1993 and 10.7 billion in 
1994. Kohl’s ‘domestic Marshall Plan’ (Fonds Deutsche Einheit — Germany Unity 
Fund) was planned for DM 115 billion. It turned out that the net public financial transfers 
to East Germany only in the first year, 1991, exceeded the original predictions 14 times, 
to a sum of DM 140 billion, what was an equivalent of West Germany’s 5.5 GDP434. 
Since then, according to the data published by the Bonn government in 1994, annually a 
sum around DM 150 billion was transferred in fiscal resources and subsidies. This made 
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around DM 600 billion over the first four years435 (throughout the whole decade it will be 
— as proved later — on average a transfer of 5 per cent of the cash resources from the 
West Germany to the Eastern part). These sums were spent mainly on improvement of 
infrastructure, cleaning up environmental damages but also on industrial investments. 
Apart from that additionally around DM20 billion was spent on improving the East 
German railways between 1991 and 1993 and DM 8.8 billion on improving the road 
network436.  
These costs seriously strained Germany’s financial capability: the public sector 
borrowing requirement, which in 1989 in the FGR was 1 per cent of the GDP, rose to 5 
per cent in 1994. At the end of 1994 the overall public sector debt reached nearly DM 2 
trillion, which stood for more than 60 per cent of the unified Germany’s GDP, and 
exceeded Maastricht Treaty guideline of 60 per cent in 1995 (in comparison to 46 per 
cent of the FRG in 1989)437. These strains started to be significantly felt by the German 
society.  
 
2. Economic Costs 
German society was undergoing a huge shock of transformation at an 
extraordinarily fast pace. In the simplest possible assessment the unification added to 
West Germany a structurally weak region with 16 million people. Not only did it turn out 
not to be the second largest economy in the former socialist block (contrary to the official 
statistics of the GDR), but by the mid 1991 gross domestic product in East Germany 
declined to one half of its 1989 level, while industrial output decreased by two thirds. 
This was a basic problem for the East Germans, and it was accompanied by the problems 
caused by the speed of the transition dictated by the political, not economic reasoning.  
One single factor that skyrocketed the costs was the decision of Helmut Kohl 
about 1 to 1 exchange rate for both German currencies. This decision is the reason why it 
is commonly known that the unification was driven by political imperatives. Bundesbank 
insisted on a less favourable exchange rate of 1DM to 2OM, and after Kohl’s decision 
                                         
435 Leistungbilanz der Bundesregierung für die neue Bundesländer, 1994 Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Aktuelle 
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president of Bundesbank Karl-Otto Pöhl resigned. Kohl’s move triggered a series of 
predicted by economists bad consequences, starting from the ‘demand shock’ for western 
consumers goods and investment goods the resulted soon with the rise of the inflation 
peaking at 4.5 per cent in the west in late 1992. Economists warned that to prevent 
overheating of the economy a real appreciation of the DM would have been the 
appropriate response438. However the failure to raise taxes in the West once the full 
budgetary consequences of the eastern collapse had become apparent fuelled inflationary 
excess demand. Public deficit financed by borrowings was matched for the first time 
since 1951 by the current account deficit. Consequently the economy plunged into 
recession in late 1992 causing in 1993 a decline in GDP of 1.7 per cent in West Germany 
and 1.1 per cent in German as a whole. 
In the Eastern part of Germany itself the shock therapy caused an economic 
havoc. First was the collapse of the Eastern production sector — the loss of the domestic 
and East European markets slowed down manufacturing, which by July 1993 stood for 
only 69 percent of the pre-unification level. Second came unemployment: the labour 
force shrank from 10 million to 7.3 million (in app. 16.5 million population of the GDR). 
In 1994 the unemployment rate in the former GDR was 15 per cent, but with 1.13 million 
people involved in special labour market schemes, the true unemployment was according 
to economists closer to 25 per cent.  
The aggregation of the costs of market support, of liquidity credits for the firms 
that were privatised and restructured by Treuhand, of pensions and social security, of 
regional assistance and infrastructural programmes, exceeded three times the sums 
foreseen in the unification treaty of 1990. In order to sustain such heavy subsidisation of 
the East the government cut down public spending in the West and redirected it to the 
East. The government also sought support for changes of the wage level in the Eastern 
part, but West German workers’ unions resisted it to protect their interests.  
In March 1993 the federal government reached a package agreement with the 
Länder, the SPD, union, and business associations called the Solidarity Pact. It provided 
a ground for a reform of intergovernmental revenue sharing, and a medium-term strategy 
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designed to limit the deficit439. The unions accepted the low pay deal that meant real 
income losses, and the Bundesbank eased its fiscal policy. Kohl’s government was forced 
also to break no-tax promise, given during the 1990 elections and introduced a single 
income tax surcharge of 7.5 per cent in 1991/92, with the next one planned for January 
1995.  
All the economic problems of the unification cast a deep shadow over the political 
potential in the late phase of the Helmut Kohl’s tenure. In the last twelve months of his 
Chancellorship Kohl was forced to pursue the ‘correction of budgetary imbalances’440; 
that did not leave much room for advocating the speeding up the enlargement. The more 
that economic and financial hardships were accompanied by the costs in a social sphere 
and translated into a change of political mood in the country.  
 
3. Social Costs 
The integration of the new German Länder, both into the German economy and 
into the European structures, was taking higher than expected toll. The Länder, just 
departing from the socialist economy, were plugged into the reality of EC/EU directives, 
without a transitional stage. Once the unification of Germany became a political reality, 
the Bonn government automatically reaffirmed EC membership of the GDR. And it 
chose not a gradual, but a rapid, and often instantaneous convergence to Community 
rules and norms.  
As a result, an almost immediate institutional transfer created significant social 
and economic problems for the new Länder and for the whole of Germany. Observers 
noted that out of the approximately 600 harmonization directives issued, the GDR could 
adopt only 10 percent441. While the trade rules and directives were easier to assimilate, 
the internal market policy generated disagreements during the negotiations over the terms 
of the GDR’s incorporation into the EC. The completion of the single market was due to 
take effect on 1 January1993; it caused the Commission’s concern with the problems of 
the GDR’s incorporation into the EC. In the opinion of the Commission, raising 
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protective barriers around the GDR might establish an awkward precedent that could in 
turn slow down the implementation of the SEA and the Schengen Agreement442.  
The momentum behind the internal market programmecreated opportunities for 
German officials to push through contentious domestic legislation. In 1992, the Kohl 
government sought to justify an increase in Germany’s base value-added-tax rate from 14 
to 15 percent by emphasising EC-level commitments to harmonise VAT. The PSD and 
labour unions, which bitterly contested the measure, accused the government of using an 
excuse of European commitments to achieve what it wanted on the domestic stage. The 
tax increase would generate much needed revenues that could be used to clear a portion 
of the mounting costs of the unification (as well as Germany’s financial pledges to the 
Gulf War effort). Similarly Bonn used the European commitment to liberalise the flow of 
persons, embodied in the Schengen Agreement, and to push through tighter asylum laws 
in 1993. 
Social problems with the unification were exacerbated by the emerging 
difficulties with unification of two profoundly different German societies. ‘We are one 
people’ — chanted the East Germans, demanding unification. ‘We are one people too’ — 
was the reply from their Western compatriots443. The attitude of the Wessies towards 
Ossies was illustrated by a catch phrase the ‘Wall in the head’. Only one fifth of all 
Germans, according to the opinion poll by Allensbach in 1993, admitted the sense of 
‘togetherness’; 22 per cent of West Germans and 11 per cent of East Germans termed 
themselves together as Germans; the rest said both sides had ‘conflicting interests’444.  
The financial burden of the unification was on the Western Germans. They paid 
the price for the controversial decision by Helmut Kohl on the currency exchange. Kohl 
decided to exchange a weak GDR mark at the rate 1:1 for the strong Deutschmark, 
applicable to savings and incomes like wages, salaries and pension payments, and 2 GDR 
marks for 1 DM for other purposes. The burden of the social unification, on the other 
hand, was on the Ossies. Almost all changes and adjustments were carried out in a form 
of implementation of western models. It was the Ossies who faced the important 
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challenge of coming to terms with the legacy of a communist past, a challenge shared by 
all ex-communist countries dealing with uncovering true history, ex-communist officials, 
‘apparatchics’ and all those involved in the activities of the communist parties and 
services.  
 
IV. OPTIONS 
Enlargement in terms of costs presented two major problems for German 
politicians: the necessity of sharing financial benefits with the new, poor members and 
among these benefits the most challenging for the old members was the defence of the 
CAP. It meant that the Union’s budget would have to be increased and the main burden 
of new additional costs would fall on Germany, because its position in the Union was of 
the main net payer to the common budget. The financial, economic and social costs of the 
unification reduced Germany's capability to act as Europe's paymaster. Commentators 
observed, that it would affect the ‘pace and direction of Europe's future enlargement’445. 
As noted by Sperling: ‘the costs of reconstructing eastern Germany have increasingly 
circumscribed German domestic economic policy options (…) ‘Unification has changed 
the relationship between the ends and means of German diplomacy’ as Germany had to 
abandon its ‘cheque book diplomacy’446.  
While the strained financial capability affected the attitudes towards the 
enlargement of German policy makers on the one side, the other was the increasing 
reluctance towards the enlargement of the German society. The experience of financial 
strains and growing economic hardships shaped a perception of the enlargement in 
Germany on all levels; from academic analyses to mainstream media, the enlargement 
was seen through the lens of the problems with the absorption of the post-socialist 
economy of the former GDR. It turned the initial enthusiastic support of the German 
public opinion for the enlargement into a much more reserved attitude. After unification 
50 percent of the surveyed Germans stated that a united Europe should include Soviet 
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Union and Eastern Europe447, but more specific questions received more conservative 
responses448. The experience with the costs of the unification was the first reason, but it 
also translated into an increasingly reluctant attitude of the German public opinion 
towards the European integration. Eurobarometer surveys conducted in October–
November 1997, just before the Agenda 2000 programme on accession was approved, 
indicated that 29 per cent of Germans were in favour of enlargement and 46 per cent were 
opposed (what should be however seen in the light of very similar outcomes of identical 
survey run in France). This outcome was likely to have been influenced by the belief of 
60 per cent that the enlargement would entail extra, unpredicted costs and 47 per cent 
thinking that it would cause higher unemployment in Germany449.  
These attitudes were part of a wider change affecting German society: the 
declining support for engaging into the European integration projects. The Maastricht 
Treaty provisions meant in practice an implementation of the four freedoms in economic 
relations among the EU member state — the freedom of trade in goods, services, free 
movement of capital and people across the borders of the EU. The provisions also 
introduced mutual harmonization of various market standards, norms and regulation 
among the member states and a tendency towards centralization of economic 
competences, the Common Agriculture Policy and Common Cohesion Policy. The 
provisions were planned for the internal market of the European Community and the 
EFTA enlargement of wealthy countries did not add problems. Maastricht provisions did 
not take into account the Eastern enlargement and that it would bring into the EU 
obsolete economies, which would disturb the internal balance of the EU. 
The ongoing process of German unification magnified the problems of the EU’s 
single market and regulations in the social sphere. Neither German government nor the 
labour organizations were satisfied with the consequences of the internal EU market. The 
new regulations of the competition policy, which monitors and authorises state aid to 
                                         
447 Bundesgeschäftsstelle Bündniss 90/Die Grünen, ed. Nur mit uns, Bornheim: Bundesgeschäftsstelle Bündnis 90/Die Grünen  1994, 
p. 280 
448 Der Spiegel and Financial Times survey November 1994 only 24 percent advocated widening (with the 42 per cent of the British). 
See also Christian Härpfer, “Public opinion on European Union enlargement”, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 
University of Strathclyde, 2001 
449 European Commission, 1998, Eurobarometer, Table 4.4. Figures on approval/opposition are calculated from results for ten eastern 
candidates. Hungary was most favoured (49–31 per cent), Romania least (17–58 per cent). Poland 29–50 per cent 
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industries, were a serious obstacle for German politicians in managing the economy of 
the new Germany. For example the state incentives offered on regular basis in order to 
attract investments in Eastern Länder (plagued by a high rate unemployment) were at 
odds with the internal market regulations. The second internal market principle, of 
freedom to provide services from any place to any place in the EU, limited government’s 
attempts to lower the unemployment; the principle opened free flow of contractor teams 
from  ‘low wage’ countries for limited labour contracts in ‘high wage’ countries. 
Germany was on the top of the destination list of contractor teams.  
The unions and the labor ministry represented a view that two social policy 
principles should prevail: (1) the principle of subsidiarity, according to which social 
systems should be defined mainly by the member states, and (2) the principle 
guaranteeing member states the right to promulgate standards higher than the EU norm. 
German firms and labor unions achieved in 1996 a compromise, according to which 
minimum labor offer prices were to be set in affected industries. The case with 
contractors however underlined the problem with the enlargement: the Schengen 
Agreement, that was to abolish all internal boundary control within the EU and come into 
force on 26 March 1995, would make the German labour market vulnerable to workers 
and contractors from ‘very low wage’ countries of Eastern Europe.  
At the same time Germany’s contribution to the EU budget, despite the burden of 
the unification was on the increase: between 1990 and 1996 German net payments 
increased from about 12 billion DM to 22.5 billion. It represented 0,6 per cent of German 
GDP and 60 per cent of all net payments in the EU. The increasing trend was recorded 
since 1971 when Germany contributed 2,6 billion DM and in 1995 41 billion DM; in 
relative terms German transfers to Brussels accounted for 2,8 per cent of the federal 
budget in 1971 and about 9 per cent in 1994. In the face of the upcoming EU 
enlargement, the concerns of the German politicians were obvious: as it was put by the 
then Finance Minister Theo Waigel ‘Eastern enlargement should not cost one pfennig 
more to the German tax payer’450. The call for reform of the EU budget and reduction in 
Germany's net contributions has been formulated in the coalition agreement of the Kohl’s 
                                         
450 Quoted in: Henning Tewes, “Between Deepening and Widening: Role Conflict in Germany”s Enlargement Policy”, West 
European Politics, Vol.21, 1998, p. 129 
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government in November 1994. The main battle for the finances for the enlargement will 
be fought in years 1995-1997 during the process of preparation of the Agenda 2000.  
 
V. RESULTS 
Declining Europeanization  
The economic cost of the unification significantly weakened the support of the 
Germans for European integration. The increasing exhaustion of German society with the 
rapid political and economic changes influenced their attitudes towards the 
‘Europeanization’ and European integration. The impact of the commitment to the 
Western integration was reflected in the attitude towards the Maastricht Treaty, which 
resulted in what most of the German society resented — the abandonment of the 
Deutsche Mark. The Germans did not hold a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, but 
the opponents of the Treaty brought the case before the constitutional court. The Treaty 
was ruled as compatible with the Basic Law on 12 October 1993, and the Court set down 
several conditions necessary to fulfil by the government in order to make the Treaty 
work451.  
It did not improve the perception of the single currency among the German 
society. The Germans, together with the British and Danes, showed the lowest support 
among the EC member nations to the common European currency. The net vote started in 
1990 at about plus nearly 22 per cent (10 points below the EU average), and in 1994 it 
went down to minus 20 per cent (nearly 40 points below the EU average)452. This 
reflected strong emotions stemming from the fact that Deutschmark had a very special 
meaning for the Germans. After the trauma of the Holocaust and World War II, ‘D-mark 
nationalism’ was one of a few available venues for expressing patriotism. The mighty 
                                         
451 The conditions were: • the democratic basis of the union must be developed “keeping step with the process of integration” while 
at the same time a “living democracy” must be maintained by in all the member states; • the Bundestag must retain functions and 
competencies of “substantial import”; • and the domestic legislative branch must make clear the extent to which it intended to let the 
European Union exercise sovereign rights; • the power of the Bundestag to make decisions and exert political control should under no 
conditions be depleted through any means incompatible with the principles of democracy (the Bundestag fulfilled this stipulation by 
voting to make the transition to the third stage of the monetary union dependent on a positive vote by parliament). See:  “Urteil des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts über Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen den Vertrag von Maastricht, verkündet in Karlsruhe, 12 October 
1993 (excerpts)”,  Europa-Archiv 48, NO 22, 1993 
452 European Commission 1994, Eurobarometer No 41, Brussels, p. 68. 
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mark was a symbol of post-war achievement, rebuilding, and stability. Helmut Kohl 
realised this and made his government devote considerable effort to postponing the EC 
governmental conference until the end of 1990. The conference was to discuss the single 
currency and Kohl hoped to keep the ‘currency question’ out of the election campaign.  
After signing the Maastricht Treaty, Kohl faced a formidable criticism in the 
media for surrendering the D-Mark. All the media, from tabloids to popular magazines 
like Der Spiegel, to the conservative broadsheet daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
traditionally supportive of Kohl, raised questions about the Chancellor’s ambition to trade 
the stable D-Mark for a new and untested European currency. German commentators 
were also voicing concerns about paying for other, weaker than German, economies in 
the EC that were to adopt single currency too. This was one of the Germans’ three major 
fears regarding the single market, as was indicated in a 1992 Eurobarometer survey. 
After too much immigration (44 per cent) and criminality because of insufficient border 
control (43 per cent) the concern about paying for weaker economies was the third 
indicated problem (42 per cent). In comparison, the average dissatisfaction with the 
single currency across the EC was only 20 per cent453.  
The legal actions taken up by the opposition against the Treaty forced German 
leaders to seeking justification of their policies in terms of costs and benefits and to 
devoting more attention to the domestic policy issues. The unification took its toll in 
regards to the attitudes of the Germans towards the overall European developments; a 
combination of nostalgia for the status quo, economic malaise and critique of the 
democratic deficit of the EU had a serious impact on the general attitude of the German 
society towards the European integration, either deepening or widening projects.  
The ‘public opinion’ is often defined as the aggregation of individual opinions by 
opinion surveys. Although it is a narrow definition, far too limiting possibilities to 
explore the notion of attitude, but it is a good starting point for such a discussion. The 
survey data by Eurobarometer at the time showed a remarkable gap between the 
conventional view that Germany promoted integration, and the population’s attitude, 
which was below the average of the EU members in many respects. The most often 
indicated reasons for such results were (i) fears of too much immigration, (ii) increasing 
                                         
453 European Commission 1992, Eurobarometer No 38, Brussels, A 38 –A 39 
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criminality and (iii) presumed obligation to pay for the other members454. This 
corresponded with the indication in the survey that the Germans were part of the group of 
nations, that were least interested in European politics and least informed about this 
politics; the low level of knowledge was accompanied by the low degree of identification.  
Only 37 per cent of Germans saw themselves as ‘often or sometimes Europeans’ 
and 59 per cent as ‘never Europeans’ while the average among other EU nations was at 
the time 46 to 51 per cent respectively. Asked about their future identity 41 per cent of 
Germans regarded themselves as Germans only, 43 per cent as Germans and Europeans, 
9 per cent as Europeans and Germans and 3 per cent as Europeans. The average in the EU 
was 38, 48, 7 and 4 per cent respectively. These indicators were not surprising. In 
1989/90 asked whether the German unification or the EC single market was more 
important for them 53 per cent of the West Germans chose unification, 20 the internal 
market; the same question among the businessmen – 19 per cent chose unification, 63 per 
cent the single market455.  
As for the single currency the Germans, together with the British and the Dutch 
showed the lowest support to a common European currency; the net vote started in 1990 
at about plus nearly 22 per cent (10 points below the EU average), in 1994 it went down 
to minus 20 per cent (nearly 40 points below the EU average)456.  
Enlargement was according to any survey at the time much less popular than the 
integration. The RAND Corporation examining German attitudes towards foreign and 
security policy among the 824 representatives of German elites in the years 1990-1993, 
found out two major features457. The first one was that in the mid-1990s German elites 
tended to be more domestically oriented. The second finding was that 48 per cent 
preferred deepening the EU than widening it, with only 23 per cent other way round. 
Eventually that the elites accepted nearly unanimously that the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland should be admitted to the EU, but their preferences differed — Hungary was 
                                         
454 European Commission 1993, Eurobarometer No 40, Brussels, p.68; No 41, A20 
455 Werner Weidenfeld, Karl-Rudolf Korte, (Eds), Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit. 1949-1998-1999, Frankfurt/ New York 1999, p. 
20. 
456 European Commission 1994, Eurobarometer No 41, Brussels, p. 68. 
457 Ronald D. Asmus, Germany Strategy and Public Opinion after the Wall: 1990-1993, Santa Monica: RAND Report MR-444-
FNF/OSD/A/AF, 1994 
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given the support by 74 per cent, the Czech Republic by 58 and Poland 54. 
Eurobarometer survey on the attitude towards the enlargement revealed also a difference 
between Western and Eastern part of Germany, in relation to the Eastern enlargement. 
According to its autumn 1992 survey the East Germans were more in favour of the 
integration of Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic 
and Poland than the EU average, while the West Germans were only in favour of EU 
extension with regard to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic with Hungary 
as the only country accepted nearly as favourable as in the EU average, while all other 
countries had approval way below the EU average458. 
Those preferences of the Germans changed in the next years. At any time 
throughout the second half of the 1990s the popular votes rejected the two most important 
European projects — enlargement and the EMU. There was also a sharp decline in the 
support for Germany’s own membership, which fell from the level of 83 per cent in 1991 
to 38 per cent in 1998459. In regards to the support for the enlargement — in the year 
2000 only 35 per cent of Germans supported the enlargement with 43 per cent against460. 
The irony was that these data concerned the nation regarded commonly as the most ‘pro-
European’ of all EU members. That however was also a result of the gap between the 
public and elites preferences: the record support for the EU membership among the 
German elites was recorded in 1996, when 98 respondents to a survey for the German 
research agency Infratest Burke described the EU membership as a ‘good thing’461.  
The changing attitude of the German society towards the European integration 
impacted the general elections of 1998. While the 1992-1993 economic recession and the 
then visibly much higher costs of the unification, than Kohl promised, weakened his 
position among voters, a reviving economy early in 1994 brought Helmut Kohl his fourth 
straight election victory that year. Four years later, the prospect of the upcoming 
enlargement of the EU and the prolonging and much heavier than expected costs of the 
                                         
458 European Commission 1992, Eurobarometer No 38, Brussels, A46-A47 
459 Christian Holst, “Public Attitudes and Elite Attitudes: towards a New Foreign Policy Consensus?”, in: Eberwein W.E. and Kaiser 
Karl (eds), Germany”s New Foreign Policy, Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, Palgrave 2001  
460 Commissions of the European Communities (CEC), October 2000 
461 Infratest Burke, “Meinungsbild der Elite in Deutschland zur Außen und Sicherheitspolitik”, Dokumentation 1996; see under 
http://www.infratest-dimap.de 
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unification along with the imminent and irreversible adoption of the EMU undermined 
finally Chancellor Kohl’s popularity to the extend that he lost power. The election of 27 
September 1998 brought to an end the sixteen-year chancellorship of Helmut Kohl. 
 
SUMMARY 
The support for the enlargement introduced and led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
was based on a strong normative reasoning. It turned out to be also congruent with the 
new interests of Germany in the East. This reasoning hit in the mid-1990s a powerful 
rationalist constraint: the exhaustion of the German society with financial, economic, 
social and political costs of the unification. The prospective costs of the upcoming 
enlargement made German policy makers cautious not to put forward the enlargement in 
the elections campaign; the prospective costs of the enlargement were potentially 
explosive. Avoiding it did not however save the CDU of Helmut Kohl, which lost the 
power to the coalition of the SPD and Green Party.  
The costs of the unification that caused the exhaustion of the German society 
started weighing on the domestic politics. It conflicted the public consensus on the 
enlargement. Cautiousness about the enlargement in the domestic debate and shifting 
accents from the normative values-related reasoning to the financial and economic side of 
the enlargement made the stance of German policy makers less supportive and 
increasingly more ambivalent. This development touches upon an issue of democratic 
deficit in modern democracies. The phenomenon of the differences between the goals and 
preferences of political elites and those of the wider public is present in all polities across 
Europe; it creates foreign policies that often lack popular support. A German scholar, 
Michael Zürn, calls this phenomenon ‘executive multilateralism’462 and points out that it 
is increasingly difficult for governments to maintain foreign and domestic affairs as 
separate realms and confrontation between endogenous and exogenous forces cause 
political problems to intensify.  
This logic can be applied to Germany’s European policy in the mid-1990s, 
especially in respect to the EU enlargement. Germany’s political class found itself in 
between an electorate, which was moving away from ‘pro-Europe’, and even ‘pro-EU’ 
                                         
462 Michael Zürn, “Does International Governance Meet Demand?”  IIS-Arbeitspapier NO 4-5, Universität Bremen, 1997 
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positions, and the external pressures of Eastern European countries demanding the entry 
into the EU. German elites never attempted to manage public’s frustration in this respect. 
More worrying at the time for the government was the public frustration over the 
prospect of losing the Deutsche Mark, soon to be replaced by a single European currency.  
The election campaign began just at the time of the Amsterdam Summit, during 
which German government confirmed determination in seeking solutions that would 
facilitate the enlargement. The Agenda 2000 project challenged German politicians with 
the first concrete programme of adjustment of the existing EU policies. All further 
developments in the enlargement process and in the formation of German policy towards 
this issue would be consequences of the agenda set in 1990-1997. The following epoch of 
Gerhard Schröder, in respect to the enlargement, was a time of struggling to manage the 
agenda, to find solutions to the challenges that emerged and that had been defined during 
the Helmut Kohl’s tenure and to finalise the project. Schröder conducted the enlargement 
policy however with different attitude than of the Helmut Kohl’s government and the 
roots of this change are in the depicted change of the domestic socio-economic setting in 
Germany.  
The ambivalence as a variable demonstrates at this stage a shift in the approach to 
the European integration. While elite discourse was changing the notion of the European 
integration, widening its scope, the financial and economic costs of the unification 
changed the perception of the European integration among the German society and 
subsequently among the German policy makers. The burden of the economic and 
financial costs of the unification shifted the enlargement and its perception into the 
sphere of material, economic interests. They will shape the enlargement policy in 
subsequent years. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
Costs of Enlargement As the Cause of Ambivalence  
In Germany’s Enlargement Policy Towards the EU Enlargement 
 
1994—2000 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy, which 
was caused by the costs of the enlargement. This is an economic factor and the phase of 
the enlargement this chapter depicts is different than the first one. The first phase was 
about preparation of the ground, implementing the idea into a political rationale of the 
EU members, and introducing this idea on the EU political agenda. From the mid-1990s 
it is already a phase of managing the agenda. In the years 1995-1997 the enlargement 
process entered the phase of negotiations of terms and conditions and faced other 
challenges than before.  
It indicates a different dynamics and different character of the constraints; the 
progress of the enlargement is confronted now with the prospective economic and 
financial costs. The assessment of these costs generated a need for reforming the EU 
finances. The EU members must adjust the EU policies to a new, bigger Union; the most 
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important is the financial reform and establishing a new budget that would meet the needs 
of the enlargement project. The second challenge — as it is now in the phase of 
negotiating terms and conditions it is confronted with conflicting interests mainly of 
economic but also in some cases political of specific domestic interest groups. As such 
groups are particularly strong at the German domestic stage it is the German actors who 
still would play an important role in the process of preparations of the enlargement.  
The ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement is a result of the 
support for the enlargement and insistence on the reforms, on which other member states 
did not want to agree. It is also a difference between the approach t the enlargement of 
two governments — of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who built the supportive rhetoric and 
turned into supportive actions and the government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, 
whose approach to the enlargement was through the calculation of costs and benefits.  
The mid-1990s represent a culminating moment of the German policy maker’ 
involvement in the advocacy of the enlargement. It is the time between Kohl’s 
announcement in July 1995 and the Amsterdam Summit of 1997, when the German 
government threw its power behind the enlargement idea in order to move the process 
forward. This engagement proves the seriousness of the Chancellor Kohl’s commitment 
to support enlargement and epitomises the most positive attitude towards the enlargement 
among German political elites, maintained despite strong opposite contradictions. Soon 
afterwards a new government of Gerhard Schröder declared a new attitude towards the 
European integration projects and the enlargement, emphasising first the need to secure 
Germany’s interests and reaching agreement on the EU reforms.  
The negotiations phase represents a case for the theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism. While construction and articulation of state interests is always 
possible to explain with the constructivist approach, through examining state identities 
that constitute such interests, the liberal intergovenrmentalism is better suited for 
explanation of the German policy in this phase, because it is a phase of the integration 
process of bargaining material interests. The preferences German policy makers 
presented at the negotiations at subsequent summits in the mid-1990s reflect the basic 
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claim of liberal intergovernmentalism that the preferences emerge from distributional 
conflict and the integration outcomes result form hard bargaining among states463. 
 
I. AMBIVALENCE 
Ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy at this stage manifested as a 
conflict between the support for the enlargement and defence of the economic interests of 
Germany. It intensified with the change of government in Germany, when a new team at 
power brought a new attitude towards Germany’s engagement in the European 
integration projects.  
A debate on the reforms of the EU exposed contradictory pressures German 
policy makers were under. They were coming from three directions. First, the promised 
advocacy of the enlargement collided with the challenge of reassuring Western partners 
about preserving the existing balance among the old EU member states and particularly 
delicate issue of a diminishing status of France in a wider EU. Second, the enlargement in 
the eyes of politicians from other member states was to bring benefits to Germany (for 
geographical proximity and the strong political and economic position of Germany in the 
region). To counter this anticipated advantage of Germany, other member states expected 
German government to take up the financial burden of the enlargement. That, however, 
clashed with a strong pressure from the German domestic public, exhausted with the 
costs of the unification and therefore opposing the idea of Germany financing the 
enlargement; it presented the third conflicting factor.  
The enlargement agenda at this point was expected to initiate preparations of the 
EU for the upcoming moment: the subsequent Summits in Cannes in June 1995 and in 
Madrid half a year later presented the steps the associated countries would have to take in 
order to prepare for the Single Market, and the member states to evaluate effects of the 
enlargement on the EU’s policies and to assess possibilities of opening negotiations with 
                                         
463 Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Inergovernmentalist Approach”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, NO 4, p. 476 
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candidate countries. The Amsterdam Summit of June 1997 was to bring solutions to the 
calls for institutional reform of the EU464.  
Although according to the Edinburgh decision of the European Council of 
December 1992 the institutional reform was not to be a precondition of the 
enlargement465, yet three years later the conviction among many of the EU policy makers 
was that strengthening the EU was essential if the enlargement was to be successful. 
German diplomacy was the main force insisting on reforms and the stance of Germany on 
this issue seemed unwavering.  
A so-called Maastricht II conference planned for the Amsterdam Summit was 
expected to review the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in order to strengthen the 
introduced then reforms and German representatives were expected to lead the process466. 
The Amsterdam Summit and the reform expected to be accepted then represented a 
further deepening of the European integration. German policy makers faced in this 
context a double dilemma.  
First was a concern about domestic perception of pushing by the German 
government for the further EU integration. The support of the German public opinion for 
the integration was already stretched by the unwelcome prospect of losing the Deutsche 
Mark. German leaders presented the EMU project on the domestic stage as bringing first 
political gain, which was to compensate the economic dubious from the German point of 
view benefits. Pushing for the reforms of the EU that were supposed to tighten up 
integration even further than the introduction of the EMU, was in those circumstances 
politically risky and unlikely to succeed.  
The second dilemma related directly to the enlargement. On the one hand many 
German policy makers shared the conviction about the need for reforms, but an argument 
                                         
464 One of the main arguments for reforms was that expressed explicitly by the European Commission in 1994, which argued that “it 
is clear that a Union of 20 or more cannot be run on the same lines as a Community of 12” — see: European Commission. The 
Enlargement of the European Union. Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1994, p.10 
465 Europäischer Rat in Edinburgh — Schlußfolgerungen des Vorsitzes, 11-12. Dezember 1992, Bulletin der Bundesregierung NO 
73, Dezember 1992  
466 See for example Alfred Apholte, Herausforderung EU-Erweiterung: Wachstumschancen nutzen — Reformen vorantreiben, 
Frankfurt am Ma Dresden Bank AG, Corporate Center Volkswirtschaft, 2001; Rolf Caesar, EU-Osterweiterung und Finanzmarkte: 
gemeinsame Tagung des Zentrums für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung und des Arbeitkreises Europaische Integration. Zentrum fur 
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verl.-Ges, 2001; David D. Dickinson, and A. W Mullineaux, Financial and 
monetary integration in the new Europe: convergence between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe. Edward Elgar, 2001 
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that introducing reforms would take a long time, while the enlargement should not wait, 
was also persuasive. In the run-up to the Amsterdam Summit German politicians were 
weighing both options.  
The proposals they presented at the Amsterdam Summit were surprisingly modest 
in comparison to the ambitions and insistence on a proper reform of the Union. And to 
the surprise of other member states German representatives did not insist on reforms, 
pushing instead for the enlargement agenda. In this way they played a crucial role in 
saving the Amsterdam Summit from the impasse and failure. First, they worked out a 
compromise between the member states on the new parity votes. Second, they did not 
agree on the French proposal on the reforms of the EU. Both actions allowed avoiding a 
stalemate with the enlargement process. It was a culminating point of the support for the 
enlargement initiated and introduced into the rationale of the German Europapolitik by 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl.  
Germany chose to facilitate the enlargement without insisting on immediate 
solving of the EU reforms issue, thus without securing at the time its own economic 
interests. It demonstrated the support for the enlargement but left the issue of the EU 
reform unsolved. A conflict between determination to reduce budget contributions, the 
declared German interest in the enlargement, which according to most of the predictions 
then was not possible without CAP reform, and the upcoming federal elections created an 
impossible situation for the German government. To put it in game-analysis terms — the 
combination implied that Germany’s win-set in the Agenda 2000 negotiations on CAP 
reform was strongly limited.  
For these reasons the Agenda 2000 programme, which was conceived at the 
Madrid Summit as a roadmap for further proceeding with the enlargement, did not solve 
the problem either; the package of legislation covering the reform of the agriculture and 
regional policies along with the pre-accession instruments and a new financial framework 
did not fulfil expectations of either of sides. The issues of the CAP, regional subsidies 
and the German net-contribution to the EU budget were to be discussed.  
The change of the socio-political domestic setting in Germany brought to power a 
new, social-democratic team of Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer. The change 
coincided with relocation of Germany’s capitol and starting a new epoch of the ‘Berlin 
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Republic’. A new spirit of this time was expressed in a different perception of the past 
and a different, more assertive attitude towards the foreign policy, including the 
enlargement. The victorious SPD party during the election campaign pictured the 
enlargement as a questionable move of the EU.  This induced quickly a perception that 
the government of Gerhard Schröder would be much more reluctant towards completing 
the enlargement than the governments of Chancellor Kohl. In fact the attitude of the new 
Chancellor towards the enlargement was supportive, however, it was a ‘conditional 
support’. The main goal of a new European policy of Chancellor Schröder’s government, 
were deep reforms of the EU, and as it was announced — the enlargement depended on 
the success of these reforms. 
The declaration of the assertive pursuing national interests on the one hand and of 
the continuity of the previous premises of the foreign policy sent a mixed message as 
both options were in conflict with each other. It created ambivalence in the government 
stance on the European policy and towards the enlargement too. 
 
II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS 
A ‘managing agenda’ phase in the enlargement process and Germany’s policy 
towards the enlargement starts with a decision of the European Council at the Madrid 
Summit in December 1995, which sets a date for opening accession negotiations. The 
second milestone is the Amsterdam Treaty of June 1997; the provisions of the Treaty 
determine a task of setting a timetable for accession. The timetable comes just one month 
later in the shape of the Agenda 2000. Both these achievements were possible to a high 
degree thanks to the support and concrete actions of German policy makers. It was a 
culminating moment of their involvement in promoting the enlargement. After these two 
decisions the enlargement process is already in motion and the battle for turning the idea 
into political outcomes after the year 1997 is over. The time now is of implementation of 
the chosen means for achieving the goal and this is the time already of the SPD/Green 
coalition.  
Two turning points impacted the enlargement dynamics in the mid-1990s: a 
decision on NATO expansion and a date 2000, which was stated by Chancellor Kohl as a 
date of the enlargement completion.   
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The year 2000 was already referred to hypothetically in the elite debates and 
expert comments in the mid-1990s, but only when German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
mentioned it, it gained political meaning. Kohl mentioned the date, in his Warsaw speech 
of July 1995, as a merely prospective date, explaining soon after his intentions, and the 
date was never confirmed officially or even discussed on the level of the EU 
Commission. But it had a powerful impact on the enlargement dynamics, along with the 
decision on NATO expansion; both furthered thinking about the EU enlargement in more 
concrete terms.  
An exemplification of this impact was a change in the rhetoric of the Foreign 
Minister Klaus Kinkel, who initially issued very cautious statements, and as soon as the 
decision about enlarging NATO was made, he called for a rapid widening of the EU467. 
The governing CDU stated also in spring 1995 that negotiations about the membership 
with Višegrad states should start immediately after the governments’ conference of 
1996468. ‘The widening will make us a European inland state (…) we remain of the West 
and our Eastern neighbours also want to be a part of the West’ — was the main thought 
of the CDU’s reasoning. Wolfgang Schäuble also embraced advocacy of the early 
enlargement stating in the Bundestag that the date 2000 gave the candidate countries a 
perspective and that the economic adjustment periods should not be longer than in the 
case of Portugal and Spain469. He stressed that the enlargement should happen before the 
EU reform, since, as he explained, Eastern countries needed a certain perspective and the 
enlargement on the other hand would enforce and speed up the reforms.  
The statements of Kinkel and Schäuble signalled a position of Germany on the 
EU-reforms-EU-enlargement nexus. This position became a source of frictions with 
France; although German policy makers held the EU reforms as necessary, they decided 
not to tie them to the enlargement as a condition. In Amsterdam they chose widening 
over the deepening of the European integration, the interests that were based on the 
normative reasoning, not on the benefits and costs calculation. 
 
                                         
467 “Rede des AußenMinisters Klaus Kinkel vor der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik”,  Europa-Archiv 41, 2 1994  
468 Rudolf Seiters: Deutsche Überlegungen zur Regierungkonferenz 1996” CDU/CSU Pressedienst, 2 March 1995 
469 “Die D-Mark ist nicht alles”, Der Spiegel, 27 March 1995 
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1. Amsterdam Summit: Enlargement First 
An upcoming Intergovernmental Conference that led the Amsterdam Summit in 
June 1997 was the third turning point in the enlargement dynamics. The Conference was 
supposed to tackle issues of the EU reforms, which German policy maker held as 
necessary to introduce in order to facilitate the enlargement. A goal for the Maastricht 
Summit was to complete the project of the economic integration with political adequate 
arrangements for tightening the Union; the Maastricht II was supposed to be a 
reinforcement of the Maastricht union. It was to address the remaining disagreements on 
reforming the EU and its institutions. German policy makers had concrete and detailed 
proposals. 
A constellation of Germany’s preferences was complex and contained a seed of 
conflict. On the one hand there was a strong, grounded in a normative narrative of the 
German identity, preference to support the enlargement. On the other hand a changing 
domestic economic and social setting, due to exhaustion of the society with the costs on 
the unification, created new preferences, based on calculation of costs and benefits that 
favoured the enlargement conditionally.   
In 1995 Minister Kinkel formulated a set of goals expressing that politicians 
should subordinate the reform of the EU to ‘proximity to the people, competitiveness, 
domestic security, qualified majority of voting in foreign policy matters and institutional 
reform’470. A German proposal focused on pragmatic deepening in the form of 
‘communitising’ further in the foreign policy and domestic security matters. This 
included qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, the progress on 
developing Europol and the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement into the EU 
policy-making framework. The aim of tightening political union was not mentioned: 
there was a major reason for such a stance of the German government. 
Amid discussions about preparations for the enlargement the most problematic 
issue turned to be a distributive side of the project. German policy makers faced a 
growing domestic pressure to cut the costs of financing the EU projects, a demand caused 
by the exhaustion of the German society with the economic burden of the unification. 
Other member states, however, saw the enlargement as the most congruent with the 
                                         
470 Klaus Kinkel, “Die Europäische Union vor der Runderneuerung”, Pressreferat Auswärtiges Amt, 21 February 1995  
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interest of Germany. An expectation was then that the German government should take 
up the main burden of the enlargement costs. German policy makers chose in the run-up 
to the Amsterdam Summit a tactic of portraying the enlargement as a tremendous 
opportunity for the entire EU. With emphasis on the fact that costs and benefits are 
unquantifiable for the time being471.  
The enlargement costs, however, were not the only issue German representatives 
considered before the Amsterdam Summit. The whole plan of an big institutional reform 
presented a danger of further consuming political energy and economic resources, while 
if the Eastern enlargement was to be completed, the EU should be a strong anchor for the 
process. This was the reasoning why the EFTA enlargement was welcomed by German 
policy makers472, although not by the French ones: while the Germans perceived it as a 
factor strengthening and stabilising the EU, the French policy makers saw it as a 
dangerous prospect of changing the established balance in favour of northern countries. 
The EFTA countries first of all presented a higher per capita GDP than the EU average 
and were already linked to the EU institutionally through the Free Trade Agreement. The 
Eastern countries were incomparably poorer, and much more inconsistent as a group for 
their various domestic political and economic systems and the Eastern enlargement 
presented incomparably different challenge. Yet the EFTA factor was supposed to be 
helpful.  
For the project of the Eastern enlargement it was important that thanks to the 
EFTA enlargement the EU had on the board member states like Austria, Sweden, 
Finland. Because of their geographic position, they were potentially more interested in 
spreading the EU framework eastwards than the southwest countries like Spain, Portugal, 
France and Ireland. For Germany it brought potential allies in the campaigning for the 
enlargement and more wealthy states that could share the financial burden. An underlying 
goal was: the more stabile environment within the EU, the smoother, more successful and 
quicker Eastern enlargement.  
                                         
471 Ibid. 
472 As it was put by Helmut Kohl: “There were voices abroad pointing that the Germans looked after these accessions with particular 
intensity. I think it corresponds with our common policy that we want the enlargement of the Union. So far it is correct that the 
Foreign Minister, on the instruction of the federal government and mine, has committed himself to it”,  Helmut Kohl, Bundestag 
declaration “Aktuelle Fragen der Europapolitik”, Bulletin der Bundesregierung NO 51, 31 May 1997, p. 477 
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That was another reason why German policy makers did not want to make the EU 
reform a condition for the enlargement. It caused a friction with France. German 
politicians rejected the French proposal to tighten integration because in the view of 
German politicians it presented a risk of postponing the enlargement473. The French 
proposal, in the opinion of the German representatives, would delay the preparations. 
This was the first major clash in Amsterdam, at which German politicians proved their 
commitment to the facilitating enlargement.  
The second point of friction at the Amsterdam Summit was even tougher, yet 
German representatives demonstrated their support for the enlargement and the strength 
of their position in the EU. The issue of the EU reform brought a question about the 
parity votes in the Council of Ministers after the EFTA enlargement. It caused a bitter 
dispute between the member-states and the ferocity of the argument indicated that the 
Summit would end up in a failure. It did not only due to determination of the German 
officials.  
A role of the agreement maker in this bargaining belonged to Minister Klaus 
Kinkel. His persistence to continue negotiations against a possibility that the talks would 
break, was supported actively by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who kept calling the leaders 
of the member states in order to make them understand that the position of the German 
government was unbreakable. ‘This was the clearest sign throughout the entire 1990. that 
when it came to the enlargement, Germany diplomacy was prepared to put its neck on the 
block’ — wrote Henning Tewes474. A compromise, called from that point the Ioannina 
Compromise established that a decision blocked by 23 votes would have to be referred 
back to the Council for consultation. 
The Amsterdam Summit contrary to the expectations postponed vital decisions on 
the EU reforms. The plan for the institutional reform of the EU was a problematic point 
in relations between Germany and France. German commitment to a federal Europe 
reflected understanding on the German side that pressing for national interests explicitly 
was unacceptable in Europe, whereas working indirectly through integrated institutions 
                                         
473 The declaration stated that “the Amsterdam treaty did not respond to the necessity for substantial progress on the way to 
strengthening institutions”. The clash between the German and French representatives stemmed from the different concepts of 
deepening on both sides. The most common denominator was that both were about deepening and very loosely defined. 
474 Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power …, op.cit. p. 124 
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would allow German influence to be exerted more effectively. The French understood 
this too and therefore resisted German plans for the institutional reform of the EU. 
 Yet the Summit opened the way to the enlargement and for this reason it was 
presented as a success475. The European Council in Amsterdam called for accession 
negotiations to start with a group of six states — Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia — and the negotiations on the EU acquis were launched 
in March 1998. The EU acquis was divided into 31 chapters and the Council adopted a 
common negotiating position on each chapter, which then was put forth to each 
individual candidate country during bilateral inter-governmental conferences. For the 
enlargement this project was a big step forward. But in respect to the awaited decisions 
on the EU reforms, the Amsterdam Summit was perceived as a failure.  
As Klaus Kinkel explained shortly before signing the Treaty of Amsterdam, it 
represented a ‘considerable progress in revamping the EU to make it more efficient and 
to prepare for the inclusion of new member state’476. It did not, however, resolve all the 
issues German policy makers considered central to the success of the EU expansion. 
Chief among those issues, as Kinkel listed, was the assignment of financial 
responsibilities among the member states. Germany, which was paying in considerably 
more to the EU than receiving back from various EU programs, was determined to see a 
‘more just division of the fiscal burden’ — as Kinkel put it to the reporters in Bonn after 
the cabinet reviewed the Amsterdam Treaty477. He pointed that further negotiations 
would be necessary to work out the details of institutional reform left open by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The treaty limited the size of the EU Commission to twenty 
commissioners, but did not specify how commissioners would be chosen once the EU 
expands to more than twenty member states. ‘We still have a little bit of institutional 
touch-up work to do, particularly on the size of the Commission and the weighting of 
member states’ votes’ — explained Kinkel. He added that he had never expected a super-
                                         
475 Presidency Conclusions, Amsterdam European Council, 16-17 June 1997; Gipfeltreffen in Amsterdam, Keesing Archiv der 
Gegenwart, 17 June 1997, 42116—42117 
476  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 June 1997 
477  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 June 1997 
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outcome from Amsterdam. ‘What we have here is fifteen countries settling on the least 
common denominator’ — he commented478. 
From the liberal intergovernmenatlism perspective, German policy makers had 
conflicting with each other sets of state preferences, because these preferences derived 
from different ontologically categories and premises. The preferences the government of 
Chancellor Kohl chose on the external board, at the Amsterdam Summit, were these 
shaped by normative factors; the preferences that were based on costs and benefits 
calculation were put aside.  
 
2. Setting Accession Criteria 
Apart from the EU reform issues left after the Amsterdam Summit, there was also 
a vital concern untouched at all: the membership criteria for the candidate states. It 
followed the question about the number of the countries that should be included in the 
Eastern enlargement. The number many politicians were talking about at the time, was 
between 3 to 5 or 7 the most, within so-called ‘small enlargement’. Germany’s priority 
was Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia; all four countries were the 
closest geographically to the EU and Germany, and apart from Slovakia they were the 
most advanced in their transformation process. At the Madrid Summit Helmut Kohl 
advocated for three countries — Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic479.  
However a high economic growth of other Eastern countries like Estonia and 
Slovenia left the EU not much space for pushing for the concept of the small 
enlargement; they proved to be much more advanced in their reforms than for example 
Slovakia. Kohl’s personal interest in the matter of which countries were to be admitted in 
the first round was seen by Germany’s partners as pursuing the enlargement at the 
expense of the issues other member states were concerned with: the future ‘fit’ between 
the old and new members and whether the non-community countries would be able to 
catch up with the Maastricht criteria given the huge economic disparities between the EU 
and the candidate countries. German Chancellor meanwhile was stressing that the 
                                         
478 Ibid. 
479 Financial Times, 15 December 1995 and 18 December 1995  
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provisions of Maastricht Treaty could not bring the effect of ‘magnetism for Eastern 
countries’480 and they needed a firm prospect of admission.  
The future ‘fit’ between the old and new members rested on economic adaptation; 
the EC/EU organization was predominantly in the economic area, with the Single Market 
and the planned single currency. The main concern therefore was criteria of economic 
integration, as the most difficult segment. On the other hand the scope of the membership 
criteria established in Copenhagen was extraordinarily wide and not entirely economic — 
in a broad sense they determined that candidate countries not only would have to fulfil 
the acquis but also to contribute to the advancement of the integration process.  
Candidate countries pressed for more precise conditions fearing that the 
Copenhagen criteria might occur too flexible for negative selection and for setting a 
deadline for the enlargement. The Commission presented a White Book on the steps the 
associated countries would have to undertake in order to prepare for the Single Market at 
the Cannes Summit in June 1995. It opened the way for Eastern countries to prepare for 
accession. Nonetheless for further proceeding the enlargement needed a road map. It was 
against the tactic of Helmut Kohl’s government, which did not want to go into deep 
details on the economic issues fearing the opposition to enlargement from other member 
states if a debate on a reform of agriculture and Community finance was unleashed. 
Again, as it was put by Sedelmeier and Wallace, the German government ‘lobbied 
discreetly, but actively, among its partners for some key decisions to be taken at Madrid, 
after a strategic review of policy an Enlargement Task Force, established in the Foreign 
Office in 1994 had advocated moves from a ‘pre-accession’ to an accession strategy’481. 
Other member states however asked the Commission for a specification of the 
proposal on the reform in three main fields: finance, agriculture and the structural funds. 
It came one month after signing the Amsterdam Treaty, in a form of a document ‘Agenda 
2000’. The proposals of Agenda 2000 will be main factors shaping the attitudes towards 
the enlargement after the year 1997. 
 
                                         
480 The phrase was a variation on the theory of Konrad Adenauer about magnetic effect of the integrating group of countries on other; 
Tewes, Germany, Civilian…, op.cit., p.109 
481 Sedelmeier, Wallace, Eastern enlargement… op.cit., p.444 
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3. Agenda 2000  
Agenda 2000 set a course of the enlargement process for the next years, providing 
a framework for negotiations of entry terms and conditions. It brought to the enlargement 
project a spell of intrinsic to the internal dynamics of the European Union negotiations 
about net payments, dairy products, beef and veal, and net gains from the budget, the 
issues, which some argue the European Union is in fact all about.  
German representatives had certain preferences in each of these areas and none of 
the Agenda 2000 proposals was satisfactory for German politicians. It became a reason 
for the opposition from the affected interests groups on the domestic stage of Germany 
for the years to come. 
Agenda 2000 was also a first step in solving the financial issues connected with 
the enlargement. It was designed to show what changes were needed if the enlargement 
was to be ‘affordable’ in the context of the 2000-2006 Financial Framework. Two main 
issues were brought with the Agenda 2000 to the debate: the adjustments of CAP and of 
the Structural Policy. Both were the most important sectoral policies of the EU, absorbing 
together almost 85% of the total EU budget. Moreover, both were expected to play a 
decisive role in strengthening economic and social cohesion, which was set as one of the 
three priority objectives under the Amsterdam Treaty (along with the two established 
previously — of the Single Market and the EMU). In the run-up to the Agenda there were 
three competing issues pressing on the budgetary reform: 
1. Maintaining budget discipline — the main net contributors were concerned 
whether the budget would remain within the then brackets, as a percentage of EU GNP; 
they were also concerned about reducing their contributions or at least not increasing 
them, like with the UK which was concerned about its rebate. 
2. Reassuring the then beneficiaries that they would not be deprived of their aid; 
net recipients of the structural and cohesion funds were led by Spain and farmers across 
the EU. 
3. Ensuring that the applicant countries would not become after joining the EU the 
second class members excluded from the central EU’s policies 
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The system of financing the budget was to be maintained through the period 
2000-2006482. The Commission under the pressure from the largest net contributors 
prepared also a document on the Union's finances, which proposed three routes for 
changing the income and expenditure patterns of the EU: 
• on the financing side a simplification of the financing structure in favour 
of a system more based on GNP 
• on the expenditure side — the introduction of a system of partial 
reimbursement of CAP 
• on the balances — the application of a general correction mechanism to 
all member state experiencing large imbalances 
Negotiations about adjusting the programmelasted over the next two years. 
Similarly like with the negotiations at Amsterdam Summit the enlargement was not the 
subject of these negotiations, only the context. Therefore the opposite stance of Germany 
to some aspects of the Agenda 2000 turned out to be serious constraints working against 
the enlargement and creating ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement.  
 
III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE 
1. EU Budget 
The constraints to the enlargement in this phase shifted the creation of national 
preferences in Germany from the ideational, values-driven narrative to the material 
interests calculation. As the EU reforms advocated by Germany were not tackled at the 
Intergovernmental Conference, the problem remained to solve.   
First concern of German policy makers was to cut down Germany’s net 
contributions. A position of Germany as the EU biggest net payer was a subject of 
domestic debates in Germany on the European policy already in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The chief argument used by the governments, which defended high contribution, used to 
be that net benefits from the EU in terms of secure access to the market and economic 
stability it provided, exceeded the value of net payments. In the 1990s however the 
                                         
482 See for example: “Sein Oder Nicht Sein”, Der Spiegel, 18 May 1998; “Auditors Challenge Budget Rebate Call”, European Voice, 
11-17 June, 1998; “Bundesregierung: Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 December 1998; 
“EU North and South Split on Spending Freeze”, Financial Times, 7 December 1998 
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increasingly strained public finances began to dictate a closer scrutiny of the German 
financial contribution and the project of the enlargement revived the debate.  
A call for the reform of the EU budget and reduction of Germany's net 
contributions was formulated in a coalition agreement of the CDU/CSU-FDP government 
in November 1994. The debate at the time was focused on a dramatic increase of the 
country's contribution — from about 12 billion DM in 1990 to 22.5 billion in 1996 (what 
was equal 0,6 per cent of German GDP then and 60 per cent of all net payments in the 
EU). It constituted around 30 percent of the EU budget but only a small amount flew 
back in the shape of subsidies: in 1995 Germany’s contribution per capita was eight times 
higher than of France483. A question for German policy makers was of how to find a 
fairer way to calculate the payments; their view was to that it should reflect a proportion 
between net contributions and income per head.  
In summer and autumn of 1997 two ministries, the Foreign and Finance led by 
Klaus Kinkel and Theo Waigel started a campaign aimed at the reform of the EU 
contributions system. The basic idea was to introduce into the EU budget a so-called cap 
net contributions model and a fixed ceiling of acceptable burden, established in relation 
to the national GDP of the member state. An underpinning rule was that all net 
contributions exceeding 0.3 or 0.4 per cent of the GDP should be returned to the member 
states. As Agenda 2000 did not include such propositions, Theo Waigel along with his 
opposite numbers from the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria, wrote a letter in October 
1998 to the then president of the Commission Jacques Santer asking the Commission to 
present its policy towards the EU budget. Klaus Kinkel also made it a goal to find a just 
method of burden sharing. 
These attempts were backed by the German Länder. At a meeting in Bonn in June 
1998 the prime Ministers of the Länder stressed the need to reform the EU budget and to 
find a more equitable model484. The Bundesrat stated already in 1995 in its decision on 
the EU budget package that  ‘in view of Germany's disproportional burden compared to 
the other member states the Bundesrat considers a fundamental reorganization of 
                                         
483 “Größer und billiger: Das geht nicht. Zur zukünftigen Finanzierung der Europäischen Union”, Frankfurter Allgemenine Zeitung, 
28 April 1995, “Milliarden für Europa”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 27 November 1996 
484 Conference of the Prime Ministers of the Länder (MPK), 8 June 1998, Bonn.  
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Community finances for the period after 1999 as absolutely necessary’485. It was 
followed by the report of the Länder finance Ministers in September 1995 demanding the 
negotiations for the budget beginning in 1996.  
The finance Ministers of the German Länder presented calculation that the 
Federal Republic had overpaid by DM 12.7 billion in the first half of the 1990s486. The 
demand to renegotiate the EU budget was repeated by the conference of the Länder in 
June 1997 in Bad Homburg. The representatives of the Länder declared that neither 
German contributions to the EU budget nor budget rebates were justified. The Bavarian 
government was especially vocal calling a Commission’s proposal an affront to the 
federal government and to the German Länder487. On the other hand the Länder Ministers 
responsible for the European affairs stressed during their Bonn conference in September 
1997 that it was mainly CAP and the low returns in agriculture that were responsible for 
the high German contributions488.  
The debate about the net payments that was reflected in the German media 
divided public opinion: some commentators held that Germany, the main exporting 
country in the EU, benefited from being the member of the EU, especially from the 
liberalised internal market of the Union. For the German Länder it was not so obvious 
‘while in the Community every sixth job is dependent on the single market, in Germany it 
is only every eighth’ — argued representatives of Länder489. The Commission's proposal 
to keep the 1.27 per cent limit was generally accepted by all German participants but in 
early 1999 Germany backed up a British proposal for a budgetary stabilization. 
Eventually the Commission’s proposal to preserve the then budgetary system in terms of 
contributions for period 2000-2006, which was included in the Agenda 2000, was 
rejected both by the Länder as well as the federal governments.  
 
                                         
485 Bundesratbeschluss zum Eigenmittelsystem vom 12.Mai 1995, Bundesratdrucksache 207/95 (Beschluss) 
486 At the annual meeting of the finance Ministers of the German Länder, reported  “Größere Ausgewogenheit angestrebt”, 
Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 22 July 1997 
487 Memorandum of the Bavarian government on the proposals of the European Commission in Agenda 2000, 16 September 1997, 
available through the Bavarian Government”s Press Office 
488 Conference of European Ministers, 24 September 1997, Bonn. 
489 Memorandum of the Bavarian government on the proposals of the European Commission in Agenda 2000, 16 September 1997, 
available through the Bavarian Government”s Press Office 
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2. CAP 
The most problematic issue in the EU budget was CAP. Farm subsidies under this 
programmeaccounted for nearly half of the total EU budget490. Critics of CAP always 
pointed that liberalisation of agriculture policy would lead to massive savings, but 
powerful farm lobbies, especially in France and Germany effectively opposed these 
views. In 1998 German farmers represented only a small share of 2.8 per cent of the 
employed civilian working population491. This lobby had a strong support of the 
CDU/CSU for which farmers used to be an important constituency492. The issue of 
reforming CAP became one of the primary factors shaping negative attitudes towards the 
enlargement and the negotiations over the CAP were the reason for delays of the date of 
enlargement. 
The main German actors engaged in the CAP negotiations were three ministries, 
the Economics, the Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and the Länder. Ever since 
the first negotiations on the European agricultural policy in the late 1950s, German policy 
towards this issue was characterised by a conflict of opinion between all three ministries. 
German agricultural policy was divided between ‘a liberal free trade position and that of 
preserving the economic interests of its farmers’493. In other words the Ministry of 
Agriculture successfully resisted pressure from the Ministries of Economics and Finance 
for a more market-oriented and free trade position. The proposals on the CAP reform in 
the Agenda 2000 did not bring a change and resulted like the previous attempts of a 
significant reform494. A reaction of the German Minister of Agriculture Jochen Borchert 
to the Agenda 2000 proposals, which were presented at the Agriculture Council on 22-23 
                                         
490 In 1995 farm subsidies represented 48.9 percent of the total EU budget; see: John Keeler, “Agricultural Power in the European 
Community– Explaining the Fate of CAP and GATT Negotiations”, Comparative Politics, 28:2, January, 1996 
491 European Commission (2000), Table 2.0.1.2. 
492 It has been identified that farmers used to deliver nearly 80% of their votes to the CDU/CSU, and they have been a substantial 
force within the parliamentary delegation of the Christian Democrats. See: John Keeler, “Agricultural … op.cit 
493 Quoted by Neil Nugent, “The Government and Politics of the European Union, Fourth Edition, Duke University Press, Durham. 
1999), ch.15, See also: John Peterson and Elisabeth Bomberg, Decision-Making in the European Union, Macmillan, London 1999, 
ch.5; for earlier studies: S. Tangermann, Reforming the CAP: A Prerequisite for Eastern Enlargement,  H. Siebert (ed.), Quo Vadis 
Europe?, Tübingen: Mohr, 1997, pp. 151-79 
494 European Commission, 1998, Agenda 2000, http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm#3 
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July 1997 (shortly after announcement of the Agenda), was not surprising. He said he 
could see only ‘very few positive things’ about the Commission’s proposals495.  
German representation led an attack on the reform proposals included in the 
Agenda 2000, already at the first formal discussion at the Agriculture Council, which 
took place in September 1997 in Luxembourg. German representatives strongly opposed 
a proposed shift from price support to direct payments, advocating maintenance of quotas 
as an instrument for containing production496. They also expressed a fierce criticism of 
the removal of subsidies, which was against Germany interests (for silage maise), and 
agreed on a reduction of intervention prices (beef production), on the condition, however, 
the farmers would be fully compensated497. Finally, German agricultural officials also 
rejected a proposal of integration of structural funds into the CAP498; the Agriculture 
Minister Jochen Borchert argued that such changes would blur a division between funds 
supporting the market and those providing assistance for under-developed areas’. 
Germany advocated instead a separate policy for rural areas499. These points became a 
subject of conflict between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministries of Economics 
                                         
495 According to the data of 1996 on basis of which the Agenda proposals were prepared, the most pressing problems to tackle by the 
EU were considered to be as follows:: • the relatively large size of agricultural land (estimates based on the assumption the 
enlargement will include 10 Eastern countries, the total agricultural area would increase by 40% after the accession); • the relatively 
high importance of agriculture to the economies of the accession countries (contributing 7.0% in GDP versus 1.7% in the EU-15); • 
the high agricultural employment which would make the absolute number of farmers more than double (22% of total employment in 
Eastern countries versus 5.1% in EU-15); • the low GDP in Eastern countries and the much lower labour productivity in their 
agriculture in comparison with the EU; • the relatively low administrative capability of the applicants to adMinister the acquis, but; • 
the great potential in production capacities (all Eastern countries had undergone a considerable decline in agricultural yields due to 
various factors like depressed producer prices and backward technologies prior to the transition, the market liberalisation of the 
transition process; all those factors were expected to be remedied and in effect the production might increase considerably, even in 
medium term) though much lower when compared with EU, the productivity of agricultural labour (GDP per labour unit) in most of 
the Eastern countries was relatively higher when it was compared with the other sectors of their economies; this indicated the Eastern 
agriculture could be able to export their products. See: European Commission, 1998, Agenda 2000, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm#3 
496 Ibid. 
497 One of the few Commission”s proposals the German Minister of Agriculture endorsed was the suggestion of national envelopes 
for the beef sector as proposed in the regulation proposals in March 1998. Rzeczpospolita, 22 March 1998 
498 European Commission, 1998b, Agenda 2000, section on Structural Funds 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60013.htm 
499 Ibid. 
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and Finance500. The traditional arguments of the Economics and Finance Ministries were 
now strengthened by determination to reduce the Germany’s net payment.  
A tough stance on the financing of the EU budget was impossible for German 
politicians to soften; they faced upcoming national elections. The German payments to 
the EU generally, and payments for Eastern enlargement particularly, were the first points 
listed in surveys by all these who opposed the enlargement501. In this way Germany faced 
a dilemma between pursuing a restrictive policy for the EU budget on the one hand and 
opposing reforms of the CAP, aimed at eventual reducing agricultural expenditure of the 
EU on the other. Germany’s support for the enlargement of the EU complicated the 
choice.  
German politicians did not want to agree on far-reaching CAP reform, while most 
agricultural economists supported the Commission’s view that enlarging the EU to the 
East was incompatible with leaving the CAP unchanged502. Among them prominent 
German economists from the Scientific Advisory Group to the Ministry of Agriculture 
argued that far-reaching reform, in particular price cuts, were necessary in order to 
prepare the CAP for the enlargement but equally necessary were a gradual phasing out of 
some quotas  (in contrast to ‘phasing in’, which assumed levelling subsidies for the new 
member states), and the steps towards decentralization. The advisors were critical of 
individual ceilings on direct payments to individual farms, and of the proposal for cross-
compliance. 
A division within the German government on the CAP reforms was apparent 
when the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel welcomed EU Agriculture Commissioner 
Fischler’s proposals for reform, while German Agriculture Minister Jochen Borchert 
                                         
500 see Allice Landau, “Bargaining over Power and Policy: The CAP Reform and Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round”,  
International Negotiation, 3:3,1998 
501 Eurobarometer, various editions 
502 Agenda 2000: Zukunftsweg der Agrarpolitik? Empfehlungen des Wissenschaftlichen Beirates beim BML; Kurzstellungnahme”, 
published in September 1998. www.bml.de/forschung/beirat/gutachten/agenda-2000.htm; for the debate on the CAP reform see 
Auswirkungn der EU-Osterweiterung auf die gemeinsame Agrarpolitik und die Regionen: offentliche Anhorung des Ausschusses fur 
die Angelegenheiten der Europaischen Union und des Ausschusses fur Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten am 17. Januar 2001. 
Ausschuss fur die Angelegenheiten der Europaischen Union, Deutscher Bundestag, 2001. 270 p. Texte und Materialien; Ausschuss fur 
die Angelegenheiten der Europaischen Union, Bd. 19 
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called them unacceptable’503. In contrast to the Ministry of Agriculture other ministries 
argued that the Agenda 2000 proposals constituted a good basis for further negotiations. 
According to Agra Europe, Klaus Kinkel pointed out at the start of the enlargement 
negotiations in Brussels that ‘farmers only made up a small group of the population and 
the government must think of the other 98%’, and that eastward enlargement ‘was of 
fundamental importance to German economic prosperity and must not fail because of 
farm policy’. Given that the CAP consumed between 40-50 per cent of the EU budget, 
and the German officials wanted to reduce Germany’s net contributions to the EU budget, 
the Ministry of Finance also became a strong critic of the CAP thus in a sharp conflict to 
the Ministry of Agriculture.  
A conflict between determination to reduce budget contributions, the declared 
German interest in the enlargement, which according to most of the predictions then was 
not possible without CAP reform, and the upcoming federal elections created an 
impossible situation for the German government. To put it in game-analysis terms — this 
combination implied that Germany’s win-set in the Agenda 2000 negotiations on CAP 
reform was strongly limited.  It created ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the 
enlargement. 
 
3. Structural Funds 
Enlargement was also problematic for the German Länder in the context of the 
EU regional policy; enlargement would force Länder to sharing the EU structural funding 
with much poorer than most of the Länder new member states. 
The regional programs were the second major drain in the EU budget, taking two-
thirds of all funds504. The main concern, long before Agenda 2000, was that recipients of 
Structural Funds (Länder in the case of Germany) would no longer be eligible for these 
funds after he enlargement, as the EU average GNP per capita would fall with the 
entrance of poor Eastern countries505. By the sheer mathematics of the basic rule of 
Structural Funds that had been created for levelling disparities between the regions in the 
                                         
503 Wall Street Journal, 25 March 1998; Oxford Analytica, 26 March 1998  
504 Hans-Eckart Scharrer, Finanzen/Haushalt/Steuern, in Wichard Woyke and Beate Kohler-Koch, Die Europäische Union, vol. 5 of 
Lexikon der Politik, Munich: Verlag C.H.Beck, 1996, p. 124 
505 Kirsty Hughes, “The Intergovernmental Conference and EU Enlargement”,  International Affairs, 72, 1, January 1996 
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EU (the then EC), with the enlargement Länder would lose effectively a big part of 
funding.  
The Structural Funds presented a concern for the Eastern Länder mainly; a 
concern of the Western Länder was protection of their particular interests. These interests 
differed from Land to Land determining their politics — Bavaria had vital interests in 
agriculture, Saxony-Anhalt’s in industrial regeneration, Brandenburg in cross-border 
cooperation with the EU’s applicant states, etc. Territoriality rule was at the base of 
mobilization of the Eastern Länder, which wanted to maintain existing levels of 
Structural Funding. For this reason Länder representatives took up an effort of creating a 
group of the regions at the ‘enlargement border’ that started lobbying for subsidies for the 
Western side of the border (in German, Austria, Italy) and for introducing long transition 
periods for participation in the Structural Funds, before the full operation of the Single 
Market was reached on the Eastern side. A completing demand was to retain border 
controls until the East operates by the EU internal security standards.  
 
 
IV. OPTIONS 
1. New Dimension of Germany’s Interests 
Financial calculations of the German net contribution to the EU budget, the CAP 
and Structural Funds distribution vis-à-vis the enlargement exposed a risk for economic 
interests both of the German state and particular interests groups, of farmers and Länder. 
It changed rhetoric and atmosphere around the enlargement, both in the elite debate and 
policy makers’ actions, which now reflected a growing domestic opposition against the 
foreign policy as it was conducted under Helmut Kohl. 
A new assertive foreign policy was encouraged mainly by left-wing intellectuals 
like Gregor Schöllgen or Egon Bahr. The point of reference was the Europeanization of 
the foreign policy by Helmut Kohl; it was criticised broadly on the left side, but 
commentators usually supportive of the CDU and Helmut Kohl also called for a different 
approach to national interests. Kohl’s advisor Werner Weidenfeld asked whether 
Germany could afford to continue its renunciation of leadership in an increasingly 
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complex international situation506 and a political scientist Karl-Richard Korte called 
Kohl’s policy a ‘tactic of blending in with other states’507. Christian Hacke, who argued 
that the term of national interests in Germany had been blurred ‘by a veil of moral but 
irrational arguments’508. He called for examination of Germany’s integration in Europe 
and leaving only these elements that would be of advantage to Germany.  
The sharpest criticism came from the direct opposition to Helmut Kohl — left 
intellectuals. Egon Bahr, an influential former advisor of Willi Brandt and a leading 
thinker of the SPD, encouraged German left-wing politicians to think about foreign 
policy more in terms of power and influence509. He called for ‘emancipation’ of the 
Federal Republic, and ending a ‘vassal-like’ fear of the American ally and submitting to 
its ‘patronising’ over the foreign policy. ‘German foreign and security policy should not 
be relegated to others’ — argued Bahr510. He also argued that the ‘European identity’ 
was a chimera to which Germany should say ‘good bye’; cooperation with Europe, 
however, was in the ‘normal’ German interest.  
A focal point in a gradual evolution of the views on the German new foreign 
policy was deployment of German troops in a combat capability in the Kosovo 
conflict511. Germany, for the first time since WWII, sent Bundeswehr soldiers into a 
foreign country, as an equal partner to other European partners. It was perceived in 
Germany as a breakthrough, although a controversial one512. Adrian Hyde-Price 
analysing these new circumstances stressed that ‘much of the official discourse 
surrounding German foreign policy was phrased in terms of its morality and ethics, 
                                         
506 Werner Weidenfeld, Fragen an die Außenpolitik der neuen Regierung,  Internationale Politik 54, no 1, 1999 
507 Karl-Rudolf Korte, Unbefangen und gelassen: Über die außenpolitische Normalität der Berliner Republik”, Internationale Politik, 
53, no 12, 1998 
508 Christian Hacke, Die nationalen Interessen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert, Außenpolitik 
49, no 2, 1998 
509 Egon Bahr, Deutsche Interessen. Streitschrift zu Macht, Sicherheit und Außenpolitik. München 1998; Egon Bahr, Der Deutsche 
Weg. Selbstverständlich und normal, München 2003 
510 Egon Bahr, Die Normalisierung der deutschen Außenpolitik: Mündige Partnerschaft statt bequemer Vormundschaft,  
Internationale Politik 54, no 1, 1999 
511 See for example Ulrich Preuß, Zwischen Legalität und Gerechtigkeit: Der Kosovo-Krieg, das Volkerrecht und die Moral, Blätter 
für Deutsche und International Politik, Vol. 44, NO 7, 1999, pp. 816-28 
512 Rudolf Augstein, the editor of Der Spiegel commented for example that the U.S. played a role of sheriff of the world and that the 
air strikes against Kosovo were almost a “colonial war” for they were prompted by domestic American considerations. See: Rudolf 
Augstein, “Arroganz der Macht”, Der Spiegel, 3 May 1999 
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rather than in the traditional diplomatic language of Realpolitik and international 
law’513. That changed with the Bundeswehr deployment.  
Gerhard Schröder also evoked the notion of Realpolitik in German foreign policy 
in regards to the European policy. In his government declaration of November 1998 he 
stressed that a ‘faulty national self-confidence had created the German catastrophes of 
the twentieth century’ and therefore his government intended to act with ‘less emotional 
baggage and possibly become more German in the future’. As he reiterated these 
assumptions a year later, he used a phrase of ‘substantiated self-interest’514 as an 
exemplification of the new approach. 
Chancellor Schröder’s statements went however farther than actual governmental 
or party declarations of intended changes. The SPD programme was much less 
‘innovative’; an SPD convention in 1997 passed a resolution on foreign and security 
policy, in which NATO was described as indispensable foundation of the European 
security (which was for example opposite to the views of Egon Bahr calling for 
dissolving the Pact and greater independence of the German security policy). Similarly, 
other main points of the German foreign policy like the European integration in fact were 
declared as not that different from the policies of Chancellor Kohl, and indicated rather 
continuity than intention of breaking with the old premises. A tone of the speeches by 
Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was also moderate; he emphasised 
the continuity of the commitment to the European integration, in its complementary 
nature of deepening and widening simultaneously515. An SPD-Green coalition agreement 
also promised to ‘further develop the guidelines of previous German foreign policy’516.  
                                         
513 Hyde-Price, Germany and European order,…op. cit., p. 220. 
514 Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur offiziellen Eröffnung des Sites der Deutschen Gessellschaft für Auswärtige Politik 
am 2. September 1999 in Berlin, “Verlässichkeit in den internationalen Beziehungen”, Bullet 20 September 1999, available on 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/01/pressf.html 
515 Fischer reiterated the support for the enlargement at every occasion, most often in media interviews. For example: Bettina Marx, 
“Zur EU-Osterweiterung gibt es keine Alternative”. AußenMinister Fischer im Gespräch mit der Deutschen Welle. 8 January 1999, in 
Dietrich von Kyaw, Prioritäten der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft unter Berücksichtigung des Europäischen Rates in Wien, ZEI 
Discussion Papers, No C33, 1999 
516 Aufbruch und Erneuerung - Deutschlands Weg ins 21.Jahrhundert. Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen 
Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Bonn 20.10.1998 (Hereafter Koalitionsvereinbarung), p. 41.; also “Weil wir 
Deutschlands Kraft vertrauen.” Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers vor dem Deutschen Bundestag. 10.11.1998 (hereafter 
Regierungserklärung), Bulletin. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Nr.74,  11.11.1998, p. 912 
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Both politicians, Chancellor Schröder and Joschka Fischer also reiterated during 
the first days in the office the commitment of the previous governments to support the 
EU enlargement, as a goal of the new government. Chancellor Schröder in a speech in 
November 1998 explained that the fundamental determinants of German foreign policy 
were its ‘geographical location in the heart of Europe growing together’, its experience of 
‘integration in the Western community of states’ and ‘history and the lessons Germany 
has drawn from it’. He specified six key German national interests that indicated rather 
continuity than a break up with the assumptions of the Kohl’s policy:  
1. Deepening and widening the EU. 
2. Work towards a peace order for all of Europe. 
3. Preserve and strengthen transatlantic relations. 
4. Promote the spread of democracy and respect for human rights in all parts of the 
world. 
5. Strengthen the role of the UN as a mechanism for global order. 
6. Secure and build up a system of global free trade. 
The novelty, the new assertiveness in the foreign policy was expressed in the 
spirit of support for the EU reforms and the focus on economic issues. As Schröder 
announced in his government declaration, national identities of the member states would 
have to be preserved in the EU with a federal solution as the best for its political 
organization and with the prior tasks for the EU like fighting unemployment, dealing with 
ecological challenges across the continent, and developing common social and economic 
policies.  
Werner A. Perger, one of the political commentators watching the new 
government noted that Schröder did not want to ‘legitimise’ the European Union 
politically and historically, but through specific economic advantages517. In regards to the 
reform of the EU, he supported the three following developments: 
• Reform of the system of financing the EU in a way that would ensure 
lower German contributions to the EU’s budget and secure a ‘fairer’ 
allocation of resources. 
                                         
517 Werner A.Perger, Wir unbefangen, Die Zeit, 12 November 1997 
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• The development of and further synchronization of employment policies 
in order to tackle rising unemployment through the creation of state- 
sponsored jobs and equalization of labour costs across the EU. 
• Harmonization of corporate taxes in EU Member States518. 
Out of these goals the most important at the time was to achieve a ‘budgetary 
fairness’ as called by Schröder. His announcement of the European priorities had a 
special meaning in the context of the upcoming German presidency in the EU, which was 
to start just two months after the new government assumed power. The presidency was 
expected to reveal the new approach to the most challenging subject at the time — the 
EU enlargement.  
 
V. RESULTS 
1. No Enlargement Without Financial Reform  
The intention declared by Chancellor Schröder to cut the German net contribution 
to the EU budget was a very upfront, decisive and contradictory to the declared support 
for the enlargement. Such a perception was particularly vivid in East Europeans 
countries, where observers pointed out that while Schröder’s government was vocal about 
the support for the enlargement, cuts in the EU budget made it impossible to support 
practically the proceeding with the enlargement.  
The new German approach was clear already during the election campaign in 
1998 and the new administration directly linked finance reform with the Eastern 
expansion, declaring a policy of ‘Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform’ (No 
                                         
518 See: The Coalition Agreement between the SPD and Alliance 90/Greens signed on the 20th October 1998. The documents 
addresses directly first two of the above mentioned policy objectives, reported  “Der Streit über die Reform der Europäischen Union 
hält an”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 December 1998; Also: Programmrede des Vorsitzenden des Rates der Europäischen 
Union. BundesaußenMinister Joschka Fischer vor dem Europäischen Parlament in Straßburg am 12.1.1999. See also: “Schröder 
fordert niedrigere deutsche Zahlungen an die EU”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 December 1998; “Europe”s Spoils Up for 
Grabs” Financial Times, 14 December 1998; Germany to Push Ahead with EU Tax Harmonising Plans, Financial Times, 17 
December 1998; The assumptions for the German Europapolitik were also laid by Günther Verheugen: Günther Verheugen, 
Deustchland und die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft: Erwartungen und Realitäten, Integration, Vol 22, 1999; Günther Verheugen, The 
Future of Germany”s European Policy, speech at the Centre for European Reform, 3 February 1999; See also: Objectives and 
Priorities of the German Presidency in the Council of the European Union,  
http://www.eu-preasidentschaft.de/ausland/english/01frameset.html. (1999) 
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enlargement without financial reform)519. Gerhard Schröder at the beginning of his 
chancellorship stated that Germany was contributing more than half of the money, which 
Europe was ‘squandering’ (verbraten)520.  
The same message was reiterated during the 1999 election campaign to the 
European Parliament, with the picture of German Chancellor on posters saying: ‘We do 
not expect gifts from Europe. But the same should also hold vice versa’521. During the 
first EU Summit in Austrian Pörtschach in October 1998, which Gerhard Schröder 
attended already as the Chancellor, he also stressed that the EU should not raise false 
expectations in the accession countries because enlargement was a much more difficult 
and long-term process than had been anticipated522. Both these assertions were in a strong 
contrast to the position of Schröder’s predecessor Helmut Kohl. They expressed a new 
type of German resentment and caused both among the German and the East European 
political elites serious concerns523.  
 
2. No Enlargement In 2000 
Eastern Europeans saw the new German foreign policy as a rejection of the 
pledge made by Chancellor Kohl to support the enlargement524. This impression was so 
strong that Chancellor Schröder during his first visit to Warsaw in November 1998 felt 
obliged to say that Germany supported Poland joining the EU ‘without any buts’525. He 
explained that supporting Poland’s application was the way of strengthening the 
economic and political stability in the region, what was in the national interest of 
                                         
519 “Bundesregierung: Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 December 1998 
520 Gerhard Schröder quoted by Eckart Lohse, Ministerpräsidenten wollen Steuerreform zustimmen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
9 December 1998 
521 See for example “Der Streit über die Reform der Europäischen Union hält an”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 December 
1998; “Schröder fordert niedrigere deutsche Zahlungen an die EU”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 December 1998; “Europe”s 
Spoils Up for Grabs”, Financial Times, 14 December 1998 
522 Financial Times, 10 November 1998; EU-Magazin, 12/1998 
523 Karl Pries, Das Porzellan bleibt heil. Die rot-grünen Novisen auf europäischem Terrain mildern manchen früheren Eindruck von 
deutscher Arroganz, Frankfurter Rundschau, 21 November 1998; The perception was on tit way straight down as during the visit to 
Poland at the time Chancellor Schröder also declined to offer financial compensation to those who had been subjected to forced labour 
during the Nazi era. See: Rzeczpospolita, 26 November 1998, Focus, 16 December 1998 
524 Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, Die Woche, 28 October 1998; also: “Geremek: “Nie Wiemy, Czego 
Oczekiwac”, Gazeta Wyborcza , 29 October 1998 
525 Rzeczpospolita, 6 November 1998 
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Germany. Nonetheless he contradicted Kohl’s promise of the year 2000 as a date Poland 
would gain a EU membership, making it clear he could not confirm this date. Chancellor 
Schröder expressed this approach also in a government speech of November 1998 that his 
government would pursue ‘all opportunities for the enlargement of the EU’, remaining 
however very cautious about making any suggestions of a date.  
These developments deepened the mistrust on the Eastern side. While Kohl used 
to emphasise that enlargement was an unequivocal political goal of Germany, and 
economic issues were subordinated to the political agenda, with the government of 
Gerhard Schröder it became inverse. It was explicitly clarified much later by Joschka 
Fischer during his meeting with Polish parliamentarians in October 2000. He pointed to 
analogy between the costs of the German unification and expected costs of the 
enlargement, stressing that the costs are the second, after the institutional reform of the 
EU, problem the enlargement is loaded with. He also expressed an opinion that the focus 
should be rather on construction of the budget and deciding which expenses should be 
increased and who should be cut down on benefits526. 
On the other hand however a new element appeared in the reasoning of the further 
support of the enlargement. Joschka Fischer presented it in an article in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung ‘On the new foreign policy of Germany in 21st century’527 pointing 
out that the enlargement of the EU would have to be proceeded, otherwise there is a 
‘danger Eastern Europe would slip into a disarray’. This was a line supported by his party 
as presented by Elisabeth Schrödter, the European deputy of the Green528. It set also a 
tone for a debate to come — the arguments pointed by Fischer and his colleague became 
a core of the reasoning for proceeding with the enlargement that was presented to the 
German public opinion. In this way the enlargement rhetoric of the German government 
changed from a clear and decisive advocacy by the Kohl’s teams to a conditional support 
by the Schröder’s team. 
Four key themes in regards to the enlargement came to light during the Schröder’s 
time: 
                                         
526 Europap, 3 October 2000 
527 Fischer, Joseph, “Die Selbstbeschränkung der Macht muß fortbestehen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 August 1998 
528 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 May 1999 
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• negotiations over Agenda 2000 and the future budget of the EU 
• new approach to  the enlargement deriving mainly from a different than at 
the Kohl’s time stage of the development of the enlargement process 
• economic or economically grounded fear of social character  
• the issue of the expellees 
The first came Agenda 2000529. After a public debate all over Europe the EU 
reforms were finally to be agreed by the heads of state or government of the 15 EU 
countries at their meeting in Berlin in March 1999. The Union’s ‘forward momentum’ 
was boosted in June 1999 by the election of a new European Parliament for a five-year 
term, and in the autumn by the arrival in office of a new European Commission under the 
presidency of the former Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi with two German 
Commissioners — Günther Verheugen responsible for the EU enlargement, and Michele 
Schreyer — for the budget. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
Germany’s Europapolitik after the unification was constructed and conducted 
under Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s leadership and according to his vision of Germany’s 
place in Europe. The main concern of this policy was to resolve a dilemma over the 
choice between deepening and widening of the European Union. A stance adopted by 
Germany’s government indicates that for Chancellor Kohl it was not a dilemma over the 
choice, but a challenge how to reconcile conflicting priorities.  
Under the Kohl’s leadership German politicians embraced both directions, 
although while Western integration was easier to accept, as a more familiar phenomenon, 
the integration with the East presented increasingly apparent costs that were exceeding 
the capacity of the German economy strained by the costs of the unification. The 
challenge of balancing both directions created ambivalence in the enlargement policy. 
Nonetheless it was a consistent choice of the Kohl’s government — to pursue and 
balance both.  
                                         
529 “Fischer stellt die Agenda 2000 an die erste Stelle”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 January 1999; “Schröder fordert den 
erfolgreichen Abschluß der Agenda 2000” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 March 1999; EU-Gipfel Europa, ADN0464, 26 
February 1999 
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The policy of balancing in the first years was aimed at winning support of the EU 
partners for the enlargement. The Structured Dialogue promoted by the German 
government and accepted by the EU members in 1994 was a crucial step towards winning 
this support. Support implicated sharing the costs of the enlargement; German policy 
makers were determined to spread the costs of the enlargement on the whole European 
Union and save at the same time a balanced distribution of the EU funds. That required a 
reform of the EU finances. As such it presented a problem for various interests of various 
member states. Insistence of German representatives on reforms in the face of difficulties 
with reaching agreement, created ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the 
enlargement. It lasted until the Amsterdam Summit in 1997.  
The needed reforms implicated further deepening of the Western integration. The 
conditions of the deepening as presented by Germany’s partners were contradictory to 
German’s interests, and the lack of prospect for a fast agreement created a danger that the 
enlargement would be postponed. German policy makers chose to support the 
enlargement. A desirable outcome for the German leaders would be an agreed reform of 
the EU, but when faced with the opposition from other member states, German leaders 
focused on saving the enlargement, pushing for furthering its agenda despite the lack of 
prospect for the EU reforms. They chose interests reflecting values and ideas at the core 
of the national identity, over those based on an economic calculation of the costs and 
benefits. 
It was a culminating point of the supportive for the enlargement policy under 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl. It left however the issue of the reform of the EU finances 
unsettled. The deepening exhaustion of the German society with the costs of the 
unification turned the course of the German politics and a new team at power of 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder brought a different rhetoric about the Germany’s 
engagement into the European integration, including the enlargement. More assertive 
approach to securing Germany’s interests meant that the new government was 
determined to settle a financial reform of the EU before the completion of the 
enlargement. Given a strong opposition to such reforms not only of other member states, 
but also of the German interest groups of farmers and the Länder, the prospect for 
reaching agreement on the reforms looked remote. Although the new government 
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declared a support for the enlargement too, but as its rhetoric on the European integration 
and enlargement shifted from the normative reasoning to calculations of the financial and 
economic costs, together with the insistence on the difficult to reach financial reforms of 
the EU, it created ambivalence in the policy towards the enlargement.  
This manifestation of the ambivalence reflects next stage in the evolution of the 
concept of the European integration. While the previous manifestations (and perceptions) 
of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement pointed to the normative 
side these changes derived from, now the new, values and ideas-based premises of the 
expanded concept, were gaining a structural shape through the intergovernmental 
bargaining over the distributional preferences of the member states.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
Interests Conflicting with the Enlargement  
As the Cause of Ambivalence  
In Germany’s Enlargement Policy Towards the EU Enlargement 
 
1998—2002 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the causes of the manifestation, and perception of 
ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement that were caused by the 
conflicting with the enlargement economic interests of the German state and domestic 
interest groups.  
This is the last phase of the enlargement process, of the intergovernmental 
bargaining. The EU enlargement now is not about a normative commitment; it is a matter 
of financial calculations and bargaining over the share of the financial burden of each EU 
member state, and of the interests of particular interest groups. This is also the phase 
when the German politics came much closer than before to meeting public demands and 
expectations. The enlargement is still Germany’s priority, but it is not presented in the 
normative way, characteristic for Chancellor Helmut Kohl; it is now calculated in 
financial terms.  
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 Gerhard Schröder’s government inherited a vortex of contradictory external and 
domestic challenges in the context of the enlargement: a need to endorse the enlargement 
and to reduce German payment to Brussels, a need to maintain high returns from the EU 
regional funds and to sustain German farmers’ subsidiaries, thus to reject a 
comprehensive reform of the CAP that in fact was required for the enlargement.  
The position of a new Chancellor was very decisive — Gerhard Schröder 
demonstrated that he was ready to risk even a failure of the Berlin Summit during the 
German presidency over the EU if the German interests were not secured. Nonetheless all 
the challenges — the negotiations on reforms of CAP, structural policy and the budget 
turned out to be impossible to close at the Berlin Summit and the Summit opened the 
hardest for the accession countries phase of the enlargement process — the entry 
negotiations. 
German policy makers were locked in a struggle — to keep the pledges to the 
Eastern and Western partners and to the domestic constituency, which perceived now the 
enlargement as an immediate threat to the vital economic interests of the majority of the 
society. Those contradictory to each other challenges explain the ambiguity in the 
German policy towards the enlargement at the time.  
For explanation of this phase the best approach is of liberal intergovernmentalism. 
Although constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are 
ideational as well as material, thus it would be possible to look at the formulation of the 
new economic interests of the new Germany in respect to the European integration from a 
constructivist perspective. But the emphasis in this phase is on the bargaining these new 
interests. Liberal intergovernmentalism provides a better framework for capturing the 
change and the moment of projection of the material interests on the level of the 
intergovernmental bargaining. 
 
I. AMBIVALENCE 
The ambivalence in the German enlargement policy, in its second phase of 
negotiations manifested at four points. 
First in a difference between supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and economic-interests oriented enlargement rhetoric of his 
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successor Gerhard Schröder. Second — as a gap between a continuity to support the 
enlargement as declared by Chancellor Schröder and the attempts of his government to 
succeed with the budgetary and institutional reform of the EU that were hard, if not 
impossible, to achieve. Third manifestation of the ambivalence is observable in the 
contradictory stances of the government executives on the specific issues of the 
enlargement and the fourth manifestation was a result of a proposal that the German 
public should have a say over the enlargement in a referendum, of which the outcome 
was easily predictable as negative. 
According to the tripartite framework of integration decisions provided by liberal 
intergovernmentalism — the formation of state preferences, the outcomes of interstate 
bargaining and the choice of international institutions — the manifestation of 
ambivalence analysed here occurred mainly in the phase of formation of state preferences 
and partly during the bargaining process.  
The new team at power, of the SPD/Green coalition brought to the German 
politics and foreign policy a different approach and different rhetoric. In contrast to the 
rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl that was based on the normative premises and referred to the 
historical narrative, a new approach focused on the material, economic interests of 
Germany. It allowed the SPD and Green parties win the elections, as it was in 
congruency with the expectations of the domestic constituency. But it presented a 
profound change in the enlargement policy. There was no more referring to the ‘two-sides 
coin’ and to the goal of overcoming the division of Europe. An expression of this change 
was as much the focus on the economic interests as a criticism of the fact that Germany 
was financing the European integration projects. The change of the rhetoric of Germany’s 
enlargement policy created ambivalence in this policy. 
As the biggest and most problematic at the time of these projects was the 
enlargement, an economy/finances oriented approach of the new team generated a 
rhetoric specifically referring to the enlargement and not in a supportive tone. Gerhard 
Schröder’s election campaign and his tenure had two leading slogans: ‘No enlargement 
without financial reform’ and ‘No enlargement in 2000’. Both were in conflict with the 
declared by Chancellor Schröder support for the enlargement. Contradictory external and 
domestic challenges the government of Helmut Kohl was dealing with, caused at the end 
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his tenure, after the Amsterdam Summit, a state of suspension of Germany’s position on 
the issues of the EU reforms. Gerhard Schröder assuming Chancellorship declared the 
will to cut through the indecision of the Kohl’s government but at the same time asserted 
that ‘we neither can nor will solve Europe’s problems with a German cheque-book’530. It 
was reiterated by Schröder’s Minister for Europe (later the first European Commissioner 
for the enlargement) Günter Verheugen, who stressed that ‘the road ahead will require 
all partners to make concessions and be prepared to make compromises’531. Schröder’s 
government also announced that it would use the German presidency to pursue a more 
calculated national cost/benefit strategy in seeking to limit the financial burden on 
Germany of the EU budget, if necessary by ‘fundamentally’ reforming EU policies — the 
CAP in particular — in ways disadvantageous to other member states, especially 
France532. The insistence on the reforms that were opposed by other member states, and 
therefore hard to agree upon, created another manifestation of ambivalence in Germany’s 
policy towards the enlargement.  
The dynamic of the German enlargement policy in the end of the 1990s crossed 
the line of the usual division between the policy making by politicians and a public 
opinion. The results of the exhaustion of the German society with the unification costs 
and the policy conducted by Helmut Kohl, brought to power the SPD/Green coalition. 
The enlargement issue was positioned in the center of the European policy of the Gerhard 
Schröder’s government and the public debate influenced politicians now much stronger 
than before; the stance of the policy makers in this phase of the enlargement process is 
much closer to the postulates and expectations of the public. And the prospective costs of 
the enlargement became the main subject of the domestic debate on the foreign policy 
conducted across media.  
The debate reflected a declining support for the enlargement among the Germany 
society and influenced heavily state preferences presented by the Schröder’s government 
in the external. This change of state preferences marked a difference between the 
                                         
530 The Guardian, 2 January 1999 
531 Die Gemeinsame Außenpolitik der europäischen Union, Rede Staatsminister/AA Günter Verheugen beim Zentrum für 
europäische Integrationsforschung, Bonn 21 January 1999, available http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/index.htm ; also later 
in Tagesspiegel, 5 October 1999 
532 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 November 1998 
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Schröder’s and Kohl’s policy towards the enlargement creating a manifestation of 
ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement. It also triggered another 
manifestation of ambivalence in this policy — a proposal of a referendum over the 
enlargement. As the public opinion was increasingly more opposed to the enlargement, 
Günter Verheugen, Schröder’s Minister for Europe and then EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement, suggested (in his EU Commissioner’s capacity) a referendum as an 
appropriate means of legitimization for political projects in the German foreign policy533, 
pointing out that in the face of a widespread ‘fundamental objection’ to ‘the entire 
Eastern enlargement project as an elite project’ imposed upon people, the mistakes that 
were made regarding the euro, which was introduced ‘behind the backs of the people’, 
could not be repeated. Given the diminishing support of the German society the outcome 
of the referendum was seen as surely negative. That augmented the ambivalence of the 
German government’s stance on the enlargement.  
 
II. SUPPORTIVE FACTORS 
1. Conditioned Support 
The first supportive for the enlargement factor during the Gerhard Schröder’s 
tuner was a pledge of his government to continue support for the enlargement. The 
enlargement was presented as one of the main points in ‘Germany’s objectives and 
priorities’ for the EU-Presidency in 1999. As it was explained in the official 
government’s statement — ‘the enlargement of the European Union gives us the chance 
to use its benefits to increase our prosperity, to enhance our freedom, and to reconcile 
our interests by peaceful means’534. This was a declaration that the new government of 
Chancellor Schröder was going to continue managing the enlargement agenda. 
But Chancellor Schröder inherited a difficult legacy from his predecessor in the 
shape of the Agenda 2000—enlargement—EU reforms nexus. And the process of 
formation of the new state preference is concentrated in this area. Chancellor Kohl trying 
to meet the expectations of East Europeans by supporting the enlargement and of 
                                         
533 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 September 2000 
534 Europe”s Path into the 21st Century,  
http://www.eu-praesidentschaft.de/ausland/englisch/ 01/frameset.htm. (1999) 
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Western Europeans by supporting the idea of the EU reforms was forced to manage 
conflicting challenges. First — the opposition to CAP reform within his coalition, with 
the CDU politicians pro-reform and CSU ones against. Second — trying to advocate 
reforms of the EU necessary to facilitate the enlargement but opposed by the French 
partners and conflicted by the need to reduce German contribution to the EU budget. 
Caught in between these pressures Kohl pursued an internally conflicted agenda of:  
1. Advocating enlargement as a top priority 
2. Stressing the need to reduce the German contribution to the EU budget  
3. Blocking progress in reform of the CAP, without which restructuring of the 
EU budget was impossible535.  
Kohl also faced a new election campaign on the domestic stage, which with the 
SPD questioning the enlargement as a priority for the EU, made it difficult for him to 
push for a progress on setting the enlargement timetable. For this reason the elections 
made the EU reforms rather debated than worked on. Proceeding with the Agenda 2000 
proposals was possible in Germany in practice only after the 1998 elections under the 
new SPD/Green government.  
It started with a question how to implement EU budgetary restructuring and 
policy reform in the preparations to the Eastern enlargement. An introduction of concrete 
proposals culminated during the German EU Council Presidency in the first half of 1999. 
It took the member states next three years to worked out a final version of the future 
enlargement-related budget of the EU, agreed at the Copenhagen Summit of 2002. The 
outcome was highly unsatisfactory for the Eastern countries and it was the German stance 
as the main factor delaying the enlargement proceeding.  
The key concern for Germany was to reduce the level of the German net 
contribution to EU expenditure. That was caused by the domestic pressure, grounded first 
and foremost in the financial problems Schröder’s government inherited from the 
government of Chancellor Kohl — the huge budgetary deficit following the costs of 
unification and Kohl’s resistance to raising taxes to balance the burden. Now the 
                                         
535 Enlargement/Agenda 2000 - Watch. Pilot issue,. October 1998. Institut für Europäische Politik/TEPSA, pp.58-59 
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Schröder’s government was firmly committed to achieving ‘fairness’536. Yet it faced also 
the necessity to proceed with the Agenda 2000. At the Luxemburg European Council in 
December 1997 the EU invited five Eastern countries and Cyprus to commence 
enlargement negotiations in the first half of 1998. Half a year later, at the Cardiff summit 
in June 1998 the member states agreed that they would reach an agreement on Agenda 
2000 by March 1999. Agenda 2000 was to be treated as a package solving the issues of 
the budget, CAP reforms and Structural Funds reform for discussion and bargaining. The 
deadline for working out proposals was the Berlin Summit under the German presidency 
in the first half of 1999. 
At the moment of taking over the presidency of the EU in January 1999, the 
highest priority of the German Europapolitik was the reform of the EU and Agenda 
2000537. Both these issues were highly important, but also highly problematic and 
complex.  
 
2. Berlin Summit  
The test for the new German government initiating its Europapolitik was to be the 
presidency of the EU. It proved quickly that national interests as presented by the 
government gave way to the reality of the EU policy-making. German representatives 
faced with the constant French opposition stopped persisting on the radical reform of 
CAP or new financing arrangements. As it was explained by Günter Verheugen ‘the 
overriding national interest of Germany is always to keep the dynamic of the European 
integration process in motion’538. And the Schröder’s administration approached the task 
in a managerial way. 
The new German Europapolitik had three main goals: (i) reform of financing the 
EU; (ii) development and synchronization of employment policies; (iii) harmonization of 
corporate taxes in the EU. They all were directly linked with the Eastern expansion 
                                         
536 “Erklärung der Bundesregierung: Vorschau auf den europäischen Rat in Wien am 11/12 Dezember 1998 und Ausblick auf die 
deutsche Präsidentschaft in der ersten Jahreshälfte 1999”, Bulletin der Presse- und Infomatikonnsamtes der Bundesregierung, 14 
December 1998, pp. 965-966 
537 Erklärung der Bundesregierung: Vorschau auf den europäischen Rat in Wien am 11/12.12.1998 und Ausblick auf die deutsche 
Präsidentschaft in der ersten Jahreshälfte 1999, Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 14 December 1998, 
pp. 965-966 
538 Günther Verheugen, “Europa Wohin? Die Zukunft der Europäischen Union”,  Bayerische Landesvertretung, Bonn, 4 May 1999 
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captured in a slogan ‘Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform’ (No enlargement 
without financial reform)539. German Presidency set therefore four main objectives540:  
• agreement on Agenda 2000 
• progress in employment policy 
• improving the EU’s ability to act in the foreign policy domain and  
• progress in the preparation of EU institutional reform 
A key to breaking an impasse that lasted practically since the Amsterdam Summit 
of 1997 was the issue of financing the EU. The main discussion therefore in the run-up to 
the Berlin Summit concentrated on finding a solution for the budgetary issue. The 
challenges were to limit or reduce the level of structural fund programmes, to phase out 
cohesion funds, to reform CAP in addition to stabilize or freeze the EU budget at the real 
level of payments in 1999 (ceiling of 1.27 per cent of EU GDP limit).  
German representatives argued that all the issues must be on the table, including 
sensitive ones such as the UK rebate and that the member states, if they want to reach a 
constructive settlement, they cannot just defend their stances but have to work out a 
compromise. This demand was however extremely difficult for German policy makers, 
who found themselves in a very delicate position: as a Presidency holder Germany was 
responsible for a successful agreement and that the summit will not end in stalemate but 
the more the Germans pushed its own demands for a cut in its net contributions the 
agreement was further away. It was perceived by other member states that they were to 
lose some of their budgetary advantages just to help Germany to be a responsible 
Presidency holder. With so many complex challenges German government was unable to 
significantly further any of its objectives.  
The negotiations of the heads of the states in February 1999 demonstrated the 
opposition of Germany’s partners to the reforms of CAP, fiscal procedures, regional 
subsidies and the German net contributor position541. German proposal, presented before 
the conference by the Minister of Agriculture Karl-Heinz Funke, to lower support prices 
for most of agricultural products, met a fierce opposition from representatives of France, 
                                         
539 Bundesregierung: Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 December 1998. 
540 Programmrede des Vorsitzenden des Rates der Europäischen Union. BundesaußenMinister Joschka Fischer vor dem 
Europäischen Parlament in Straßburg am 12.1.1999, pp.18-23 
541 “In der EU ehrebliche Meinungsverschiedenheit in fast allen Kernfragen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 February 1999 
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Spain, Ireland and Britain, with the French president Jacques Chirac calling the proposal 
‘outright attack on French interests’542. Similarly the proposals of Cohesion Funds’ 
reform met opposition543. The fiscal reform ended in lowering the German contribution 
only by 300 million euro544, what prompted Minister Joschka Fischer to openly saying at 
the Bundestag that ‘ he had realized for the first time that the member states would run 
away from each other if the Bundesrepublik did not want to assume a role of a financial 
leader’545. 
In the end a compromise was reached and most of the big players like Britain, 
France and Spain managed to defend their interests making only minor concessions: 
• Britain maintained its rebate 
• There was agreement on less radical reform on CAP, 
• and on continuation of the cohesion funds 
A general orientation of the Berlin European Council was that the budgetary 
imbalances should be resolved by introducing ‘corrections’ to the expenditure side of the 
Budget, and especially of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF). As a result, the final compromise concentrated on making savings rather than 
reaching the targets of the reform546. 
                                         
542 “Teure Wahrheit”, Der Spiegel, 22 February 1999; “Mit mir nich”, Der Spiegel, 8 March 1999; also “EU—Gipfel, Europa”, 
ADN0464, 26 February 1999 
543 Bundesregierung rückt von umstrittener Kofinanzierung ab, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 March 1999 
544 European Council, 1999, Conclusions of the Berlin Council 
http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm 
545 Helmut Kohl commented on this statement that he had been preaching for all 16 years of hic chancellorship what Minister Fischer 
now revealed. See: Ernstfall für Schröder, Der Spiegel, 29 March 1999 
546 The agreed proposals were launched in 1999 in the form of twenty legislative texts relating to the following priority areas: (i) 
continuation of the agricultural reform along the lines of the changes made in 1988 and 1992, with the view at stimulating European 
competitiveness, taking great account of environmental considerations, ensuring fair income for farmers, simplifying legislation and 
decentralising the application of legislation; (ii) increasing the effectiveness of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund by greater 
thematic and geographic concentration of projects on specific objectives and geographical areas and thus improving management; (iii) 
strengthening the pre-accession strategy for applicant countries by setting up two financial mechanisms: a pre-accession structural 
instrument (ISPA) to support improved transport and environmental protection infrastructures and a pre-accession agricultural 
instrument (SAPARD) to facilitate the long-term adjustment of agriculture and the rural areas of the applicant countries; (iv) adopting 
a new financial framework for the period 2000-06 in order to enable the Union meeting the main challenges of the beginning of the 
21st century, in particular enlargement, while ensuring budgetary discipline.  
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Despite a decisive position of Chancellor Schröder, who demonstrated that he was 
ready to risk even a failure of the Summit547, it was impossible to close the negotiations 
on CAP, structural policy and the budget at the Berlin Summit. On the contrary — the 
closing agreement was still just a proposal, thus went under further negotiations. As it 
was commented by Günter Verheugen ‘a real reform did not take a place in Berlin 
because of the resistance of the French government’. Verheugen stressed that fast 
admission of associate countries to the EU would be impossible under these 
conditions548. That was a correct prediction: a phase opened after the Berlin Summit was 
the hardest for the accession countries. It was a time of struggle for the share of benefits 
in the future Union of 25. Demands for long transition periods for the full freedom of 
movement of labour, and plans by the existing member states and the European 
Commission to exclude the accession countries from some agricultural subsidies, was the 
main battlefield. For German policy makers it was a struggle to keep the pledges to the 
domestic constituency, to the Eastern European countries and to the Western partners, 
what created ambiguity in the German policy towards the enlargement at the time.  
 
III. CAUSES OF AMBIVALENCE 
Problems with the Enlargement  
The two concrete policy issues he mentioned in this context were the free 
movement of labour and agriculture. The prospective problems in these areas that would 
occur after the enlargement caused negative attitudes towards the enlargement not only of 
the directly interested groups like farmers and low-skilled workers, but contributed to the 
overall negative perception of the enlargement in Germany. 
 
1. Labour Market 
The fear the domestic labour market could be destroyed by the cheap labour from 
the East549 was indicated in various polls as the first, most important reason for the 
                                         
547 Ernstfall für Schröder, Der Spiegel, 29 March 1999 
548 EU—Kompromiß halt nicht bis 2006, Die Welt, 3 April 1999 
549 For a discussion of the enlargement”s impact on the German labour market see for example Hans-Werner Sinn, “EU-Erweiterung 
und Arbeitskraftemigration: Wege zu einer schrittweisen Annäherung der Arbeitsmarkte. Ifo-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung”, in 
Zusammenarbeit mit dem Max-Planck-Institut für Ausländisches und Internationales Sozialrecht, Andreas Hanlein. München: Ifo-
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negative attitudes towards the enlargement. In Eurobarometer survey 53 per cent agreed 
with the statement ‘The more countries there are, the more unemployment there will be in 
Germany’. That was a higher share than the average in the EU-15 (41 per cent). Similarly 
the statement ‘Once new countries have joined the European Union, Germany will 
receive less financial aid from it’ was supported by 57 per cent of the participating in the 
survey Germans, while in the EU the number was 49 per cent. These results were backed 
by another survey carried out by the European Commission in September 2002: 50 per 
cent of the German population expected more unemployment after enlargement, while 
the EU-15 average was 40 per cent.  
A. Transition Periods for Labour until 2015 
That issue also presented a threat to Austria. Both German and Austrian 
representatives picked up the demands for transition periods that would protect the 
markets of the old member states. German CDU/CSU demanded restrictions on the free 
movement of people from Eastern countries until 2015 at the earliest550. As it was 
exemplified by the well-known stance of the CSU politician, the leader of the CSU 
parliamentary group Peter Ramsauer ‘free movement of people in the enlarged Union 
would bring a catastrophe to the labour market551. The CDU pointed during the 2002 
election campaign to the need of sufficiently long transitional periods in order to prevent 
the migration of large quantities of East European workers to Germany552. After 1989 
migration from Central and Eastern Europe to destinations in Western Europe, including 
most prominently Germany increased substantially, but was decreased since then. In 
1997 a total of 415,823 citizens of Central and East European accession countries lived in 
Germany, representing 7 percent of Germany's total population. In 1998 Germany took 
                                         
Inst. fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 2001; Robert Seibold, Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union und das Arbeitsrecht der 
Tschechischen Republik: eine Kompatibilitätsuntersuchung. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001; Elmar Honekopp, Maria Helena Andre 
and Karl-Johan Lonnroth. “Labour markets and the free movement of labour”, in: Renate Langewiesche and Andras Toth (eds), The 
unity of Europe: political, economic and social dimensions of EU enlargement, Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2001 
550 Rzeczpospolita, 9 July 1998; Die Welt, 8 July1998 
551 Die Welt, 6 January 2001 
552 Ibid. 
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58.8 percent of all the Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian citizens working in the EU, 
while Austria accounted for 15.6 percent553.   
It was however a concern not only of Germany and Austria: other EU member 
states wanted to reduce a total flow of immigrants too. In April 2000 the European 
Commission presented an information note to the member states, which stated that 
enlargement most likely would have only a limited impact on EU labour markets554. In 
response the Austrian government issued its own information note, which suggested that 
enlargement could have a significant impact on the Austrian labour market and that there 
were a number of important differences between the EC’s southern expansion and the EU 
eastern enlargement. 
From the German perspective an important point made by the Austrians was that 
although immigration might be limited by planned transition periods, there was also the 
issue of border commuters. The huge differences in the level of the average incomes on 
both sides of the border — between the EU and the candidate countries — presented for 
the Austrian neighbours a strong economic incentive to work in Austria and earn high 
wages but to spend this income in the Czech Republic or Hungary where the costs of 
living were much lower. The Austrians argued that this was not an issue at the time of the 
southern expansion because income differentiation between southern French and northern 
Spanish border regions were much narrower than those between Austria and its Central 
and East European neighbours. Furthermore, simple topographical differences between 
the mountainous French-Spanish border regions and the much more permeable Austrian 
borders made border commuting more difficult at the time of the southern expansion. Not 
only in Austria but in the German debate as well, the issue of border commuters played a 
significant role555. There were four main types of workers: guest workers, seasonal 
                                         
553 Data from: EU Accession Monitoring Program. Monitoring the EU accession process: country reports, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 
2001 
554 http://www.bmaa.gv.at/Außenpolitik/wirtschaft/movement.html.en. 
555 See: Roland Freudenstein, and Henning Tewes, Die EU-Osterweiterung und der deutsche Arbeitsmarkt: Testfall für die deutsch-
polnische Interessengemeinschaft, Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2001; Manfred Husmann, “Ost-Erweiterung der EU 
und Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit”,  Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Arbeits- und Sozialrecht 13, 1999; Ulrich Becker, 
EU-Erweiterung und differenzierte Integration: Zu beitrittsbedingten Übergangsregelungen am Beispiel der Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999; For the Bundestag debate see: EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitnehmerfreizugigkeit: offentliche Anhorung 
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workers, project-tied worker (Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer) and border commuters. After 
1989 bilateral agreements (and disagreements556) over the rights of subcontractors were 
constantly reported in the press on both sides of Germany’s eastern border. The problems 
stemmed mainly from the differences between interest groups — the workers unions 
opposing employment of the workers from the East and employers willing to use cheaper 
labour.  
Similar differences were at the base of a discussion over the conditions for the 
enlargement in respect to the construction industry. German unions were not only 
concerned about Polish workers undercutting German wages but about subcontractors 
and workers from other EU member states as well. This resulted in a long-lasting struggle 
within the European Union over a directive concerning the posting of workers and within 
Germany over a national law setting minimal standards for workers employed by a 
foreign subcontractor in Germany. In regards to the enlargement the German Chamber of 
Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag) presented a totally opposite stance. In 
a paper of April 2000 it argued that it did not share fears of increased immigration. 
Linguistic and cultural barriers as well as insufficient flexibility would limit migration in 
a natural way, and, in any case, the immigration of well-qualified workers could be an 
advantage. 
The Federation of German Industry also argued that the EU should hold on to the 
principle of not allowing long transition periods. Dieter Hundt, the president of the 
Federation of German Employers Associations (BDA), argued in a press conference on 
the 18th of September 2000, that transition periods of seven years, as used during the 
southern expansion, were too long557. Even within limited transition periods, there was a 
need for flexibility allowing individual member states or sectors to introduce gradually 
free movement of labour and services on bilateral basis before the end of the transition 
period.  
German farmers eventually, although having had their own special concerns in 
regards to agricultural policy, viewed that the free movement of labour from the East 
                                         
vom 4. April 2001. Deutscher Bundestag, Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europaischen Union - Sekretariat. Texte und 
Materialien, Bd. 23, Berlin: 2001.  
556 As reported by the author in Rzeczpospolita, throughout years 1996— 1999. www.rp.pl/archiwum  
557  See www.arbeitgeber.de; also Rzeczpospolita, 20 September 2000 
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should not be banned totally as German farmers used to employ seasonal workers from 
Eastern Europe. Their pressure on the German agriculture Minister made him asking in a 
resolution of the 24th of March 2000, that any transition arrangements for labour had to 
take into account the needs of the German agricultural sector. Those most concerned with 
the closing borders against the workers from the East were German unions, particularly 
construction workers’ union, thus from the area, which used to be most targeted by 
immigrant workers. The trade union federation postulated transition periods on the free 
movement of workers for about seven to ten years after the accession of the Eastern 
countries. This stance was supported by representatives of the business community in 
border regions558. 
B. Government Divided 
The German government was divided. The Labour Ministry wanted to address 
demands of economic sectors and regions, indicating adaptation of the ‘Swiss model’ as 
adequate for the transition periods rather than the ‘southern expansion’ model and 
supported a solution, in which there would be one transition period for all member states 
(with an open option for those member states that wanted to open their markets earlier). 
The Finance Ministry in turn was more concerned with coordination of social security 
systems that was directly tied to the freedom of movement question and which had clear 
budgetary implications. The foreign office under Minister Joschka Fischer took the most 
more liberal position559. Wolfgang Ischinger, state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, 
argued that German border regions in particular should not fear a large influx of labour 
migrants560 because after establishing the free movement of labour, Polish migrant 
workers would most likely go to regions with high demand for labour rather than regions 
with high unemployment. 
Chancellor Schröder presented an official position of the German government in 
December 2000. He noted that, in comparison to the transition arrangements for the 
                                         
558 Deutscher Bundestag, Europaausschuss, Materialsammlung “EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitnehmer freizügigkeit”, p. 60; Deutscher 
Bundestag, Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, Wirtschaftliche Chancen und Herausforderungen der EU-
Erweiterung: Öffentliche Anhörung am 14. Februar 2001, p. 52. 
559 An interview with Joschka Fischer, Gespräch mit Joschka Fischer über das Koalitionsklima und die Außen - und 
Sicherheitpolitik”, Der Spiegel, NO 48/23 November 1998 
560 Rzeczpospolita, 2 October 2000 
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Southern expansion of the EC in the 1980s, transition agreements for the Eastern 
enlargement should be more flexible; Chancellor proposed a seven-year transition period 
for the free movement of labour, with an option for shortening it for individual accession 
countries, and, in case of labour shortages. Schröder proposed also restrictions on the free 
movement of services for selected areas, including the construction sector and 
handicrafts561. 
It met strong criticism in the accession countries whose representatives opposed 
such transition periods arguing that these demands were based on mistaken assumptions. 
In Germany the European affairs committee of the German Bundestag, the Association of 
German Employers (BDA) and the Federation of German Industry supported the flexible 
and differentiated handling of transition periods but criticized the government’s defensive 
approach which neglected Germany’s need for immigrants due to an aging population562. 
 
2. Agriculture 
The Farmers Association (Bauernverband) representing the voice of the German 
farmers accepted the budget package for 2000-06 as providing adequate funds for 
incorporating the accession countries into the CAP. It did not see a need for introducing 
regressive elements into the direct payments scheme for farmers in the existing member 
states563 (i.e. reducing direct payments over time to pay for enlargement). The 
Association did not make any bilateral demands, like in the case of the free movement of 
labour. However, distributional issues were critical564. 
                                         
561  Bundespresseamt, Bulletin der Bundesregierung, no. 90-1, 19 December 2000; Rzeczpospolita, 22 December 2000 
562 For the report of the bipartisan commission see: Auswärtiges Amt/Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Die Rolle der EU mit 25 
und mehr Mitgliedern im 21. Jahrhundert. Beiträge für eine neue Weltordnung. Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Studien (Juni 2001– 
Mai 2003) Berlin/Warsaw 2003. https://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/ 
pdf/eu/dt-pl-studie.pdf 
563 For a general overview of the German agriculture policy in the face of the enlargement see for example Akzente der Beratung 
landwirtschaftlicher Unternehmen: Organisationsstrukturen, Rechtsformen, Besteuerung, EU-Osterweiterung; Vortrage der HLBS-
Hauptverbandstagung vom 21. bis 23. Mai 2001 in Dresden. Sankt Augustin: HLBS-Verl., 2001.  
564 For details of the proposed reform of the CAP: “Agenda 2000-For Stronger and Larger Union”, Bulletin der Europäischen Union 
Beilage 5/97, pp. 27-36; “The Week in Europe”, The European Commission, 19 March 1998; European Commission, 1998, Agenda 
2000, 
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Accession negotiations on the agricultural chapter were opened in June 2000. As 
particularly difficult were regarded the issues of fixing the quotas, veterinary and 
phytosanitary standards and the extension of the system of direct payments to the 
accession countries. Accession countries asked for relatively high production quotas, 
which were in line with the predicted future level of production. The European 
Commission opposed this demand and pushed for transition periods. German Farmers 
Association’s opinion differed with of the Commission on the milk sector. 
Bauernverband did not regard milk quotas as particularly problematic in the context of 
EU enlargement, the German milk industry viewed the EU milk quota system as 
administratively rather complex and difficult and favoured a phase-out of milk quotas. 
A second issue, of veterinary and phytosanitary standards, such as sanitary 
standards for dairies and slaughterhouses, caused a friction with the German 
representatives. The accession countries asked for transition periods for introducing the 
EU standards. The German government opposed it on the basis that it would undermine 
the operation of the single market. The German Farmers Association was of the same 
opinion as the government.  
The most contentious issue was of direct payments, as it had budgetary 
implications. This issue brought out the contradictions in German policy between 
advocacy of the Eastern enlargement, and concern with reducing German 
disproportionate contribution to the EU budget. The direct payments were first instituted 
to compensate farmers for price cuts. Since integration into the EU was understood as 
bringing higher prices for the majority of Central and East European farmers, German 
farmers argued that there was no reason to extend them to the accession countries565 
However over time other reason for maintaining the payments emerged: they were to be 
an income support for the poorest farmers. On this basis Eastern farmers should not be 
excluded. If the payments were to be treated as a reward for stewardship of the land, all 
farmers should receive such a reward566. 
                                         
565 Ewa Rabinowicz, “EU Enlargement and the Common Agricultural Policy: Finding Compromise in a Two-Level Repetitive 
Game,” International Politics 36, September 1999 
566  Ibid. 
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The EU Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler in a speech on10 July 2000 
stressed a distinction between equal and fair treatment and stated that he was ‘committed 
to fair treatment of all members, old and new’567. He also repeated other arguments 
against the extension of direct payments, such as direct payments would not facilitate the 
necessary restructuring of the agricultural sector in the accession countries and could lead 
to social tensions between subsidized farmers and industrial workers. German proposals 
for national co-financing failed in the run-up to the Berlin Summit of 1999 due to French 
resistance. In the Bundestag debate on the results of the Berlin Summit members of the 
governing parties claimed that the government had succeeded in defending the interests 
of eastern farmers preventing the introduction of differentiating elements into the 
administration of direct payments568. The Bauernverband stated that in principle it 
supported the extension of direct payments to farmers in the accession countries. This did 
not end acrimonious negotiations, however they had broader scope than of bilateral 
German-Polish relations.  
 
3. Border 
Another ‘enlargement threat’ was the future border of the EU: over 1,000 km of 
the borders shared with Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, after enlargement would become a 
strategic border of the EU. The demand from the EU, to raise the security of this border 
up to the EU standards, was one of the most forcefully presented to Poland. In order to 
meet these requirements Poland needed aid (it is worth however mentioning that claims 
of some scholars that before 1989, there had no been Polish border guards on the Eastern 
border, only Soviet border guards569, are untrue).  
It was Germany that provided a major financial and training aid aimed at 
increasing the efficiency of the border policing. The first legal regulations according to 
the EU standards came in the shape of the bilateral Readmission Agreement of 1993 with 
Germany; it introduced a possibility to gain asylum in Germany once migrants have 
arrived in Poland. Poland was encouraged to sign this agreement with Germany in 
                                         
567  Ibid. 
568 Deutscher Bundestag, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Protokolle, 14. Wahlriode, p. 3690 
569 Jörg Monar, Justice and Home Affairs, in H. Wallace and A. Mayhew (eds), Poland: A Partnership Profile. OEOS Policy Paper, 
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exchange for funding of 120 million DM to improve its asylum systems and border 
controls. The further legal adjustment aimed at creating asylum and refugees policies.  
Neither of the Eastern countries had any experience in dealing with asylum 
seekers; they used to produce asylum seekers for decades of communism, but not to host 
them, except for Hungary, which took on some refugees from neighbouring Romania in 
the late 80s570. The Aliens Act introduced in 1997 constituted the first attempt to regulate 
comprehensively the situation of asylum seekers and refugees in Poland. It did not 
however conform to international refugee law standards and the provision was amended 
in 2001. In order to implement the ‘safe country of origin’ and ‘safe third country’’ rules, 
the Polish government was required to adopt lists of safe countries under former Article 
95 (it failed however to agree on similar lists in regards to the citizens of Ukraine571).  
Initially candidate countries adopted relatively generous policies towards asylum 
seekers perceiving the influx of asylum seekers as rather temporary. With the EU 
accession, these states were bound to become more attractive as a destination for refugees 
and economic immigrants.  
The Langdon Report released in 1995 emphasized the need to adopt measures 
against illegal immigration and build efficient asylum systems in candidate countries572. 
The EU immigration and asylum laws under the new Title IV introduced at Amsterdam 
Summit in 1998. In particular, the Schengen acquis became part of the EU acquis and, as 
such, it also had to be adopted by candidate countries. These policies brought the 
requirement to introduce visas for non-EU citizens. It was particularly sensitive for 
Poland in the context of Poland’s policy towards Ukraine and Belarus, of which the main 
goal was to strengthen democratic processes there and one of the instruments was the 
open-border for the citizens of these countries. That was inducing a special fear among 
                                         
570 Claire Wallace, “Opening and Closing Borders: Migration and Mobility in East-Central Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, Vol. 28:, 2002; Also Malcolm Anderson, and Eberhard Bort, The frontiers of the European Union, New York: Palgrave, 2001 
571 see Katarzyna Wolczuk, “Poland”s Relations with Ukraine in the Context of EU Enlargement”, Brighton: ESRC One Europe or 
Several Programme, Briefing note 4/01. Katarzyna Wolczuk, “The Polish-Ukrainian Border: on the Receiving End of EU 
Enlargement”,  Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3:2, 2002. 
572 As presented by S. Lavenex, ““Asylum, Immigration, and Central-Eastern Europe: Challenges to EU Enlargement”,  European 
Foreign Affairs Review, NO 3, 1998; see also Guild, E., and C. Harlow (eds) Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum 
Rights in EC Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001; Byrne, R., G. Noll, and J. Vested-Hansen (eds) New Asylum Countries? Migration 
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German society. During the Cold War the borders of the Bundesrepublik had been tightly 
controlled (the internal German border and the border with Czechoslovakia). Opening 
borders now raised fears of spilling Russia organized criminal networks, Chinese illegal 
immigrants trafficked across the border and the like. Those fears were confirmed as 
justified in the following years, so the quality of control on Poland’s eastern border was 
of special meaning for the Germans. 
 
4. Living Standards 
Apart from the fears of immigration, for a substantial part of the German society 
the problem was still the German-Polish border, although in a different than historical 
legacy dimension; it was referred to by German media as a ‘poverty border’573.  
A national survey of January 2002 showed that nearly two thirds, 61 per cent of 
the Germans expected a diminution of their individual living standards after the 
enlargement, whereas only 18 per cent held an opposite view574. At the same time, a 
decrease of the standards of social welfare was expected, with 51 per cent being the 
highest figure among all current member states (the EU-15 average amounts to 39 per 
cent). Overall, in the first place it was fears related to the financial implications that 
explain German reservation against enlargement. The size of the future Union caused 
serious concerns (mainly connected with the EU functioning, and the lack of adequate 
reforms, for example on the seize of the Commission) and together with the awareness 
how much financial help the newcomers would need in order to catch up with at least the 
lowest level of GDP in the old EU, produced obvious conclusions.  
Despite some opinions that the enlargement would be a way of stabilising the new 
members’ economies and keeping the working population in place575, the common 
perception in Germany was opposite576. 
                                         
573 Tageszeitung for example used often the notion of the “European border of poverty” (Armutsgrenze Europa) 
574 For example Michael Bohmer, Migrationseffekte der Osterweiterung auf die EU-Arbeitsmarkte. Berlin: VWF, Verl. fur Wiss. und 
Forschung, 2001 
575 Alisdair Smith and Helen Wallace. “The European Union: Towards a Policy for Europe”,  International Affairs, 70, 3, July 1994. 
576 Hans-Werner Sinn, "EU enlargement and the future of the welfare state." In Stevenson lectures in citizenship, Discussion paper in 
economics, NO. 01-05, Glasgow: University of Glasgow, Department of Economics, 2001; Hans-Jurgen Wagener, The welfare state 
in transition economies and accession to the EU, EUI working papers, RSC NO. 2001/1, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy: European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre, 2001.  
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IV. OPTIONS 
1. Democratic Deficit 
The fears connected with the prospect of the enlargement were exacerbated by the 
introduction of the single currency on 1 January 1999. It came as an expected, yet hugely 
uncomfortable development for the German society. The abandonment of the powerful 
Deutsche Mark that epitomized the post-war success of Germany was the first reason for 
this lack of enthusiasm.  
Euro never had a solid support in German. The polls of 1994577 indicated 59 
percent of the Germans questioned were against the euro, in 1997 52 percent and in April 
1999, three months after the introduction still 43 per cent578 were against, and in autumn 
2000, according to the German Fors’ Institute survey, 56 percent of the questioned 
wanted to withdraw from the euro579. Helmut Kohl justified the abandonment of the D-
Mark (and other big political decisions) stressing the higher good, in this case that it was 
taken in the name of Europe. This reasoning was exploited by the opposite to Kohl 
politicians, who made an election pledge to abandon the top-down fashion of building 
Europe, as it was under Helmut Kohl.  
As the euro was already sealed as a currency in Germany, the enlargement 
became a new point of reference in the foreign policy debate. The fact that the way of 
introducing euro diminished hugely Germans’ support for anything connected with 
Brussels, was used now as an argument against ‘concealing the truth’ about the costs of 
enlargement. The prime Minister of Bavaria Edmund Stoiber announcing his intention to 
make the issue of the enlargement a central point of his election campaign of 2002, 
attacked Chancellor Schröder and his Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer on this ground, 
pointing that their government was exercising 19th century diplomacy with Brussels and 
hiding the inconvenient facts about the enlargement from German public opinion580. ‘The 
German government wants to push through this issue exactly as it did with the euro with 
discussing it with the German society’ — wrote Stoiber. His accusations were reiterated 
                                         
577 European Commission 1994, Eurobarometer No 41, Brussels 
578 Europap 3 Novermber 2000 
579 Ibid 
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Passauer Neue Presse, 3 December 1998; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 September 2000 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
268 
by Gerd Müller the spokesman of the CDU parliamentary foreign affairs group. He 
stressed that the ‘German government should start at last treating seriously national 
interests’581. 
The atmosphere exacerbated by the following media coverage. The respected 
weekly magazine Der Spiegel published in September 2000 the survey carried out by the 
Emnid Institute on the attitudes toward the 13 countries considered for the future rounds 
of the enlargements (thus including Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey) asking which country 
a respondent would favour as the first admitted to the EU582. The general support for the 
enlargement was conditional and the most characteristic outcome of this survey was that 
over 68 per cent of the questioned did not hold enlargement as a priority for the EU. The 
most important information in the article covering the Emnid survey, was however not 
about the Emnid survey, but about a survey allegedly carried out by the German 
government’s press office (Bundespresseamt) in the border regions of Germany. The aim 
of this survey was to assess the social mood in regards to the upcoming enlargement. 
According to the article the results of the survey were so horrifying that the government 
preferred to keep it secret. The Bundespresseamt however denied having carried out any 
survey like that583. 
Other survey worth quoting was the one on the attitudes of the elites carried out in 
1998 for the Polish International Relations Centre by two poll-institutions — Demoskop 
on the Polish side and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin on the German side — showed that 
over 73 per cent of the German elites felt and respected historical responsibility for the 
atrocities done to the Poles in the past and held that the supporting Poland on its way to 
NATO and the EU was a moral duty of the German elites. Enlargement had extremely 
high support among the elites — 85 per cent of the questioned did not have doubts over 
the admission of Poland to the EU. This rate was similarly high across backers of all 
political parties — with a record rate of 94 per cent of the FDP voters (Free Democrats 
Party), 86,5 per cent of SPD voters, 82 of the Green party, 89 of CDU and only 66 per 
cent of the CSU voters. These results did not however have any impact on the perception 
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582 Der Spiegel, 11 September 2000 
583 Author”s own research in the Autumn 2000. 
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of the negative sides of the enlargement — here the opinion of the elites was not much 
different from the perception of the wide public.  
For the German public opinion most of the ‘enlargement fears’ were connected 
with Poland as the nearest and most populous country among the candidates584, and the 
country burdened with most difficult and most threatening in the view of the German 
public problems. The last phase of the enlargement process, of the finalising it through 
the implementation of the means centred the perception of the enlargement in Germany 
often to bilateral German-Polish dimension of it.  
Looking into the German press presenting the developments over the time of five 
years 1998 — 2003585 one can list the main reasons for the fears of the enlargement as 
follows:  
• Cheap labour threatening stability of the German labour market  
• Obsolete Polish agriculture and costs of its modernization 
• The threat to the internal security given high rate of crimes in 
Poland and not sufficient security of the Eastern border 
• The threat to the Eastern border Länder due to disparities in wages 
and social welfare that would attract migration from the East  
Although the issue of agriculture or cheap labour concerned rather particular 
interest groups like food producers or specific sectors like of a construction industry, their 
arguments became a common opinion of the German public. It is important however to 
outline two other sets of factors completing the public perception of and the discussion 
over the enlargement. Potential advantages, that the enlargement was to bring, used to be 
formulated as follows: 
• New markets promising the growth of already dynamic trade 
• New jobs based on the assumed growth in trade and investments in 
the East 
                                         
584 Poland was the largest candidate country both in terms of area (313,000 sq km) and population (38.6 million inhabitants in 2000) 
585 Much of this research by author is based on the monitoring the developments on a daily basis, while working as a journalist for 
“Rzeczpospolita” Daily, the leading daily newspaper with the biggest broadsheet issue in Poland. 
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• Increased security on the Eastern front thanks to both economic 
and political stabilisation of the region and the increase of the security standards 
at the Eastern border of Poland 
• Gaining more central position of Germany in the EU 
The explanations of the low support for the enlargement pointed to the potential 
results of the enlargement that should be perceived through the lens of two specific 
German experiences586 — economic and social costs of the German unification and the 
way of introducing the single currency. These areas represent the ground of the debate 
and reasons why the attitudes of the German public towards the enlargement exacerbated 
at the time of the Agenda 2000 negotiations over the years 1998-2002. 
A new approach of the government to the European policy based on the more 
assertive voicing of criticism over the burden share and the insistence on the decrease of 
net payments of Germany escalated the negative perception of the enlargement. The new 
Red/Green coalition changed the atmosphere around the enlargement — with the 
questioning of some aspects of the enlargement, what replaced advocacy exercised by the 
previous government. It took its toll on the public attitude towards the enlargement. In 
autumn 2000 the Eurobarometer survey revealed the lowest support for the European 
integration among the German public: 36 per cent of the questioned supported 
enlargement with 43 per cent against587. Two most important issues the German society 
was concerned with were the labour market and agriculture. Poll questions on 
consequences of the enlargement for Germany specifically resulted in 20 per cent saying 
the enlargement would create more jobs and 55 per cent that it would not; 24 per cent that 
it would improve quality of life and 50 per cent that it would not; and 20 per cent that it 
would not cost Germany more and 64 per cent that it would. The decreasing trend in the 
support was to follow in the next years. 
German politicians recognized importance of these attitudes for the success of the 
enlargement. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in his speech on ‘multilateralism as a task 
of German foreign policy’ argued that the ‘multilateral imperative’ in German foreign 
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policy presented Germany with a number of challenges, including most prominently EU 
enlargement588. 
 
2. Referendum  
The media debate culminated in a surprising for majority of observers 
development. In September 2000, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter 
Verheugen suggested in a newspaper interview589 that a referendum could be an 
appropriate means of legitimization for political projects involving Germany. He pointed 
out that for ‘treaties which change the character of the state, there should be referendums 
(Volksentscheide)’. In response to the question about a widespread ‘fundamental 
objection’, namely that ‘the entire Eastern enlargement project is an elite project’ 
imposed upon people in the West and East, Verheugen replied that the mistakes that were 
made regarding the euro, which was introduced behind the people’s back, could not be 
repeated. He stressed that in the case of euro there should have been a referendum. ‘It 
would have compelled the elites to come out of their ivory tower and promote the Euro in 
dialogue with the people. Now, with the EU-enlargement, we are not permitted to again 
decide over the heads of the citizens’ — stated Verheugen. Although his suggestion to 
put the enlargement at a test of a referendum were entirely in line with the gist of the 
debate, it caused enormous irritation among other German politicians.  
It conflicted with the views of the coalition leadership on how enlargement and 
the German public’s attitudes towards it should be handled and even with the views of 
the opposite CDU party, except for Bavarian CSU and Edmund Stoiber, whose rhetoric 
indicated he would welcome referendum and its doubtlessly negative outcome. The day 
after Verheugen’s statements, Elmar Brok, the Chairman of the European Parliament’s 
External Affairs Committee, and a CDU politician, said that Eastern enlargement was a 
decided matter. If one could ‘state the basic reasons for eastern enlargement and not just 
let populism ensue, then one has a good chance to convince the public’. Brok claimed 
that the problematic accession candidates was not ‘taboo because of the political 
correctness’ and that ‘individual countries must be discussed, but not in the manner of an 
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election campaign or a referendum’590 His views were representative for the political 
elite’s position across the main parties. Yet the public was fed with different views and 
opinions by the German media. 
Verheugen’s proposal met approval of many German commentators and 
observers. A characteristic comment was that of Tagessppiegel that the time of Kohl’s 
pathos had passed and now there was time for solving problems in a pragmatic way591. 
But it was rejected by the German government as contradictory with the federal 
constitution (Basic Law), which for the historical reasons does not provide for this 
opportunity at the national, federal level. 
 
V. RESULTS 
Copenhagen Summit 
German government of Gerhard Schröder was not especially successful with the 
bargaining of the presented German preferences in the financing system of the European 
Union. The European Commission proposed in January 2002 a financial framework that 
was a result of the negotiations over Agenda 2000. It was not accepted first of all by the 
German government; it did not present a detailed reaction but a general criticism of 
which the main claim was that Germany was not prepared to accept expensive package 
deals in return for agreement on common EU positions.  
The principal argument of the German government was that Germany as the 
biggest net-contributor to the EU budget and the country that still had to bear costs of 
German unification should not be ‘overburdened’592. The position of the Germans was 
based on the Agenda 2000 agreement, which was achieved under the German Presidency 
in March 1999. Therefore, both Chancellor Schröder and his Foreign Minister Fischer 
insisted on not extending direct payments to the new members from Central and Eastern 
Europe up to the elections in September 2002 and that a slower gradual phasing-in of 
                                         
590 Der Spiegel, 4 September 2000. 
591 Tagesspiegel, 28 October 2000 
592 So e.g. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in Caceres, 9-10 February 2002, cf. Judy Dempsey, Paying for a bigger Europe, in 
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candidate countries was envisaged in the Agenda 2000 because of the absorption 
capacities of the new members.  
Chancellor Schröder explicitly presented the view of his government in an article 
published by the national Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung593. He pointed that Germany 
alone would have to bear costs of about 2 billion annually for direct payments in the EU 
of 25, which would be equivalent to a quarter of the total cost. He argued that given the 
Maastricht criteria for sustaining a balanced budget by the year 2004, these costs could 
not be taken over by Germany. Schröder also pointed out that proposals by the 
CDU/CSU to extend direct payments to the new members would have them co-financed 
from national budgets what would be ‘totally unrealistic’. First, because it would lead to a 
conflict with the French government, and secondly because the candidate countries could 
hardly finance the payments from their national budgets594.  
Chancellor Schröder reminded that his government had supported the proposal of 
co-financing during the Agenda 2000 negotiations in 1999, but this option was 
fundamentally rejected by France and other member states595. The German government 
co-initiated the statement, in the conclusions to the Seville European Council that an 
agreement on the Common position should be passed to the candidates. According to the 
statement there was room for a compromise which could be based on the principle of ‘no 
phasing-in without phasing-out’ which meant that the gradual granting of direct payments 
to new member states should go hand-in-hand with a phasing-out of direct payments for 
all member states and CAP reforms596. A solution along these lines could also tune down 
concerns about a two-class EU, which were strongly voiced by Eastern countries, 
especially Poland597.  
On the CAP reform the key coalition remained of France and Germany. 
                                         
593 Gerhard Schröder, Die Erweiterung muss bezahlbar sein, in Frankfurter Allgemeine  Sonntagszeitung, 16 June 2002. 
594 The ongoing at the time negotiations over the EU budget were much more complex, with the German, British and other net 
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597 Uniting Europe No. 173, 4 February 2002; Schröder: EU-Beitritt verzögert sich nicht, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 June 
2002 
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Schröder’s conflict with the French over the costs and benefits of integration ended up 
with Schröder’s withdrawal from his position over the German net contribution and the 
CAP in order — as it was said by Verheugen — to keep the dynamic of the integration598. 
Joschka Fischer also kept assuring that the Franco-German motor for the European 
integration remained undaunted599. The two countries agreed at the ‘head of government 
level’, before the first Agriculture Council in June 2003, that the degree of price cuts and 
the proportion of production should be lower than proposed by the Commission. Then 
ahead of the Brussels European Council of October 2002 they agreed that the agricultural 
budget should be frozen until 2013. This was duly agreed by at Brussels600.  
The initial position of Schröder’s government supporting reform of CAP was in 
principle widely supported in academic literature which pointed that this overly costly 
policy led to poor quality food and disadvantages for the third world countries 601. This 
critical position was shared by large parts of the Federal Confederation of German 
Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI) and other interest groups. The 
farmers’ lobbies were however in favour of the extension of the acquis including direct 
payments to the new members from Eastern Europe602. On the other hand, they refused 
spending more money on development of rural areas and the limitation in direct 
payments to large farms603 wanting to postpone any reforms after 2006604.  
The negotiations over the entry conditions continued and the final date of 
enlargement was being postponed. That was the reason why the commitment of the West, 
                                         
598 Financial Times, 10 May 2001; H. Stark, “The French Perspective,  The Franco-German Relationship after Nice as Viewed from 
Different National Perspectives”,  German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Vol.2 NO 4 May 2001, at http://www.deutsche-
Außenpolitik.de 
599 Ibid. 
600 On prices the proposed cut in cereals prices of 5% was rescinded, the cut in butter prices proposed in Agenda 2000 for the year 
2000 was reduced from 35.8% to 25% and frozen until 2005. The milk production quota increase also proposed in Agenda 2000 for 
the year 2000 was delayed another year to 2006 and additional increases of 2% in quota were dropped. 
601 For example Christian Weise et al., Die Finanzierung der Osterweiterung der EU, Baden-Baden 2002: Nomos; see also Barbara 
Lippert/Wolfgang Bode, Enlargement and the EU Budget: the Battles Ahead,  Intereconomics, March/April 2002, pp. 68-71; 
Wolfgang Quaisser, “Kosten der EU-Erweiterung – Neue Vorschläge der Europäischen Kommission und ihre Implikationen für die 
nächste Finanzperiode”,  Kurzanalysen und Informationen  No. 1/2002, Osteuropa-Institut München, February 2002.  
602 Enlargement/Agenda 2000-Watch, no. 4/2002; cf. also EU-Osterweiterung scheitert nicht an Agrarpolitik, press release by the 
German Farmers” Association, 18 June 2002, http://www.bauernverband.de. 
603 “German Criticism of CAP proposal may delay enlargement”, EU Observer, 10 July 2002 
604 Ibid.; see also CDU/CSU, Positionspapier zur Agrarpolitik, 1st August 2002, download: http://www.cdu.de/politik- a- 
z/landwirtschaft/positionspapier_agrarpolitik2.pdf. 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
275 
and especially of the German government, to the goal of embracing Eastern countries into 
the EU was ambivalent and perceived as such.  
It took four and a half years, from July 1998 to the Copenhagen European Summit 
in December 2002, to negotiate the conditions of the Agenda 2000. Much of this time 
was taken by a ‘ping-pong’ exchange of the proposals on certain quotas and transition 
periods between the Commission, candidate countries and the two main players — 
France and Germany. Although the Copenhagen Summit eventually confirmed that the 
first wave of enlargement would take place in 2004, the ‘enlargement package’ agreed 
upon then was again disappointing to the Eastern countries.  
The financial proposals not only did not match those initially envisaged in the 
Agenda 2000 and agreed on by the Commission in 1998; they provided for even less, 
than had been agreed upon at the Berlin Council in March 1999, when the budget for six 
new members was designed. The Copenhagen package, both in agriculture and Structural 
Funds, offered to the newcomers the conditions less favourable than to the incumbents. 
The total EU budget was established at barely more than 1% of GDP. That allowed 
saving the EU funds, since the four extra countries were small, and the time period of 
membership was reduced by more than half, from 4 years to 18 months, but the budget 
fell to a lower level, than proposed in Agenda 2000 and at the Berlin Summit. 
In the Agenda 2000 negotiations on CAP reform605 the German Ministry of 
Agriculture succeeded in imposing its policy objectives, that were nearly identical with 
those of the farm lobby, and in opposition to the stance of the Foreign, Economics and 
Finance Ministries. The increasing skepticism of the German public toward European 
policies encouraged the farm lobby606 to fight the CAP reform more strongly than during 
the 1992 negotiations. At Copenhagen the Council accepted the Commission’s proposal 
for the ten-year phase-in to full reimbursement of agricultural direct aids, starting at the 
25 percent level, as recommended by the Commission. Under the enormous pressure 
                                         
605 European Commission, 2003d Cap Reform Summary 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/mtr/sum_en.pdf; DEFRA, 2003, Summary of CAP reform Agreement – 26 June 2003 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/capreform/agreement-summary.htm 
606 The core of the powerful farm lobby is concentrated in Bayern, traditional constituency of the CSU. For an assessment of the 
problems Bayern faced with the prospect of the enlargement see see Bjorn Alecke, Auswirkungen der EU-Osterweiterung auf 
Wirtschaft und Arbeitsmarkt in Bayern: Studie im Auftrag des Bayerischen Staatsministeriums fur Wirtschaft, Verkehr und 
Technologie. Ifo-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Forschungsbereich Sozialpolitik und Arbeitsmarkte. 2001  
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from the accession candidates, mainly Poland, the Council modified the scheme to allow 
the new members to ‘top up’ the EU’s reimbursement of direct payments to farmers by 
30 percent, bringing the rate of reimbursement up to 55 percent in 2005, 60 percent in 
2006, 65 percent in 2007, etc. It also agreed that in 2005-2007, up to 40 percent of the 
‘top-up’ payments could be paid out of the EU funds received for rural development.  
As a result, while the ten states that were to enter the EU in 2004, would be by 
aggregation in the first three years of the membership net beneficiaries of the EU, rather 
than net contributors to the common budget, the financial terms of accession were much 
less generous than those granted to previous accession candidates. East Europeans 
perceived these outcomes as the result of the German negotiators’ stance. 
 
SUMMARY 
Simon Bulmer studying different facets of German power observed that 
‘Germany’s power in Europe during the Kohl period was better seen in pushing for long-
term strategic goals rather than the nitty-gritty bargaining over individual policy areas’607. 
This found its reflection in the difference of approaches between Chancellor Kohl and 
Schröder to the enlargement. The ambivalence in the enlargement policy of the 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s government was created by the gap between the support 
for the enlargement Chancellor felt obligated to continue, by the commitment of his 
predecessor Helmut Kohl and the desire to secure Germany’s financial and economic 
interests, that would be met if the EU members had agreed on the budgetary and 
institutional reforms. This was an attempt brought about by the changed terms of the 
‘contract’ with the German society on the issue of the European integration projects.  
A combination of the new sovereign status of Germany and resulting from it an 
elite debate on the ‘normalisation’ of the foreign policy, with an underlying suggestion to 
embrace more assertive approach to the national interests on the one hand, and the 
prospective costs of the enlargement on the other hand, triggered and exposed all threats 
                                         
607 Simon Bulmer, “Shaping the rules? The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and the German Power”, in: Katzenstein, 
Tamed Power…, op. cit., p. 49-79. Also: Simon Bulmer, The Domestic Structure of European Policy-Making in the West Germany, 
New York, 1986; Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, “European Policy-Making in the Federal Republic: Internal and External 
Limits to Leadership”, in: W.Wessels & E.Regelsberger (eds), The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community: The 
Presidency and Beyond, Bonn, 1987; Dyson and Goetz (eds), Germany, Europe…, op.cit. 
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and fears, real and perceived of the European integration, epitomised now by the 
enlargement project. It brought into the policy making process the public opinion in a 
manner not noted before. And the public opinion at this stage expressed through the 
media in Germany conjured up fears of social threats. Once opened up during the election 
campaign, they were difficult to contain later and to a high degree determined the 
enlargement policy of Chancellor Schröder’s government.  
That touches upon the issue of democratic deficit in modern democracies. The 
phenomenon of differences between the goals and preferences of political elites and the 
wider public is present in all polities across Europe and the conducting of foreign policy 
that lacks popular support is rather common. In case of German polity Karl Kaiser 
observed in 1992, that ‘intermeshing of decision making across national frontiers and the 
growing multinationalization of formerly domestic issues are inherently incompatible 
with the traditional framework of democratic control’608. Kaiser pointed to the problems 
that politicians can refer to the collective character of the decision taken and high costs 
for the country if a parliament rejected the agreement that was negotiated by the 
governments. This led him to the conclusion that the executive can use the complexity 
and the lack of transparency of international negotiations to prevent unwelcome 
intrusions by the parliament or by public opinion before an agreement is concluded. 
Thirty years later the phenomenon matured into a sharp contradiction between 
declarations of ‘bringing Europe to the citizens’ and introducing more democracy on the 
one hand, and institutionalised avoidance of it in practice and keeping citizens 
consistently at bay.  
According to the liberal conception of international relations the state is not an 
actor but a representative institution, constantly subjected to ‘capture and recapture, 
construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors’609. However liberal 
                                         
608 Karl Kaiser, Unsere Rolle in Europa”, in: Christian Hein, Karl von Beyme, Marl Mayer, Deutsche Ansichten. Die Bundesrepublik 
in Übergang, Bonn, 1992  
609 Andrew Moravcsik offers for example a rich theoretical framework for studying collusive delegation based on three general 
theoretical propositions: 1. international cooperation can have the effect of redistributing (with (i) international cooperation can shift 
agenda-setting power, (ii) redistribute opportunities for participation in domestic decision-making procedures, (iii) amplify 
informational asymmetries, (iiii) change ideological justification for policies; 2. the second proposition is that the redistribution of 
domestic political resources favours those directly in charge of international cooperation, which generally are national executives; 3. 
the third proposition is that this redistributive effect feeds back into intergovernmental bargaining, generally increasing the 
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approach assuming that domestic politics determines the possibility and form of 
international cooperation, departs from liberalism in that that the state is not 
conceptualized as a ‘problem-solver’ aiming at satisfying societal demands, but as a ‘self-
interested’ actor aiming at maximising its own room for manoeuvre.  
As Klaus Goetz and Kenneth Dyson610 pointed the congruency of the Germany’s 
and the European Union’s interests is based on the consistent pro-European consensus of 
the German elite, ‘permissive’ public consensus and the basic accommodation between 
EU and German institutions and policies, which rests on the ‘institutional similarities’611. 
These features Peter Katzenstein described as the key to the ‘softness of German power 
in Europe612.  
Lack of permissive consensus on the European policy as led by Chancellor Kohl 
change this policy during the Chancellor Schröder’s tenure. The new state preferences 
also shook the pro-European consensus of the German elite. Germany’s political class 
found itself under a tension between an electorate moving away from ‘pro-Europe’, and 
even ‘pro-EU’ positions, and the external pressures of Eastern European countries 
demanding the entry into the EU (after fulfilling a set of difficult conditions). There was 
no organized attempt on behalf of the German elites to manage public frustration in this 
respect, as it was no in respect to embracing the EMU. 
The analysis of the ‘ambivalence’ variable as indicating the changing concept of 
the European integration in this case, points out that the normative side of the new 
concept was gaining in this phase, through the intergovernmental bargaining over the EU 
reforms and post-enlargement arrangements of the redistributive system, a new economic 
and financial framework. 
 
 
 
                                         
executive”s incentive to reach agreement. See: Andrew Moravcsik, “Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic 
Politics and International Cooperation”, Center for European Studies Working Paper Series No. 52., Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1994;  Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist 
approach”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 April 1993 
610 Dyson, Goetz, Germany, Europe…, op.cit.  
611 Ibid.  
612 Katzenstein, Tamed Power…, op.cit. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
This thesis aimed to find and explain the causes and the reasons of ambivalence in 
Germany’s policy towards the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. There are 
seven major conclusions that have been drawn from the presented material and they 
unfold as follows: 
 
1. A Geopolitical and Historically Conditioned Choice. The endorsement of the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU was an obvious choice for German policy makers as 
pertaining to geopolitics. The idea introduced by Eastern Europeans was congruent with 
the most fundamental interests of the German nation, which reflected the core of the 
national identity — an imperative to overcome the results of WWII and to conduct the 
policy towards the enlargement on the premises of multilateral cooperation. 
2. Two Sets of Constraints. The constraints to the support for the EU 
enlargement that caused ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy were primarily of 
political character and occurred first in the external realm. They appeared on the level of 
concepts and at the stage of conceptualising a new political and security order in Europe, 
and only afterwards in the economic area. The first constraints belonged both to bilateral 
relations of Germany with its Western and Eastern partners, as well as to the areas of 
international security, and interdependencies within the European Union. The second set 
of constraints was primarily of domestic origins — these were economic interests created 
by a new domestic setting shaped by the process of Germany’s unification and also 
interests of domestic groups represented at the negotiations of the accession terms and 
conditions. 
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3. Balancing ‘As-Well-As’ Strategy. All the constraints and contradictory 
interests and expectations of the partners forced German policy makers to adopting a 
strategy of balancing challenges. This strategy created a background for occurrence of 
ambivalence in the German policy towards the enlargement, but ultimately decided about 
the enlargement’s success. 
4. Changing Concept of the European Integration. The enlargement policy of 
the German governments became a part of Germany’s grand European strategy, its 
Europapolitik. The East European states were included in the European integration 
policy. It represented a new, expanded concept of the European integration. The analysis 
of the causes of ambivalence in the enlargement policy of Germany helps to see the 
process of this change — how the new concept of the European integration was emerging 
and how German elites shaped this concept. 
5. Helmut Kohl’s Leadership. Chancellor Helmut Kohl was called an architect 
of the enlargement. Given the role of the European Commission in the enlargement 
process, this opinion may be debatable. But the analysis of the causes of ambivalence in 
Germany’s enlargement policy provides evidence for this claim; the constantly 
supportive stance of Chancellor Kohl for the enlargement is visible especially when 
confronted with constraints and conflicting with the enlargement factors. It is visible in 
the balancing contradictions tactics. Although the tactics led to manifestations and 
perception of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards the enlargement, but at the same 
time it exposes the consistency of Chancellor’s commitment. It exposes how this 
commitment was carried out despite contradictions to the moment of the EU decision 
about admission of the Eastern European countries.  
6. New Quality of Ostpolitik. Germany’s policy towards the enlargement, despite 
its apparent contradictions, introduced a change in German Ostpolitik. The Eastern 
neighbours gained equal footing with the former main addressee of this policy — Russia. 
And Germany’s advocacy of the enlargement supported the process of overcoming the 
difficult legacy of WWII. 
7. Theory: Constructivism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism. This thesis 
demonstrates that Germany’s enlargement policy is possible to understand with the 
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application of two accounts that are usually considered mutually exclusive, of 
constructivism and liberal intergovernmentalism. 
 
1. A Geopolitical and Historically Conditioned Choice. For German policy 
makers the endorsement of the Eastern enlargement of the EU was an obvious choice for 
historical reasons, both related to the World War II consequences and to the end of the 
Cold War — it was harmonious with the need for a post-WWII reconciliation with the 
Eastern neighbours and elevating the relations with these countries. The idea was also 
congruent with the most fundamental interests of the German nation that were conveyed 
in the post-war European integration policy through the principle of multilateral 
cooperation with partners, a feature that allowed Germany to change its international 
position and standing after WWII.  
From a geopolitical point of view the end of the Cold War once more put 
Germany back in the centre of Europe, as its strongest and largest economy, thus 
potentially its dominant power. At the same time, German policy makers found 
themselves forced to operate under a wide range of external constraints, many of them 
exerting pressures that directly countered the preferences Germany’s partners were 
pushing for. Eastern European pressed Germany for leading post-1989 changes in 
European order across a wide agenda; they expected Germany to lead first a process of 
embracing Eastern Europe into the structures of the European Union and NATO. German 
policy makers were, however, constrained in their freedom of action. These constrains 
were shaped by a decades-long semi-sovereign status of Germany and they did not 
disappear after the unification. On the contrary — fears of the emerging, largest power in 
Europe, prompted Germany’s partners, France mainly, to imposing on the new Germany 
conditions that would contain this power. A commitment to the deepening of the Western 
integration was a tool for this containment. 
The choice of multilateral cooperation by the unified Germany can be seen from 
two points of view. A rationalist perspective points that German policy makers had no 
alternative but to accept the requests of the Western partners in order to win the 
unification and save a reputation of a reliable partner. From a constructivist point of view 
German policy makers did not want to dismiss the requests of their Western partners 
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because the principle of multilateral cooperation was embedded into the German national 
identity and Germany’s political rationale and it served Germany’s interests in the world 
of growing international interdependencies.  
Germany’s support for the Eastern enlargement was a strategic choice. And again 
— it can be seen that for German policy makers and elites this support was hardly a 
choice. Political circumstances of 1990-1991, the break-down of communism in Eastern 
Europe and the unification of Germany, forced upon German political elites, and in fact 
on all Western European political elites, the support for the ambitions formulated by 
Eastern Europeans to join the Western structures. In this context, the calls of Eastern 
Europeans for the Western Community to expand were impossible to ignore; for Western 
policy makers because of the collapse of communism, and for German policy makers 
because of the successful unification of the German states. 
German elites, however, as this research confirms, did not see themselves as 
having a choice over the EU enlargement, for the reasons entrenched much deeper, in the 
national identity and deriving from the history of the relations with their Eastern 
neighbours. The strongest proof is the choice German leaders made endorsing the Eastern 
Europeans’ goals, despite the opposition to the enlargement first of all France, the main 
partner of Germany, then of other member states, for whom the enlargement presented a 
risk of losing economic benefits provided by the EU subsidiary system. They declared 
and consistently sustained the support for the enlargement also despite the fact that it was 
in conflict with the commitment to participate in the process of deepening the Western 
integration. 
A strong sense of historical imperative to support the process of overcoming the 
division of Europe was a primary motive behind Germany’s support for the EU 
enlargement. It was the main facet of historical reasoning, but it had also a bilateral 
dimension. The end of communism created a possibility for developing a new quality in 
the bilateral relations with Eastern Europe, which thus far had been burdened by the 
unresolved legacy of WWII. Support for the EU enlargement, for political ambitions and 
goals of the new East European democracies, provided an excellent platform for solving 
problems and building relations of a new quality.  
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The support for the enlargement has to be also seen as a logical continuation of 
the post-war pattern of the FRG’s foreign policy, of which the premise was the European 
integration. Now, as this principle was strengthened by the successful unification of 
Germany, it would be historically consistent to follow and spread the unification trend on 
the whole continent. The success of Germany’s unification also generated expectations 
that the German political elites should lead the process of the unification of Western and 
Eastern parts of Europe.  
Geopolitical and historical circumstances made thus German policy makers 
choose to meet the expectations of both Western and Eastern partners, and pursue both 
deepening and widening of the European Union. It was a choice of the ‘as-well-as’ 
strategy, which for some scholars represents one of the basic traces of the FRG’s post-
war foreign policy613. For the same reasons, geopolitical and historical, Germany engaged 
into a task of securing NATO expansion by smoothing relations with the Soviet Union, 
employing the same tactics. 
Under these circumstances, the ambiguities and inconsistencies of German 
enlargement policy are explicable. First the enlargement was only a part of Germany’s 
European policy, its grand strategy of Europapolitik. Second — any explicit strategy for 
reshaping post-Cold War Europe, if it had been pushed through against the interests of 
the major partners, would have aroused suspicions and hostility. German policy makers 
refrained from such a strategy, but it did not protect them from criticism: all of 
Germany’s partners were frustrated by Germany’s policy anyway. The Western partners 
were anxious about Germany’s support for the East Europeans’ ambitions, Eastern 
Europeans feared that Germany would defend the EU internal balance against the 
enlargement. German policy makers, first of all Chancellor Helmut Kohl, decided that a 
chief goal of the new foreign policy of the unified Germany would be to dispel fears of 
Germany’s partners and to balance contradictory expectations. 
This set of circumstances constitutes a background for emerging of ambivalence 
in the policy towards the enlargement. The ambivalence was caused and created by a 
                                         
613 The two leading authors presenting this much closer to the assumptions expressed in the tradition of the German foreign policy 
are Timothy Garton Ash and Adrian Hyde-Price; see Ash, In Europe”s Name…, op.cit., Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order…, 
op.cit. 
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tension between opposite factors, which first occurred at the time of Germany’s 
unification and then unfolded along the enlargement project, for the most part on the 
external board, and only in the last phase of the process, on the domestic level. Yet the 
German governments, both of Helmut Kohl and his successor Gerhard Schröder 
maintained support for the enlargement throughout the whole enlargement process, 
although the policy under Chancellor Schröder differed from the policy of Chancellor 
Kohl.  
History-based and geopolitical factors, and a decision to maintain the principle of 
multilateralism in the foreign policy, were not the only reasons for supporting the Eastern 
enlargement. The enlargement also proved to be congruent with Germany’s material 
interests, which emerged after the collapse of communism. German elites were well 
aware of a need to stabilize the region and the idea of anchoring Eastern European 
nascent democracies in the Western institutional framework was a logical and 
indispensable step. That, together with understanding that the enlargement provided an 
opportunity to liberate Europe from the remaining WWII legacy limitations, represented 
a permissive public consensus among German elites. This consensus, however, faced 
strong conflicting factors not only in the external but on the domestic stage too.  
 
2. Two Sets of Constraints. The research allowed systematising challenges, 
constraints, and contradictions German policy makers faced while conceptualising and 
conducting a policy towards the Easter enlargement of the EU. The analysis of the 
empirical material in this thesis shows that the ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards 
the enlargement was not a result of a lack of political will to support this idea. On the 
contrary — the policy of subsequent German governments, that spanned 14 years, proved 
to be consistently supportive of the enlargement. Yet this policy was not immune to 
contradictory factors that were in conflict with the enlargement. The examination of the 
causes of this ambivalence depicts Germany’s policy as unfolding in two main phases:  
1) The first phase corresponds roughly with Helmut Kohl’s tenure; it began at the 
moment when Chancellor Kohl picked up the idea of enlargement in response to the 
demands of the Eastern European countries. It was a phase of ‘setting agenda’ — 
conceptualising and building the enlargement policy both on the EU and of German 
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foreign policy level. On the EU level it was a phase of designing a roadmap and setting a 
timetable for the enlargement as the culminating point. On the German foreign policy 
level it was a phase of a strategic reorientation of the Ostpolitik, and including it into a 
broad Europapolitik framework. Enlargement’s supporters during this phase faced 
political constraints in the external realm: German policy makers were required to 
maintain the balance with the United States and Russia in the context of creating a new 
security system in Europe and with the Western EU partners in the context of the 
enlargement project itself.  
2) The second phase started in the mid-1990s and lasted till the completion of the 
enlargement in 2004. It began when the timetable was set in the Agenda 2000 programme 
and it was a phase of ‘managing the agenda’. German policy makers were faced in this 
phase with new pressures and constraints to the enlargement, this time economic and of 
domestic origins. The costs of Germany’s unification strained financial capability of the 
German states and impacted the attitudes of the German society towards the European 
integration, and the project of the EU Eastern enlargement, shifting the enlargement 
rhetoric from the normative narrative of values and ideas of the new concepts of the 
European organization, to the financial and economic benefits/costs calculation of this 
organization. 
The research demonstrates that German policy makers while considering the EU 
Eastern enlargement faced the necessity to balance first strategic external political 
constraints and only then domestic interests and preferences that were in conflict with 
enlargement. The former reflect a phase of conceptualising a new European order, the 
latter — a phase of implementing the adopted policy. 
The first set of constraints, the political and external ones German policy makers 
faced in the context of the EU enlargement, were a result of a combination of a specific, 
geo-political position of Germany in the heart of Europe on the one hand and the post—
Cold War political circumstances of the European environment on the other. This 
combination confronted German politicians with a challenge of making strategic choices 
for the new, post-unification German foreign policy, be it in the international security 
area or in the European integration area. The elements of this combination were mutually 
constitutive: Germany’s geo-political position allowed German policy makers and elites 
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to co-shape the post-Cold War changes in the security and political order in Europe, for 
example through supporting the NATO expansion project, or through a domestic debate 
on a new concept of the European integration. 
Economic interests of German actors that were in conflict with the enlargement, 
and that are so often recalled as the cause of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement 
policy, impacted this policy towardsly in its last phase, of negotiations over the admission 
terms. They impacted the phase of ‘managing the agenda’, slowing down the process of 
the enlargement, while in the light of this analysis, the main constraints that impacted 
Germany’s enlargement policy causing the ambivalence in this policy occurred at the first 
stage, during the process of ‘turning idea into political agenda’. This represents a point of 
departure of this thesis with other accounts of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement 
policy. 
The analysis proves that the ambivalence appeared and manifested mainly during 
the first half of the 14-year long policy. It was Helmut Kohl’s tenure, and the 
enlargement in the first years was only a concept. Chancellor Kohl picked up this concept 
as highly congruent with the most fundamental interests of the German nation, that 
represent the core of the national identity. The subsequent constraints to this concept, and 
to the Chancellor’s support, occurred on the level of conceptualising a new political and 
security order in Europe. This is the main reason why ambivalence at this stage 
manifested as a gap between the supportive rhetoric of Chancellor Kohl and lack of 
following tangible actions. Only after the concept was uploaded on the EU political 
agenda (after setting the Copenhagen criteria in 1993), the process of the enlargement 
gained a tangible dimension of more concrete political actions, but the primary 
battleground for the enlargement was still a ground of ideas and concepts, and remained 
as such, until the process entered the phase of negotiations over the entry terms and 
conditions, that were outlined in the Agenda 2000 programme and started after 1998. The 
tension that was caused by the domestic debate over a choice between two directions of 
widening and deepening of the European integration and over the NATO expansion 
project versus an exclusive European security system, are paramount evidence here. 
The second phase, after the Agenda 2000, was a phase of highly tangible and 
visible actions around the enlargement, because negotiations of quotas, limits and 
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transition periods are actions by definition. And the scale of engagement of German 
actors in these negotiations (highly organized and strong interest groups and highly vocal 
of their interests Germany’s representatives to the EU) made this phase widely reported 
in media and therefore known. A focus on those negotiations would suggest that this was 
the phase when the enlargement idea faced the most serious opposing factors, decisive for 
its success or failure. Yet this research demonstrates that the decisive for a success or 
failure phase was the initial one, between the years 1990 and 1995, when the enlargement 
project was in the process of turning it from an idea into a policy.  
Domestic interests reflected the exhaustion of the German society with the costs 
of the unification that were much higher than anticipated. This exhaustion triggered fears 
about the costs of the EU enlargement. It was not only a strong domestic constraint to the 
support for enlargement; it also brought about a national debate on the new interests and 
the new foreign policy of the unified Germany. This debate reflected a generational 
difference in perception of the past between two government teams — of Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl and of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. For Helmut Kohl, a promoter of the 
enlargement, the war was a personal memory and a formative factor of his political 
philosophy of support for the European integration and for the enlargement; Kohl was 
perceived as an advocate of the enlargement. Kohl’s successor Gerhard Schröder, who 
lacked war experience, operated with a different, more material-interests oriented rhetoric 
and was perceived as less committed to the enlargement and to the European integration 
too. Yet Chancellor Schröder did not have much choice over the enlargement policy; 
when he assumed power the enlargement process, set in motion by Helmut Kohl, was 
already irreversible. 
 
3. Balancing ‘As-Well-As’ Strategy. The constraints and factors that were 
opposing the enlargement idea forced German policy makers to conducting a policy of 
balancing challenges. It was ‘as-well-as’ strategy and was carried out consistently over 
the years in regards to the major external challenges: the European integration, the NATO 
enlargement and the EU enlargement. For Chancellor Kohl it was a matter of reconciling 
these directions, not of choosing one over another. This decision to carry out the support 
for the enlargement, and simultaneously to embrace other, conflicting directions and 
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challenges made the German enlargement policy often ambivalent, causing both 
manifestations and perception of ambivalence. But the ‘as-well-as’ strategy employed for 
balancing contradictory challenges proved highly effective; it was decisive for the 
success of the enlargement.  
It was critical for Germany to save old loyalties to its Western partners, whose 
support for the Federal Republic was fundamental for its international success after 
WWII, while at the same time to meet the expectations of Eastern Europeans and support 
their goal of joining the NATO and European Union structures. It was also fundamental 
to maintain balance with the U.S. and with Russia in the context of creation of a new 
European security system. These imperatives were shaping Germany’s foreign policy 
throughout the 1990s decade. And, as they conflicted with each other, they inhibited the 
progress of the EU enlargement. 
The balancing strategy was apparent the most in three cases — of a challenge to 
maintain good relations with France which opposed the enlargement, in the case of 
maintaining engagement into the Western integration project which was in conflict with 
the enlargement, and in the case of the NATO expansion, which was congruent with the 
enlargement but delayed its progress. 
The first two challenges — the French opposition to the enlargement and the idea 
of deepening the Western integration first, constrained the enlargement explicitly. The 
support for NATO expansion constrained the enlargement implicitly, but a final result of 
this project was highly supportive for the EU enlargement.  
French opposition to the enlargement blocked initially a possibility for German 
policy makers to take up tangible actions that would project the enlargement idea onto the 
level of decision-making in the EU, and given the position of Germany in the EU such 
actions are possible to imagine. Instead of taking up actions that would support the 
enlargement directly, German policy maker responded with an idea of the Weimar 
Triangle. The Triangle was designed as a diplomatic vehicle for getting the French on 
board; German policy makers did not push their French counterparts to accept the 
enlargement, they wanted to convince them to the enlargement, first by creating a 
potentially favourable platform. It was dictated by a concern to avoid any impression of 
wavering about the pledges and commitments made to the French partners. German 
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policy makers were faced therefore with the necessity to balance the relations with 
France against the emerging new interests in the relations with Eastern partners. The 
challenge in this phase was of choosing priorities, and an explicit choice of Germany was 
the Maastricht Treaty. At the same time, the Weimar Triangle was to serve a task of 
building up a momentum for the enlargement and upgrading the Europe Agreements.  
A challenge of maintaining balance between two opposite directions of the 
European integration was equally complicated. It arose when German leading policy 
makers put the idea of ‘deepening of Western integration first’ on the table. The 
commitment to deepening the Western integration, made during the unification 
negotiations, faced German policy makers with a dilemma how to reconcile two 
directions, of deepening and widening of the EU. It was a dilemma of a choice, because it 
was seen as such, both in political and economic terms, by majority of German and 
Western elites. The initial choice made by Chancellor Kohl of deepening the integration 
as priority seemed to subordinate the enlargement commitment to the European ‘ever 
closer Union’. The endorsement of the Maastricht Treaty and the pledge to embrace the 
European Monetary Union were strengthened then with a proposal of Karl Lamers and 
Wolfgang Schäuble to create the ‘core of the Union’. It presented a risk of suppressing 
the enlargement idea. But in fact it demonstrated a process of hammering out a consensus 
over the goals of the German foreign policy, that were set by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
and that were about keeping a balance between conflicting challenges and saving the 
Franco-German relationship intact, building new relations with the Eastern European 
countries, and supporting both widening and deepening of the EU. As those directions 
were seen as opposite and conflicting with each other, the German policy towards the 
enlargement was by default ambivalent. 
Nonetheless the ‘as-well-as’ strategy was decisive for the success of the 
enlargement. Considering the difficulties the members of the Union had at the beginning 
of the 1990s with working out a coherent framework for institutionalisation of a political 
dialogue with Eastern partners, it was the Germany’s stance, consistently supportive for 
the ambitions of Eastern Europeans, and a simultaneous emphasis on the commitment to 
the Western integration, that led the EU members states to the endorsement of the 
enlargement. The declaration of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993 set 
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the criteria for the EU membership. It opened the way for German policy makers for 
more decisive politics towards the enlargement and the Structured Dialogue, which was 
promoted by Germany and provided an institutional platform for a dialogue with Easter 
European applicants, was a direct result of this opening. A culminating point of the 
supportive policy towards the enlargement was at the Amsterdam Summit of 1997, when 
Germany chose facilitating the enlargement over insisting on agreement on the EU 
reforms.  
Chancellor Helmut Kohl made the enlargement policy an integral part of 
Germany’s grand European policy, including Eastern Europe into the project of the 
European integration. His strategy ‘as-well-as’ introduced the relations with Eastern 
Europe into the EU politics. This change was supported also by the second major factor 
analysed in this thesis: the process of building a new security system in Europe, for which 
participation of German policy makers was crucial. They employed a strategy of 
balancing opposite challenges in this case too. 
The initial hesitation of German politicians about the NATO expansion project 
created ambivalence in the German stance on the new European order, of which the EU 
enlargement was one of the three pillars. After making a decision to support the 
expansion of NATO, German policy makers were positioned as a broker for addressing 
Russian concerns. Although the project absorbed political energy postponing the progress 
of the EU enlargement but ultimately it helped to facilitate it. The velvet revolution of 
1989 that ended communist rule in Eastern Europe was unfinished without new security 
arrangements that would end the Soviet/Russian influence in the region. The agreement 
that included Eastern Europe in the NATO pact sealed the post Cold War order in 
Europe. The success affected the thinking about the EU enlargement in two ways. First, 
once the new security order was decided, the road to the political new order was open. 
Secondly, the fact that Russian leaders did not take up any major action against the 
expansion of NATO, which was moving Western military power right up to the Russian 
borders, eased the fear about the Russia’s reaction to the plan of moving the political 
power of the EU right up to its borders.  
Given that German policy makers were expected to play a role of a broker 
between the U.S. and Russia and that it was the German Defence Minister Volker Rühe 
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who put the idea of expanding NATO on the table as early as in March 1993, the progress 
in this area helped to ground the new way of thinking about European order among 
German and Western elites. The most visible proof of this was the position of Chancellor 
Kohl himself, who at first was caught off guard by his Defence Minister’s bold proposal, 
but eventually supported the idea. The balancing strategy ‘as-well-as’, although in the 
case of NATO enlargement not as pro-active as it was in case of the European 
integration, also proved to be a winner for Germany. The NATO expansion was to a high 
degree a success of the German diplomacy. 
This strategy was successful in balancing the external constraints outlined above. 
Addressing domestic challenges required a different strategy — not of diplomacy, but of 
defending domestic interests. While the multilevel policy-making system of Germany 
made it possible for specific interest groups to defend their economic interests directly at 
the European Union stage, like in the case of German Länder, which created their own 
representation to the EU within the framework of the regional policies, the economic 
interests of the state, like the issue of Germany’s net contribution to the EU budget, had 
to be, and was, handled by the federal government.  
The federal government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl chose at the Amsterdam 
Summit the enlargement over the insistence on the impossible at the time to agree upon 
reform of the EU. The centre in the balancing strategy shifted here in favor of the 
enlargement but cost Chancellor Kohl and his party the elections in 1998. His balancing 
strategy was absent from one, vital though area — the relation with public opinion. 
German governments failed to present the enlargement case in a way that would make 
this policy better understood and accepted by German society. The result was that the 
prospective costs of the enlargement, in the context of the much higher than anticipated 
costs of the German unification, made it difficult for the constituencies to embrace the 
enlargement. And the Amsterdam Summit contributed to the perception that Chancellor 
Kohl subordinated national interests to the interest of the European integration. 
 
4. Changing European Integration Policy. The enlargement policy of the 
German governments became a part of Germany’s grand European strategy. The East 
European states, through the enlargement policy, were included into Germany’s 
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European integration policy. The analysis of causes of ambivalence in Germany’s policy 
towards the enlargement exposes how German elite debate contributed to the change of 
the concept of the European integration.  
In the light of this analysis it was the German debate over endorsing two 
directions of widening and deepening of the European integration that started this change 
and contributed extensively to the new shape of this concept. There are two reasons here 
— the European integration concept originated as a preventive political mechanism 
against a repetition of war, and West Germany was at the centre of creation of this 
mechanism. The second reason is that West German elites developed the concept of the 
European integration as a foundation of the rationale of their foreign policy. 
The sense of historical responsibility for WWII shared by German elites, which 
was at the basis of Germany’s promotion of the Eastern enlargement, had shaped the 
premises of Germany’s post-war foreign policy614. It set a principle of cooperation with 
other countries and resulted in developing a unique phenomenon of ‘Europeanization’, 
which with time became imprinted in a ‘genetic code’ of German political elites615. The 
concept of implanting Europeanization into the Germany’s ‘genetic code’ implies that it 
allowed German policy makers to embrace international interests, making them national 
interests.  
This element, as the analysis of ambivalence that was created by the widening-
deepening tension indicates, was at play when Germany chose to champion the 
enlargement in the name of Europe’s best interests, while at the same time German 
political elites preferred to prioritize the deepening the integration within the EU. The 
course was set by Chancellor Kohl; his endorsement of both directions gained a broad 
understanding among German elites, who saw it as highly congruent with the national 
interests. And although the domestic debate was elaborating the ‘pros and cons’ of both 
directions, confronting them in this way, the dilemma for German government executives 
was not to choose one direction or the other. It was how to balance both directions in 
order to preserve national interests, how to conduct ‘as-well-as’ politics, thus how to 
                                         
614 See: Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order. Enlarging NATO and the EU, Manchester University Press 2000 
615 Klaus Goetz, “Integration in a Europeanized State: Germany and the Intergovernmental Conference”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 3, 1996: p.24 
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prioritize choices in a practical way. German politicians’ support for the deepening the 
EU was a response to the expectations of the Western partners but it was also in the 
interest of Germany to co-shape the future of the European Union. The support for the 
enlargement was a consequence of recognising the momentum created by the Eastern 
countries and a response to their application.  
The analysis of the ambivalence variable demonstrates that the ‘as-well-as’ 
strategy of balancing contradictory challenges initiated the change of the concept of the 
European integration. A seemingly small shift of accents in the rhetoric of Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl, from the ‘Western’ to ‘European’ integration was a harbinger of the 
change.  
A phenomenon of the European integration continued to evolve since it was 
applied in the aftermath of WWII, when the Federal Republic sought a way to rebuild its 
international credibility. Until 1989 the notion meant the West European integration, by 
default. After 1990 the term became highly ambiguous. The French, Belgians and Dutch 
still held it as the West European integration fearing, that the concept of pan-European 
unity would reduce their influence in the EU and leave Germany as the central power. 
However, for the reasons indicated above, which made German politicians and elite lend 
support to the enlargement, German policy makers became much more deeply engaged in 
the process of the enlargement, than the policy makers of other member states. Therefore 
the notion of the European integration was evolving much faster in the German elite 
debate and for German policy makers, than for their French, Dutch or Belgian 
counterparts.  
The analysis of the identified constraints and how they created ambivalence in 
Germany’s enlargement policy demonstrates that German policy makers chose the 
enlargement as one of the prerequisites of Germany’s European policy. The policy of 
balancing the subsequent tensions created by the French opposition to the enlargement, 
by the revisionist narrative of the expellees’ groups, by the debate over widening and 
deepening and by consideration of other than NATO security systems for Europe, led to 
identifying new dimensions of the European integration. In this way German elites and 
policy makers expanded the scope of the concept of the European integration, still 
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maintaining it as a fundamental thrust of their Europapolitk. This is how the concept of 
the European integration was changed.  
 
5. Helmut Kohl’s Leadership. The view of Chancellor Kohl as the architect of 
enlargement, which is evoked sometimes in media, can be debatable given the fact that 
the European Commission played the main role in the decision making process regarding 
the enlargement. But the analysis of the causes of ambivalence in Germany’s policy 
towards the enlargement demonstrates that Chancellor’s position on the enlargement was 
the main factor in smoothing contradictions on the European stage, for example the 
opposition of French policy makers or a threat of the Russian reaction. And the domestic 
permissive consensus on the enlargement was brought about under Chancellor Kohl’s 
leadership.  
The decision of choosing the ‘as-well-as’ strategy by Chancellor Helmut Kohl set 
the course for Germany’s post-unification European policy. But Chancellor Kohl’s 
commitment to the support for the enlargement was tested at the domestic stage. The 
German political system, often characterised as a mixed system of parliamentary 
structures and negotiating procedures, is susceptible to such circumstances. It was 
however Chancellor as a CEO of the government who had to secure a balance between 
the national and the international616. This role was clearly illustrated by his work on most 
of the aspects of the EU enlargement agenda: from voicing the idea, to upgrading 
bilateral and trilateral relations engaging France, to upgrading the relations of the EU 
with Eastern countries (Essen Summit), to clearing the way for the enlargement, by 
completing the Ioannina Compromise. The whole enlargement policy as carried out by 
Helmut Kohl is the evidence that the decisive voice in directing foreign policy belongs in 
German political system to the Chancellor. It derives from the Chancellor’s constitutional 
power to establish Richtlinie. 
The most effective tool that Chancellor Kohl used to carry out this policy with 
was his rhetoric about the unity of Germany and unity of Europe as ‘two sides of the 
same coin’. It was this unwavering repeating and emphasising the necessity to embrace 
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Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
295 
Eastern countries into the common European framework that embedded this idea in the 
Germany’s political rationale, and to a high degree in the rationale of other member 
states. This is the strongest evidence for Helmut Kohl’s advocacy of the enlargement. It 
was confirmed in the next sequences when the Chancellor’s rhetoric served introducing 
the idea into the German and the EU political agendas. The value of Chancellor’s 
consistent rhetoric should not be underestimated — further developments of he 
enlargement process show that, in fact, no other German actor but the Foreign Ministry 
supported the enlargement without doubts or hesitations. The latter was the only actor 
solidly espousing the idea. First because the role of this Ministry is that of an executive 
arm of Chancellor, its position on the enlargement was thus the consequence of executing 
the Chancellor’s Richtlinie. Secondly because both Foreign Ministers in Kohl’s 
governments in the 1990s, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Klaus Kinkel, were supporters of 
the enlargement by conviction. German elite, as the domestic debate indicates, was more 
divided over the choices for the foreign policy. 
It also proves that Chancellor Kohl set the course of the EU enlargement policy so 
firmly that the next Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, although having a different attitude 
towards the enlargement, had to follow this course. Helmut Kohl set the course firmly, 
because he derived the support from, and grounded it in, the most fundamental 
characteristic of the German national identity — of multilateral cooperation in order to 
overcome shadows of the past. Gerhard Schröder had a different attitude towards the 
enlargement because both Chancellors represented two opposite political parties, and 
more importantly different generations that invoked different attitudes towards the 
historically motivated policy. 
The CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s sense of historical responsibility stemmed 
from the prerequisites of the policy of the old Bonn Republic. German political elites, 
especially those of Helmut Kohl’s and Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s generation were 
committed to a goal of addressing and solving the legacy of the past and the end of the 
Cold War provided such a possibility — for the unification of the German states and for 
solving the legacy of the past. The last shadows of the past were still present in the 
relations with the Eastern countries. Not to respond positively to the expectations of the 
East Europeans, who were applying for European Union membership, would have held 
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back the process of reconciliation with those nations. It was a moral obligation, but 
embraced fully into the identity of Kohl and Genscher’s generation.  
A generational change at power of 1998, however, brought an element of 
reluctance to embracing a challenge of reconciliation. In the view of the ‘68’ generation 
of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, this 
reconciliation was already achieved. The difference in attitudes towards the ‘moral 
obligation’ between the two generations contributed to the perception of ambiguity in the 
enlargement policy under Chancellor Schröder. Schröder used to refer less to the history 
and more to assertiveness in the new Berlin Republic’s foreign policy. In this context the 
fact Schröder’s government maintained by and large the supportive stance on the 
enlargement would imply either a firm, decisively and irreversibly set agenda by 
Schröder’s predecessor Chancellor Kohl, or that despite profound differences between 
two Chancellors they had similar understanding and definition of Germany’s interests 
versus the Eastern countries. Eastern partners found Germany’s enlargement policy more 
ambiguous under Gerhard Schröder’s government than during the Helmut Kohl’s years. 
Some authors like Frank Shimmelfennig consider that the decision about 
enlarging the European Union was a moral imperative, which exploited a ‘rhetorical 
entrapment’ to silence the opposition617. This rhetorical entrapment prevented EU 
member states from backing down on their initial declarations of support for the 
enlargement, and forced them to continuing on the initiated path, whether they still 
wanted or not. The presented in this thesis analysis can be interpret in favour of the 
‘rhetorical entrapment’ claim — the supportive for the enlargement rhetoric of 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl exploited this entrapment especially effectively. But the 
empirical material in this research points out that in the case of the German debate and 
policy towards the enlargement, it was not an entrapment; it was a reasoning grounded 
deeply in the national identity, especially the narrative pertaining to the experience of 
war. 
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6. New Quality of Ostpolitik. Germany’s policy towards the enlargement, despite 
its inner contradictions, introduced a new quality in the German Ostpolitik: the Eastern 
neighbours not only gained equal position, but because of and during the enlargement 
became more important than the former main addressee of this policy — Russia. And 
Germany’s advocacy of the enlargement supported the process of overcoming the 
difficult legacy of the past. 
Germany’s policy towards the enlargement in an overall evaluation can be seen as 
a breakthrough in the bilateral relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours. 
Gunther Hellmann commented that Germany was one of the biggest winners of the 
radical transformation in Europe during the decade of 1990s618. The unification was the 
first benefit, but Germany subsequently also realized many other of its ambitious goals, 
like the reshaping of its immediate environment according to its own design by opening 
up NATO and the EU to its Eastern neighbours.  
For the Eastern countries the realization of the aspiration for joining both NATO 
and the EU was a fulfilment of their strategic national priorities. The German role in both 
processes allows a conclusion that the idea of the EU enlargement enabled and enforced 
the change in bilateral relations from the grip of the Cold War and merely on diplomatic 
contacts, to a full-scale and extraordinarily rich bilateral cooperation. This cooperation 
was asymmetrical: it was Germany who carried out the costs of the growing scope of 
cooperation. Germany, throughout the 1990s, made an extraordinary effort to provide a 
huge financial and institutional aid especially for Poland (but for the Czech Republic 
too), that resulted in an unprecedented close relationship between the two sides. Never 
before had the Germans and the Poles worked together so close in so many and various 
areas as they had during the preparations for the enlargement.  
The EU enlargement also proved to be the only concept that was applicable to the 
relations with the Eastern countries after 1989. According to some authors, like for 
example the long-serving European diplomat Robert Cooper619, the year 1989 marks a 
breakthrough in European history in a sense that this was not just the end of the Cold 
                                         
618 Gunther Hellmann, "Die Prekäre Macht: Deutschland an Der Schwelle Zum 21. Jahrhundert." In: Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl 
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War, but the end of the balance-of-power system in Europe. The goal behind the Eastern 
enlargement is an evident illustration of this. The embracing of Eastern Europe was not 
just a rearrangement of the old system. It was an arranging of a new system, of which the 
main characteristic was the decline of the Westphalian model of the state. Despite the 
constraints to the enlargement identified and described in this thesis, the decision of 
German leaders to support the enlargement was driven by the pragmatic motives to 
achieve a long-term goal of political and economic stability of the neighborhood. The 
wisdom of the German politicians was expressed by Karsten Voigt620, who observed that 
one can be “encircled by friends only when one takes their interests into consideration”.  
 
7. Theory: Constructivism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism. This research 
is primarily a constructivist inquiry, as an underlying theoretical explanatory variable for 
this research is a constructivist concept of the changing of a normative, based on values 
and ideas, social construct of the international system in Europe. With the exception of 
the last phase of the enlargement process — of the negotiations motivated by economic 
interests over the terms and conditions of admission, for explanation of which it is liberal 
intergovernmentalism most suitable — for understanding and explaining the origins of 
interests and concepts behind the choices made by German policy makers that created 
ambivalence in their enlargement policy, constructivism has the most adequate 
explanatory power. 
Uncovering the causes and reasons of ambivalence in Germany’s policy towards 
the enlargement demonstrated that motives behind Germany’s choices that contradicted 
the support for the enlargement are possible to understand with the application of 
constructivist approach, first because the manifestations and perceptions of ambivalence 
occurred mainly during the first phase of the enlargement process, when the idea was 
discussed and uploaded on the EU political agenda. The constraints that caused the 
manifestations of ambivalence at this stage occurred on the level of conceptualising a 
new political and security order in Europe and making strategic choices of directions in 
the foreign policy. This is how ‘ambivalence’ variable allows observing the process of 
                                         
620 Karsten Voigt Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, 2001 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
299 
the changing of the European integration concept, and how it became a cornerstone of the 
new order. 
The two level game’621 is a prime tool employed in this thesis. It allowed 
capturing the interplay between international and domestic realms i.e. between the 
enlargement related rhetoric and actions of German policy makers on the external board, 
and the reasons motivating this rhetoric and these actions on the domestic level. To 
capture this interplay the two-level game allowed first focusing on the external board and 
detecting manifestations and perceptions of ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement 
policy. It then allowed identifying, on the same board, supportive and contradictory to the 
enlargement factors, concepts and circumstances that were at play at the moment of 
manifestation of ambivalence (or occurrence of its perception). The second step the two-
level game opened was identification of supportive and contradictory to the enlargement 
factors, concepts and circumstances at the domestic level. This examination started from 
looking into the process of creation of the policy, thus focusing on the actors, whose 
rhetoric or actions were detected on the external board.  
Only with those points identified, an analysis of the causes of the occurred 
ambivalence was possible. In the majority of the cases of ambivalence’s manifestations 
detected in the German enlargement policy, an approach suitable for their explanation is 
constructivism. The ambivalence in Germany’s enlargement policy was caused primarily 
by the fact that German policy makers endorsed simultaneously contradictory interests, 
e.g. supporting both projects of widening the EU and of its deepening, which were for 
political and economic reasons in conflict with each other, or balancing conflicting 
interests of its partners, e.g. of France and of Eastern Europeans. The endorsement of 
conflicting directions in the foreign policy points to the fact that these directions 
presented for Germany vital interests. Germany chose therefore a strategy ‘as-well-as’ 
instead of ‘either-or’. The resulting for the research question was why those interests 
were important, i.e. what made German policy makers embrace conflicting directions. 
Constructivist approach with its focus on ideas, values and social constructs 
allowed to observe that the interests at the basis of Germany’s choices that led to 
ambivalence in their enlargement policy were a projection of the ideas and values that are 
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at the core of the post-war German national identity — the historically motivated 
imperative to overcome the WWII results and of multilateral cooperation with partners. It 
forced German policy makers to employing the ‘as-well-as’ strategy and balance 
relations with France against the relations with Eastern Europeans, the challenge of 
deepening the European integration against its widening, or the U.S. interests against the 
desire to maintain good relations with Russia. The interests deriving from the premises of 
overcoming the WWII legacy and of multilateralism, were confronted with both realist 
structural grip of the Cold War order, as well as revisionist narrative of the historical 
experience, that was contrary to the narrative embraced by majority of the German elites. 
But other contradictions were based, like the support for the enlargement on the same 
premises of multilateral cooperation, or like in the case of a changed domestic setting, 
caused by the exhaustion of the German society with the costs of the unification, which 
presented an emerging new set of social constructs in the domestic arena. 
Employment of constructivist perspective in this research is congruent with the 
methodologies of other scholars examining Germany’ foreign policy, and leads to 
conclusions that too are congruent with the conclusions of the other scholars. 
Thomas Banchoff, Gunther Hellmann, Peter Katzenstein, Thomas Risse for 
example applied broadly a constructivist approach for their analyse of Germany’s 
European policy,622 arguing that it is critical to examine the historical, ideational and 
cultural sources of actors’ identities in order to understand the behaviour of states. States’ 
grand strategies are considered a result not only of material geopolitical conditions in the 
domestic and international environments but also of broader cultural determinants. Such 
an account was appropriate for this research in order to examine how enlargement policy 
became a part of Germany’s grand European strategy.  
                                         
622 Thomas Banchoff, “German Policy Towards the European Union: The Effects of Historical Memory”, German Politics, Vol. 6 
1997; Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed, Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press 1999; Gunther Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany”, 
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol.40 1996; Gunther Hellmann, “Weltpolitik and Self-Containment? Germany”s Global 
Ambitions”, University of Birmingham Discussion Papers in German Studies No IGS99/10, 1999; Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture 
of National Security,: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York; Columbia University Press 1996; Thomas Risse, “Between 
the Euro and the Deutsche Mark”, Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown, Working Papers, 1997; Thomas Risse et al, 
“To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Indentity Politics in the European Union”, iEuropean Journal of International Relations, 
Vol., 5 1999 
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The endorsement of the enlargement was primarily a result of championing the 
European integration. It is however a new (and very challenging in its novelty) dimension 
of the European integration. In this respect another broad constructivist interpretation 
applied by Adrian Hyde-Price and Charlie Jeffery623 is congruent with the findings of this 
research. Hyde-Price and Jeffery pointed out that Germany’s political elites were engaged 
after unification in a project of redesigning Germany as a ‘normal’ country, which first 
and foremost affected the future of the European integration. They integrated Eastern 
enlargement of the EU into their European grand strategy, redesigning this policy and — 
as this research proves — the concept of the European integration too. It supports an 
agreement that exists among the IR scholars and political scientists that Germany was 
able to take a leading position in the process of shaping an institutional arena in Europe 
and as this research adds — Germany was able to take the lead through changing, 
modernising the concept of the European integration. This provides evidence that 
although a state is not ‘programmed’ to constantly seek a new thrust for its national 
interests, but Germany, due to its history, has been forced to reinvent its interests.  
The implementation of the new Eastern policy into the main thrust of the German 
European policy makes the case also for fulfilling the concept of the ‘civilian power’624 
that has been applied to Germany by numerous scholars. After unification, contrary to the 
predictions of neorealists, Germany did not seek autonomy maximization strategies in the 
regional context through for example the Mitteleuropa concept625, or unilateral freedom 
of action at the expense of multilateralism and the integration.  As elaborated in this 
thesis, constraints to the enlargement indicate that actions of German politicians were 
conditioned by the circumstances of cooperation with their European partners. Yet the 
established position of Germany — through its consistent multilateral cooperation with 
other states and Europeanized identity — allowed German governments to push its 
                                         
623 Adrian Hyde-Price and Charlie Jeffery, Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 39, 2001 
624 Hans Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Europa-Archiv, 10, 1992 
625 Strategy suggested by neorealist theorists like Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis, New York: 
Columbia Press 2001, Joseph Grieco, “State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht 
Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union”, in B. Frankel, Realism: Restatements and Renewal, London Frank Cass, 1996 
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weight around in the EU arena, establishing new rules and modifying or abandoning 
others, like with the new concept of the European integration.  
German scholar Gunther Hellman pointed out that the Federal Republic of 
Germany had become a Civilian Power in its own self-image, because it had learnt from 
the world, and its own history, but “more than anything else because the allies wanted it 
to be that way”626. German policy makers supporting the Eastern enlargement of the 
European Union proved that the Germany has become a Civilian Power in its own fully-
fledged self-image. During 14 years after the unification and regaining full sovereignty, 
despite powerful constraints and contradictory factors, interests and concepts pertaining 
to the new, post-Cold War organization of Europe, German policy makers supported 
consistently the project of the Eastern enlargement of the EU till its’ successful 
completion. They did it not only without inflaming any relations in Europe, but with 
maintaining vital partnerships, building new ones and strengthening Germany’s position 
as the Civilian Power.   
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
626 Gunther Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitik, Self-Containment and Civilian Power: United German”s Normalising Ambitions”, IGS 
Discussion Paper 99/10, p. 2 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
303 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Alamir F.M., Pradetto A. (1997),“Osteuropa und die Erweiterung der NATO: 
Identitätssuche als Motiv für Sicherheitspolitik”, Studien zur Internazionalen 
Politik, H.1 Hamburg 
2. Alecke Bjorn (2001), Auswirkungen der EU-Osterweiterung auf Wirtschaft und 
Arbeitsmarkt in Bayern: Studie im Auftrag des Bayerischen Staatsministeriums 
fur Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Technologie. Ifo-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 
Forschungsbereich Sozialpolitik und Arbeitsmarkte  
3. Anderson Jeffrey and Goodman John (1993), “Mars or Minerva: a united 
Germany in a post-Cold War Europe”, in; Keohane R., Nye J. and Hoffmann S., 
eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe 
1989-1991, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 
4. Anderson Jeffrey (1997), “Hard Interests, Soft Power and Germany’s Changing 
Role in Europe”, in Peter Katzenstein, ed. Tamed Power: Germany in Europe, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
5. Anderson Jeffrey (1999), German Unification and the Union of Europe, 
Cambridge University Press 
6. Anderson Kim and Tyers Rodney (1993), “Implications of EC expansion for 
European agricultural policies, trade and welfare”, Discussion paper / Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, No.829 
7. Anderson Malcolm, and Bort Eberhard (2001), The frontiers of the European 
Union, New York: Palgrave 
8. Aniol Wlodek et al (1997), “Poland: Returning to Europe”, in: Peter Katzenstein, 
(ed.) Mitteleuropa: Between Europe and Germany, Oxford: Berghahn Books 
9. Ash Timothy Garton, (1990) “Mitteleuropa?” Daedalus, Vol. 119 NO 1, Winter  
10. Ash Timothy Garton, Moisi Dominique and Mertes Michael (1991), “Let the East 
Europeans In”, New York Review of Books, 38/17 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
304 
11. Ash Timothy Garton (1994), “Germany’s choice”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, Issue 
4 
12. Asmus Ronald D. (1992), Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and 
International Relations (Rand Notes N-3522-AF), Santa Monica: The Rand 
Corporation  
13. Asmus Ronald D. (1994), Germany Strategy and Public Opinion after the Wall: 
1990-1993, Santa Monica: RAND Report MR-444-FNF/OSD/A/AF 
14. Asmus Ronald D., Kugler Richard L. and Stepehen Larrabee F. (1995), ”NATO 
expansion: the next steps”, Survival 37/1  
15. Augstein, Rudolf (1999), “Arroganz der Macht”, Der Spiegel, 3 May  
16. Bach Jonathan P.G., (1995), “The Conceptual Underpinning of German Foreign 
Policy: A Thematic Treatment, Paper presented at the International Studies 
Association Annual Conference, Chicago February  
17. Bach Jonathan P.G., (1998), “Germany after Unification and Eastern Europe: 
New Perspectives, New Problems”, originally given as a talk at the University 
Seminar on Post-Communist States, Societies and Economies at Columbia 
University, November 10 
18. Bach Jonathan P.G. (1999), Between Sovereignty and Integration, German 
Foreign Policy and National Identity after 1989, St. Martin's Press, New York  
19. Bahners Cf. Patrick (1998), “Total Normal. Vorsicht Falle: Die unbefangene 
Nation”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 November  
20. Bahr Egon (1999), “Die Normalisierung der deutschen Außenpolitik: Mündige 
Partnerschaft statt bequemer Vormundschaft”, Internationale Politik 54, no 1  
21. Bahr Egon (1998), Deutsche Interessen. Streitschrift zu Macht, Sicherheit und 
Außenpolitik, München  
22. Bahr Egon (2003), Der Deutsche Weg. Selbstverständlich und normal, München  
23. Baldwin, R. (1994), Towards an Integrated Europe. London: Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 
24. Banchoff Thomas (1997), “German Policy Towards the European Union: The 
Effects of Historical Memory”, German Politics, Vol. 6  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
305 
25. Banchoff Thomas (1998), “German Identity and European Identity”, European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5 No 3, September  
26. Banchoff Thomas (1999), The German Problem Transformed, Institutions, 
Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press  
27. Banchoff Thomas (1999), “German Identity and European Integration”, European 
Journal of International Relations, vol. 5, NO 3 
28. Baring Arnulf (1991), Deutschland, was nun? Ein Gespräch mit Dirk Rumberg 
und Wolf Jobst Siedler, Berlin  
29. Baring Arnulf (ed.) (1994), Germany’s New Position in Europe. Problems and 
Perspective, Berg Oxford/Providence USA 
30. Baring Arnulf (1997), Scheitert Deutschland?, Stuttgart 
31. Barnett Michael and Duvall Raymond (2005), “Power in International Politics”, 
International Organization 59, Winter  
32. Bazin Anne (1999), Germany and the Enlargement of the European Union to the 
Czech Republic, EUI Working Papers RSC NO 99/21, San Domenico di Fiesole 
(FI), EUropean University Institute,  
33. Bender Peter (1989), “Die Grosse Chance für den alten Kontinent”, Die Zeit, 1 
July  
34. Bennhold M. (1991), Deutschland und die Dekomposition Osteuropas, Blätter für 
deutsche und internationale Politik, NO 10 
35. Bertram Christoph (1997), “Europas Jahr der Entscheidungen”, Die Zeit, 31 
January  
36. Beyme Karl von (1991), Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
nach der Vereinigung, München: R. Piper & Co Verlag 
37. Bingen Dieter (1998), Die Polenpolitik der Bonn Republik von Adenauer bis Kohl 
1949-1991, Nomos, Baden-Baden 
38. Blanchard Olivier, Froot Kenneth, Sachs Jeffrey, eds. (1994), The Transition in 
Eastern Europe, Chicago: Chicago University Press  
39. Bohmer Michael (2001), Migrationseffekte der Osterweiterung auf die EU-
Arbeitsmarkte,. Berlin: VWF, Verl. fur Wiss. und Forschung 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
306 
40. Borodziej Włodzimierz, Hajnicz Artur eds. (1996), Kompleks Wypędzenia, 
Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 1998; Jan Józef Lipski, Powiedzieć sobie wszystko… 
Eseje o sąsiedztwie polsko-niemieckim, Wydawnictwo Polsko-Niemieckie, 
Warszawa  
41. Bracher Karl Dietrich (1970), The German Dictatorship, New York Praeger  
42. Brandt Willi (1992), Eine EG von Paris bis Wladiwostok?”, Frankfurter 
Rundschau 13 May  
43. Brechtefeld Jörg (1996), Mitteleuropa and German Politics: 1848 to the Present, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan,  
44. Broer M., Diehl O. (1990), “Die Sicherheit der neuen Demokratien in Europa und 
die NATO”, Europa-Archiv, NO 12 
45. Broszat Martin (1979), "Hitler und die Genesis der "Endlösung". Aus Anlaß der 
Thesen von David Irving", Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Volume 25, 1977, 
translated into English as "Hitler and the Genesis of the ‘Final Solution’: An 
Assessment of David Irving’s Theses" from Yad Vashem Studies, Volume 13 
46. Brzeziński Zbigniew (1989), “Post-communist Nationalism”, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 68, No 5 
47. Brzeziński, Zbigniew (1995), “A Plan for Europe,” Foreign Affairs, January-
February  
48. Brzeziński, Zbigniew, “A Divided Europe: The Future of Yalta”, Foreign Affairs, 
Winter 1984/85 
49. Bulmer Simon (1986), The Domestic Structure of European Community Policy-
Making in West Germany, New York, Garland  
50. Bulmer Simon and Paterson William (1987), “European Policy-Making in the 
Federal Republic: Internal and External Limits to Leadership”, in: W. Wessels 
and E. Regelsberger eds., The Federal Republic of Germany and the European 
Community: The Presidency and Beyond, Bonn  
51. Bulmer Simon and Paterson William (1987), The Federal Republic of Germany 
and the European Community, London Allen and Uwin 
52. Bulmer Simon and Paterson William (1994), “Germany in the European Union: 
Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?”, International Affairs Vol. 72, No 1 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
307 
53. Bulmer Simon, Jeffery Charlie, and Paterson William (2000), Germany’s 
European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press 
54. Byrne, R., G. Noll, and J. Vested-Hansen eds. (2002), New Asylum Countries? 
Migration Control and Refugee Protection in an Enlarged European Union, The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International 
55. Caesar Rolf (2001), EU-Osterweiterung und Finanzmarkte: gemeinsame Tagung 
des Zentrums für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung und des Arbeitkreises 
Europaische Integration, Zentrum fur Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Baden-
Baden: Nomos-Verl.-Ges  
56. Christiansen Thomas (1996), “Reconstructing European Space: From territorial 
politics to multilevel governance”, EUI Working Papers, RSC NO 96/53 
57. Cichocki Marek, ed. (2000), “Dlaczego Niemcy obawiają się rozszerzenia UE o 
Polskę i inne kraje Europy Środkowo- Wschodniej?”, Centrum Stosunków 
Międzynarodowych (Center for International Relations), Raporty I Analizy, NO8 
58. Clemens Clay and Paterson William E., The Kohl Chancellorship, Frank Cass 
London, 1998 
59. Collins Stephen D. (2003), German Policy-Making and Eastern Enlargement of 
the EU During the Kohl Era; Managing Agenda?, Manchester University Press 
60. Conradt David P., German Polity, East Carolina University, Longman 2001, the 
7th edition 
61. Cooper Robert (2003), The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-
First Century, Atlantic Press 
62. Corterie Peter (1990), “Quo vadis NATO?”, Survival, March/April 
63. Courchene Thomas et al (1993), “Stable Money – Sound Finances”, European 
Economy, No. 53  
64. Dauderstädt Michael (1996), Can the Democracies of East-Central Europe Cope 
with the Double Impact of Transformation and Integration, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, Bonn 
65. Daugbjerg Carsten (1999), “Reforming the CAP: Policy Networks an Broader 
Institutional Structures”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37:3, September  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
308 
66. Davies Norman (1981), God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 
67. Delors Jacques (1991), “European Integration and Security”, Survival, March-
April, vol. 32, NO 2 
68. Dettke Dieter ed. (2003), The Spirit of the Berlin Republic, New-York-Oxford  
69. Deubner Christian (1999), “Frankreich in der Ostweiterung der EU, 1989 
bis1997”, Politische Studien, Vol. 50, NO 1  
70. Deubner Christian (1995), Deutsche Europapolitik Von Maastricht nach 
Kerneuropa?, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden  
71. Deubner Christian (1996), “Germany as Architect of European Integration and 
Eastern Europe”, Working Paper 7.11 of Center for German and European 
Studies, University of California, Berkley, April  
72. Dickinson David D., and Mullineaux A. W. (2001), Financial and monetary 
integration in the new Europe: convergence between the EU and Central and 
Eastern Europe, Edward Elgar 
73. Dinan Desmond (1999), Ever Closer Union, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 
74. Dornbusch Rudiger and Holger Wolf (1994), “East German Economic 
Reconstruction”, in Olivier Blanchard, Kenneth Froot, Jeffrey Sachs eds., The 
Transition in Eastern Europe, Chicago: Chicago University Press 
75. Dönhoff Marion, Schmidt Helmut (1990), Der Osten braucht unsere Solidarität, 
Die Zeit, 25 May  
76. Duffield J.S., (1998), World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International 
Institutions and German Security Policy after Unification, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998; 1999; Berger  
77. Dyson Kenneth (1996), “West Germany: The search for a rationalist consensus”, 
in: J. Richardson, European Union, Power and Policy-Making, London: 
Routledge 
78. Dyson Kenneth (1998), Chancellor Kohl as Strategic Leader: The Case of 
Economic and Monetary Union, in Clay Clemens and William Paterson eds., The 
Kohl Chancellorship, Frank Cass, London  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
309 
79. Dyson Kenneth (1999), “The Franco-German Relationship and Economic and 
Monetary Union: Using Europe to Bind Leviathan”, West European Politics, Vol. 
22, No 1 January  
80. Dyson Kenneth and Goetz Klaus eds. (2003), Germany, Europe and the Politics 
of Constraint, Oxford University Press 
81. Eberwein Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser Karl eds. (2001), Germany’s New Foreign 
Policy. Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, Palgrave  
82. Egger Peter, Pfaffermayr Michael and Wolfmayr-Schnitzer Yvonne (2001), Study 
by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research commissioned by the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Labour, Wien: WIFO 
83. Eising Rainer (2008), Interest Groups in EU Policy Making, Living Reviews in 
European Governance, vol.8, iss.4 
84. Elbe Frank, Kiessler Richard (1996), A Round Table With Sharp Corners, The 
Diplomatic Path to German Unity, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 
85. Enders Thomas (1988), “Die deutsche Angst vor der Sonderbedrohung, Zur Rolle 
der nuklearen Kurzstreckenwaffen in Europa”, Die Sonde, Nr 1/2  
86. Engelmann-Martin D. and Risse T. (2002), “Identity Politics and European 
Integration. The Case of Germany”, in: Pagden A. ed., The Idea of Europe: From 
Antiquity to the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
87. Eyal, Jonathan (1997), “NATO’s enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision”, 
International Affairs, NO 73:4 
88. Feldmeyer Karl (1986), “Sorgen um das Bündnis”, Frankfurter Allgemenine 
Zeitung, 19 December  
89. Fischer Joschka (1994), Risiko Deutschland, Krise und Zukunft der deutschen 
Politik, Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch 
90. Fischer Joschka (1998), Gespräch mit Joschka Fischer über das Koalitionsklima 
und die Außen - und Sicherheitpolitik”, Der Spiegel, NO 48/23 November  
91. Flockton C.H. (1993), “The Federal German Economy in the Early 1990s”, 
German Politics, No 2, August  
92. Forster Anthony and Niblett Robin (2001), Concepts of European Order after the 
Cold War: In with the Old, Out with the New; in: Robin Niblett and William 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
310 
Wallace eds., Rethinking European Order. West European Responses, 1989-97, 
Palgrave  
93. Forster Anthony and Wallace William (2003), “Common Foreign and Security 
Policy”, in: Helen Wallace and William Wallace, eds.: Policy-Making in the 
European Union, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press  
94. Frankel B. (1996), Realism: Restatements and Renewal, London Frank Cass  
95. Frenkler Ulf (2001), “Germany at Maastricht: Power Politics or Civilian Power?”, 
in S. Harnish and H.W. Maull (ed), Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign 
Policy of the Berlin Republic, Manchester: Manchester University Press 
96. Freudenstein Roland, and Tewes Henning (2001), Die EU-Osterweiterung und 
der deutsche Arbeitsmarkt: Testfall für die deutsch-polnische 
Interessengemeinschaft, Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
97. Friedrich Jörg (2002), Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg, 1940–1945, 
Propyläen Verlag Munich, Germany 
98. Gardner Feldman Lily (1999), Germany’s Reconciliation with France, Israel, 
Poland and the Czech Republic, Journal of International Peace and Organization, 
74, NO.4  
99. Geipel L.G.ed. (1991), Future of Germany, Hudson Institute, Indiana  
100. Geißler Heiner, Zugluft. Politik in stürmischer Zeit, Güterloch, 1990  
101. Genscher Hans-Dietrich (1991), “Perspektiven Gemeinsamer Politik und 
kooperative Sicherheit in Europa”, Bulletin, NO 81, 12 July  
102. Genscher Hans-Dietrich (1998), Rebuilding a House Divided, Broadway 
103. Ghaussy, A. Ghanie, and Schäfer Wolf, eds. (1993), The Economics of 
German Unification, London: Routledge 
104. Glotz Peter (1990), Der Irrweg des Nationalstaats: europäische Reden an 
ein deutsches Publikum, Stuttgart : Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 
105. Glotz Peter (1994), Die falsche Normalisierung: die unmerkliche 
Verwandlung der Deutschen 1989 bis 1994: Essays, Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp  
106. Goertz Gary (1994), Contexts of International Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
311 
107. Goetz Klaus (1995), “National Governance and Euroepan Integration: 
Intergovernmental relations in Germany”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol 33 No 1 
108. Goetz Klaus (1996), “Integration Policy in a Europeanised State: Germany 
and the Intergovernmental Conference”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 
3 No 1 
109. Görtemaker Manfred (1994), Unifying Germany, 1989-90, New York: St 
Martin’s Press 
110. Grieco Joseph (1996), “State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: 
A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and 
Monetary Union”, in: B. Frankel, Realism: Restatements and Renewal, London 
Frank Cass 
111. Guild, E., and Harlow C. eds. (2001), Implementing Amsterdam: 
Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing 
112. Haas Ernst B. (1958), The Uniting of Europe: Political, social and 
economic forces 1950-57, London Stevens 
113. Haas Ernst B. (1964), Beyond the Nation State, Stanford University Press 
114. Habermas Jürgen (1995), Die Normalität der Berliner Republik, Frankfurt 
am Main, Suhrkamp 
115. Hacke Christian (1998), “Die nationalen Interessen der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert”, Außenpolitik 49, no 2 
116. Haggard S., Levy A.M., Moravcsik A. and Nicolaidis K. (1993), 
“Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of interests bargaining and 
institutions”, in: Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Stanley Hoffman eds., 
International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press 
117. Handl Vladimir, Hon Jan and Pick Otto (1999), Germany and the East 
Central Europe since 1990, Prague  
118. Handl Vladimir and Zaborowski Marcin (2000), “Comparative Czech and 
Polish Perspective and Policies on the Eastern Enlargement of the EU and the 
Prominence of the ‘German Factor’”, ESRC-IGS Discussion Paper  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
312 
119. Hanrieder Wolfram (1967), “Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for 
the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy”, 
American Political Science Review, Vol.61, No. 4, December  
120. Hanrieder Wolfram (1989), Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of 
German Foreign Policy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press  
121. Harnish Sebastian and Maull Hanns W. eds. (2001), Germany as a 
Civilian Power? The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester and New York 
122. Härpfer Christian (2001), Public opinion on European Union 
enlargement, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of 
Strathclyde 
123. Harvey David (2000), “The future of the CAP? Problems and proposals”, 
in “Reforming the CAP”, Economic Affairs, Institute of Economic Affairs, 20:3, 
June  
124. Hauser Erich (1992), “Das Monster von Maastricht”, Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 18 February  
125. Havel Vaclav (1991), “Präsident Havel in einer Rede vor der NATO am 
21. März 1991”, Europa-Archiv, No 10 
126. Hellmann Gunther (1996), ‘Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of 
Contemporary Germany’, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40  
127. Hellmann Gunther (1998), "Die Prekäre Macht: Deutschland an Der 
Schwelle Zum 21. Jahrhundert." In: Eberwein Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser Karl eds., 
Deutschland Neue Außenpolitik, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag 
128. Hellmann Gunther (1999), ”National Normalität als Zukunft? Zur 
Außenpolitik der Berliner Republik”, Blätter für deutsche und internationale 
Politik, Vol.44, No 7, July  
129. Hellmann Gunther (1999), “Weltpolitik and Self-Containment? 
Germany’s Global Ambitions”, University of Birmingham Discussion Papers in 
German Studies No IGS99/10 
130. Hellmann Gunther, “Beyond Weltpolitik, Self-Containment and Civilian 
Power: United German’s Normalizing Ambitions”, IGS Discussion Paper 99/10 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
313 
131. Heynitz von Achim, Maull Hanns W. (1990), “Im Osten lockt kein 
Eldorado”, in Die Zeit 12 January  
132. Hill Christopher (2003), The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan 
133. Hodge Carl Cavanagh (1992), ‘The Federal Republic and the Future of 
Europe’, German Politics, Vol. 1 
134. Hoffmann Stanley (1993), “Goodbye to a United Europe?”, in New York 
Review of Books, 27 May  
135. Holst Christian (2001), “Public Attitudes and Elite Attitudes: towards a 
New Foreign Policy Consensus?”, in W.E. Eberwein and K.Kaiser eds., 
Germany’s New Foreign Policy, Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, 
Palgrave  
136. Holzer Stanisław Jerzy, Fischer Józef eds. (2001), Rola Niemiec w 
procesie integracji Polski z Europą, Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej 
Akademii Nauk, Komitet Nauk Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warszawa 
137. Hughes Kirsty (1996), “The Intergovernmental Conference and EU 
Enlargement”, International Affairs, 72, 1, January  
138. Hyde-Price Adrian (1991), European Security Beyond The Cold War, 
Four Scenarios for the year 2010, Royal Institute for International Affairs  
139. Hyde-Price Adrian (1993), “Uncertainties of security policy”, in: Gordon 
Smith et al eds. Developments in German Politics, London Macmillan 
140. Hyde-Price Adrian and Jeffery Charlie (2001), “Germany in the European 
Union: Constructing Normality”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 39 NO 
4, November  
141. Hyde-Price Adrian (2000), “Building a Stable Peace in Mitteleuropa: The 
German-Polish Hinge”, ESRC-IGS Discussion Paper, 18 
142. Hyde-Price Adrian (2000), Germany and European Order. Enlarging 
NATO and the EU, Manchester University Press 
143. Jackobsen H.A., Tomala M.,Hrsg.( 1992),  Bonn-Warschau 1945-1991. 
Die Deutsch-Polnischen Beziehungen. Analyse und Dokumentation, Verlag 
Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
314 
144. Janicki L. (1992), “Podstawy prawne stosunków Polski ze zjednoczonymi 
Niemcami, w: Wokół traktatów Polska—Niemcy”. Biblioteka Przegladu 
Zachodniego, z. 16, Poznan 
145. Janning Joseph (1996), “A German Europe — a European Germany? On 
the debate over Germany’s foreign policy, Foreign Affairs, NO 72 January, I 
146. Janning Joseph (1996), “A German Europe — A European Germany? On 
the Debate over Germany’s Foreign Policy”, International Affairs 72:3 
147. Janning Joseph (1994), “Europa braucht vershiedene Geschwindigkeitne”, 
Europa-Archiv 44, 1  
148. Janning J. and Algieri F. (1996), “The German Debate”, in: The 1996 IGC 
— National Debates (2): Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK, Chatham House 
Discussion Paper 67, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs 
149. Jarausch Konrad (1994), The Rush to German Unity, New York: Oxford 
University Press  
150. Jeffery Charlie and Paterson William E., “Germany’s Power in Europe”, 
in One Europe or Several. Birmingham Discussion Papers, No. ESRC-IG2000/10, 
2000 
151. Jeffery Charlie, Paterson William (2000), “Germany’s Power in Europe”, 
ESRC- IGS Discussion Paper 10 
152. Jervis Robert (1976), Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
153. Joffe Josef (1994), “German Grand Strategy after the Cold War”, in: 
Arnulf Baring (ed.), Germany’s New Position in Europe. Problems and 
Perspectives, Berg Oxford/Providence USA 
154. Jopp Mathias (1994), “The Strategic Implications of European 
Integration”, Adelphi Papers, 290, London IISS 
155. Jolyon Naegele, “The Beneš Decrees — How Did They Come to Be and 
What Do They Mandate?”, online: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1098965.html 
156. Kaiser Karl (1991), Deutschlands Vereinigung. Die Internationale 
Aspekte. With documents, Bergich Gladbach: Lübbe  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
315 
157. Kaiser Karl, Maull Hanns W., Hrsg. (1994), Deutsche Außenpolitik. 
Grundlagen, Bd. 1, München 
158. Kaiser Karl (1992), “Unsere Rolle in Europa”, in: Christian Hein, Karl 
von Beyme, Karl Meyer, Deutsche Ansichten. Die Bundesrepublik in Übergang, 
Bonn  
159. Kalinska Emilie (1999), “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the 
Process of Transformation of the CEFTA Countries”, in: The Role of CEFTA in 
the Process of EU Enlargement. International Conference, May 28-29, 1999. 
Prague: Institute of International Relations 
160. Katzenstein Peter (1987), Policy and Politics in West Germany. The 
Growth of a Semisovereign State, Philadelphia: Temple University Press 
161. Katzenstein Peter (1993), “Taming of Power: German Unification, 1989-
1990”, in Meredith Woo-Cumings and Michael Lorriaux, eds.,Past and Prelude: 
History in the Making of a New World Order, Boulder: Westview Press 
162. Katzenstein Peter ed.(1996), The Culture of National Security, Norms and 
Identity in World Politics, New York; Columbia University Press  
163. Katzenstein Peter ed. (1997), Tamed Power: Germany in Europe, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press 
164. Katzenstein Peter (1998), Mitteleuropa: Between Europe and Germany, 
Providence, RI: Berghahn Publishers 
165. Keohane Robert (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy, Princeton  
166. Keohane R., Nye J. and Hoffmann S., eds. (1993), After the Cold War: 
International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe 1989-1991, Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press 
167. Kersten Krystyna, (Jan Bujnowski) (1988), Przesiedlenie Niemców, Veto, 
nr 16 
168. Kinkel Klaus (1994) “Deutschland in Europa: Zu den Zielen der deutschen 
Präsidentschaft in der Europäische Union”, Europa-Archiv 41, 1 
169. Kinkel Klaus (1994), “Rede des Außenministers Klaus Kinkel vor der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik”, Europa-Archiv 41, 2  D541-542 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
316 
170. Kinkel Klaus (1995), “Die Europäische Union vor der Runderneuerung”, 
Pressreferat Auswärtiges Amt, 21 February 
171. Kinzer S. (1991), “Germany is a Challenge for Post-Soviet Europe”, The 
New York Times, 27 December  
172. Kiwerska Jadwiga (1993), “W Atmosferze Wrogości” in: Anna Wolff-
Powęska, eds. Polacy Wobec Niemców. Z Dziejów Kultury politycznej Polski 
1945-1989, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań  
173. Kohl Helmut (1990), “Die Deutsche Frage und die Europäische 
Verantwortung, Rede in Paris am 17 January 1990”, Bulletin des 
Bundesregierung 19 January  
174. Kohl Helmut (1991), Our Future in Europe, (Edinburgh: Europa 
Institute/Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
175. Kohl Helmut (1992), “Grundlagen und Leitlinien für enine gemeinsame 
europäische Zukunft”, Bulletin, no.26, 10 March  
176. Kohl Helmut (1992), Bilanzen und Perspektiven, Regierungspolitik 1989-
1991, Bergisch Gladbach: Gustave Lübbe 
177. Kohl Helmut (1997), Bundestag declaration “Aktuelle Fragen der 
Europapolitik”, Bulletin no 51, 31 May  
178. Kohler-Koch Beate ed (1991), Die Ostwerweiterung der EG: Die 
Einbeziehung der ehemaligen DDR in die Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft 
179. Kolboom Ingo (1991), “Die Vertreibung der Dämonen: Frankreich und 
das vereinte Deutschland”, Europa-Archiv 15-16  
180. Konarzewska Joanna (2000), “Kräftige Erholung im Handle mit den 
Reformländern in Mittelß und Osteuropa seit Mitte 1999”, DIW Wochenbercicht, 
12 
181. Korte Karl-Rudolf (1998), “The Art of Power: the kohl system. 
Leadership and Deutschlandpolitik.”, in: Clay Clemens and William Paterson 
eds., “The Kohl Chancellorship”, in German Politics, Vol 7 No 2, Special Issue 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
317 
182. Korte Karl-Rudolf (1998), “Unbefangen und gelassen: Über die 
außenpolitische Normalität der Berliner Republik”, Internationale Politik, 53, no 
12 
183. Kramer Heinz (1992), “Die EG und die Stabilisierung Osteuropas”, 
Außenpolitik, NO 1 
184. Kramer Heinz (1993), “The European Community’s response to the New 
Eastern Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies, NO 31/2 
185. Krause Heydrich, J., U. Nötzold Nerlich, J., and Rummel R., eds. (1992), 
Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands: Neue Konstellation, Risiken, Instrumente, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos 
186. Krippendorf Ekkehart (1996), “Germany as a World/European Power”, in: 
Heurlin Bertel, ed. Germany in Europe in the Nineties, Palgrave 
187. Kühn Jürgen (1993), Die Koordinierung der deutschen Europapolitik, 
Bonn: Zentrum für europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht, Vorträge und Berichte 33 
188. Kühnhardt Ludger (1996), “Die NATO im Prozeß der inneren und 
äußeren Veränderung”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 5 
189. Kunsztát Miroslav (1998), “Germany and the Czech Republic”, in: 
Vladimir Handl, Jan Hon and Otto Pick, Germany and the East Central Europe 
since 1990, Prague 
190. Küsters Hanns Jürgen, “Die Kontroverse zwischen Bundeskanzler Kohl 
und Präsident Mitterrand um die institutionelle Reform der EG 1989-90”, in: 
Marie-Therese Bitsch (ed.), Le Couple Franco-Allemand et les Institutions 
Europeennes, Paris 2005 
191. Kurz Heinz D., ed. (1993), The United Germany and the New Europe, 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar Pbls 
192. Kyaw Dietrich von (1999), “Prioritäten der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft 
unter Berücksichtigung des Europäischen Rates in Wien”, ZEI Discussion Papers, 
No C33 
193. Lamers Karl1 (993), Deutschlands außenpolitische Verantwortung und 
seine Interessen, Berlin 23/24 August  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
318 
194. Landau Allice (1998), “Bargaining over Power and Policy: The CAP 
Reform and Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round”, International 
Negotiation, 3:3 
195. Langewiesche Renate and Toth Andras eds. (2001), The unity of Europe: 
political, economic and social dimensions of EU enlargement, Brussels: European 
Trade Union Institute 
196. Lantis Jeffrey S. (2002), Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German 
Foreign Policy since the Unification, Praeger, London  
197. Lavenex S. (1998), ‘“Asylum, Immigration, and Central-Eastern Europe: 
Challenges to EU Enlargement”, European Foreign Affairs Review, NO 3 
198. Leaman Jeremy (2001), The Bundesbank Myth. Towars a Critique of 
Central Bank Independence, Palgrave, London & New York 
199. Lehmbruch Gerhard, Die deutsche Vereiningung: Strukturen und 
Strategien”, Politische Vierteljahresschriftn 32, December 1991 
200. Lippelt Helmut (1990), Vereintes Deutschland — Einiges Europa? Die 
Grünen/Bündnis 90 Bulletin, Nr 4  
201. Lippert Barbara and Bode Wolfgang (2002), Enlargement and the EU 
Budget: the Battles Ahead, Intereconomics, March/April 
202. Lippert Barbara and Schneider Heinrich, eds. (1995), ”Monitoring 
Association and Beyond. The European Union and the Višegrad States”, 
Europäische Schriften des Instituts für Europäische Politik, Band 74, Europa 
Union Verlag Bonn 
203. Lippert Barbara and Schneider Heinrich (1995), Association and Beyond: 
the European Union and the Višegrad States, in Barbara Lippert and Heinrich 
Schneider, (eds.), Monitoring Association and Beyond. The European Union and 
the Višegrad States, Europäische Schriften des Instituts für Europäische Politik, 
Band 74, Europa Union Verlag Bonn  
204. Lipski Jan Józef (1979), “Niemcy a Polska”, Kultura, No 370/371. ‘Polen 
und Deutschland’, Osteeuropa, No 2, Februar  
205. Lipski Jan Józef (1996), “Dwie Ojczyzny- Dwa Patriotyzmy. Uwagi o 
Megalomanii Narodowej i Ksenofobii Polakow”, in: Powiedzieć Sobie wszystko, 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
319 
Eseje o Sąsiedztwie Polsko-Niemieckim, Wydawnictwo Polsko-Niemieckie, 
Warszawa  
206. Lipski Jan Józef (1996) “Niemcy a Polska”, Kultura, No 370/371  
207. Lipski Jan J. (1996), Powiedzieć sobie wszystko. Eseje o sąsiedztwie 
Polsko-Niemieckim, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Polsko-Niemieckie 
208. Malinowski Krzysztof (1996), “Asymetria Partnerstwa. Polityka 
Zjednoczonych Niemiec wobec Polski”, in: Zbigniew Mazur, ed. Rola Nowych 
Niemiec na Arenie Międzynarodowej, Poznań: Instytut Zachodni  
209. Markovits Andrei S. and Reich Simon (1991), ”Should Europe Fear 
Germans?”, Germany Politics and Society, 23 
210. Marks G., Hooghe L. and Blank K. (1997), “European Integration since 
the 1980s: State-centric versus multi-level governance,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies, NO 35  
211. Marx Bettina (1999), “Zur EU-Osterweiterung gibt es keine Alternative”. 
Außenminister Fischer im Gespräch mit der Deutschen Welle. 8 January 1999, in: 
Dietrich von Kyaw, Prioritäten der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft unter 
Berücksichtigung des Europäischen Rates in Wien, ZEI Discussion Papers, No 
C33 
212. Marsh David (1994), Germany and Europe. The Crisis of Unity, William 
Heinemann Ltd  
213. Maull Hanns W. (1990), “Germany and Japan: the new Civilian Power”, 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, NO 5 
214. Maull Hans W. (1992), “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, 
Europa-Archiv, 10 
215. Maull Hanns W. (1993), “Civilian Power: The Concept and its Relevance 
for Security Issues”, in Lidija Babic and Bo Huldt eds., Mapping the Unknown: 
Towards a New World Order, The Yearbook of the Swedish Institute of 
International Affairs, 1992-93, Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International 
Affairs 
216. Maull Hanns W. (2000), “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian 
Power”?, Survival 42  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
320 
217. Maull Hanns W. and Harnish Sebastian, eds. (2001), Germany as a 
Civilian Power. The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic, Manchester University 
Press 
218. Mayhew Alan (1998), Recreating Europe. The European Union's Policy 
towards Central and Eastern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
219. Mayhew Alan (2003), “The Financial and Budgetary Impact of 
Enlargement and Accession”, SEI Working Paper No 65 Sussex European 
Institute 
220. Mazur Zbigniew, ed. (1999), Rola Nowych Niemiec na Arenie 
Międzynarodowej, Poznań: Instytut Zachodni 
221. Mearsheimer John (1990), “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after 
the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 15, NO 1, Summer  
222. Meiers Franz-Josef (1995), “Germany: The Reluctant Power”, Survival 
Vol. 37, Autumn  
223. Mertes Michael, Prill Norbert (1989), “Der verhängnisvolle Irrtum eines 
Entweder-Oder. Eine Vision für Europa”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 
July  
224. Michael Tracy (1995), “Major influences on the CAP: Attitudes of the 
various Member States and the international context”, Summary paper for 
Department of the Environment seminar, Agricultural Policy Studies, La Hutte, 
Belgium, 26 January  
225. Michalski Anna, Wallace Helen, (1992), The Challenge of Enlargement, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs 
226. Milner Helen (1995), “Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of 
International, American and Comparative Politics”, International Organizations 
Vol. 152, NO  4, 1998 
227. Moisi Dominique, “Insecurities, Old and New, Plague the Paris-Bonn 
Axis”, The Wall Street Journal, Europe, 7 February  
228. Mommsen Wolfgang, Die Mitteleuropaidee und die 
Mitteleuropaplanungen im Deutschen Reich vor und während des ersten 
Weltkrieges, in: R.G. Plaschka, H. Haselsteiner, A. Suppan, A.M. Drabek, B. 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
321 
Zaar (Hrgs), Mitteleuropa-Konzeptionzen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. 
Jahrhunderts, Wien 1995. 
229. Monar Jörg, Justice and Home Affairs, in H. Wallace and A. Mayhew 
eds., Poland: A Partnership Profile. OEOS Policy Paper, April. University of 
Sussex, Brighton: 44, 2001 
230. Moravcsik Andrew (1993), “Preferences and Power in the European 
Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 31, NO. 4  
231. Morgenthau Hans (1973), Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for 
Power and Peace, 5th ed. New York: Knopf 
232. Müller-Rommel Ferdinand (1994), “The Chancellor and his Staff”, in S. 
Padgett (ed.) Adenauer to Kohl: The development of the German chancellorship, 
London: C.Hurst &Co 
233. Müller-Rommel Ferdinand (2007), “The Chancellor and His Staff”, in: 
Dalton, Russell / Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds.): Handbook of Political 
Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
234. Münch Holger (2000), “Demokracje w Europie Środkowej nie są stabilne. 
Musimy się pospieszyć”, in Marek Cichocki, (ed.) Dlaczego Niemcy obawiają się 
rozszerzenia UE o Polskę i inne kraje Europy Środkowo- Wschodniej?, Centrum 
Stosunków Międzynarodowych (Center for International Relations), Raporty i 
Analizy, NO8 
235. Nehrlich Uwe (1993), “Sicherheitsfunktionen der NATO”, Europe Archiv 
NO 48 (23) 
236. Nonnemacher Günther (1993), “Deutsche Interesen”, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 March  
237. Nugent Neil (1999), The Government and Politics of the European Union, 
Fourth Edition, Duke University Press, Durham 
238. Núñez Ferrer, Jorge and Emerson Michael (2000), “Good Bye, Agenda 
2000 – Hello, Agenda 2003”. Working Paper No.140, February, Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS)  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
322 
239. Ott Andrea & Inglis Kirstyn, eds. (2002), Handbook on European 
Enlargement: Commentary on the Enlargement Process, T.M.C. Asser Press: The 
Hague  
240. Paterson W.E. (1998), “Helmut Kohl and the Vision Thing, and Escaping 
the Semi-Sovereignty Trap”, German Politics, Vol 7 No 1 
241. Paterson W.E. and Southern D. (1991), Governing Germany, Oxford: 
Blackwell 
242. Pedersen Thomas (1998), Germany. France and the Integration of 
Europe. Realist Interpretation, London: Pinter  
243. Perger Werner A. (1997), “Wir unbefangen”, Die Zeit, 12 November 
244. Peterson John and Elisabeth Bomberg (1999), Decision-Making in the 
European Union, Macmillan, London  
245. Pflüger Friedbert (1996), “Polen-Unser Frankreich im Osten”, in: W. 
Schäuble, R.Seiters (Hrsg.) Außenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, Die Thesen der 
Jungen Außenpolitiker, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn  
246. Plaschka R.G., Haselsteiner H., Suppan A., Drabek A.M., Zaar B. Hrgs 
(1995), Mitteleuropa-Konzeptionzen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, 
Wien  
247. Pond Elisabeth (1996), “Germany Finds its Niche as a Regional Power”, 
The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, NO 1, Winter  
248. Preuß Ulrich (1999), Zwischen Legalität und Gerechtigkeit: Der Kosovo-
Krieg, das Volkerrecht und die Moral”, Blätter für Deutsche und International 
Politik, Vol. 44, NO 7 
249. Putnam Robert (1988), “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of 
Two-Level Games”, International Organization, Vol.42, NO.3 
250. Quaisser Wolfgang (2002), “Kosten der EU-Erweiterung – Neue 
Vorschläge der Europäischen Kommission und ihre Implikationen für die nächste 
Finanzperiode”, Kurzanalysen und Informationen  No. 1/2002, Osteuropa-Institut 
München, February  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
323 
251. Rabinowicz Ewa (1999), “EU Enlargement and the Common Agricultural 
Policy: Finding Compromise in a Two-Level Repetitive Game,” International 
Politics 36, September  
252. Regelsberg Elfriede (2002), “Germany”, in Brian Hocking, David Spence 
eds., Foreign Ministries in the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd  
253. Reinhard Meier-Walser (1992), “Deutschland, Frankreich und 
Grossbritannien and der Schwelle zu einem neuen Europa”, Außenpolitik NO 4 
254. Risse Thomas et al (1999), “To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and 
Indentity Politics in the European Union”, European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol., 5  
255. Risse Thomas (1997), “Between the Euro and the Deutsche Mark”, Center 
for German and European Studies, Georgetown, Working Papers 
256. Rittberger Volker (1990), “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland — eine 
Weltmacht? Außenpolitik nach vierzig Jahren”, Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 4-5  
257. Ruggie John Gerard (1998), “What Makes the World Hang Together? 
Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”, International 
Organization, vol. 52, NO 2, Autumn  
258. Rühe Volker (1990), The New Germany in Europe, CPC Party 
Conference Lecture, Conservative Political Centre, November  
259. Rühl Lothar (1992), “Einige Kriterien nationaler Interessenbestimmung”, 
in W. Heydrich, J. Krause, U. Nerlich, J. Nötzold, and R. Rummel, eds., 
Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands: Neue Konstellation, Risiken, Instrumente, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos 
260. Rühl Lothar (1993), “The Ghost of Rapallo Does Not Walk Tonight”, 
Global Affairs. The American Journal of Geopolitics, Spring  
261. Sadurski Wojciech (2003), Accession’s Democracy Dividend:From 
Conditionality to Post-Accession , a paper for the workshop Implications of 
enlargement for the rule of law and constitutionalism in post-communist legal 
orders, European University Institute, Florence, 28-29 November  
262. Sager Karl (1996), “Grüne Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik”, 
Internationale Politik Vol. 51, NO 8 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
324 
263. Sally Razeen and Weber Douglas (1994), “The German Solidarity Pact”, 
German Politics 3, 1 April  
264. Sandholz Wayne (1996), “Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional 
Approach to European Institutions”, Journal of Common Market Studies, NO 34, 
September  
265. Scharrer Hans-Eckart (1996), “Finanzen/Haushalt/Steuern”, in: Wichard 
Woyke and Beate Kohler-Koch, Die Europäische Union, vol. 5 of Lexikon der 
Politik, Munich: Verlag C.H.Beck 
266. Schäuble Wolfgang, Seiters Rudolf, Hrsg. (1996), Außenpolitik im 21. 
Jahrhundert, Die Thesen der Jungen Außenpolitiker, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn  
267. Schendelen M.P.C.M. ven (1993), Die wachsende Bedeutung des 
europäischen Lobbying, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 24 No 1  
268. Schimmelfennig Frank (2001), “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, 
Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, 
International Organization 55/1, Winter  
269. Schlögel Karl (1986), Die Mitte liegt ostwärts. Europa im Übergang, 
Berlin: W.J. Siedler 
270. Schmuck Otto (2009), Die Europaministerkonferenz der Deutsche 
Länder: Strukturen—Aufgaben —Themeschwerpunkte, Nomos, 
Berlagsgesselschaft, Baden-Baden 
271. Schoch Bruno (1992), “Renaissance der Mitte — Ein Fragwürdiger 
Bestandteil deutscher Ideologie kehrt wieder”, in: Schoch Bruno (ed), 
Deutschlands Einheit und Europa Zukunft, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
272. Schmidt Peter (1996), “German Security Policy in the Framework of EU, 
WEU and NATO”, Außenpolitik, Vol. 47, NO 3  
273. Schöllgen Gregor (1993), Angst vor der Macht. Die Deutschen und ihre 
Außenpolitik, Berlin: Ullstein  
274. Schössler Dietmar, Albert Reiner, Kostelnik Frank (1993), Deutschland, 
die NATO und Europa. Die sicherheitspolitische Lage im Spiegel von Elite-
Gruppen Meinungen, 1. Forschungsbericht zum EURO SIPLA-Projekt, Münster: 
Lit Verlag  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
325 
275. Schütze W. (1995), “Sackgasse oder Königsweg? Die Ostweierung des 
NATO”, Blätter für Deutsche und International Politik, No 8 
276. Sebald W.G. (2004), On the Natural History of Destruction, Penguin 
Books Ltd  
277. Schwarz Hans-Peter (1994), Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschlands 
Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne, Berlin Siedler  
278. Sedelmeier Ulrich and Wallace Helen (2000), “Policies Towards Central 
and Eastern Europe”, in: Helen Wallace and William Wallace, (Eds.): Policy-
Making in the European Union, 4th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press  
279. Sedelmeier Ulrich (2001), “The European Union’s association policy 
towards Central and Eastern Europe”, Sussex European Institute Discussion 
Paper 
280. Seibold Robert (2001), Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union und 
das Arbeitsrecht der Tschechischen Republik: eine Kompatibilitätsuntersuchung, 
Frankfurt am Main: Lang 
281. Seiters Rudolf (1995): “Deutsche Überlegungen zur Regierungkonferenz 
1996”, CDU/CSU Pressedienst, 2 March  
282. Senghaas Dieter, ed. (1995), Den Frieden Denken, Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag 
283. Seppain Helena (1993), “European integration, German Unification and 
the Economics of Ostpolitik”, in: Heinz D.Kurz, ed. The United Germany and the 
New Europe, Aldershot: Edward Elgar Pbls 
284. Sharpf Fritz W. (1988), “The Joint-Decision Trap: lessons from German 
federalism and European integration”, Public Administration, Vol 66 
285. Sinn Hans-Werner (2001), "EU enlargement and the future of the welfare 
state." In Stevenson lectures in citizenship, Discussion paper in economics, NO. 
01-05, Glasgow: University of Glasgow, Department of Economics 
286. Sinn Hans-Werner, “EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskraftemigration: Wege 
zu einer schrittweisen Annäherung der Arbeitsmarkte. Ifo-Institut fur 
Wirtschaftsforschung”, in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Max-Planck-Institut für 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
326 
Ausländisches und Internationales Sozialrecht, Andreas Hanlein. München: Ifo-
Inst. fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 2001 
287. Siwert-Probst Judith (2001), “Traditional Institutions of Foreign Policy”, 
in: Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser eds., Germany’s New Foreign Policy. 
Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, Palgrave  
288. Słomkowski Zbigniew (1996), “Realia i mity”, Trybuna, Polish Daily 
Newspaper, 2-3 March  
289. Smith Alisdair and Wallace Helen (1994), “The European Union: Towards 
a Policy for Europe,” International Affairs, 70, 3, July  
290. Smith, Karen (2004), The making of EU foreign policy: The Case of 
Eastern Europe, Palgrave Macmillain, Basingston, Hamphire, New York 
291. Smith, Karen (2005), “Enlargement and European Order”, in: Christopher 
Hill and Michael Smith, (eds.) International relations and the European Union, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 
292. Smith Michael (1994), “The European Union, Foreign Economic Policy 
and the Changing World”, Journal of European Public Policy, 1:2, Autumn  
293. Smyser W.A. (1993), The German Economy: Colossus at the Crossroads, 
New York: St Marin’s Press 
294. Smyser W.A. (1993), The German Economy: Colossus at the Crossroads, 
New York: St Marin’s Press  
295. Sørensen Georg (1997), “An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: 
Consequences for Conflict and Cooperation”, Review of International Studies, 
Vol. 23  
296. Spence David (1993), “The European Community and German 
Unification”, in: Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm (eds.) Federalism, Unification 
and European Integration, London Frank Cass 
297. Sperling James (1994), “German Foreign Policy after Unification: The 
End of Cheque Book Diplomacy?”, West European Politics, Vol 17, No 1, 
January  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
327 
298. Staack M., Meier O. (1992), “Die KSZE und die europäische Sicherheit. 
Kooperative Konfliktverhütung für Gesamteuropa”, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, B 13 
299. Stark H (2001)., The French Perspective, In: “The Franco-German 
Relationship after Nice as Viewed from Different National Perspectives”, German 
Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Vol.2 NO 4 May 
300. Stent Angela (2000), Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet 
Collapse, and the New Europe, New Jersey, Princeton  
301. Steppacher Burkard (1994), Der Europäische  Wirtshaftsraum (EWR) —
 Ein Modell für Mittel und Osteuropa?, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Interne 
Studien, 87/94  
302. Stomma Stanislaw (1980), Czy Fatalizm Wrogości, Refleksje o Stosunkach 
Polsko- Niemieckich 1871-1933, Znak: Kraków  
303. Stuth Reinhard, Deutschlands neue Rolle im sich wandelnden Europa, 
Außenpolitik NO 1, 1992  
304. Tangermann Stefan (1995), “Ostweiterung der EU: Wird die Agrarpolitik 
zum Hindernis?”, Wirtschaftsdienst, 9 
305. Tangermann Stefan (1997), Reforming the CAP: A Prerequisite for 
Eastern Enlargement, in: H. Siebert (ed.), Quo Vadis Europe?, Tübingen: Mohr 
306. Tangermann, Stefan (1997), “Agenda 2000: one step forwards, one 
sideways”, Agra Europe, August 22, P/3-6 
307. Tewes Henning (1998), “Between Deepening and Widening: Role 
Conflict in Germany’s Enlargement Policy”, West European Politics, Vol.21 
308. Tewes Henning (2001), “How Civilian? How much power? Germany and 
the Eastern enlargement of NATO”, in: Sebastian Harnish and Hanns W.Maull 
eds., Germany as a Civilian Power? The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York 
309. Tewes Henning (2002), Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe, 
Palgrave 
310. Thatcher Margaret (1993), The Downing Street Years, London 
HarperCollins  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
328 
311. Thies Jochen (1994), “Germany and Eastern Europe between Past and 
Future”, in: Arnulf Baring (ed.), Germany’s New Position in Europe. Problems 
and Perspectives, Berg Oxford/Providence USA 
312. Tietmayer Hans (1994), “Europäische Währungsunion und Politische 
Union: Das Modell mehrerer Geschwindigkeiten”, Europa-Archiv 44, 1  
313. Teltschik Horst (1991), 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung, Siedler 
Verlag 
314. Torreblanca Payá José Ignacio (1997), The European Community and 
Central Eastern Europe (1989-1993): Foreign Policy and Decision-Making, 
Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 
315. Treverton Gregory F. (1992), “The New Europe”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 71 
No 1 
316. Unseld Siegfried, ed. (1993), Politik ohne Projekt? Nachdenken über 
Deutschland, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag  
317. Verheugen Günther (1999), Deustchland und die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft: 
Erwartungen und Realitäten, Integration, Vol 22 
318. Verheugen Günther (1999), Europa Wohin? Die Zukunft der 
Europäischen Union, Bayerische Landesvertretung, Bonn, 4 May  
319. Verheugen Günther (1999), The Future of Germany’s European Policy, 
speech at the Centre for European Reform, 3 February  
320. Voigt Karsten (2001) Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of 
International Studies, UC Berkeley 
321. Vogel Heinrich (1996),  “Osteuropa — ein Schwerpunkt Deutscher 
Außenpolitik”, in: Karl Kaiser, Joachim Krause, (Hrsg.), Deutschlands neue 
Außenpolitik. Band 3. Interessen und Strategien, München Oldenbourg 
322. Wagener Hans-Jurgen (2001), The welfare state in transition economies 
and accession to the EU, EUI working papers, RSC NO. 2001/1, San Domenico 
di Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre 
323. Wallace Claire (2002), “Opening and Closing Borders: Migration and 
Mobility in East-Central Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 28 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
329 
324. Wallace Helen and William, eds. (2000), The Policy-making in the 
European Union, Oxford  
325. Wallace Helen and Mayhew Alam eds. (2001), Poland: A Partnership 
Profile. OEOS Policy Paper, April. University of Sussex, Brighton: 44 
326. Wallace William, “Europe, which Europe?”, in William Wallace, The 
transformation of Western Europe, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990 
327. Wallace William (2000), “Collective Governance”, in: Helen and William 
Wallace, eds., The Policy-making in the European Union, Oxford  
328. Wallace Helen and Wallace William, eds. (2005): Policy-Making in the 
European Union, 3rd ed., London: Routledge 
329. Waltz Kenneth (1993), “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, 
International Security, Vol. 18, NO 2, Fall  
330. Waltz Kenneth (2001), Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis, 
New York: Columbia Press 
331. Wandycz Piotr (1992), The Price of Freedom, London and New York, 
Routledge 
332. Weidenfeld Werner (1990), Der deutsche Weg, Berlin, Siedler Verlag 
333. Weidenfeld Werner, Korte Karl-Rudolf, eds. (1999), Handbuch zur 
deutschen Einheit. 1949-1998-1999, Frankfurt/ New York  
334. Weidenfeld Werner (1999), “Fragen an die Außenpolitik der neuen 
Regierung”, Internationale Politik 54, no 1 
335. Weise Christian et al. (2001), Die Finanzierung der Osterweiterung der 
EU, Baden-Baden 2002: Nomos 
336. White Brian, Understanding European Foreign Policy, Basingstoke : 
Palgrave 
337. Wickert Ulrich ed (1990), Angst vor Deutschland, Hamburg  
338. Wieczorek-Zeul Heidemarie (1994), Erklärung zu der CDU/CSU-Fraktion 
vorgelegten Vorschlägen zu einem Kerneuropa, Presseservice der SPD, 5, 
September  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
330 
339. Wolczuk Katarzyna (2002), “The Polish-Ukrainian Border: on the 
Receiving End of EU Enlargement”, Perspectives on European Politics and 
Society, 3:2 
340. Wolf Reinhard (1996), “The doubtful mover: German and NATO 
expansion”, in David J. Haglund, (ed.) Will NATO go East?, Belfast, Queens 
University Centre for International Relations 
341. Wolff-Powęska Anna (1992), “Dylematy Nowej Kultury Politycznej”, in: 
Raport o Zjednoczeniu Niemiec. Problemy, Wyzwania, Strategie, Poznań: Instytut 
Zachodni 
342. Wolff-Powęska Anna, eds. (1993), Polacy Wobec Niemców. Z Dziejów 
Kultury politycznej Polski 1945-1989, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań  
343. Wolicki, K. (Timur) (1989), Niemcy, Krytyka 
344. Wörner Manfred (1991), “Die Atlantische Allianz in den neuziger 
Jahren”, Außenpolitik, No III 
345. Wörner Manfred (1992), “Die Atlantishce Allianz und die europäische 
Sicherheit”, Europa-Archiv, NO 1 
346. Zelikow Philip and Rice Condolezza (1995), Germany Unified, and 
Europe Transformed, Cambridge, Harvard University Press  
347. Zelikow Philip, Rice Condoleezza (1997), Germany Unified and Europe 
Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, Harvard University Press 
348. Zeman Karel, Grexa Boris (1999), “Economic Relations of the FRG with 
the Central and East European Countries”, in: in: Vladimir Handl, Jan Hon, 
Otto Pick et all, Germany and East Central Europe since 1990, Prague: Ustav 
mezinarodnich vztahu 
349. Zürn Michael (1997), “Does International Governance Meet Demand?”, 
IIS-Arbeitspapier NO 4-5, Universität Bremen 
 
 
I. PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
GERMAN Language 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
331 
• Address by Jacques Delors, President of the of the Commission, to the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg on 17 January 1990”, Bulletin of the 
European Communities, Supplement, 1990, “Conclusions of the 
Presidency Adopted at the End of the European Council in Strasbourg, 8 
and 9 December 1989”, Bulletin of the European Communities 12, 1989 
• Aufbruch und Erneuerung - Deutschlands Weg ins 21.Jahrhundert. 
Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei 
Deutschlands und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Bonn 20.10.1998  
• Agenda 2000: Zukunftsweg der Agrarpolitik? Empfehlungen des 
Wissenschaftlichen Beirates beim BML; Kurzstellungnahme”, published 
in September 1998. www.bml.de/forschung/beirat/gutachten/agenda-
2000.htm; 
• European Commission, 1998, Agenda 2000, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm#3 
• “Agenda 2000-For Stronger and Larger Union”, Bulletin der Europäischen 
Union Beilage 5/97 
• Akzente der Beratung landwirtschaftlicher Unternehmen: 
Organisationsstrukturen, Rechtsformen, Besteuerung, EU-Osterweiterung; 
Vortrage der HLBS-Hauptverbandstagung vom 21. bis 23. Mai 2001 in 
Dresden. Sankt Augustin: HLBS-Verl., 2001 
• Ansprache des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Dr. Edmund Stoiber 
anlässlich der zentralen Auftaktveranstaltung des Tages der Heimat am 
Samstag, 1. September 2001, in Berlin – „Leitwort: Im Zentrum – 
Vertreibung ächten”, www.bayern.de/Presse-Info/Reden/2001/09- 01.html 
• Auswärtiges Amt/Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Die Rolle der EU 
mit 25 und mehr Mitgliedern im 21. Jahrhundert. Beiträge für eine neue 
Weltordnung. Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Studien (Juni 2001– Mai 
2003) Berlin/Warsaw 2003. 
https://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/ 
• pdf/eu/dt-pl-studie.pdf 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
332 
• Auswirkungn der EU-Osterweiterung auf die gemeinsame Agrarpolitik 
und die Regionen: offentliche Anhorung des Ausschusses fur die 
Angelegenheiten der Europaischen Union und des Ausschusses fur 
Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten am 17. Januar 2001.  
• Ausschuss fur die Angelegenheiten der Europaischen Union, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2001. 270 p. Texte und Materialien; Ausschuss fur die 
Angelegenheiten der Europaischen Union, Bd. 19 
• Beschluss zur Außen, Friedens- und Sicherheitpolitik der SPD, in 
Protokoll des SPD-Bundesparteitages in Mannheim, 14-17 November 
1995, Hrgs vom Bundesvorstand der SPD, Bonn, 1995 
• Bindlacher Erklärung of 7 May 1996, Proudfoot 1997 
• Bundesratbeschluss zum Eigenmittelsystem vom 12.Mai 1995, 
Bundesratdrucksache 207/95 (Beschluss) 
• Bundesgeschäftsstelle Bündniss 90/Die Grünen, ed. Nur mit uns, 
Bornheim: Bundesgeschäftsstelle Bündnis 90/Die Grünen  1994 
• CDU, Unsere verantwortung in der Welt, Christlich-demokratische 
Perspektiven zur Außen-, Sicherheits-, Europa- und Deutschlandpolitik, 
Beschuß des 36. Bundesparteitages der CDU, in: CDU-Dokumentation 
19/1988 
• CDU: Ja zur Deutschland, Ja zur Zukunft, Wahlprogramm der CDU zu 
den Bundestagwahlen am 2.Dezember 1990, Broschüre, available 
thgrough the CDU’s Press Office 
• Deutsch-tschechische Erklärung über die gegenseitigen Beziehungen und 
deren künftige Entwicklung - einschließlich des dazu ergangenen 
Briefwechseles. Deutscher Bundestag - 13.Wahlperiode. Drucksache 
13/6787 
• Deutscher Bundestag, Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union, Wirtschaftliche Chancen und Herausforderungen der 
EU-Erweiterung: Öffentliche Anhörung am 14. Februar 2001 
• Deutscher Bundestag, Europaausschuss, Materialsammlung “EU-
Erweiterung und Arbeitnehmer freizügigkeit” 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
333 
• http://www.bmaa.gv.at/Außenpolitik/wirtschaft/movement.html.en. 
• Die Gemeinsame Außenpolitik der europäischen Union, Rede 
Staatsminister/AA Günter Verheugen beim Zentrum für europäische 
Integrationsforschung, Bonn 21 January 1999, available 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/index.htm ; also later in 
Tagesspiegel, 5 October 1999 
• Die deutsch-polnischen Verträge vom 14.11.1990 und 17.06.1991. 
Traktaty polsko-niemieckie z 4.11.1990 i 17.06.1991, Bonn 1991 
• Enlargement/Agenda 2000 - Watch. Pilot issue,. October 1998. Institut für 
Europäische Politik/TEPSA 
• Enlargement/Agenda 2000-Watch, no. 4/2002; cf. also EU-Osterweiterung 
scheitert nicht an Agrarpolitik, press release by the German Farmers’ 
Association, 18 June 2002, http://www.bauernverband.de. 
• Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Halmut Kohl zu den Ergebnissen des 
Europäischen Rates in Maastricht vor dem Bundestag am 13 Dezember 
1991 (statement to the Bundestag by Chancellor Kohl regarding the results 
of the European Council in Maastricht), Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 
Nr.142, 17 December 1991 
• European Council, Copenhagen, 21-23 June 1993, Conclusions of the 
Presidency, SN/180/93. Also:http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement 
• “Erklärung der Bundesregierung: Vorschau auf den europäischen Rat in 
Wien am 11/12 Dezember 1998 und Ausblick auf die deutsche 
Präsidentschaft in der ersten Jahreshälfte 1999”, Bulletin der Presse- und 
Infomatikonnsamtes der Bundesregierung, 14 December 1998 
• EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitnehmerfreizugigkeit: offentliche Anhorung 
vom 4. April 2001. Deutscher Bundestag, Ausschuss für die 
Angelegenheiten der Europaischen Union - Sekretariat. Texte und 
Materialien, Bd. 23, Berlin: 2001 
• Europäische Perspektiven in den neunziger Jahren, Rede Rudolf Sharpings 
in Prag, Presseservice der SPD, 6 April 1994 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
334 
• Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Arbeitsgruppe Europäische Integration , Die 
Kosten der Ostweiterung der EU werden überschatz, Arbeitspapier Nr 2, 
Bonn, 1996 
• “Gemeinsame Erklärung der Außenminister der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft und der Višegrad-Länder anläßlich ihres Treffens in 
Luxemburg am 5. Oktober 1992, Europa-Archive, 21, 1992 
• Institute for German Studies, Birmingham, the Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava 
the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava and the Institute of 
International Relations, Prague, Prague 19-21.05.2000 
• Kinkel Klaus: Speech in Sigmaringen on 29 April 1994 Bulletin des 
Bundesregierung NO 40, 5 May 1994 
• Kinkel Klaus: speech on 24 August 1994 in Bonn, in: Bulletin der 
Bundesregierung, 76 1994 
• Bulletin der Bundesregierung 
• Kohl Helmut: Bericht zur Lage der Nation im geteilten Deutschland”, 8 
November 1989, Auswärtiges Amt 1995 
• Kohl Helmut: Speech at the German Society for Foreign Policy  (DGAP) 
in Bonn on 7 February 1990 
• Kohl Helmut: “Our future in Europe”, speech made at the European 
Institute, Edinburgh 1991;“United Germany in a United Europe”, speech 
made at Oxford 11 November 1991; in 1992 —Helmut Kohl, speech of 3 
April 1992 to the Bertelsmann-Forum, Königswinter, Bulletin Nr.38, 8 
April 1992 
• Kohl Helmut: Speech at the Bertelsmann-Forum, Königswinter, Bulletin 
Nr.38, 8 April 1992 
• Kohl Helmut: Speech of Chancellor at the opening of the Conference for 
Economic Cooperation in Europe in Bonn 19 March 1990, in Auwärtiges 
Amt 1995, 661-666. 
• Kohl Helmut: Available in Polish and German: Rede von Bundeskanzler 
Helmut Kohl im Polnischen Parlament vor Mitgliedern von Sejm und 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
335 
Senat, Warschau, 6. Juli 1995, in: Zbiór Dokumentów — dokumenty z 
zakresu polityki zagranicznej Polski i stosunków międzynarodowych 
• Leistungbilanz der Bundesregierung für die neue Bundesländer, 1994 
Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Aktuelle Beiträge für 
Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, 13 July 1993 
• “Meinungsbild der Elite in Deutschland zur Außen und 
Sicherheitspolitik”, Dokumentation 1996 
• Memorandum of the Bavarian government on the proposals of the 
European Commission in Agenda 2000, 16 September 1997, available 
through the Bavarian Government’s Press Office 
• Nordrhein-Westphalen in Bonn, Berlin und Brussel”, Ministerium für 
Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten des Landes Nordhein-Westphalen, 
Bonn 1997 
• “Memorandum of the Governments of the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland on 
strengthening their integration with the European Communities and on the 
perspective of accession”, Prague, Budapest, Warsaw, September 1992 
• Objectives and Priorities of the German Presidency in the Council of the 
European Union,  
• http://www.eu-preasidentschaft.de/ausland/english/01frameset.html. 
(1999) 
• EU-Gipfel Europa, ADN0464, 26 February 1999 
• OECD, Aid, and Other Resource Flows to the Central and East European 
Countries and the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (1990-
1994), Paris, 1996 
• Petersberg Declaration Adopted by the Western European Union Council 
of Ministers, in Bonn on 19 June 1992, Brussels, European Press and 
Information Service, 1992 
• Polen und Deutschland, Osteuropa, Ferbuar 1979  
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
336 
• Positionspapier zur Agrarpolitik, 1st August 2002, download: 
http://www.cdu.de/politik- a- 
z/landwirtschaft/positionspapier_agrarpolitik2.pdf. 
• Preuß Ulrich, Zwischen Legalität und Gerechtigkeit: Der Kosovo-Krieg, 
das Volkerrecht und die Moral, Blätter für Deutsche und International 
Politik, Vol. 44, NO 7, 1999 
• Programmrede des Vorsitzenden des Rates der Europäischen Union. 
Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer vor dem Europäischen Parlament in 
Straßburg am 12.1.1999 
• Protokoll des 3. Parteitages der CDU Deutschlands, 26-28 Oktober 1992, 
Düsseldorf 
• Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur offiziellen Eröffnung des 
Sites der Deutschen Gessellschaft für Auswärtige Politik am 2. September 
1999 in Berlin, “Verlässichkeit in den internationalen Beziehungen”, 
Bulletin: 20 September 1999, available on 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/01/pressf.html 
• Rede von der 46. Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen, 25 
September 1991, Auswärtiges Amt, Mittelung für die Presse, Nr. 1205/91 
• Regierungserklärung des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Dr. Edmund 
Stoiber zur Zwischenbilanz für die Legislaturperiode 1998 bis 2003 am 
19. April 2002: Bayerninnovativ, sozial, erfolgreich:  
• www.bayern.de/Presse-Info/Reden/2002/regierung_020419.html 
• Rühe Volker, Wann kommt Polen in die NATO? Vortrag des 
Bundesministers für Verteidigung bei der Deutsch-Polnischen 
Gesellschaft am 7 März in Bonn, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. 
Material für die Presse. No 32/3, 1995 
• Stellungnahmes der Kommission Sicherheitspolitik beim SPD-
Parteivorstand zur sicherheitspolitischen Verantwortung des 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Mitteilung für die Presse 
• TRANSFORM : Die Beratung Mittel- und Osteuropas beim Aufbau von 
Demokratie und sozialer Marktwirtschaft – Konzept und 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
337 
Beratungsprogramme der Bundesregierung, (350), Bonn, BMWi - KfW, 
1994. BMWi-Dokumentation 
• “Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts über Verfassungsbeschwerden 
gegen den Vertrag von Maastricht, verkündet in Karlsruhe, 12 October 
1993 (excerpts)”, Europa-Archiv 48, NO 22, 1993 
• Von der Konfrontation der Blöcke zu einem Europäischen Sicherheits-
system. Positioinpaper zu den sicherheitspolitischen Aspekten der 
Einigung Deutschlands im Rahmem der Europäischn Integration, Bonn, 
25 April  
• “Weil wir Deutschlands Kraft vertrauen.” Regierungserklärung des 
Bundeskanzlers vor dem Deutschen Bundestag. 10.11.1998 Bulletin. 
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Nr.74,  11.11.1998 
• Zehn-Punkte-Plan zur Deutschlandpolitik, Frankfurter Rundschau, 29 
November 1989 
• Zehn Forderungen an die deutsche Ratpräsidentschaft der EU, 
Presseservice der SPD 30 April 1994 
• “Diskussion um die Kovergenzkriterien zur Teilnahme an der EWWU”, 
Keesing Archiv der Gegenwart, 27 November 1997, 41601 
 
ENGLISH Language 
• Bulletin of the European Communities, Luxembourg: office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities 
• Conference of the Prime Ministers of the Länder (MPK), 8 June 1998, 
Bonn.  
• Conference of European Ministers, 24 September 1997, Bonn. 
• European Commission, 1998, Agenda 2000, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm#3 
• European Commission, 2003d Cap Reform Summary 
• http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/mtr/sum_en.pdf; DEFRA, 2003, 
Summary of CAP reform Agreement – 26 June 2003 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
338 
• European Council, Meeting on 9 and 10 December 1994 in Essen, 
Presidency Conclusions 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00300-1.EN4.htm 
• European Council, 1999, Conclusions of the Berlin Council: 
http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm 
• EU Accession Monitoring Program. Monitoring the EU accession process: 
country reports, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Budapest, New York: 
Central European University Press, 2001 
• Official Journal of the European Communities 
• Bulletin des Press- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung 
• United States Department of State, Documents on Germany 1944-1985, 
Dpt of State Publication 9446 
 
MEDIA 
USED FREQUENTLY: 
Neue Zeit 
Der Spiegel 
Die Zeit 
Die Welt 
Wirtschafstwoche 
Focus 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Tages Zeitung 
Handelsblatt, 
Passauer Neue Presse 
 
Frankfurter Rundschau 
Bonner Rundschau 
Polskie Radio 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
339 
 
Rzeczpospolita 
Gazeta Wyborcza 
Nowaya Yezednievaya Gazieta 
 
The Wall Street Journal Europe 
The Economist 
Financial Times 
Le Monde 
 
INSTITUTIONS / PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS  
USED FREQUENTLY: 
Archiv den Gegenwart (AdG) 
Bundespresseamt, Bulletin der Bundesregierung 
Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 
Deutscher Bundestag, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische 
Protokolle 
Schriftenreihe der Akademie der Bundeswehr für Information und Kommunikation 
 
CDU’s Press Office 
FDP’s Press Office 
SPD’s Presseservice 
FPD’s Press Office 
German Embassy in Warsaw Press Office 
 
Polen und Deutschland, Osteuropa 
Biblioteka Przegladu Zachodniego 
Materiały i Dokumenty, Biuro Sejmowe 
Europa-Archiv 
Bulletin of the European Communities 
EU Observer Uniting Europe 
Anna WIELOPOLSKA 
PhD Thesis: Causes and Consequences of Ambivalence in Germany’s EU Eastern Enlargement Policy 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 
340 
European Commission  
European Commission, Eurobarometer 
Europap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
